

- Декану и председавајућем Изборног већа, проф. др Данијелу Синанију;
- Члановима Изборног већа Филозофског факултета.

У складу са чл. 135, ст. 3 и чл. 136, ст. 1 Статута филозофског факултета подносим

П Р И Г О В О Р

на реферат комисије о кандидатима пријављеним на конкурс за избор у звање
асистента

Дана 04.02.2022. на интернет страници Филозофског факултета појавио се реферат комисије у саставу проф. др Живан Лазовић (председавајући), проф. др Драго Ђурић, проф. др Владимир Н. Цветковић, о кандидатима пријављеним на конкурс за избор у звање асистента (ужа научна област: Општа филозофија; тежиште истраживања: античка филозофија, средњовековна филозофија, нововековна филозофија, немачка филозофија 18. и 19. века, савремена филозофија 19, 20. и 21. века) у којем се Петар Нуркић предлаже за избор у звање асистента. Сматрам да је комисија приликом израде реферата поступала тенденциозно, несавесно и пристрасно, релативизујући значај прописаних изборних критеријума и занемарујући (свесно или несвесно) чињенице које озбиљно доводе у питање утемељеност и оправданост предлога да се Петар Нуркић изабере у асистентско звање, а међу којима се превасходно истиче чињеница да се против Петра Нуркића воде *чак два* поступка пред Етичком комисијом Филозофског факултета због оптужби за *плагирање*.

Према чл. 121, ст. 5 Статута Филозофског факултета, при избору у звање асистента узимају се у обзир следећи критеријуми: (1) просечна оцена и дужина студирања на претходним нивоима студија, (2) укупна активност кандидата у наставном раду, (3) објављени радови и укупна активност кандидата у истраживачком раду. Требало би да је опште позната чињеница да чланови колегијалних стручних органа Факултета (какав је конкурсна комисија за избор у звање асистента) приликом учешћа у раду комисије **немају слободу и право да поступају по свом нахођењу**, већ су дужни да поштују процедуралне и материјалноправне одредбе одговарајућих аката. Самим тим, *ad hoc* фаворизовање једног над преостала два критеријума из чл. 121, ст. 5 Статута каквом је прибегао писац реферата („међу наведеним елементима за оцену кандидата, Комисија је највећи значај придала научној активности и постигнутим резултатима научно-истраживачког рада“) мора се сматрати недопустивим утолико што комисија нема дискреционо право да врши произвољно рангирање прописаних критеријума за избор у звање уколико ти критеријуми нису већ ранжирани по тежини и значају у релевантним нормативним актима којима је регулисан поступак избора у звање. Статут Филозофског факултета у чл. 121, ст. 5 не прави никакву разлику између три прописана критеријума који се вреднују приликом избора у звање асистента те самим тим ни комисија није смела да прави такву разлику. Чињеница да комисија јесте направила овакву разлику представља злоупотребу.

Поред тога, није јасно због чега би се на конкурс за избор у сарадничко (наставно) а не у научноистраживачко звање фаворизовао критеријум који се односи на научни а не нпр. на наставни тј. педагошки рад кандидата. То говори о пристрасности комисије – дати већи значај једином критеријуму према којем истраживач-сарадник Петар Нуркић *наводно* има предност значи занемарити преостале критеријуме као мање значајне. Међутим, као што ће бити показано у оквиру Тачке 3 у наставку, Нуркић ни по овом критеријуму заправо није најбољи кандидат иако је комисија неосновано то тако приказала. Када је реч о преосталим критеријумима из чл. 121, ст. 5 Статута, очигледно је да Саша Поповић има предност у односу на Петра Нуркића.

1. Просечна оцена и дужина студирања на претходним нивоима студија:

- a. **Саша Поповић** (рођ. 1992. године):
- i. Основне студије: 2011–2015, просечна оцена **9,94/10**, оцена на завршном раду **10**; студент генерације Одељења за филозофију и студент са највишом просечном оценом у генерацији на Филозофском факултету.
 - ii. Мастер студије: 2015 (први на листи кандидата)–2016, просечна оцена **10**, оцена на мастер раду **10**;
 - iii. Докторске студије: 2017 (први на листи кандидата), тренутно пета година студија, просечна оцена **10**;
- b. **Петар Нуркић** (рођ. 1991. године):
- i. Основне студије: 2013–2017, просечна оцена **8,56/10**, оцена на завршном раду **9**;
 - ii. Мастер студије: 2017 (десети на листи кандидата)–2018, просечна оцена **9,5/10**, оцена на завршном раду **9**;
 - iii. Докторске студије: 2019 (пети на листи кандидата), тренутно трећа година студија, просечна оцена **9,5/10**.

Увидом у конкурсну документацију може се утврдити да Нуркић није био добитник *ни једне стипендије или награде* за разлику од Поповића који је био носилац различитих стипендија (домаћих и иностраних) и награда (за изванредан успех на студијама 2015. и награда „Др Зоран Ђинђић“ за најбољи дипломски рад 2016.). Из наведених података се јасно види да Нуркићево постигнуће на студијама—за разлику од Поповићевог—није ни по чему изузетно и не истиче се. Констатација писца реферата да „је Нуркић тренутно на трећој години а С. Поповић на петој години докторских студија“ је тенденциозна јер сугерише да Нуркић има предност над Поповићем када је реч о дужини студирања, а заправо су оба кандидата претходне нивое студија завршили у року док дужина студирања на докторским студијама уопште не може да се пореди будући да кандидати нису истовремено уписали докторске студије и ни један ни други их још нису завршили.

2. Укупна активност кандидата у наставном раду:

- a. **Саша Поповић:**
- i. Од 2017. сарадник у настави, од 2018. асистент на обавезним предметима *Историја филозофије 1а, Историја филозофије 2а, Историја филозофије 2б, Историја филозофије 4б* и изборном предмету *Филозофија простора*; званичним планом реакредитације студијских програма на Одељењу за филозофију из 2020. године распоређен је на **8 предмета** (ОАС и МАС филозофије): *Историја филозофије 1, Историја филозофије 3, Историја филозофије 4, Филозофија математике, Правци савремене филозофије, Антика и рани средњи век, Филозофска становишта, Савремене метафизичке теме*.
 - ii. Студентске евалуације: просечна оцена **4,87/5**;
 - iii. Оцењен највишим оценама и од стране 4/5 предметних наставника (од наставника са којима је Поповић сарађивао једино члан комисије, проф. Ђурић није поднео извештај о Поповићевом раду);
 - iv. Рад у комисијама: **члан 13 комисија** за оцену и одбрану завршних радова из области историје филозофије;
- b. **Петар Нуркић:**
- i. Од 2019. сарадник у настави на изборним предметима *Методика наставе филозофије са основама филозофије образовања* (група методичких предмета у оквиру образовања наставника предметне наставе) и *Основе методологије наука* (за студенте етнологије и антропологије).

Тешко би се могло рећи да је Нуркићево двогодишње искуство на изборним предметима (методичко-методолошким) посебно релевантно за конкурс за радно место асистента на

историји филозофије. Поред тога, писац реферата је у одељку о наставним активностима изнео и ирелевантно а уз то и нетачно тврђење да је „Нуркић 2020/2021. био члан тима за акредитацију студијских програма Одељења за филозофију“. Званичном одлуком Одељења за филозофију од 06.02.2020. изабрана је одељенска Комисија за акредитацију у саставу: проф. др Машан Богдановски (координатор), проф. др Драго Ђурић, проф. др Слободан Перовић и доц. др Александар Добријевић. Дакле, Петар Нуркић никада није званично именован за члана акредитационе комисије Одељења за филозофију, а чак и да јесте, то поново не би било ни на који начин релевантно за рад у настави из историје филозофије (као уосталом ни Нуркићев ангажман у разношењу листова за студентску евалуацију педагошког рада наставника и сарадника Филозофског факултета, који комисија такође помиње). Овакво поступање комисије представља злоупотребу и кршење чл. 34, ст. 1 Кодекса професионалне етике у којем се наводи да је „члан универзитетске заједнице дужан да процене о условима за професионално напредовање других чланова заснива **искључиво на критеријумима који су релевантни** за вршење професионалних обавеза“, те да „процена успешности остваривања професионалних обавеза и професионалне компетенције члана универзитетске заједнице мора да буде **објективна, непристрасна и утемељена на унапред утврђеним и транспарентним критеријумима**“.

3. **Објављени радови** (према Статуту, оцењују се *објављени* радови, а не радови у припреми за објављивање или у штампи¹; поред тога, апстракти *нису* радови):

а. **Саша Поповић:**

- і. Пет радова (четири објављена и један са додељеним DOI бројем), од чега два рада у међународним часописима категорије **M23**² (један коауторски), један рад категорије **M24** и два рада категорије **M53 (14 бодова)**;

б. **Петар Нуркић:**

- і. Четири објављена рада од чега два рада категорије **M24** (један коауторски), један коауторски рад у зборнику (категирија **M44**) и један рад категорије **M53 (11 бодова)**;

Поставља се питање због чега комисија у реферату није навела компаративни приказ радова са јасно истакнутом категоризацијом и бројем остварених бодова. Упркос томе што се оцењују објављени радови кандидата, комисија је побројала и радове за које је Нуркић предао потврде да ће бити објављени (3 од побројаних 11 радова), кратке апстракте саопштења са конференција (4 од 11 радова) и један рад који је само прихваћен за презентацију на конференцији (*paper accepted for oral presentation* не значи „рад прихваћен за објављивање или штампу“; дакле, реч је о саопштењу, а не о објављеном раду). Занимљиво, комисија за избор Петра Нуркића у звање истраживача-сарадника у јулу 2021. чији је проф. Лазовић био члан (а сада је председавајући комисије која предлаже Петра Нуркића за избор у асистентско звање) није третирала Нуркићеве апстракте као радове и осврнула се само на његов у том тренутку једини објављени рад. Писац реферата је по свој прилици сада прибегао убрајању апстраката међу објављене радове како би се произвео (погрешан) утисак да је Нуркић изузетно плодан аутор. Међутим, према јасно дефинисаним

¹ Видети и чл. 118, ст. 4 Статута: „уколико рад није објављен у часопису прихватиће се и рад коме је додељен DOI број“ (Поповићев текст из 2021. није само прихваћен за објављивање како се то каже у реферату комисије већ му је већ додељен и DOI број, што је уосталом уредно наведено у Поповићевој библиографији из конкурсне документације).

² Према важећем Правилнику о категоризацији и рангирању научних часописа из 2021, међународни часопис је часопис реферисан у JCR, WOS или SJR (чл. 2, ст. 2 и 3), „с тим да категорији M23 припадају и часописи означени као Q1 у SJR и часописи на листама ERIH+“ (чл. 14, ст. 2). Поповићев текст објављени су у *European Journal of Analytic Philosophy* (на ERIH+ листи) и у *Filozofskim istraživanjima* (индексан у WOS, SJR и ERIH+).

Правилницима³ апстракт (категорије М34 и М64) се не узимају у обзир ни приликом избора у наставничка и сарадничка, нити у истраживачка и научна звања. Поред тога, ствар је устаљене праксе да се приликом избора у звање апстракт не третирају као радови – то потврђује већ и латимичан преглед реферата са интернет странице Филозофског факултета.

Оваквим паушалним и тенденциозним представљањем Нуркићевих резултата, комисија је дошла до закључка да се у погледу „броја, квалитета и релевантности“ радова за конкурсом предвиђено тежиште истраживања издваја Петар Нуркић, истичући притом „престижност публикација“ у којима су Нуркићеве радове објављени, „квалитет садржаја у погледу интерпретације, приказа и анализе филозофских проблема и гледишта којима се баве“, те „конзистентност и систематичност“ Нуркићеве филозофске аргументације. Није јасно на чему комисија темељи ове оцене будући да не само што у реферату није категоризовала, већ није ни приказала нити анализирали ни један од радова пријављених кандидата. Независно од тога, утемељеност оваквих оцена доводи у питање већ сама чињеница да Нуркић за разлику од Поповића нема ни један рад у међународним часописима.

Када су у питању друге научноистраживачке активности кандидата, комисија није навела да је Поповић члан четири научна друштва (од чега два међународна), те да је организовао три међународне конференције *Belgrade Graduate Conference in Philosophy*⁴ (2018. ко-организатор, 2019. и 2020. председавајући) и да ће бити један од организатора међународне конференције *33rd Novembertagung on the History and Philosophy of Mathematics* (2022.). Поред тога, када је реч о учешћу на научним скуповима, неопходно је напоменути да је Нуркић превасходно учествовао на локалним или регионалним (студентским) скуповима са кратким саопштењима на српском језику (Бања Лука, Сремски Карловци, Београд, Сплит). С друге стране, Поповић је учествовао на само једном националном скупу (у Српској академији наука и уметности), а сва остала саопштења и предавања (укупно 8) одржао је на рецензираним међународним конгресима и специјалистичким конференцијама и курсевима (Сорбона, Институт за филозофију Чешке академије наука, *Institut supérieur de philosophie UCLouvain*, *course lecturer* међународног Интеруниверзитетског центра у Дубровнику, итд.).

Када је у питању истицање и вредновање квантитета и диверзитета Нуркићевих радова од стране писца реферата, такве (пр)оцене су озбиљно доведене у питање чињеницом да се против Петра Нуркића тренутно воде чак два поступка пред Етичком комисијом Филозофског факултета и то због најтеже повреде Кодекса професионалне етике Универзитета у Београду – п л а г и р а њ а.

Прво, у Захтеву за утврђивање неакадемског понашања поднетом Етичкој комисији 11.02.2022. Нуркићу се ставља на терет да је у раду из 2021. „Хјум и Кант о епистемичкој нормативности“ (*Theoria* 64(3), стр. 91–112, кат. М24) који је поднео у конкурсној документацији и који комисија помиње у реферату починио плагијат (видети Прилог 1).

³ Видети Правилник о минималним условима за стицање звања наставника, Правилник о ближим условима за избор наставника и сарадника ФФ, Правилник о начину и поступку стицања звања и заснивања радног односа наставника УБ, и Правилник о поступку, начину вредновања и квантитативном исказивању научноистраживачких резултата истраживача.

⁴ У периоду у којем је Поповић учествовао у организацији *Belgrade Graduate Conference in Philosophy*, Филозофски факултет су посетили значајни савремени филозофи (Tuomas Tahko, Hans-Johann Glock, Genoveva Martí, Carl Hoefer, Jonathan Schaffer, Timothy Williamson и Katalin Farkas је требало да одрже пленарна предавања на *5th BGCPHil* која је отказана услед пандемије) и млади истраживачи са водећих светских универзитета и института (Edinburgh, St Andrews, Bristol, Leipzig, Berlin, Frankfurt, Vienna, Helsinki, Manchester, Leeds, Birmingham, Stockholm, Gothenburg, Barcelona, Girona, Warsaw, CEU, Alberta, Utrecht, Leuven, Pavia, Milan, Institut Jean Nicod, London School of Economics, Ријека, Марибор, итд.)

Увидом у доказни материјал у **Прилогу 1**, стиче се утисак да је реч о тзв. **мозаичком плагвијату** заснованом на чак пет различитих извора.

Друго, у Захтеву за утврђивање неакадемског понашања поднетом Етичкој комисији 14.01.2022. Нуркићу се ставља на терет да је у коауторском раду из 2021. „Епистемички ауторитет и реторичке стратегије у кризним околностима“ објављеном у зборнику *Етика и истина у доба кризе* (уред. Ненад Цекић, издавач Филозофски факултет, стр. 153–180, кат. М44) такође починио плагвијат (видети **Прилог 2**). Поставља се питање због чега је комисија побројала и поменула велики број Нуркићевих још необјављених радова и апстраката, али је пропустила да помене рад објављен у истакнутом зборнику од националног значаја⁵, који је сам Нуркић уредно навео у својој библиографији из конкурсне документације. Будући да је комисија у време писања реферата знала да се против Нуркића води овај поступак, плаузибилно је претпоставити да комисија није навела овај рад управо због тога што постоји основана сумња да је и у њему почињен **плагвијат**.

С обзиром на наведене мањкавости реферата, као и на озбиљност и тежину горенаведених примедби, у складу са одредбама чл. 11, чл. 17, ст. 5, те чланова 21 и 22 Кодекса професионалне етике Универзитета у Београду апелујем на председавајућег и на чланове Изборног већа Филозофског факултета да у светлости овог приговора и материјала које достављам у прилогу **не усвоје предлог комисије** да се Петар Нуркић изабере у звање асистента како би се избегло наношење потенцијално трајне и непоправљиве штете угледу и интегритету Филозофског факултета. Конкурсна комисија је својим предлогом довела Изборно веће и читав Факултет у потенцијалну опасност да постане саучесник у неакадемском понашању и кршењу Кодекса професионалне етике Универзитета у Београду.



У Београду, 17.02.2022.

Саша Поповић, некадашњи асистент и
студент генерације Одељења за филозофију

Прилози:

1. Захтев за утврђивање неакадемског понашања Петра Нуркића од 11.02.2022;
2. Захтев за утврђивање неакадемског понашања Петра Нуркића од 14.01.2022.

⁵ Као што је комисија констатовала у реферату, Нуркић је током 2021. укључен на пројекат Филозофског факултета „Човек и друштво у време кризе“. Међутим, комисија није поменула да је из тог пројекта проистекао зборник *Етика и истина у доба кризе* у којем је Нуркић објавио спорни коауторски рад.

Univerzitet u Beogradu
Filozofski fakultet
Čika Ljubina 18–20, 11000 Beograd
Etičkoj komisiji Univerziteta u Beogradu – Filozofskog fakulteta

Na osnovu člana 3, stav 1 Pravilnika o postupku utvrđivanja neakademskog ponašanja u izradi pisanih radova podnosim

ZAHTEV ZA UVTRĐIVANJE NEAKADEMSKOG PONAŠANJA

istraživača-saradnika Petra Nurkića sa Instituta za filozofiju Univerziteta u Beogradu – Filozofskog fakulteta (u daljem tekstu: Institut za filozofiju) koji obavlja dužnost tehničkog urednika časopisa *Belgrade Philosophical Annual* a koji objavljuje Institut za filozofiju, i koji je nedavno predložen za izbor u zvanje asistenta na Odeljenju za filozofiju Univerziteta u Beogradu – Filozofskog fakulteta (u daljem tekstu: Odeljenje za filozofiju). Prema mojim saznanjima Nurkić obavlja i kurirske poslove na Univerzitetu u Beogradu – Filozofskom fakultetu kao i administrativne poslove na Institutu za filozofiju.

Postoji osnovana sumnja da je gore imenovani počinio plagijat i značajno odstupao od akademskih pravila citiranja u tekstu „Hjumovo i Kantovo shvatanje epistemičke normativnosti“, *Theoria* 64 (3), 2021, str. 91–112 (<https://doi.org/10.2478/260087782013821594>). Samim tim, smatram da je Petar Nurkić prekršio članove 21 i 22 Kodeksa profesionalne etike Univerziteta u Beogradu. Tekstovi iz kojih su preuzimane osnovne ideje i doslovno preuzimane (prevođene, ponegde uz neznatne izmene) rečenice i čitavi pasusi bez jasnog obeležavanja preuzetih delova i bez navođenja odgovarajućih referenci i korišćenja navodnika tamo gde su oni potrebni su:

- Peter Railton, "Normative force and normative freedom: Hume and Kant, but not Hume *versus* Kant", *Ratio* (New Series) XII, 1999, str. 320–353, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9224.00098>. [Railton 1999]
- Ruth Marcela Espinosa, "General rules and the normative dimension of belief in Hume's epistemology", *Filosofia Unisinos - Unisinos Journal of Philosophy* 17 (3), 2016, str. 283–290, DOI: . [Espinosa 2016]
- Ryan Hickerson, "What the wise ought believe: a voluntarist interpretation of Hume's general rules", *British Journal for the History of Philosophy* 21 (6), 2013, str. 1133–1153, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1080/02643758.2013.821594>. [Hickerson 2013]
- James Hutton, "Epistemic normativity in Kant's 'Second Analogy'", *European Journal of Philosophy* 27, 2019, str. 593–609, DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0264375819000097>
- Alix Cohen. "Kant on science and normativity". *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science* 71, 2018, str. 1–7, DOI: .

1. Tekst [Railton 1999] Nurkić nije naveo u spisku korišćene literature a doslovno je iz njega preuzeo dva pasusa bez navođenja odgovarajuće reference u uvodu svog rada (odjeljak „Umesto uvoda: o lenjinima i blokovima“). Nurkić je u istom odeljku uz manje izmene parafrazirao još jedan pasus iz [Railton 1999], takode bez navođenja odgovarajuće reference:

Nurkić 2021, str. 92	Railton 1999, str. 320–321
Normativnost, na našu sreću ili žalost, predstavlja jedan od centralnih pojmova koje filozofi koriste dok razmatraju neke od	'Normativity' is, for better or worse, the chief term we philosophers seem to have settled upon for discussing some central but deeply puzzling

<p>najzagonetnijih pojava ljudskog života. Normativnost često koristimo kada uspostavljamo distinkcije između ispravnog i pogrešnog, istinitog i neistinitog, aktualnog i mogućeg. Etika, estetika i epistemologija predstavljaju samo neke od oblasti u okviru kojih nas filozofska istraživanja uvlače u raspravu o normativnosti.</p> <p>Norme, pravila i standardi poseduju dugu etimološku istoriju. Latinska <i>norma</i> je označavala gradivni blok, dok je <i>regulus</i>, takođe latinski izraz, označavao pravu ivicu ili lenjir. Za nas <i>regulus</i> znači pravilo. Svakome, ko se ikada našao u okolnostima u kojima je morao da preseče dasku ili ciglu, je jasno da bi taj rez bio vrlo nespretno bez ivice po kojoj sečemo željeni oblik. Odstupanja, između našeg reza i šablona po kojem je trebalo da sečemo, ukazuju na ono što treba da „popravimo“.</p>	<p>phenomena of human life. We use it to mark a distinction [...] between the good and the bad (or between the right and the wrong, the correct and the incorrect). [...] and the actual, possible [...]. Ethics, aesthetics, epistemology, rationality, semantics – all these areas of philosophical inquiry draw us into a discussion of normativity.</p> <p>[...] [N]orms – rules or standards. The etymology of the English term <i>norm</i> traces it back to the Latin <i>norma</i>, a builder's square. The term <i>rule</i> also seems to come to us from the building trade – it descends from the Latin <i>regulus</i>, a straight-edge or ruler. Now anyone who has sawn a board or chiseled a stone recognizes what it is to take a square or a ruler as a guide in cutting, and thus to treat gaps between the actual cut and the square or ruler to show there is something to be “corrected”</p>
Nurkić 2021, str. 92	Railton 1999, str. 321
<p>Na sličan način, kroz svakodnevno iskustvo, koristimo različita pravila i norme koje bi trebalo da usmere naše ponašanje, bilo da se radi o postupcima ili rasuđivanju. Iako je ova analogija ilustrativna, treba da imamo u vidu da su <i>norma</i> i <i>regulus</i> očigledni u kontekstu gradilišta, ali da to nije uvek slučaj kad je reč o rasuđivanju i postupcima. Kada pokušamo da predstavimo filozofsko shvatanje normativnosti, pitanja koja se prirodno nameću su „zašto?“ i „kada?“. Okolnosti u kojima se primenjuje filozofsko shvatanje normativnosti su daleko osetljivije od svakodnevnih okolnosti kućnih poslova.</p>	<p>Ovde je reč o parafrazi sledećeg pasusa iz [Railton 1999]:</p> <p>Because the <i>norma</i> (or <i>regulus</i>) is a tool whose application is so transparent to us, it can prove a useful example. But there is a danger as well as an aptness in using such a model when we attempt to construct a philosophical account of normativity. A builder can consult his <i>norma</i> to guide himself in making cuts and to judge whether his work “measures up”, but does this tool, or any tool, tell him <i>why</i> or <i>when</i> his cuts should measure up to the <i>norma</i>?</p>

Kao što se može videti, Nurkićeve rečenice odstupaju od Railtonovih prvenstveno tamo gde on pogrešno prevodi pojedine reči sa engleskog jezika – na primer, kada „builder's square“ prevodi sa „gradivni blok“ umesto, kao što bi trebalo, sa „tesarski kvadrat“, dok „straight-edge or ruler“ prevodi kao „prava ivica ili lenjir“ umesto „vinkla i lenjir“ - ili tamo gde donekle skraćuje Railtonov tekst. Kada je reč o parafraziranom pasusu, vidi se da Nurkić izražava istu ideju koju je izneo P. Railton ali ipak ne navodi referencu na [Railton 1999].

- II. Delovi teksta koje je Nurkić najčešće samo doslovno preuzeo (preveo, ponegde uz neznatne izmene) iz članka [Espinosa 2016] bez navođenja referenci i navodnika tamo gde su oni potrebni:

Nurkić 2021, str. 93	Espinosa 2016, str. 283
<p>U ovom poglavlju pokušaću da predstavim normativnu dimenziju Hjumovog shvatanja verovanja. Kako bih to učinio izložiću Hjumova opšta pravila iz <i>Rasprave o ljudskoj prirodi</i>. Pokušaću da, uprkos naturalističkom okviru Hjumove epistemologije, identifikujem</p>	<p>The main concern of this paper is whether Hume's account of belief has a normative dimension, especially concerning his account of general rules of reasoning in his <i>Treatise of Human Nature</i>, and consequently, whether it is possible to offer an account of the normative force</p>

normativne elemente njegovog shvatanja verovanja i rasuđivanja.	of those rules in spite of his naturalist framework.
Nurkić 2021, str. 93	Espinosa 2016, str. 284
Za Hjumova opšta pravila možemo, s pravom, da kažemo da zauzimaju značajno mesto u <i>Raspravi</i> . Iako, Hjum, pojam „pravila“ koristi pridajući mu bar tri različita značenja (Hearn, 1970: 404-406 ¹), opšta pravila su prisutna u svakoj od tri knjige <i>Rasprave</i> . Međutim, kako bi poslužila ostvarivanju cilja ovog rada, razmatraću samo problem normativnosti prisutan u opštim pravilima. Normativno značenje, koje želim da razmotrim, nalazi se u trećem delu prve knjige <i>Rasprave</i> . <u>Ovde, ujedno, možemo da pronademo prvo obimnije pojašnjenje opštih pravila i njihovog uticaja na naša rasuđivanja i verovanja</u> (Hjum, 1983: 161-163).	That Hume's thought is concerned with the problem of rules in its central parts has been well known since Hearn's two papers on general rules from the 1970's, in which he shows that <i>general rules</i> play a systematic role in the <i>Treatise</i> , being present in each of its three books (Hearn, 1970, p. 404-406). In this paper, however, I will be dealing only with the problem of the normativity of general rules in Hume's epistemology, mostly in part 3 of book I of the <i>Treatise</i> . There we find for the first time an extensive exposition of general rules and their influence on our judgment and belief.
Nurkić 2021, str. 93	Espinosa 2016, str. 284
Opšta pravila se pojavljuju u okviru Hjumovog razmatranja verovatnoće i predstavljaju generalizacije, odnosno sklonost naše imaginacije da uopštava, na osnovu prethodnih iskustava i navike.	General rules are, as described by Hume in T 1.34, generalizations [...] This kind of general statement appears within the analysis of probabilities [...] they are conveyed by the imagination's tendency to generalize, based on past experience and custom.
Nurkić 2021, str. 93-94	Espinosa 2016, str. 284
Način na koji opšta pravila utiču na naše rasuđivanje je, takođe, predstavljen u odeljcima XI-XV <i>Rasprave</i> . Hjumovo razmatranje verovatnoće nastalo je kao posledica analize verovanja i procesa kojima formiramo verovanja. Prema Hjumu, verovanje je snažna i stabilna ideja koja je usmerena ka istini (Hjum, 1983: 114).	The way in which general rules affect our judgment is also addressed by Hume in his treatment of probability in the <i>Treatise</i> since it also belongs to the topic of belief and belief-formation mechanisms. According to Hume, a belief is a "strong and steady conception of an idea" that includes a claim to truth [...].
Nurkić 2021, str. 94	Espinosa 2016, str. 284
Hjum identifikuje neke od mehanizama koji imaju veće izglede da ispune naša epistemička očekivanja i spreče da naše ideje postanu samo „puki izdanci imaginacije“ (Loeb, 2002: 13 ²). U odeljku o verovatnoći uzroka, Hjum sugerise da se naše rasuđivanje temelji na navici i opštim pravilima, a da nas navika može dovesti do „lažnog upoređivanja ideja“ (Hjum, 1983: 125-135). Ova pojava se dešava kada, zbog težnje imaginacije da generalizuje, formiramo opšta pravila poput, čuvenog Hjumovog primera, <i>Iruc ne može imati duhovitost a Francuz ne može imati temeljitost</i> (Hjum, 1983: 138). Ova vrsta rasuđivanja pripada nefilozofskoj vrsti verovatnoće i zasnovana je na opštim pravilima	Hume naturally endorses some of those mechanisms which are in a better position to fulfill that expectation (see Loeb, 2002, p. 13) and prevent our ideas from being the mere "offspring of the imagination" (see T 1.3.9.4; SBN 108). Besides, considering the <i>probability of causes</i> , Hume holds that our judgments take place by virtue of <i>custom</i> and <i>general rules</i> (see T 1.3.12.24; SBN 141), and that "custom can lead us into false comparison of ideas" (T 1.3.9.17; SBN 116. See also T 1.3.13.2; SBN 143-144), especially when we, as a result of the imagination's propensity to generalize, form <i>general rules</i> of the following type: "An Irishman cannot have wit, and a Frenchman cannot have

¹ Indikativno je da je ova referenca na Hjernov članak koju Nurkić navodi potpuno ista kao ona koju Espinoza navodi u delu teksta koji je Nurkić preuzeo bez navođenja reference.

² Indikativno je da je jedina referenca na Lebov članak koju Nurkić navodi potpuno ista kao ona koju Espinoza navodi u delu teksta koji je Nurkić preuzeo bez navođenja reference.

koja su ishitreno izvedena i koja predstavljaju izvor predrasuda.	solidity". This kind of judgment is called an "unphilosophical species of probability" and "is that deriv'd from general rules, which we rashly form to ourselves, and which are the source of what we properly call prejudice" (T 1.3.13.7; SBN 146; for another example see T 2.2.5.12-13; SBN 362).
Nurkić 2021, str. 94	Espinosa 2016, str. 284
Za prvu vrstu opštih pravila je karakteristično proširivanje opsega rasuđivanja, nastalog u jednom spletu okolnosti, na drugi splet okolnosti koji naliči, ali nije identičan prethodnim okolnostima (Hearn, 1970: 405 ³).	This first kind of general rule is caused by the "propensity of the imagination to extend the scope of judgments formed in one set of circumstances to other resembling but non-identical circumstances" (Hearn, 1970, p. 405).
Nurkić 2021, str. 94	Espinosa 2016, str. 285
Iako svako rasuđivanje, zasnovano na verovatnoći, nastaje na osnovu navike, prethodnog iskustva i imaginacije, razum nije primoran da prati ono što Hjum naziva „prirodnim težnjama“. Moguće je sprečiti formiranje neistinitih verovanja zasnovanih na pravilima predrasuda, odnosno sprečiti pridavanje izvesnosti proizvodima imaginacije, sličnosti i kontigvitetu (Hjum: 1983, 105). Način da to učinimo je promišljanje, refleksija ili „drugi nivo rasuđivanja“. Posredstvom refleksije, imaginacija i sklonost generalizaciji, mogu da proizvedu „filozofske verovatnoće“.	Although every judgment on probability is a function of custom, i.e. past experience and the projection of the imagination, the mind is not condemned to follow its faulty natural tendencies. It is possible to prevent the mind from forming false beliefs founded on rules of prejudices and from "the reposing any assurance in those momentary glimpses of light, which arise in the imagination from a feign'd resemblance and continuity" (T 1.3.9.6; SBN 110), by means of the reflective mediation of second level judgments. Thus, the same propensity of the imagination to generalize can result in "philosophical probability" when it is mediated by reflection.
Nurkić 2021, str. 94-95	Espinosa 2016, str. 285
<p>Posredovanje refleksije nam omogućava da uspostavimo korektivna opšta pravila, kojima možemo da utičemo na rasuđivanje, uprkos trenutnim opažajima i iskustvu. U centralnom delu rasprave o korektivnim pravilima Hjum navodi sledeće:</p> <p><i>Razmotrićemo docnije neka opšta pravila po kojima treba da podešavamo naše suđenje o uzrocima i posledicama; a ta su pravila obrazovana na prirodi našeg razuma i na našem iskustvu njegovih delovanja u sudovima koje obrazujemo o predmetima. Ona nas uče da razlikujemo slučajne okolnosti od dejstvenih uzroka [...] Opšte pravilo pripisuje se našem suđenju, kao opsežnijem i stalnijem (Hjum, 1983:140).⁴</i></p>	<p>That is why Hume suggests that mediation in judgment leads to the so-called corrective general rules, which are allowed "to influence their judgments <of men> even contrary to present observation and experience" (T 1.3.13.8; SBN 147, clarification added). In a very central passage for this investigation Hume claims that</p> <p><i>We shall afterwards take notice of some general rules, by which we ought to regulate our judgment concerning causes and effects; and these rules are form'd on the nature of our understanding, and on our experience of its operations in the judgments we form concerning objects. By them we learn to distinguish the accidental circumstances from the efficacious causes [...] The general rule is attributed to our judgment; as being more extensive and constant (T 1.3.13.11; SBN</i></p>

³ I ova referenca na Hearnov članak koju Nurkić navodi potpuno je ista kao ona koju Espinoza navodi u delu teksta koji je Nurkić preuzeo bez navođenja reference. Treba primetiti da Espinoza, za razliku od Nurkića, na ovom mestu koristi navodnike zato što citira Herna.

Hjum, u narednom paragrafu, nastavlja rečenicom: <i>Katkada preovlađuje jedan a katkada drugi, prema nastrojenosti i naravi čoveka. Proste ljude obično vode prvi, a mudre drugi</i> (Hjum, 1983: 141).	149. <i>emphasis added</i>). Hume continues: "Sometimes the one, sometimes the other prevails, according to the disposition and character of the person. The vulgar are commonly guided by the first, and wise men by the second <kind of rules>" (T 1.3.13.12; SBN 150).
Nurkić 2021, str. 95	Espinosa 2016, str. 285
Mudri, uz pomoć korektivnih opštih pravila, poseduju zdrava doksastička stanja i formiraju verovanja čiji sadržaj ne zavisi od hirova i ličnih preferencija.	Ova rečenica je nastala parafrazom delova sledeće tri Espinozine rečenice: A wise person is someone whose beliefs are reliably formed [...] This is because, according to the corrective general rules account, a rational belief not only expresses a <i>healthy</i> mental attitude of a believer, but it is also somehow related to the content of the beliefs [...] ["less influenced by whim and private fancy" (Essays I. XIV, p. 112; G&G, p. 175)]
Nurkić 2021, str. 94-95	Espinosa 2016, str. 286
Opšta pravila su, prema Hjumu, neizostavna za objašnjenje veze između predmeta našeg saznanja i metoda koji bi trebalo da sledimo kako bismo došli do istog tog saznanja.	[T]here is an underlying connection between what can properly be an object of our knowledge and the method that can lead a <i>reasoner</i> to that knowledge; a connection that we can make sense of only by appealing to Hume's account of general rules.
Nurkić 2021, str. 95	Espinosa 2016, str. 286
Na osnovu prve dve vrste, možemo da napravimo prostor za uspostavljanje treće vrste pravila, korektivnih pravila. Opšta pravila predstavljaju „logiku“ rasuđivanja o verovatnoći i neophodna su za formiranje pouzdanih verovanja, na kojima se sve nauke zasnivaju (Hjum, 1983: 144). Stoga, korektivna opšta pravila vrše trostruku funkciju: (iii*) Predstavljaju model za pouzdano formiranje, i korekciju, verovanja; (iii**) Korriguju rasuđivanje zasnovano na prvoj vrsti opštih pravila (Hjum, 1983: 144); (iii***) Omogućavaju nam da kroz refleksiju, odnosno analizu nereflektivnog rasuđivanja, identifikujemo kognitivni izvor iz kojeg su potekli neistinita verovanja (Hjum, 1983: 99).	These first two kinds of rules make space for the third, the one we have been calling "corrective". These general rules are "the logic" of probable reasoning and is required to achieve justified and reliable belief, on which all valuable sciences are based. Corrective general rules have therefore at least a threefold function: (1) they display a model of reliable belief formation and correction; (2) they can also correct judgment produced by the first kind of general rules (T 1.3.13.12; SBN 149-50); and (3) they make it possible to return irreflective judgment or belief to its cognitive sources and foundations and, thus, to identify false belief as such (see T 1.3.8.14; SBN 104-5).
Nurkić 2021, str. 95	Espinosa 2016, str. 286
Nakon razmatranja filozofskih verovatnoća i njihove zavisnosti od relacije uzročnosti, Hjum je uspostavio <i>Pravila po kojima suditi o uzrocima i posledicama</i> (Hjum, 1983: 160-163). Postoji osam kriterijuma koji nam omogućavaju da razlikujemo relaciju stalne združenosti i prividne uzročne relacije. Ovi kriterijumi nam dozvoljavaju da	After developing his theory of philosophical probabilities and its dependency on causal inference, Hume outlined his famous set of <i>Rules by which to judge causes and effects</i> (T 1.3.15; SBN 173). They are 8 criteria that allow us to distinguish between a relation of constant conjunction that describes a causal nexus and an

⁴ Indikativno je to što Nurkić navodi samo one citate Hjuma koje navode autori od kojih je preuzimao (bez odgovarajućih referenci) delove teksta u kojima oni navode upravo te iste citate; pre svega je reč o preuzimanju od Espinoze i Hikersona (videti nastavak tabelarnog prikaza dole).

<p>proverimo ispravnost rasuđivanja i verovanja zasnovanih na relaciji uzročnosti. Dalje, Hjum napominje da su ovih osam kriterijuma [...] <i>sva logika koju smatram umesnom da upotrebim u svojim umovanjima</i> (Hjum: 1983, 162).</p>	<p><i>apparent</i> causal relation. They should permit us to discern the correctness of inferences and beliefs based on causal reasoning. Furthermore, Hume affirms that the 8 rules are “all the logic I think proper to employ in my reasoning” (T 1.3.15.11; SBN 175).</p>
<p>Nurkić 2021, str. 95-96</p>	<p>Espinosa 2016, str. 286</p>
<p>Opšta pravila za uzročno rasuđivanje su prirodan zaključak koji Hjum izvodi iz razmatranja verovatnoće u <i>Raspravi</i>. Ne samo zbog toga što je svako rasuđivanje, koje se odnosi na činjenice, zasnovano na uzročnoj relaciji, nego i zbog toga što nam ovakvo rasuđivanje donosi mnogo više koristi nego rasuđivanje zasnovano na pukoj sličnosti i kontigvitetu (Hjum, 1983: 105).</p> <p>Postoje brojna druga pravila (u okviru opštih pravila) koja takođe utiču na naša verovanja, sličnom živošću i snagom, ali su takva pravila zasnovana na sličnosti između ideja i činjenica, opravdanja za takva verovanja ne možemo da pronađemo u iskustvu. Ovde Hjum govori o lakovernosti, olakom verovanju u svedočanstva drugih, kao i o obrazovanju. Lakovernost i obrazovanje zasnovani su na vrlo sličnim osnovama kao navike i pojave koje se često ponavljaju u našem iskustvu (Hjum, 1983: 109).</p>	<p>The general rules for causal reasoning are the natural conclusion of Hume’s treatment of probabilities and probable belief in the <i>Treatise</i> (and not the skeptical conclusion of T 1.4). This is not only because of the plain fact that, according to Hume, every reasoning concerning matters of fact relies on causal inference, but also and mostly, because despite this reliance “the relation of cause and effect has all the opposite advantages” compared to reasoning based on “feign’d resemblance and continuity” since “the objects it presents are fixt and unalterable” (T 1.3.9.7; SBN 110).</p> <p>There are many other principles that enlivened our ideas similarly bringing us to believe “and command our assent beyond what experience will justify; which can proceed from nothing beside the resemblance between ideas and facts” (T 1.3.9.12; SBN 113), for example, credulity (“easy faith in the testimony of other”) and education, which rest “almost on the same foundation of custom and repetition as our experience or reasoning from causes and effects” (T 1.3.9.19; SBN 117).</p>
<p>Nurkić 2021, str. 96</p>	<p>Espinosa 2016, str. 287</p>
<p>Upravo ovde možemo pronaći i poreklo normativnosti opštih pravila. Opšta pravila poseduju drugačiji status od verovanja, Lyons (2001: 273) ih naziva drugim redom mentalnih stanja⁵. Funkcija opštih pravila je da koriguju i stabilizuju „sentiment verovanja“ (Hearn, 1976: 65), koji nastaje na osnovu prirodnih, uzročnih faktora. Na osnovu paragrafa Hjumove <i>Rasprave</i>, odnosno njihovog karaktera epistemičkih preporuka, smatram da su korektivna opšta pravila normativna, a ne deskriptivna. Ova pravila predstavljaju uputstva za formiranje i korigovanje verovanja.</p>	<p>Precisely on this point rests the origin of their normativity. I agree with Hearn’s claim that “these rules come for Hume to occupy a different status [...] the function of the causal rules is to correct and stabilize the sentiment of belief which is generated by certain natural, causal factors” (1976, p. 65). It seems to be the case that corrective general rules are normative rather than descriptive, that is, they are prescriptions about how we ought to form and correct states of belief.</p>
<p>Nurkić 2021, str. 96</p>	<p>Espinosa 2016, str. 287</p>
<p>U narednom potpoglavlju ispitaću odnos</p>	<p>Napomena: odnos verovanja i istine ispituje i</p>

⁵ Ovu rečenicu Nurkić preuzima iz [Espinosa 2016, str. 287, fusnota 15], pogrešno je prevodeći: „Lyons rejects the claim that the general rules for causal reasoning are second order mental states, evident by their reflective character (T 1.3.13.11; SBN 149). Instead he holds that they are about objects (Lyons, 2001, p. 273, n. 13).” Indikativno je i to što je referenca na Lajonsa potpuno ista kao ona koju navodi Espinoza u delu teksta koji je Nurkić preuzeo bez navođenja reference.

verovanja i istine u Hjumovoj <i>Raspravi</i> .	Espinoza i to upravo u narednom odeljku svog teksta iz kojeg Nurkić u nastavku nastavlja da preuzima delove bez navođenja referenci. Prva rečenica tog odeljka Espinozinog teksta glasi: „The question concerning the normative dimension of belief runs into the intricate relationship between belief and truth.“
Nurkić 2021, str. 96	Espinosa 2016, str. 287, fusnota 16
Kao što sam ranije obrazložio, epistemičke norme predstavljaju standard za ispravno verovanje. Ispitaću da li su epistemičke norme usmerene ka njihovom, uobičajenom, cilju – istini.	Epistemic norms are in a sense standards of correctness of belief. Norms governing beliefs are nonetheless still related to their characteristic aim: truth.
Nurkić 2021, str. 96	Espinosa 2016, str. 287
Isto važi i u slučaju opštih pravila: ako su A, B i C principi prema kojima formiramo istinita verovanja, to znači da su verovanja koja su u skladu sa tim principima, pouzdanija i verovatnije istinita, nego verovanja koja nisu u skladu sa njima.	The same would apply for the case of rules: if A, B and C are principles for forming true beliefs, it follows that in reasoning we have to consider beliefs that are consistent with those rules to be more reliable than ones that are not.
Nurkić 2021, str. 96, fusnota 5	Espinosa 2016, str. 287
[V]iše o Hjumovom evidencijalizmu, pogledati (Lyons, 2001; Owens, 2003; Engel, 2007; [...])	For the topic of normativity and epistemic norms, as well as norms of truth, see Lyons (2001), Owens (2003, p. 285-289) and Engel (2007, p. 182 ff).
Nurkić 2021, str. 97	Espinosa 2016, str. 287
Čak i da su verovanja usmerena ka istini, naturalistički prigovor ne možemo tako lako da odbacimo. Naturalisti smatraju da ne postoji ništa normativno u verovanju, kao i da ne postoje uputstva za formiranje istinitih verovanja (Engel, 2007: 179 ⁶). Međutim, epistemička normativnost nije stvar nužnosti, nego opsega. Drugim rečima, epistemička normativnost se odnosi na ono što nije nužno, ne odnosi se na disanje, svakodnevno smenjivanje dana i noći, ili bilo koju logičku ili fizičku nužnost. Opseg normativnosti, koji sam pomenuo, tiče se svakodnevnog iskustva.	For even if belief aims at truth, the following naturalist objection cannot be easily avoided: “[...] For there is nothing normative about believing: neither we believe with an eye fixed on the horizon of an ideal of truth nor we obey any prescription to believe the truth” (Engel, 2007, p. 179). [...] I would like to draw attention to the problem concerning the scope of normativity [...]. Normativity, at least in a philosophical sense, is not mere necessity (logical or physical). Rather, it concerns what is not absolutely necessary and, accordingly, it would be pointless to attach in any way normativity to a plain fact as breathing or sunshine. The proper scope of normativity, in the sense I am interested in, is that of practice.
Nurkić 2021, str. 97	Espinosa 2016, str. 287
Verovanje i disanje predstavljaju dva različita stanja, verovanje se odnosi na kategorije koje smatramo normativnim, odnosi se na rasuđivanje, slobodu izbora i racionalnost.	If believing and breathing are not two different kinds of phenomenon I would agree that there is no point in ascribing normativity to the realm of belief. But I think that there is certainly a difference between them, in so far as belief is the result a typical kind of agency, namely, epistemic agency, which involves other typical components of the realm of normative facts, such as judgment, will, epistemic freedom and, in short, rationality.
Nurkić 2021, str. 97	Espinosa 2016, str. 288

⁶ Indikativno je da je referenca na Engelov članak koju Nurkić navodi potpuno ista kao ona koju Espinoza navodi u delu teksta koji je Nurkić preuzeo bez navođenja reference.

Ako su sloboda i racionalnost sastavni deo naših doksastičkih života onda postoji prostor za normativnost. Smatram da se Hjum udaljava od prvog, deskriptivnog dela <i>Rasprave</i> ka razmatranju mehanizama refleksije kojima možemo da korigujemo svoja verovanja i zaključimo da formiranje verovanja nije puki mehanički proces. Korektivna opšta pravila su usmerena ka rasuđivanju, samim tim možemo da ih smatramo standardima racionalnosti.	Hence, in so far as freedom and rationality are involved in how we structure our doxastic lives, there are <i>prima facie</i> good reasons to assume that there is also a normative dimension involved. Hume's theory penetrates this dimension by moving from a descriptive account of natural causes of belief formation to a deeper level, where reflective mechanisms of belief correction and formation reveal that belief is not a mere mechanical response, but also a matter of rational deliberation. Corrective general rules are mechanisms of reflective thinking, directed to judgment and, therefore, standards of rational thinking.
Nurkić 2021, str. 97-98	Espinosa 2016, str. 288
Prema Hjumu, uzročna relacija je neizbežna i nužno je usmerena ka realnosti. U skladu sa tim, možemo da zaključimo da je Hjum smatrao da svi rasuđuju u skladu sa opštim pravilima.	Since causal reasoning (or causal inference or generalization) is inevitable, and since it naturally involves the intention of truth, it follows that everyone must reason in accordance with general rules.
Nurkić 2021, str. 98	Espinosa 2016, str. 288-289
[...] potrebno nam je da rasuđujemo ispravno zato što želimo stvari, a da bismo dobili ono što želimo moramo da identifikujemo efikasno sredstvo kojim možemo da ostvarimo svoje ciljeve. Ispravno uzročno rasuđivanje je nužan uslov ostvarivanja ciljeva koje želimo. Stoga, kao odgovorni epistemički subjekti, moramo da uskladimo svoje rasuđivanje sa epistemičkim normama kako bismo zadovoljili svoje želje (Hjum, 1983: 247, 270, 389).	[...] we need to reason correctly, because as agents we desire things, and in order to reach what we want, we need to identify the efficient means for obtaining them. Correct causal reasoning is a necessary condition for achieving the ends we desire; thus, being responsible epistemic agents by reasoning according to basic epistemic norms is something we must do in order to satisfy our desire.

Dakle, kao što se može videti iz ovog tabelarnog prikaza, iz teksta [Espinosa 2016] su doslovno preuzimane čitave rečenice i pasusi bez odgovarajućeg i jasnog obeležavanja preuzetih delova i bez navođenja referenci. Nurkićevo izlaganje na str. 93–98 njegovog teksta je gotovo u celosti i po redu preuzeto iz [Espinosa 2016, str. 283–289]. Od Espinoze su preuzete i reference na drugu sekundarnu literaturu (Herna, Leba, Lajonsa, Ovensa i Engela), kao i na Hjuma (uključujući i citate iz Hjumovih dela).

- III. Delovi teksta koje je Nurkić najčešće samo doslovno preuzeo (preveo, ponegde uz neznatne izmene) iz članka [Hickerson 2013] bez navođenja referenci i navodnika tamo gde su oni potrebni:

Nurkić 2021, str. 93	Hickerson 2013, str. 1133
2. U šta bi mudri trebalo da veruju?	What the Wise ought Believe (Hickersonova originalna kovanica)
Smatram da ne postoji kontradikcija između naturalističkih i normativnih aspekata Hjumove epistemologije.	Ovo je Hickersonova osnovna teza u [Hickerson 2013] i Hickerson je artikulise i brani u čitavom tekstu. Videti npr.: „[T]o reconcile epistemic normativity with naturalism about the mental“

	(str. 1133), "What I will call the 'Problem of Believing Wisely' is the problem of reconciling this epistemic normativity with Hume's naturalist theory of belief" (str. 1139), itd.
Nurkić 2021, str. 97	Hickerson 2013, str. 1133
[...] što nas dovodi do centralnog problema ovog poglavlja, usklađivanja Hjumovog naturalizma i epistemičke normativnosti.	Ovo je centralni problem u [Hickerson 2013], već u apstraktu: „a significant problem in attempting to reconcile his [sc. Hume's] epistemic normativity [...] with naturalism about the mental.“
Nurkić 2021, str. 98	Hickerson 2013, str. 1133 i 1134
U prethodnom potpoglavlju predstavio sam Hjumova opšta pravila kao prirodne principe u skladu sa kojima bi trebalo da formiramo verovanja.	This paper advances an interpretation of what Hume called 'the general rules': natural principles of belief-formation (str. 1133). I will argue that the General Rules were treated by Hume as natural principles of belief-formation (str. 1134).
Nurkić 2021, str. 98	Hickerson 2013, str. 1133
Prema Hjumu, refleksija predstavlja ono što razlikuje mudre od vulgarnih. Pitanje na koje želim da ponudim odgovor u ovom potpoglavlju tiče se Hjumovog doksastičkog involuntarizma.	According to Hume, reflection is, in part, what separates the wise from the vulgar. [...] In this paper, I am principally concerned with Hume's doxastic involuntarism.
Nurkić 2021, str. 98	Hickerson 2013, str. 1134 i 1133
Da bi refleksija mogla da posluži kao osnov za uspostavljanje korektivnih opštih pravila, ona mora da bude voluntarna. Hjum se često, zbog naturalističkog pristupa saznanju, tumači kao doksastički involuntarista. Ukoliko uspem da pronađem način da Hjuma okarakterišem kao doksastičkog voluntaristu, moći ću da ostvarim cilj ovog poglavlja, odnosno. da pokažem zašto Hjumov epistemički naturalizam ne stoji u suprotnosti sa epistemičkom normativnošću.	Ovo je takođe osnovna teza i poenta u [Hickerson 2013]: „in this paper my concern will be with [...] how Hume can make good on his naturalism. I argue below that Hume can only make good on (v) [sc. belief arises in us naturally] by treating it as a process capable of being influenced by reflection, when that reflection is construed as <i>voluntary</i> . This is a bit surprising, given Hume's frequent emphasis of the <i>involuntary</i> nature of belief, but that will be my thesis.“ (str. 1134) „Reflection on the General Rules, and an interpretation of that reflection as voluntary, helps explain not only Hume's theory of belief, but also how he hoped to reconcile epistemic normativity with naturalism about the mental.“ (str. 1133)
Nurkić 2021, str. 98	Hickerson 2013, str. 1134 i 1136
„Da li je Hjum doksastički involuntarista?“. Odgovor na to pitanje je „Da“. U <i>Raspravi</i> postoji dovoljno tekstualne evidencije koja ukazuje na Hjumov involuntarizam u pogledu verovanja.	2. WAS HUME A DOXASTIC VOLUNTARIST? He was. [...] (str. 1134). There is a good deal of textual evidence for interpreting Hume as a modal doxastic involuntarist. (str. 1136)
Nurkić 2021, str. 98	Hickerson 2013, str. 1134 i 1135
Takođe, veliki broj hjumovaca smatra da mu etiketa involuntariste pristaje. Međutim, u ovom potpoglavlju želim da pokažem da Hjum, ako njegov projekat okarakterišemo kao involuntaristički, nije uspeo u svojim namerama.	I ovde je reč o Hickersonovoj osnovnoj tezi iz [Hickerson 2013]. 2 WAS HUME A DOXASTIC VOLUNTARIST? He was. Or at least he meant to be. The degree to

Kao i da pokažem zašto se Hjumu ne može pripisati involuntarizam bez problema koji bi pratili takvo tumačenje.	which he was unable to be is what I hope to demonstrate in this paper (str. 1134). Nevertheless, I argue here (in this section and the next) that the view of him [sc. Hume] as an involuntarist is appropriately, if problematically, ascribed. (str. 1135)
Nurkić 2021, str. 99	Hickerson 2013, str. 1135
Globalni doksastički involuntarista smatra da je verovanje, u odnosu na volju, odvojena kognitivna aktivnost. Drugim rečima, kakvi god da su mehanizmi kojima formiramo verovanja, mehanizmi koje, prema Hjumovom mišljenju, delimo sa životinjama i koje je moguće ispitati kroz naučne eksperimente (Hjum: 1983, 342-348 ⁷), involuntarista smatra da oni funkcionišu nezavisno od volje.	According to (global) modal doxastic involuntarism [...] [b]elieving is treated as a separate cognitive activity. Whatever natural mechanisms produce beliefs, mechanisms surely shared with other animals and discoverable through scientific investigation, the involuntarist understands them to be operating independently of our willing.
Nurkić 2021, str. 99	Hickerson 2013, str. 1135
..., onda je psihološki nemoguće formirati verovanja slobodnim izborom. Takođe, globalna verzija se odnosi na sva naša verovanja. Međutim, potrebno je razmotriti verziju modalnog doksastičkog involuntarizma koji se ne odnosi na sva, nego samo na deo naših verovanja.	... it is psychologically impossible to believe willfully. Second, doxastic involuntarism is normally taken to be a global thesis, i.e. a thesis about all beliefs. This should be distinguished from more specific claims about the involuntary origination of a particular belief or set of beliefs.
Nurkić 2021, str. 99	Hickerson 2013, str. 1135–1136
..., pretpostavka da su neka od naših verovanja, manje ili više, pod našom volontarnom kontrolom, deluje prihvatljivo. Imam slobodu da izaberem da li ću da verujem u svedočanstvo svog prijatelja ili neke druge osobe, ali kada je reč o neposrednim čulnim iskustvima, verovanju da je automobil ispred mene crvene boje, onda je pitanje da li imam slobodu da poverujem u svoje neposredne čulne opažaje, depasirano.	... plausibility of the view that <i>some</i> of our beliefs are <i>more or less</i> within voluntary control than others, [...]. [I]t is more within my voluntary control to believe what I will about an abstruse subject for which I rely on dubious human testimony, for example. It might be less within my control to believe what I will about a subject of immediate sensory awareness, for example.
Nurkić 2021, str. 99	Hickerson 2013, str. 1136
Ova distinkcija nam dozvoljava da razmotrimo nad kakvim verovanjima imamo doksastičku kontrolu...	The distinction between global doxastic involuntarism and local doxastic involuntarism makes it possible to suggest that some beliefs or sets of beliefs cannot be or are not the product of willing while others can be or are.
Nurkić 2021, str. 99	Hickerson 2013, str. 1136
[M]ožemo da pronađemo nekoliko paragrafa na osnovu kojih možemo Hjumu da pripišemo zastupanje, kako globalne tako i lokalne verzije, modalnog doksastičkog involuntarizma. <i>Drugo, um ima vlast nad svim svojim predstavama i može da ih razdvaja, sjedinjuje, meša i menja kako god mu se sviđa; tako da, kad bi se verovanje sastojalo samo u novoj predstavi prisajedinjenoj poimanju, bilo bi u čovekovoj</i>	There is a good deal of textual evidence for interpreting Hume as a <i>modal doxastic involuntarist</i> , whether local or global. The evidence can be found in passages like the following: <i>Secondly</i> , The mind has the command over all its ideas, and can separate, unite, mix, and vary them, as it pleases; so that if belief consisted merely in a new idea, annex'd to the conception, it wou'd be

⁷ Ova referenca na Hjumovu *Raspravu* deluje nasumično budući da u odeljku na koji Nurkić referira Hjum raspravlja o slobodi i nužnosti a ne o mehanizmima formiranja verovanja.

<p><i>vlasti da veruje šta hoće. Stoga možemo zaključiti da se verovanje sastoji prosto u izvesnom osećanju ili čuvstvu, u nečemu što ne zavisi od volje, već mora da nastane od izvesnih određenih uzroka i principa kojima mi ne gospodarimo</i> (Hjum, 1983: 524).</p>	<p>in a man's power to believe what he pleas'd. We may, therefore, conclude, that belief consists merely in a certain feeling or sentiment; in something, that depends not on the will, but must arise from certain determinate causes and principles, of which we are not masters. (T Appendix 2: SBN 623)</p>
Nurkić 2021, str. 99–100	Hickerson 2013, str. 1136–1137
<p>Dakle, jasno je da Hjum sugerise da ne možemo da verujemo u šta god poželimo. Sličnu tezu možemo da prepoznamo u četvrtom delu, prve knjige, <i>Rasprave</i>. <i>Priroda nas je, apsolutno i nesagledivom nužnošću, opredelila da rasuđujemo kao god i da dišemo i osećamo; i mi ne možemo izbeći da sagledamo izvesne predmete u jacoj i potpunijoj svetlosti, iz razloga njihove uobičajene povezanosti sa nekim datim utiskom, isto onako kao što ne možemo sprečiti sebe da mislimo dok smo budni, ili da vidimo okolna tela kad ka njima okrenemo oči pri punoj sunčanoj svetlosti</i> (Hjum, 1983: 168–169).</p>	<p>When Hume wrote: 'if belief consisted merely in a new idea, annex'd to the conception, it wou'd be in a man's power to believe what he pleas'd', I take him to be expressing (quite generally, at least about some type of belief) that we cannot simply believe what we please. [...] Similar passages can be found throughout Hume's work. Another particularly pointed statement is the following: Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity has determin'd us to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of their customary connexion with a present impression, than we can hinder ourselves from thinking as long as we are awake, or seeing the surrounding bodies, when we turn our eyes towards them in broad sun-shine. (T 1.4.1.7; SBN 183)</p>
Nurkić 2021, str. 100	Hickerson 2013, str. 1137
<p>U ovom paragrafu, Hjum govori o snazi i živosti neposrednih čulnih utisaka.</p>	<p>In this passage, Hume is clearly drawing out his famed analogy between the <i>force and vivacity</i> of belief and the <i>force and vivacity</i> of present impressions.</p>
Nurkić 2021, str. 100	Hickerson 2013, str. 1137
<p>Ono što je dovoljno za ostvarivanje cilja ovog potpoglavlja, odnosno ono što je dovoljno da okarakterišemo Hjuma kao modalnog doksastičkog involuntaristu je pozivanje na sintagmu u okviru prethodnog navoda, „apsolutna i nesaglediva nužnost“. Ovakva vrsta nužnosti, prema Hjumu, ista je kao i nužnost disanja, nužnost nadražaja topline kada stojimo pored vatre, prirodna i neodoljiva.</p>	<p>This is just what I mean when I call him a <i>modal doxastic involuntarist</i>. According to Hume, when faced with believable circumstances we confront an 'absolute and uncontrollable necessity' of the same sort that compels us to breathe, or that compels us to feel warmth when standing next to a fire.</p>
Nurkić 2021, str. 100	Hickerson 2013, str. 1137
<p>Kako bih pokazao da Hjum nije bio dosledan u shvatanju verovanja kao doksastičke kategorije van domena naših izbora, predstavicu Prajsovo [H.H. Price] tumačenje Hjumovog involuntarizma. (Price, 1969: 239–240)⁸</p>	<p>Hume was not entirely consistent in his claims that belief cannot be willed. The identification of an 'inconsistency' in this regard dates back at least to H.H. Price and the Gifford lectures of 1960.</p>
Nurkić 2021, str. 100	Hickerson 2013, str. 1137
<p>(i) Verovanja koja poseduju snažnu induktivnu zasnovanost, formirana na osnovu dugog iskustva</p>	<p>On the one hand, there are the beliefs which have strong inductive support, based on a long</p>

⁸ Indikativno je da je jedina referenca na Prajsa (H. H. Price, *Belief*, 1969) koju Nurkić navodi potpuno ista kao ona koju Hickerson navodi u delu teksta koji je Nurkić preuzeo bez navodenja reference [Hickerson 2013, str. 1138].

stalne združenosti; i (ii) Verovanja koja poseduju slabu, ili nikakvu, induktivnu zasnovanost.	experience of constant conjunctions; on the other, there are beliefs which have very little inductive support or none at all.
Nurkić 2021, str. 100	Hickerson 2013, str. 1137
Hjum, kada nije u svom uobičajenom skeptičkom maniru, razlikuje zdrava verovanja i, sa druge strane, besmislena i sujeverna verovanja. Hjum takođe smatra da je bolje posedovati zdrava verovanja, sa snažnom induktivnom zasnovanošću na prethodnim iskustvima, nego sujeverna verovanja bez induktivne potpore.	[I]n this less skeptical mood) Hume clearly does think that there is a distinction between sensible or sober or sane beliefs on the one side, and silly or superstitious beliefs on the other. [...] [H]e (sc. Hume) clearly thinks that it is better to hold sensible beliefs, those which have strong inductive support from past experience [...], than to hold superstitious or silly ones which have very weak inductive support or none at all. (Price, <i>Belief</i> , 239–40)
Ne samo što Hjum nije bio dosledan doksastičkom involuntarizmu, nego je i smatrao da se verovanja mogu suspendovati (vrlo značajno za Hjumov skepticizam) našim slobodnim izborom (Price, 1969: 240).	According to Price, Hume was not only committed to doxastic involuntarism, but also to treating beliefs as capable of being willingly suspended. Price thought this the case because he thought suspension of belief was a prerequisite for Hume's scepticism.
Nurkić 2021, str. 100	Hickerson 2013, str. 1137
uzdržavanje od rasuđivanja, u okolnostima u kojima to nije prirodno	'refrain[ing] from assenting' to what would otherwise naturally be believed.
Nurkić 2021, str. 101	Hickerson 2013, str. 1133–1134 itd.
Problem verovanja mudrih	I ovo je Hickersonova kovanica: I present what I call 'The Problem of Believing Wisely'.
Nurkić 2021, str. 101	Hickerson 2013, str. 1133–1134 itd.
Uspostavljanje opštih pravila i razmatranje doksastičkog involuntarizma je neophodno kako bismo mogli da nademo rešenje problema verovanja mudrih.	I will call the problem of reconciling Hume's epistemic normativity with his doxastic involuntarism 'The Problem of Believing Wisely'. Ultimately, whether a Humean can resolve this problem depends upon the viability of what Hume called 'the general rules'.
Nurkić 2021, str. 101	Hickerson 2013, str. 1133–1134
Objasnio sam zašto Hjum, i u kojoj meri, smatra da nemamo slobodu upravljanja verovanjima. Ovo predstavlja poteškoću za Hjumov evidencijalizam, tezu prema kojoj bi trebalo da verujemo samo u razmeri sa pouzdanom, induktivnom, evidencijom. Evidencija stoji u suprotnosti sa sujeverjem i predrasudama. Centralni problem ovog potpoglavlja predstavlja dodatno usaglašavanje elemenata epistemičke normativnosti u Hjumovoj epistemologiji sa njegovim doksastičkim involuntarizmom. Taj problem možemo da nazovemo „Problem verovanja mudrih“.	In this paper, I am principally concerned with Hume's <i>doxastic involuntarism</i> , i.e. his suggestion that belief cannot be willed. That claim creates particular difficulties for Hume's <i>evidentialism</i> : the doctrine that we ought to believe only in proportion to reliable inductive evidence, rather than on the basis of superstitions or prejudice. I will call the problem of reconciling Hume's epistemic normativity with his doxastic involuntarism 'The Problem of Believing Wisely'.
Nurkić 2021, str. 101	Hickerson 2013, str. 1134
Prema Hjumu, trebalo bi da verujemo na način na koji mudri formiraju verovanja.	[A]ccording to Hume we ought to believe as 'the wise' do.
Nurkić 2021, str. 101	Hickerson 2013, str. 1138
Ne samo što Hjum razlikuje zdrava i sujeverna	And Price read Hume not only as describing such

verovanja, nego nam savetuje da verujemo na način na koji mudri ljudi veruju. Ovom normativnom preporukom, Hjum savetuje da bi trebalo da verujemo u ono što ima snažnu induktivnu zasnovanost, i obratno.	a difference, but as <i>counseling</i> us to believe as the wise person would, i.e. suggesting we <i>ought</i> to believe what has stronger inductive support and <i>ought not</i> believe what has weaker inductive support.
Nurkić 2021, str. 101	Hickerson 2013, str. 1139
Hjumovo korišćenje normativnog jezika je prisutno i u zaključku <i>Istraživanja o ljudskom razumu</i> . kada Hjum kritikuje sujeverje i podstiče nas na spaljivanje dela koja ne sadrže apstraktno rasuđivanje o kvantitetu, niti eksperimentalno rasuđivanje o činjenicama, to su, prema Hjumu, dela u koja ne bi trebalo da verujemo (Hjum, 1988: 155).	Especially in places where Hume champions philosophy and criticizes superstition, but at many key moments, he indeed counsels us to be wise. The <i>Treatise</i> and <i>Enquiries</i> are replete with normative epistemic language. Perhaps, the most famous of these is the passage at the finale of the first <i>Enquiry</i> , long celebrated (if not self-consciously) by positivists, wherein Hume admonishes us to commit 'to the flames' works that concern neither abstract reasoning about quantities nor experimental reasoning about facts, works that ought not be believed.
Nurkić 2021, str. 101	Hickerson 2013, str. 1140
U tradicionalnom smislu, odmeravanje verovanja spam evidencije je takođe predstavljalo odlike mudrosti. Ovo podrazumeva uzdržavanje od rasuđivanja do trenutka kada će nam biti dostupne relevantne informacije, koje ćemo zatim razmotriti i usvojiti (ili odbaciti) kao istinite. Rasuđivanje, u tradicionalnom smislu, predstavlja mogućnost slobodne kontrole mehanizama za formiranje verovanja. Da bismo mogli mudro da rasuđujemo, potrebni su nam dobri prirodni instinkti, kao i racionalna kontrola nad sopstvenim verovanjima (Stroud, 1977: 10 ⁹). Ovo znači da je moguće da se izdignemo iznad „životinjskog instinkta“.	[P]assage about the wise person 'proportion[ing] belief to the evidence' would not be a puzzle had it instead been written by someone who holds what Stroud (rather prosaically) calls 'the traditional conception of the nature of man' (Stroud, <i>Hume</i> , 11). On the 'traditional conception' a distinctive feature of human wisdom is our sensitivity to evidence, not insofar as we naturally believe, but insofar as we consciously assess evidence qua evidence and come to decisions via deliberation, i.e. provisionally withhold assent until all relevant data have been collected, evaluated, and then <i>reflectively endorsed</i> (or dissented from, or judged insufficient, etc.). To judge, in this traditional sense, presumes the ability to voluntarily control one's belief-forming mechanisms. [...] The ability to form a wise judgement was supposed by many to require not only good instincts, but rational control over one's self; [...] This process was traditionally construed as 'rising above' the merely animal instincts.
Nurkić 2021, str. 101	Hickerson 2013, str. 1140–1141
Međutim, kao što sam napomenuo, Stroud [Barry Stroud] ovo tumačenje naziva tradicionalnim. Ovo nije Hjumovo tumačenje, budući da je Hjum smatrao da se opšta pravila mogu primeniti, kako na mudre, tako i na životinje, decu i obične ljude. Hjum se udaljio od tradicionalnog uspostavljanja	[...] what Stroud (rather prosaically) calls 'the traditional conception of the nature of man'. [...] But it should go without saying that this was not Hume's view. One of the advertised features of Hume's newer theory of belief was its <i>naturalistic</i> account of belief-formation, not only applicable to

⁹ Ova referenca na Straudovu knjigu (*Hume*, 1977) nema nikakve veze sa prethodnim tekstom. Straud na str. 10 ne govori o mudrosti i mudrom rasuđivanju već o Hjumovoj filozofiji kao o „sistematskoj generalizaciji Hlačesonovovih gledišta o estetici i moralu“. Ispravna referenca bila bi na str. 11 koju navodi i Hickerson u tekstu koji je Nurkić preuzeo bez navođenja odgovarajuće reference (na str. 11 Straud govori o „tradicionalnoj koncepciji ljudske prirode“).

<p>veze između onog u šta verujemo i slobodnog izbora. Smatrao je da su tradicionalne teorije nedovoljno opšte i usmerene na mali deo "izvrsnih" pojedinaca, što ne odražava činjenicu da svi ljudi poseduju verovanja[.]</p> <p><i>Obični nedostatak tih sistema, koji su filozofi upotrebljavali da objasne radnje uma, jeste taj što oni pretpostavljaju takvu tananost uma da to prevazilazi ne samo sposobnost prostih životinja već i sposobnost dece i običnog sveta naše vlastite vrste, koji su, uprkos tome, podložni istim emocijama i efektima kao i osobe najsavršenijeg duha i inteligencije. Takva tananost jasan je dokaz lažnosti jednog sistema, kao što je suprotnu prostota dokaz njegove istinitosti</i> (Hjum, 1983: 163-164).</p>	<p>the 'subtlety and refinements' of the wise, but to the beliefs of 'mere animals', 'children', and 'the common people'. Hume's theory was set against the traditional account precisely insofar as it broke the traditional linkage between the believed and the voluntary. [...] Hume criticized the older theories <i>as insufficiently general</i>, suggesting they had mistakenly focused on the activity of only a select few, i.e. 'the wise', and were not truthfully characteristic of the way we <i>all</i> believe.</p> <p>The common defect of those systems, which philosophers have employ'd to account of the actions of the mind, is, that they suppose such a subtlety and refinement of thought, as not only exceed the capacity of mere animals, but even of children and the common people in our own species; who are notwithstanding susceptible of the same emotions and affections as persons of the most accomplish'd genius and understanding. Such a subtlety is a clear proof of the falsehood, as the contrary simplicity of the truth, of any system. (T 1.3.16.3; SBN 176)</p>
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Dakle, kao što se može videti iz ovog tabelarnog prikaza, iz teksta [Hickerson 2013] su doslovno preuzimane čitave rečenice i pasusi bez odgovarajućeg i jasnog obeležavanja preuzetih delova i bez navođenja referenci. Nurkićevo izlaganje na str. 98–102 njegovog teksta je gotovo u celosti i po redu preuzeto iz [Hickerson 2013, str. 1133–1141]. Od Hikersona su preuzete i reference na drugu sekundarnu literaturu (Prajsa i Strauda), kao i na Hjuma (uključujući i citate iz Hjumovih dela).

- IV. Delovi teksta koje je Nurkić najčešće samo doslovno preuzeo (preveo, ponegde uz neznatne izmene) iz članka [Hutton 2019] bez navođenja referenci i navodnika tamo gde su oni potrebni:

Nurkić 2021, str. 103	Hutton 2019, str. 593 (Abstract)
<p>U „Drugoj analogiji“, <i>Kritike čistog uma</i>, Kant zastupa tezu da nije moguće formirati objektivni vremenski sled, ako naši mentalni sadržaji ne sadrže pojam uzročnosti. Prema Kantu, pojam uzročnosti omogućava da određeno uređivanje predstava, u vremenu, smatramo nužnim. Smatram da ova nužnost, i objektivnost određenog vremenskog sleda predstava, predstavlja izvor normativnosti u Kantovoj epistemologiji. Pokazaću zašto Kant smatra da bi iracionalno rasuđivanje u pogledu uređivanja predstava u vremenu predstavljalo „bolno“ izbegavanje normativnih obaveza. I zašto smo, usled neodrživosti iracionalnog rasuđivanja, primorani da postavimo svoje predstave u određeni sled.</p>	<p>In the “Second Analogy”, Kant argues that, unless mental contents involve the concept of causation, they cannot represent an objective temporal sequence. According to Kant, deploying the concept of causation renders a certain temporal ordering of representations necessary [...] I argue that this necessitation is a matter of epistemic normativity: with certain causal presuppositions in place, the individual is obliged to make a judgment with certain temporal contents, on pain of irrationality. To make this normatively obligatory judgment, the subject must place her perceptual representations in a certain order.</p> <p>Napomena: kao što se može videti, Nurkić glavnu tezu Odeljka 3. svog teksta („<i>Sapere aude!</i>“) preuzima direktno iz apstrakta Hlalonovog rada a da ni ne pominje [Hutton 2019], pa ovu tezu predstavlja kao vlastiti originalni doprinos.</p>

Nurkić 2021, str. 103	Hutton 2019, str. 593–594
<p>Nameravam da pokažem <u>koje mentalne operacije su potrebne da bi naše predstave posedovale objektivni vremenski sadržaj</u>. Takođe, pokušaću da obrazložim zašto je baš <u>epistemička normativnost vrsta modalnosti koja određeni subjektivni red predstava čini nužnim</u>.</p> <p>Napomena: kao što se može videti, i ovde Nurkić samo preuzima Hatonovu interpretativnu strategiju i osnovne teze (predstavljajući ih kao sopstvene) a da ne pominje tekst [Hutton 2019].</p>	<p>This article has two aims: one narrow, one broad. The narrow aim is to resolve an interpretative dispute about Kant's "Second Analogy." The "Second Analogy" gives an account of how we can perceive temporal sequences. However, disagreement remains over the details of <u>the mental operations required for perception to have objective temporal content</u>. In particular, it remains controversial how, according to Kant, deploying <u>the concept of causation renders a certain subjective "order of perceptions" "necessary"</u> (A193/B238) and with what kind of <u>modality this subjective order of perceptions becomes necessary</u>. [...] I argue that this <u>inferential necessity applies to the subdoxastic level of perceptions as well as to judgments and that the modality in question is that of epistemic normativity</u>.</p>
Nurkić 2021, str. 103	Hutton 2019, str. 594
<p>[N]ormativnost predstavlja uobičajenu perspektivu tumačenja Kantove teorijske i praktične filozofije (Alison, 2004; McDowell, 1994; O'Neill, 1989¹⁰). <u>Odnos heteronomije i autonomije predstavlja centralni problem Kantove etike, dok pitanja o sadržaju naših predstava, kao i odnosu između sveta i čoveka, predstavljaju osnovna pitanja Kantove epistemologije</u>.</p>	<p>This narrow exegetical conclusion connects with a broader debate about the role of normative notions in Kant's philosophy of mind. Recent decades have seen numerous attempts to interpret the project of the <i>Critique of Pure Reason</i> as fundamentally normative in character. Allison (2004) argues that it "involves a radical reconfiguration of epistemic norms" and "serves as the epistemological counterpart of the <u>shift from heteronomy to autonomy, which is [...] the essence of Kant's 'revolution' in ethics</u>" (p. xvi). O'Neill (1989) holds that, for Kant, a "critique of pure reason" is a "(quasi-)juridical or political task" (p. 9). McDowell (1994) reads Kant as attributing a normative status to all <u>contentful mental representations</u>, thereby giving a promising account of <u>the relation between mind and world</u>.</p>
Nurkić 2021, str. 103	Hutton 2019, str. 593–594
<p><u>[P]otrebno je ispitati o kakvoj normativnosti je reč, i koliki domen Kantove filozofije normativnost uspešno pokriva. Smatram da je ovde reč o epistemičkoj normativnosti</u>. Pre svega, ispitaću elemente <u>epistemičke normativnosti u Drugoj analogiji</u>, nakon čega ću pokušati da redukujem sve upotrebe normativnosti u Kantovoj filozofiji na epistemičku normativnost.</p>	<p>Ovde Nurkić preuzima nekoliko ideja/rečenica iz Hatonovog teksta:</p> <p>The problem with relying on such "big picture" consideration is that they leave indeterminate <u>the scope of normativity in Kant's project</u>. (str. 594)</p> <p><u>I argue that this [...] is a matter of epistemic normativity</u>. (str. 593, Abstract)</p> <p>„Epistemic normativity in Kant's 'Second Analogy'“ je <i>naslov</i> Hatonovog teksta a</p>

¹⁰ Indikativno je što Nurkić i ovde samo preuzima reference koje navodi i Hutton u delu teksta koji Nurkić sažima i parafrizira bez navođenja reference na [Hutton 2019].

	ispitivanje epistemičke normativnosti u „Druvoj analogiji“ je ono što Haton radi u čitavom tekstu.
Nurkić 2021, str. 103–104	Hutton 2019, str. 595
U <i>Druvoj analogiji</i> , Kant ispituje preduslove uspešnog predstavljanja objektivnog vremenskog sleđa. Iskoristiću primer kojim je Haton [James Hutton] ilustrovao Kantovo shvatanje relacije uzročnosti. Zamislimo Džona koji posmatra Sneška Belića kako se topi (Hutton, 2018: 3 ¹¹). Da bi Džonovo posmatranje bilo moguće, <u>on mora da poseduje tri osobine predstavljanja</u> ¹² : (i) Mora da poseduje predstavu početnog stanja, Sneška koji stoji uspravno; (ii) Mora da poseduje predstavu stanja kao posledice, otopljenog Sneška; i (iii) Mora da poseduje predstavu početnog stanja koje prethodi stanju posledice. Kant smatra da pitanje, kako možemo da objasnimo mentalna stanja koja predstavljaju (iii) kao objektivnu relaciju između (i) i (ii), nimalo nije jednostavno.	The “Second Analogy” examines the preconditions for representing objective temporal sequence. Let’s illustrate the problem with an example: Jones watches his beloved snowman melt. For this to happen, <u>Jones must have a mental representation with three features</u> : (a) it must represent the initial state, that is, the snowman standing tall; (b) it must represent the subsequent state, that is, the melted snowman; and (c) it must represent the initial state as preceding the subsequent state. The problem is to explain how a mental state could represent (c), that is, the objective temporal relation between the two states.
Nurkić 2021, str. 104	Hutton 2019, str. 595
Kant najpre iznosi negativno tumačenje: predstava objektivnog vremenskog sleđa ne može da bude ostvarena na osnovu činjenice da se predstave (i) i (ii) dešavaju sukcesivno (Kant, 1970: 189). Iako Džon, najpre, opaža uspravnog Sneška, a zatim, istopljenog Sneška, ova sukcesivnost nije dovoljna da bismo je smatrali objektivnim vremenskim sledom. Prema Kantu, <i>aprehenzija raznovrsnosti pojave jeste uvek sukcesivna</i> (Kant, 1970: 191). Ovo je slučaj i kada posmatramo kuću, odnosno različite delove kuće – predstave različitih delova kuće su sukcesivne, iako se radi o jednom objektu. Dakle, sukcesija je arbitrarna za naš zadatak, ne možemo na osnovu sukcesije da rešimo problem objektivnog vremenskog sleđa predstava.	Kant’s discussion begins with a negative point: representation of objective temporal relations cannot be achieved simply by the fact that the representations of the two states occur successively in the mind. Although Jones perceives the snowman standing tall at t_0 and perceives the melted snowman at t_1 , this mere successiveness is insufficient for the representation of objective temporal sequence [...]: “[t]he apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive” (A189/B234). Perceptual contents occur sequentially in the mind even when they represent coexistent, enduring features, as when one successively sees the different parts of a large house (A190/B235, A192f./B237f. [...]) Kant emphasizes that it is the “arbitrariness” of the subjective sequence that renders it insufficient to carry objective representational purport.
Nurkić 2021, str. 104	Hutton 2019, str. 595–596
Takođe navodi: <i>Međutim, spajanje nikako nije neka tvorevina</i>	<i>Connection [e.g. of “two perceptions in time”] is</i>

¹¹ Ovo je jedino mesto u Nurkićevom tekstu gde on pokušava da navede referencu na Hatona ali pogrešno – Hatonov članak je iz 2019. a ne iz 2018. godine, a deo na koji on referira nalazi se na str. 595 a ne na str. 3 Hatonovog članka.

¹² Kao i u prethodnim slučajevima, jedno od retkih značajnih odstupanja od originalnog teksta koji Nurkić preuzima (bez navođenja odgovarajućih referenci) nastupa onda kada nešto pogrešno prevede: tako on ovde „Jones must have a mental representation with three features“ prevodi sa „on [sc. Džons] mora da poseduje tri osobine predstavljanja“ umesto sa „Džons mora da poseduje mentalnu predstavu koja ima tri osobine/svojstva“.

<p>samoga čula i opažanja, već je ovde proizvod jedne sintetične moći uobrazilje koja određuje unutrašnje čulo u pogledu vremenskog odnosa. Uobrazilja pak može dotična dva stanja da spoji na dva načina, tako da ili jedno ili drugo stanje dolazi prvo u vremenu; jer vreme po sebi ne može se opaziti niti se u odnosu prema njemu može tako reći empirički odrediti šta prethodi, a šta sleduje na objektu (Kant, 1970: 190).¹³</p> <p>Arbitramost, koju sam pomenuo, je prouzrokovana time što su vremenski odnosi između sadržaja naših predstava uvedeni imaginacijom. Da bi Džon imao predstavu Sneška koji se topi, on prethodno mora da ima predstavu uspravnog Sneška. Upravo imaginacija proizvodi predstavu prethodnog stanja, uspravnog Sneška. Međutim, imaginacija može slobodno da kombinuje čulne opažaje, kao predstavu uspravnog Sneška koja prethodi predstavi istopljenog Sneška, i obratno. Drugim rečima, Kantu je potrebno nešto što može da ukloni ovu arbitramost subjektivnog sleda. Kantovo pozitivno tumačenje počinje, čuvenim, primerom lađe koja plovi nizvodno. [...]Kada je subjektivni sled predstava nužan, onda možemo da zaključimo da se radi o objektivnom vremenskom sledu. Pod određenim uslovima, subjektivni sled, postaje nepovratan, odnosno nužan, a ne arbitaran.</p>	<p><i>not the work of mere sense and intuition, but is here rather the product of a synthetic faculty of the imagination, which determines inner sense with regard to temporal relations. This [i.e. the imagination] [...] can combine the two states in question in two different ways, so that either one or the other precedes in time. (B233, cf. A201/B246)</i></p> <p>[...]This arbitrariness results from the fact that, according to Kant, temporal relations among perceptual contents are introduced by the faculty of imagination [...]. A necessary condition of Jones's representing the event of the snowman melting is that, while seeing the melted snowman, he is also conscious that previously the snowman was standing tall. This would, according to Kant, require Jones's imagination to reproduce the perceptual content A, placing it before perception B in Jones's inner sense. Yet the imagination has the power to freely combine sensory material. At t_1, when it is in possession of all the relevant sensory material, the imagination can thus produce either subjective ordering—A then B, or B then A—with equal ease. Unless something removes this arbitrariness of subjective order, the subjective order cannot have the semantic significance of denoting the objective order in which states succeed each other.</p> <p>Kant's positive account is that when the subjective order of perceptions is a necessary order, it can have the significance of denoting an objective temporal relation. Under certain conditions, the subjective order is irreversible—not arbitrary but necessary. [...] Kant illustrates this with the example of "a ship driven downstream" (A192/B237).</p>
<p>Nurkić 2021, str. 104–105</p>	<p>Hutton 2019, str. 597–598</p>
<p><u>Alison (2004, 252)</u>¹⁴, rekonstruiše Kantov uzročni princip na sledeći način:</p> <p>(i) Da bismo imali predstavu nekog događaja, subjektivni sled predstava mora da bude nepovratan;</p> <p>(ii) Da bi subjektivni sled predstava bio nepovratan, moramo da ga podvedemo pod šemu uzročnosti;</p> <p>(iii) Stoga, primena šeme uzročnosti predstavlja</p>	<p>Recent versions of the <i>conceptual</i> reading (<u>Allison, 2004, p. 252</u>) have converged on a coherent reconstruction of Kant's argument for the Causal Principle:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To represent an event, the subjective order of perceptions must be irreversible. 2. For the subjective order of perceptions to be irreversible, they must be subsumed under the schema of causality.

¹³ Kao i u slučaju Hjumovih citata gore (nap. 7), Indikativno je to što Nurkić navodi samo one Kantove citate koje navode autori od kojih je preuzimao (bez referenci) delove teksta u kojima oni navode upravo te iste citate, u ovom slučaju od Hatona.

¹⁴ Indikativno je da je jedina referenca na Alisonov članak koju Nurkić navodi potpuno ista kao ona koju Haton navodi u delu teksta koji je Nurkić preuzeo bez navođenja odgovarajuće reference.

nužan uslov postojanja nekog događaja u našem iskustvu; (iv) Stoga, ograničivši domen na pojave (predmete mogućeg iskustva), možemo da zaključimo da svaki događaj ima svoj uzrok.	3. Therefore, application of the schema of causality is a necessary condition for the experience of an event. 4. Therefore, restricting the domain to appearances (i.e., objects of possible experience), every event has a cause.
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Dakle, kao što se može videti iz ovog tabelarnog prikaza, iz teksta [Hutton 2019] su doslovno preuzimane čitave rečenice i pasusi bez odgovarajućeg i jasnog obeležavanja preuzetih delova i bez navođenja referenci. Nurkićevo izlaganje na str. 103–105 njegovog teksta je gotovo u celosti i po redu preuzeto iz [Hutton 2019, str. 593–598]. Od Hatona su preuzete i reference na drugu sekundarnu literaturu (Alisona, Mekdauela i Onif), kao i na Kanta (uključujući i citate iz Kantovih dela).

- V. Delovi teksta koje je Nurkić najčešće samo doslovno preuzeo (preveo, ponegde uz neznatne izmene) iz članka [Cohen 2018] bez navođenja referenci i navodnika tamo gde su oni potrebni:

Nurkić 2021, str. 105	Cohen 2018, str. 3
Kao što bi formula autonomije trebalo da uređuje naše slobodne izbore u pogledu praktičnih aspekata našeg života, tako bi epistemička verzija ove formule trebalo da uređuje naša verovanja i doksastički život. [...] epistemička pravila ili normativna uputstva o kojima ću nadalje govoriti, nazvaću epistemičkim maksimama.	Thus on my reading, just as the formulas of the Categorical Imperative should guide maxim-formation, the principles of thinking should guide first-order maxims of belief formation, which I would like to call “epistemic maxims” to parallel the more familiar “moral maxims”.
Dakle, iz prethodnog pasusa postaje jasno da se epistemička odgovornost ne zasniva na verovanjima nego na maksimama koje bi trebalo da ih regulišu.	In this sense, epistemic responsibility is a matter of whether and how we formulate our epistemic maxims, and the source of false or unjustified beliefs turns out to be the wrong ‘way of thinking’ about these maxims.
Nurkić 2021, str. 105	Cohen 2018, str. 6, fusnota 56
Epistemičke maksime obrazuju naše epistemičke strategije. Epistemičke strategije bi trebalo da koriguju način na koji saznavamo, kao i da nam pomognu da što bolje iskoristimo svoje kognitivne kapacitete.	In brief, epistemic maxims are second order principles that constitute an agent’s epistemic strategy: how should he think about the world? How can he make the best use of his cognitive abilities?
Nurkić 2021, str. 105-106	Cohen 2018, str. 3, fusnota 26
[...] maksime, između ostalog, mogu da predstavljaju evidencijalistička pravila prema kojima bi trebalo da sameravamo svoja verovanja spram evidencije koju posedujemo. Možemo da navedemo neke od maksima (Cohen, 2018: 4 ¹⁵): (i) Ne bi trebalo da ignorišem evidenciju u slučajevima kada je moje verovanje u suprotnosti sa njom;	[...] but in the meantime, note that the epistemic maxims I have in mind are of the sort “I will not ignore evidence in cases when it falsifies a belief I desire to be true” or “the degree of certainty of my belief ought to be proportioned to the evidence I possess”.
Nurkić 2021, str. 106	Cohen 2018, str. 6
Da bismo verovali odgovorno, moramo da budemo sigurni da su epistemičke maksime, na	[...] on my reading, believing responsibly consists in ensuring that the epistemic maxims that guide

¹⁵ Slično kao i u slučaju reference na Hatonov tekst, Nurkić i ovde pokušava da referira na [Cohen 2018] ali to čini pogrešno – ispravna referenca bila bi na fusnotu 26 na str. 3 u [Cohen 2018].

osnovu kojih formiramo verovanja, u skladu sa normativnim ograničenjima.	belief-acquisition are universalisable [...]
Nurkić 2021, str. 106	Cohen 2018, str. 5 i 6
<p>Da bih formulisao epistemičku verziju formule autonomije, razmotriću Kantovu formulaciju iz <i>Zasnivanja metafizike morala</i>¹⁶:</p> <p><i>Postupaj tako kao da bi trebalo da maksimu tvoga delanja postane tvojom voljom opšti prirodni zakon</i> (Kant, 2008: 61).</p> <p>Ovde možemo da primetimo da se normativnost, u praktičnom smislu, zasniva na subjektima koji postavljaju zakone. Naši kognitivni kapaciteti bi trebalo da budu izvor maksima koje nas obavezuju, čime se uspostavlja autonomija i univerzalnost.</p> <p>[...]</p> <p>Na sličan način, kao u prethodnoj verziji formule, epistemičku normativnost možemo da zasnujemo na racionalnom subjektu koji svoje kognitivne kapacitete smatra izvorom epistemičkih maksima koje ga obavezuju.</p>	<p>Ove rečenice nastale su parafrazom sledećih rečenica iz [Cohen 2018]: To make sense of the claim that our theoretical and practical enterprises are regulated by the same norm, let's go back once again to the moral case. Famously for Kant, maxims of action are only morally permissible if they pass a universalisability test. Its function is to rule out any maxim that cannot become a universal law: 'I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law'. [...] (str. 5)</p> <p>[...]</p> <p>[A]utonomy is the principle that grounds epistemic normativity as well as moral normativity. [...] Our capacity for self-legislation also underlies our cognitive activity. (str. 6)</p>
Nurkić 2021, str. 106	Cohen 2018, str. 6
Ako verujemo u skladu sa univerzalnim epistemičkim maksimama, koje sami sebi propisujemo, onda verujemo autonomno.	[...] we believe autonomously if we believe according to epistemic principles we give ourselves.
Nurkić 2021, str. 106	Cohen 2018, str. 6
Iako se predrasude, uobičajeno, smatraju neopravdanim verovanjima, za Hjuma i Kanta, one predstavljaju nelegitimni princip koji smo usvojili kao epistemičku maksimu (ili pravilo). Za njih, predrasude predstavljaju maksimu/pravilo objektivnog rasuđivanja zasnovanog na subjektivnim osnovama.	Whilst prejudice is commonly thought of as an unjustified belief, for Kant a prejudice is an illegitimate principle the subject has adopted as his epistemic maxim: 'Prejudice is a maxim of judging objectively from subjective grounds'.
Nurkić 2021, str. 107	Cohen 2018, str. 6
Iako navedene maksime predrasuda, kako kod Hjuma tako i kod Kanta, deluju različito, možemo da ih smatramo nedopustivim iz istog razloga: preporučuju upotrebu subjektivnih osnova rasuđivanja kao objektivnu. Ukoliko usvojimo ove maksime, verovaćemo heteronomno.	<p>Ove rečenice nastale su parafrazom delova sledećih rečenica iz [Cohen 2018]:</p> <p>[A]ll prejudiced epistemic maxims are ruled out as impermissible. [...]</p> <p>We let it be determined heteronomously through the adoption of prejudiced maxims that use subjective grounds as though they were objective.</p>
Nurkić 2021, str. 107	Cohen 2018, str. 6
<p>U prethodnom delu rada pokušao sam da pokažem da, za Hjuma i Kanta, verovanja podležu sledećim normativnim ograničenjima:</p> <p>(i) Epistemički subjekti ne bi trebalo da formiraju verovanja zasnovana na subjektivnim osnovama; i</p> <p>(ii) Proces formiranja verovanja bi trebalo uskladiti sa epistemičkim pravilima/ maksimama koja su univerzalna (važe za sve).</p>	To sum up, I have argued that for Kant, belief is subject to the following normative constraints. First and negatively, epistemic agents should not form beliefs based on mere subjective grounds. Second and positively, the process of belief-formation should be guided by epistemic maxims that are universalisable. I would like to end this section by suggesting that these constraints in fact

¹⁶ Kao što se može videti, ideja o poređenju etičke i epistemičke normativnosti kod Kanta, pa i o epistemičkim maksimama formulisanim po uzoru na kategorički imperativ („formula autonomije“) potiče iz [Cohen 2018] a Nurkić to ovde ni ne pominje tj. ne navodi odgovarajuću referencu.

Prema Kantu, izvor epistemičke normativnosti, kao što sam ranije pokazao, leži u zahtevu uma za autonomijom.	express one and the same demand, namely the demand to believe autonomously.
Nurkić 2021, str. 107-108	Cohen 2018, str. 6, fusnota 16
Naslov trećeg poglavlja ovog rada glasi <i>Sapere aude!</i> , što znači hrabrost korišćenja sopstvenog razuma. Ovaj moto adekvatno predstavlja Kantovo shvatanje epistemičke normativnosti, odnosno zahtev uma za autonomijom. <i>Prosvećenost je čovekov izlazak iz maloletnosti za koju je sam kriv. Maloletnost je nesposobnost služenja vlastitim razumom bez nečijeg vođstva. Čovek je sam kriv za ovu maloletnost, ako njen uzrok nije pomanjkanje razuma, nego rešenosti i hrabrosti da se njime služi bez nečijeg vođstva. Sapere aude! Imaj hrabrosti da se služiš vlastitim razumom! Ovo je, dakle, moto prosvećenosti.</i> (Kant, 1972: 41)	Kant's famous enlightenment motto formulates the demand for autonomy in the most striking way: ' <i>Enlightenment is the human being's emergence from his self-incurred minority. Minority is inability to make use of one's own understanding without direction from another. This minority is self-incurred when its cause lies not in lack of understanding but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! Have courage to make use of your own understanding!</i> is thus the motto of enlightenment' ('What is Enlightenment?' 17 [8:35]).
Nurkić 2021, str. 105	Cohen 2018, str. 7
Na osnovu toga, možemo da zaključimo da se zahtev za autonomijom odnosi, kako na moral, tako i na kogniciju.	[...] epistemic norms, both epistemic and moral normativity are grounded on reason's demand for autonomy

Dakle, kao što se može videti iz ovog tabelarnog prikaza, iz teksta [Cohen 2018] su doslovno preuzimane ili parafrizirane čitave rečenice bez odgovarajućeg i jasnog obeležavanja preuzetih delova i bez navođenja referenci. Nurkićevo izlaganje na str. 105–107 (Pododeljak 3.2 „Epistemičke maksime“) njegovog teksta je u značajnoj meri napisano po uzoru na [Cohen 2018, str. 3–7] i koristi se njenim idejama a da to eksplicitno ne navodi. Od Koen su preuzete i reference na Kanta (uključujući i citate iz Kantovih dela).

Ilustracija i napomena:

Nurkić 2021, str. 107	Napomena: kao što je jasno na osnovu prethodnih tabelarnih prikaza, u pasusima poput ovog Nurkić <i>sebi pripisuje</i> „predstavljanje“ i „ukazivanje“ o kojima piše ali se zapravo radi o tome da ti delovi njegovog teksta <i>ni u čemu nisu originalni</i> utoliko što se u celosti zasnivaju na (uglavnom) doslovnom preuzimanju (prevodenju, ponegde uz neznatne izmene) ili parafriziranju rečenica i čitavih pasusa iz [Espínosa 2016] i [Hickerson 2013] kada je u pitanju deo rada o Hjumu, i [Hutton 2019] i [Cohen 2008] kada je u pitanju deo rada o Kantu. Kao što je prethodno pokazano, Nurkić nije navodio odgovarajuće reference na ove tekstove i nije koristio navodnike tamo gde je bilo potrebno da to učini (npr. kada je redom doslovno prevodio čitave rečenice). Ilustrativni primeri ove vrste su u Nurkićevom tekstu podvučeni crvenom bojom.
U ovom, i prethodnom potpoglavlju, <u>predstavio sam</u> Kantovo shvatanje relacije uzročnosti, epistemičke maksime i epistemičku normativnost kao „zahtev uma za autonomijom“. Takođe <u>sam ukazao</u> na sličnosti između Hjuma i Kanta u pogledu shvatanja uzročnosti, uporedivši <i>Raspravu i Drugu analogiju</i> .	

Za razliku od teksta [Railton 1999], tekstove [Espinosa 2016], [Hickerson 2013], [Hutton 2019] i [Cohen 2008] Nurkić jeste naveo u spisku korišćene literature i povremeno je na njih i referirao u samom tekstu. Međutim, kao što se jasno vidi iz prethodno navedenog tabelarnog prikaza, Nurkić je preuzimao čitave rečenice i pasuse od ovih autora (najčešće doslovno) a nije navodio odgovarajuće reference na njihove tekstove (primera radi, na [Hutton 2019] je referirao samo jednom (i to pogrešno) a tekst na str. 103–105 Nurkićevog teksta (Odeljak 3. i Pododeljak 3.1) je gotovo u celosti preuzet/preveden od Hatona; slično važi i za Hickersonov tekst – na [Hickerson 2013] referirao je samo tri puta a gotovo celokupan tekst na str. 98–102 Nurkićevog teksta (Pododeljci 2.2 i 2.3) se sastoji od preuzimanja/prevođenja rečenica i pasusa od Hickersona).

Međutim, čak i one rečenice nakon kojih je naveo reference na ove tekstove prevashodno su *doslovno prevedene* tj. navedene su u gotovo istom obliku u kom su ih naveli i autori radova na koje Nurkić referira. Samim tim, to znači da je pre reč o *citatima* nego o parafrazi, zbog čega je bilo potrebno navesti navodnike. Međutim, Nurkić to nigde nije uradio. Mesta gde Nurkić zapravo navodi reference na tekstove [Espinosa 2016], [Hickerson 2013], [Hutton 2019] i [Cohen 2008] odnose se na konkretne, pojedinačne tvrdnje/rečenice i nikako se ne mogu smatrati dovoljnim kao vid navođenja izvora za čitave rečenice i pasuse koji su preuzeti/prevedeni iz tih tekstova. Navodim samo nekoliko primera:

Nurkić 2021, str. 95	Espinosa 2016, str. 286
Potrebno je izdvojiti tri kategorije u okviru opštih pravila (Espinosa, 2016: 286): (i) Ekstenzivna opšta pravila, ili predrasude; (ii) Opšti principi, koji odražavaju posebne, materijalne, karakteristike nekog fenomena (taj fenomen može pripadati fizici, politici, ekonomiji, etici...);	[I]t is necessary to distinguish not two (as has been often done), but three different categories within the concept of “general rule”. Firstly, there are extensive general rules of prejudice. Secondly, there are <i>general principles</i> which are, so to speak, materially determined, for they express specific properties or characteristics of phenomena (in physics, politics, economics, moral, for example) [...]
Nurkić 2021, str. 96	Espinosa 2016, str. 287
Ova pravila ne predstavljaju samo preporuke, nego i strukturu ispravnog funkcionisanja rasuđivanja, drugim rečima, predstavljaju epistemčki standard (Espinosa, 2016: 287). [...] racionalni epistemčki subjekt bi trebalo da veruje u <i>p</i> ako, i samo ako, postoji dovoljna evidencija na osnovu koje smatra da je <i>p</i> istinito (Espinosa, 2016: 287).	Those rules are not mere recommendations [...] They represent instead the structure of a corrected natural faculty of reason; in other words: a standard. [...] a rational agent should believe <i>p</i> if and only if, there is enough evidence for the truth of <i>p</i> .
Nurkić 2021, str. 97	Espinosa 2016, str. 288
Verovanja su, manje ili više, adekvatna u zavisnosti od stepena evidencije i iskustva. Ono što određuje adekvatnost verovanja su upravo opšta pravila (Espinosa: 2016: 288).	[B]elief, accordingly, can be more or less adequate, depending on the degree of evidence and experience available. Furthermore, general rules help to determine the level of adequacy.
Nurkić 2021, str. 98	Hickerson 2013, str. 1133
Prema definiciji modalnog doksastičkog involuntarizma, verovanja ne mogu da budu formirana na osnovu slobodnog izbora.	Hume’s <i>doxastic involuntarism</i> , i.e. his suggestion that belief <i>cannot be willed</i> .
Sa druge strane, pristalica doksastičkog voluntarizma smatra da posedujemo mogućnost da verujemo, ili da ne verujemo, na osnovu	Hickerson 2013, str. 1135
	[T]he modal doxastic voluntarist believes humans have a ‘power’, i.e. the ability to believe (or not believe) on the basis of willing. The modal

sopstvenog izbora, odnosno, na osnovu volje.	doxastic involuntarist, on the other hand, is someone who would deny humans have such a power.
Nurkić 2021, str. 99	Hickerson 2013, str. 1135
Prema globalnoj verziji doksastičkog involuntarizma, ono što je predmet volje, odnosno ono što slobodno želimo, nije od značaja za sadržaj naših verovanja (Hickerson, 2015: 1135 ¹⁷).	According to (global) modal doxastic involuntarism, what is willed is entirely irrelevant for what is believed.
Lokalni doksastički involuntarizam predstavlja manje radikalnu verziju, prema kojoj određeno verovanje \mathcal{Z} , ili određeni skup verovanja f , ne mogu da budu formirani na osnovu slobodnog izbora (Hickerson, 2015: 1135).	Local doxastic involuntarism would merely be the thesis that for some particular belief f , or some set of beliefs type F , the particular belief or set of beliefs cannot be (or are not) held as the result of willing.
Nurkić 2021, str. 103	Hutton 2019, str. 595
Zamislimo Džona koji posmatra Sneška Belića kako se topi (Hutton, 2018: 3). Da bi Džonovo posmatranje bilo moguće, on mora da poseduje tri osobine predstavljanja: (i) Mora da poseduje predstavu početnog stanja, Sneška koji stoji uspravno; (ii) Mora da poseduje predstavu stanja kao posledice, otopljenog Sneška; i (iii) Mora da poseduje predstavu početnog stanja koje prethodi stanju posledice.	Let's illustrate the problem with an example: Jones watches his beloved snowman melt. For this to happen, Jones must have a mental representation with three features: (a) it must represent the initial state, that is, the snowman standing tall; (b) it must represent the subsequent state, that is, the melted snowman; and (c) it must represent the initial state as preceding the subsequent state.
Nurkić 2021, str. 106	Cohen 2018, str. 5–6
Prema navedenom, epistemičku verziju formule autonomije možemo da formulišemo na sledeći način: <i>Def:</i> Veruj tako da tvoji kognitivni kapaciteti mogu da predstavljaju izvor univerzalnog zakona za sve tvoje maksime (Cohen, 2018: 5 ¹⁸).	If we apply this model to the epistemic realm, the formula of universal law would be formulated as follows: 'I ought never to believe except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.'

Kada je reč o Nurkićevom spisku literature i referencama u tekstu, indikativno je to što su jedine reference na tekstove [Allison 2004], [Engel 2007], [Hearn 1970, 1976], [Loeb 2002], [Lyons 2001], [O'Neill 1989], [Owens 2003], [Price 1969], [Stroud 1977], [McDowell 1994] potpuno iste kao one koje se navode u sekundarnoj literaturi koja je plagirana. Dakle, Nurkić referira samo i isključivo na ona mesta koja su navedena u tekstovima drugih autora od kojih je doslovno preuzimao rečenice i pasuse (bez referiranja i korišćenja navodnika tamo gde su onu potrebni) u kojima oni referiraju na ta mesta; jedina referenca koja odstupa jeste referenca na [Stroud 1977] na str. 101 ali ona je pogrešna utoliko što uopšte nema nikakve veze sa tekstom za koji je vezana; verovatno je reč o tome da je Nurkić pogrešno prepisao broj stranice od Hikersona, str. 10 umesto str. 11). Dakle, tekst [Nurkić 2021] ne predstavlja nikakvo svedočanstvo da je autor ikada video ili pročitao delove literature koju navodi. Preuzimanjem rečenica drugih autora bez navođenja referenci, Nurkić je od njih naprosto preuzeo i reference koje su oni navodili.

Kada je reč o referencama na Hjumovu *Raspravu o ljudskoj prirodi*, indikativno je to što su jedine reference koje upućuju na tačna mesta u knjizi one koje Nurkić stavlja nakon dužih citata (koje je, ¹⁷ Nurkić u citavom tekstu pogrešno referira na Hikersonov članak – članak je objavljen 2013, a ne 2015. godine.

¹⁸ Ova referenca deluje proizvoljno – u tekstu [Cohen 2018] se ne javlja ovakva formulacija niti definicija.

kao što je pokazano u tabelarnom prikazu gore, takođe samo preuzeo iz tekstova [Espinosa 2016] i [Hickerson 2013]). Kada je reč o preostalim referencama na *Raspravu*, one su sve pogrešne. Primera radi. (Hjum 1983: 114) bi trebalo da bude (Hjum 1983: 95), (Hjum 1983: 125-135) bi trebalo da bude (Hjum 1983: 113), (Hjum 1983: 247, 270, 389) bi trebalo da bude (Hjum 1983: 355-6, 381, 389), itd.

Kvantitativno posmatrano, procenat plagiranog teksta je veći od 50%. Gore izneseni dokazi pokazuju da su osnovne ideje, teze i poente, kao i struktura i redosled izlaganja u Nurkićevom tekstu preuzeti iz sekundarne literature a da pritom u najvećem broju slučajeva nije eksplicitno navedeno šta je od toga preuzeto od drugih autora. Kao što je jasno na osnovu prethodnih tabelarnih prikaza, Nurkić često *sebi pripisuje* „predstavljanje“, „ukazivanje“ i „dolaženje do zaključaka“ u onim delovima njegovog teksta koji *ni u čemu nisu originalni* utoliko što se u celosti zasnivaju na (uglavnom) doslovnom preuzimanju (prevođenju, ponegde uz neznatne izmene) ili parafraziranju rečenica i čitavih pasusa iz prethodno navedenih izvora. Kao što sam pomenio, ilustrativni primeri ove vrste su u Nurkićevom tekstu podvučeni crvenom bojom. Na taj način se stiče utisak da je skoro sve o čemu Nurkić piše u radu njegov originalni rezultat, a na isti zaključak (pogrešno) navodi i Nurkićevo veoma autoritativno pisanje u prvom licu. Međutim, uvidom u gore navedeni tabelarni prikaz jasno se može utvrditi da u većini takvih slučajeva Nurkić zapravo prisvaja tuđe rezultate.

U prilogu ovog Zahteva dostavljam:

1. Tekst Petra Nurkića „Hjum i Kant o epistemičkoj normativnosti“ (*Theoria* 64 (3), 2021, str. 91–112) u kojem su, redom, obeleženi delovi sa plagiranim rečenicama i to na sledeći način:
 - a. Žutom bojom – delovi preuzimani iz [Railton 1999];
 - b. Zelenom bojom – delovi preuzimani iz [Espinosa 2016];
 - c. Roze bojom – delovi preuzimani iz [Hickerson 2013];
 - d. Plavom bojom – delovi preuzimani iz [Hutton 2019];
 - e. Narandžastom bojom – delovi preuzimani iz [Cohen 2018];
2. Tekstove [Railton 1999], [Espinosa 2016], [Hickerson 2013], [Hutton 2019] i [Cohen 2008] u kojima su odgovarajućim bojama obeleženi delovi teksta koje je Nurkić plagirao.

U prilogu dostavljam i Izveštaj komisije od 03.02.2022. sa predlogom za izbor Petra Nurkića u zvanje asistenta na Odeljenju za filozofiju. U izveštaju se ističe da se Petar Nurkić izdvaja po broju i kvalitetu svojih radova, a za Nurkićeve radove se kaže da su „sadržinski kvalitetniji kada je reč o interpretaciji, prikazu i analizi filozofskih problema i gledišta kojima se bave, a filozofska argumentacija koja je u njima izložena konzistentnija je i sistematičnija“ (u odnosu na radove drugih kandidata). Jedan od radova o kojima govori komisija je upravo rad „Hjum i Kant o epistemičkoj normativnosti“ koji je predmet ovog Zahteva. Može se reći da bi Petar Nurkić uz pomoć tog rada mogao da ostvari dodatni interes (u vidu izbora u asistentsko zvanje i zaposlenja na Odeljenju za filozofiju).

Podnosilac zahteva: dr Filip Čukljević

Zvanje: naučni saradnik

Radno mesto: Institut za filozofiju

Univerzitet u Beogradu

Filozofski fakultet

E-pošta: filipcukljovic@beograd.rs

Potpis: Filip Čukljović

Beograd, 11.02.2022.

Petar Nurkić

HJUMOVO I KANTOVO SHVATANJE EPISTEMIČKE NORMATIVNOSTI

APSTRAKT: *Pitanje (d) kako formiramo verovanja?, podrazumeva deskriptivne odgovore. Sa druge strane, pitanje (n) kako bi trebalo da formiramo verovanja?, podrazumeva normativne odgovore. Da li možemo da pružimo odgovore na (n) pitanja bez odgovora na (d) pitanja? Ova (n)-(d) relacija može da se okarakterise kao epistemička normativnost. Hjum i Kant pružaju odgovore na oba pitanja. Hjum je skloniji psihologizaciji ovih odgovora kroz empirijski pristup pitanjima koja se odnose na verovanja. Dok je Kant skloniji razmatranju a priori uslova našeg rasuđivanja. Kroz opšta pravila i epistemičke maksime. Hjum i Kant pružaju normativna uputstva u skladu sa kojima bi trebalo da formiramo verovanja. Međutim, da bismo uopšte mogli da govorimo o normativnosti, moramo da odgovorimo na pitanja koja se odnose na doksastički voluntarizam. Kod Kanta je pitanje slobode, donekle, očigledan preduslov njegovih kritika (naročito praktičkog uma). Dok je kod Hjuma, upravo zbog njegovog empirijskog pristupa verovanjima i željama, stvar nejasnija, i deluje kao da Hjum zastupa doksastički involuntarizam. U ovom radu pokušaću da predstavim sličnosti između Hjuma i Kanta u pogledu epistemičke normativnosti. Tamo gde izgleda kao da su njihova stanovišta nespojiva, pokušaću da ispitam zašto je to slučaj. Usredsređiću se na Hjumovu Raspravu o ljudskoj prirodi i Kantovu Drugu analogiju. Na kraju ću da ponudim par misaonih eksperimenata kroz koje ću pokušati da „testiram“ Hjuma i Kanta. Ukoliko uspem da potvrdim početne hipoteze onda će ovaj rad predstavljati uspešan epistemički poduhvat. Međutim, ako ne uspem da pronađem očekivane sličnosti, između Hjumovog i Kantovog shvatanja epistemičke normativnosti, onda se ovaj rad može okarakterisati kao istorijski pristup normativnom okviru „dogmatskog dremeža“.*

KLJUČNE REČI: *Hjum, Kant, epistemička normativnost, doksastički voluntarizam, opšta pravila, epistemičke maksime*

1. Umesto uvoda: o lenjirima i blokovima¹

Normativnost, na našu sreću ili žalost, predstavlja jedan od centralnih pojmova koje filozofi koriste dok razmatraju neke od najzagonetnijih pojava ljudskog života. Normativnost često koristimo kada uspostavljamo distinkcije između ispravnog i pogrešnog, istinitog i neistinitog, aktualnog i mogućeg. Etika, estetika i epistemologija predstavljaju samo neke od oblasti u okviru kojih nas filozofska istraživanja uvlače u raspravu o normativnosti.

Norme, pravila i standardi poseduju dugu etimološku istoriju. Latinska *norma* je označavala gradivni blok, dok je *regulus*, takođe latinski izraz, označavao pravi ivicu ili lenjir. Za nas *regulus* znači pravilo. Svakome, ko se ikada našao u okolnostima u kojima je morao da preseče dasku ili ciglu, je jasno da bi taj rez bio vrlo nespretna bez ivice po kojoj sečemo željeni oblik. Odstupanja, između našeg reza i šablona po kojem je trebalo da sečemo, ukazuju na ono što treba da „popravimo“.

Na sličan način, kroz svakodnevno iskustvo, koristimo različita pravila i norme koje bi trebalo da usmere naše ponašanje, bilo da se radi o postupcima ili rasuđivanju. Iako je ova analogija ilustrativna, treba da imamo u vidu da su *norma* i *regulus* očigledni u kontekstu gradilišta, ali da to nije uvek slučaj kad je reč o rasuđivanju i postupcima. Kada pokušamo da predstavimo filozofsko shvatanje normativnosti, pitanja koja se prirodno nameću su „zašto?“ i „kada?“. Okolnosti u kojima se primenjuje filozofsko shvatanje normativnosti su daleko osetljivije od svakodnevnih okolnosti kućnih poslova.

Vrsta normativnosti kojom ću se baviti u daljem nastavku rada je epistemička normativnost. Smatram da je, za razliku od pojma normativnosti u etici, epistemička normativnost nedovoljno ispitana. Kako bih odgovorio na što veći broj pitanja u vezi sa epistemičkom normativnošću usredsrediću se na Hjumovo i Kantovo rumačenje. Hjum se smatra epistemičkim naturalistom, štaviše, paradigmatičnim primerom i prvim jasnim predstavnikom, kao i jednim od radikalnijih kritičara tradicionalne filozofije, u kojoj se obračunavao sa brojnim sholastičkim i metafizičkim nametanjima različitih normi i pravila. U tom smislu, Hjum se ne smatra simpatizerom normativnosti, naprotiv. Sa druge strane, Kantovo čuveno pitanje *šta treba da činim?*, predstavlja osnov za brojne rasprave o normativnosti. Međutim, iako se Kantovo shvatanje normativnosti često ispitivalo u okvirima etike i estetike, smatram da je epistemološka perspektiva neopravdano zanemarena. Iz navedenih razloga, pokušaću da uporedim Hjumovo i Kantovo shvatanje epistemičke normativnosti. Pokušaću da pronađem zajedničke elemente njihovog shvatanja relacije uzročnosti, kontrole koju imamo nad

¹ Želeo bih da zahvalim svom mentoru, Mašanu Bogdanovskom, na iscrpnim komentarima i strpljenju da sasluša i usmeri moje ideje o mešanju baba i žaba, bez čega bi ovaj rad imao duplo manje fusnota.

doksastičkim stanjima, izvora epistemičke normativnosti kao i, ukoliko postoje, pravila na osnovu kojih bi trebalo da formiramo svoja verovanja.

Čak i u slučaju da ne pronađem sličnosti, koje očekujem da ću da pronađem, rezultat ove komparativne analize u pogledu epistemičke normativnosti biće instruktivan za dalja istraživanja u oblasti istorije filozofije.

2. U šta bi mudri trebalo da veruju?

U ovom poglavlju pokušaću da predstavim normativnu dimenziju Hjumovog shvatanja verovanja. Kako bih to učinio izložiću Hjumova opšta pravila iz *Rasprave o ljudskoj prirodi*. Pokušaću da, uprkos naturalističkom okviru Hjumove epistemologije, identifikujem normativne elemente njegovog shvatanja verovanja i rasuđivanja. Smatram da ne postoji kontradikcija između naturalističkih i normativnih aspekata Hjumove epistemologije. Odnosno, da možemo da pronađemo srednji put kroz naturalizaciju normativnosti.

2.1 Opšta pravila

Za Hjumova opšta pravila možemo, s pravom, da kažemo da zauzimaju značajno mesto u *Raspravi*. Iako, Hjum, pojam „pravila“ koristi pridajući mu bar tri različita značenja (Hearn, 1970: 404-406), opšta pravila su prisutna u svakoj od tri knjige *Rasprave*. Međutim, kako bi poslužila ostvarivanju cilja ovog rada, razmatraću samo problem normativnosti prisutan u opštim pravilima. Normativno značenje, koje želim da razmotrim, nalazi se u trećem delu prve knjige *Rasprave*. Ovde, ujedno, možemo da pronađemo prvo obimnije pojašnjenje opštih pravila i njihovog uticaja na naša rasuđivanja i verovanja (Hjum, 1983: 161-163).

Opšta pravila se pojavljuju u okviru Hjumovog razmatranja verovatnoće i predstavljaju generalizacije, odnosno sklonost naše imaginacije² da uopštava, na osnovu prethodnih iskustava i navike. Iako se o Hjumovim opštim pravilima može govoriti kao o pukoj deskripciji funkcionisanja našeg kognitivnog sistema, pokušaću da istaknem njihovu normativnu dimenziju. Takođe, ne poseduju sve generalizacije isti status, postoje opšta pravila izvedena iz predrasuda (ekstenzivna opšta pravila) i opšta pravila izvedena iz relacije uzročnosti (korektivna opšta pravila) (Espinosa, 2016: 284). Način na koji opšta pravila utiču na naše rasuđivanje je, takođe, predstavljen u odeljcima XI-XV *Rasprave*. Hjumovo razmatranje verovatnoće nastalo je kao posledica analize verovanja i procesa kojima formiramo verovanja. Prema Hjumu, verovanje je snažna

2 Umesto termina „imaginacija“, možemo da koristimo termin „uobrazilja“. U prevodima Hjumovih i Kantovih dela se koristi „uobrazilja“, međutim, budući da se ovde radi o sinonimima, upotreba jednog ili drugog termina predstavlja stilsko opredeljenje.

i stabilna ideja koja je usmerena ka istini (Hjum, 1983: 114). Hjum identifikuje neke od mehanizama koji imaju veće izgleda da ispune naša epistemička očekivanja i spreče da naše ideje postanu samo „puki izdanci imaginacije“ (Loeb, 2002: 13). U odeljku o verovatnoći uzroka, Hjum sugerije da se naše rasuđivanje temelji na navici i opštim pravilima, a da nas navika može dovesti do „lažnog upoređivanja ideja“ (Hjum, 1983: 125-135). Ova pojava se dešava kada, zbog težnje imaginacije da generalizuje, formiramo opšta pravila poput, čuvenog Hjumovog primera, *Irac ne može imati duhovitost a Francuz ne može imati temeljitost* (Hjum, 1983: 138). Ova vrsta rasuđivanja pripada nefilozofskoj vrsti verovatnoće i zasnovana je na opštim pravilima koja su ishitreno izvedena i koja predstavljaju izvor predrasuda. Kao što sam napomenuo, postoje dve vrste opštih pravila a predrasude predstavljaju prvu vrstu. Za prvu vrstu opštih pravila je karakteristično proširivanje opsega rasuđivanja, nastalog u jednom spletu okolnosti, na drugi splet okolnosti koji naliči, ali nije identičan prethodnim okolnostima (Hearn, 1970: 405).

Iako svako rasuđivanje, zasnovano na verovatnoći, nastaje na osnovu navike, prethodnog iskustva i imaginacije, razum nije primoran da prati ono što Hjum naziva „prirodnim težnjama“. Moguće je sprečiti formiranje neistinitih verovanja zasnovanih na pravilima predrasuda, odnosno sprečiti pridavanje izvesnosti proizvodima imaginacije, sličnosti i kontigvitetu³ (Hjum: 1983, 105). Način da to učinimo je promišljanje, refleksija, ili „drugi nivo rasuđivanja“⁴. Posredstvom refleksije, imaginacija i sklonost generalizaciji, mogu da proizvedu „filozofske verovatnoće“. Hjum izdvaja dve značajne funkcije refleksije u pogledu naših mentalnih aktivnosti (Hjum: 1983: 135; Espinosa: 2016, 285):

- (i) Usmeravanje sklonosti generalizacije ka obrascima ispravnog rasuđivanja, kroz korektivna opšta pravila;
- (ii) Identifikovanje, kroz korekciju, slučajeva u kojima rasuđujemo spram pravila navedenih u (i).

Posredovanje refleksije nam omogućava da uspostavimo korektivna opšta pravila, kojima možemo da utičemo na rasuđivanje, uprkos trenutnim opažajima i iskustvu. U centralnom delu rasprave o korektivnim pravilima Hjum navodi sledeće:

Razmotrićemo docnije neka opšta pravila po kojima treba da podešavamo naše sudeње o uzrocima i posledicama; a ta su pravila obrazovana na prirodi našeg razuma i na našem iskustvu njegovih delovanja u sudovima koje obrazujemo o predmetima.

3 Slično kao u prvoj fusnoti, korišćenje termina „kontigvitet“ predstavlja davanje stilske prednosti u odnosu na termin „stalna združenost“.

4 Čitanjem Hjumove *Rasprave*, možemo uvideti da refleksija nije nikakva mistična sposobnost niti vrsta ezoteričnog unutrašnjeg čula. Refleksija predstavlja pažljivo promišljanje i razmatranje principa u skladu sa kojima formiramo verovanja. Ako refleksiju protumačimo na ovaj način, to će biti sasvim dovoljno za potrebe ovog rada.

Ona nas uče da razlikujemo slučajne okolnosti od dejstvenih uzroka [...] Opšte pravilo pripisuje se našem suđenju, kao opsežnijem i stalnijem (Hjum, 1983:140).

Hjum, u narednom paragrafu, nastavlja rečenicom: *Katkada preovlađuje jedan a katkada drugi, prema nastrojenosti i naravi čoveka. Proste ljude obično vode prvi, a mudre drugi* (Hjum, 1983: 141). U skladu sa vrstom pravila, kojima se vodimo, Hjum postavlja kriterijume koje epistemički subjekt mora da zadovolji da bismo ga smatrali racionalnim. Na racionalnog epistemičkog subjekta utiču epistemičke norme i na osnovu tih normi moguće je zauzeti „kritičku filozofsku perspektivu“ (Espinosa, 2016: 285). Mudri, uz pomoć korektivnih opštih pravila, poseduju zdrava doksastička stanja i formiraju verovanja čiji sadržaj ne zavisi od hirova i ličnih preferencija.

Opšta pravila su, prema Hjumu, neizostavna za objašnjenje veze između predmeta našeg saznanja i metoda koji bi trebalo da sledimo kako bismo došli do istog tog saznanja. Potrebno je izdvojiti tri kategorije u okviru opštih pravila (Espinosa, 2016: 286):

- (i) Ekstenzivna opšta pravila, ili predrasude;
- (ii) Opšti principi, koji odražavaju posebne, materijalne, karakteristike nekog fenomena (taj fenomen može pripadati fizici, politici, ekonomiji, etici...);
- (iii) Pravila koja, prethodno formirana na osnovu verovatnoće, postaju pravila na osnovu relacije uzročnosti.

Na osnovu prve dve vrste, možemo da napravimo prostor za uspostavljanje treće vrste pravila, korektivnih pravila. Opšta pravila predstavljaju „logiku“ rasuđivanja o verovatnoći i neophodna su za formiranje pouzdanih verovanja, na kojima se sve nauke zasnivaju (Hjum, 1983: 144). Stoga, korektivna opšta pravila vrše trostruku funkciju:

- (iii*) Predstavljaju model za pouzdano formiranje, i korekciju, verovanja;
- (iii**) Koriguju rasuđivanje zasnovano na prvoj vrsti opštih pravila (Hjum, 1983: 144);
- (iii***) Omogućavaju nam da kroz refleksiju, odnosno analizu nereflektivnog rasuđivanja, identifikujemo kognitivni izvor iz kojeg su potekla neistinita verovanja (Hjum, 1983: 99).

Opšta pravila i Hjumovo shvatanje relacije uzročnosti

Nakon razmatranja filozofskih verovatnoća i njihove zavisnosti od relacije uzročnosti, Hjum je uspostavio *Pravila po kojima suditi o uzrocima i posledicama* (Hjum, 1983: 160-163). Postoji osam kriterijuma koji nam omogućavaju da razlikujemo relaciju stalne združenosti i prividne uzročne relacije. Ovi kriterijumi nam dozvoljavaju da proverimo ispravnost rasuđivanja i verovanja zasnovanih na relaciji uzročnosti. Dalje, Hjum napominje da su ovih osam kriterijuma [...] *sva logika koju smatram umesnom da upotrebim u svojim umovanjima* (Hjum: 1983, 162). Opšta pravila za uzročno rasuđivanje su prirodan zaključak koji Hjum izvodi iz razmatranja verovatnoće u *Raspravi*. Ne samo zbog toga što je svako rasuđivanje, koje se odnosi na činjenice, zasnovano na uzročnoj relaciji, nego i zbog toga što nam ovakvo rasuđivanje

donosi mnogo više koristi nego rasuđivanje zasnovano na pukoj sličnosti i kontigvitetu (Hjum, 1983: 105).

Postoje brojna druga pravila (u okviru opštih pravila) koja takode utiču na naša verovanja, sličnom živošću i snagom, ali su takva pravila zasnovana na sličnosti između ideja i činjenica, opravdanja za takva verovanja ne možemo da pronađemo u iskustvu. Ovde Hjum govori o lakovernosti, olakom verovanju u svedočanstva drugih, kao i o obrazovanju. Lakovernost i obrazovanje zasnovani su na vrlo sličnim osnovama kao navike i pojave koje se često ponavljaju u našem iskustvu (Hjum, 1983: 109). Sličnost sa iskustvom rasuđivanja, zasnovanom na uzrocima i posledicama, dovodi do epistemičkog neopreza i zaključivanja koje ne može da bude opravdano pozivanjem na iskustvo. Ova pravila ne predstavljaju samo preporuke, nego i strukturu ispravnog funkcionisanja rasuđivanja, drugim rečima, predstavljaju epistemički standard (Espinosa, 2016: 287). Upravo ovde možemo pronaći i poreklo normativnosti opštih pravila. Opšta pravila poseduju drugačiji status od verovanja, Lyons (2001: 273) ih naziva drugim redom mentalnih stanja. Funkcija opštih pravila je da koriguju i stabilizuju „sentiment verovanja“ (Hearn, 1976: 65), koji nastaje na osnovu prirodnih, uzročnih faktora.

Na osnovu paragrafa Hjumove *Rasprave*, odnosno njihovog karaktera epistemičkih preporuka, smatram da su korektivna opšta pravila normativna, a ne deskriptivna. Ova pravila predstavljaju uputstva za formiranje i korigovanje verovanja. U narednom potpoglavlju ispitaću odnos verovanja i istine u Hjumovoj *Raspravi*.

Opšta pravila i istinita verovanja

Postavljanjem pitanja o odnosu između verovanja i istine, ujedno postavljamo pitanje o epistemičkim ciljevima. Jednostavnije rečeno, ako postoji epistemička normativnost, u smislu korekcije onog što „jeste“ i preporuka za ono što „treba“, onda se taj prelaz, sa deskriptivnog na normativno, zasniva na određenom epistemičkom cilju. Ovaj epistemički cilj, koji ću ispitati u ovom potpoglavlju, predstavlja osnov za praćenje normativnih preporuka.

Kao što sam ranije obrazložio, epistemičke norme predstavljaju standard za ispravno verovanje. Ispitaću da li su epistemičke norme usmerene ka njihovom, uobičajenom, cilju – istini. Prema Hjumovom evidencijalističkom stanovištu, racionalni epistemički subjekt bi trebalo da veruje u *p* ako, i samo ako, postoji dovoljna evidencija na osnovu koje smatra da je *p* istinito (Espinosa, 2016: 287). Isto važi i u slučaju opštih pravila: ako su A, B i C principi prema kojima formiramo istinita verovanja, to znači da su verovanja koja su u skladu sa tim principima, pouzdanija i verovatnije istinita, nego verovanja koja nisu u skladu sa njima⁵. Međutim, ne treba da ispustimo iz vida

5 Postoji veliki broj tekstova iz kojih možemo da saznamo, posredno i neposredno, više o Hjumovom evidencijalizmu, pogledati (Lyons, 2001; Owens, 2003; Engel, 2007; Bogdanovski, 1996, 2006, 2012).

da je Hjum bio naturalista, što nas dovodi do centralnog problema ovog poglavlja, usklađivanja Hjumovog naturalizma i epistemičke normativnosti.

Čak i da su verovanja usmerena ka istini⁶, naturalistički prigovor ne možemo tako lako da odbacimo. Naturalisti smatraju da ne postoji ništa normativno u verovanju, kao i da ne postoje uputstva za formiranje istinitih verovanja (Engel, 2007: 179). Međutim, epistemička normativnost nije stvar nužnosti, nego opsega. Drugim rečima, epistemička normativnost se odnosi na ono što nije nužno, ne odnosi se na disanje, svakodnevno smenjivanje dana i noći, ili bilo koju logičku ili fizičku nužnost. Opseg normativnosti, koji sam pomenuo, tiče se svakodnevnog iskustva. Kao što ne treba da ispustimo iz vida Hjumov naturalizam, tako ne treba ni da zatvorimo oči pred činjenicom da je Hjum bio filozof zdravog razuma, zainteresovan za svakodnevno iskustvo. Verovanje i disanje predstavljaju dva različita stanja, verovanje se odnosi na kategorije koje smatramo normativnim, odnosi se na rasuđivanje, slobodu izbora i racionalnost.

Pre nego što u sledećem poglavlju pokušam da odgovorim na pitanje da li su naša verovanja pod našom doksastičkom kontrolom, na šta naturalisti imaju negativan odgovor, pokušaću da izložim još nekoliko Hjumovih stavova iz *Rasprave*, i na taj način postavim temelj za razmatranje involuntarizma. Ako su sloboda i racionalnost sastavni deo naših doksastičkih života onda postoji prostor za normativnost. Smatram da se Hjum udaljava od prvog, deskriptivnog dela *Rasprave* ka razmatranju mehanizama refleksije kojima možemo da korigujemo svoja verovanja i zaključimo da formiranje verovanja nije puki mehanički proces. Korektivna opšta pravila su usmerena ka rasuđivanju, samim tim možemo da ih smatramo standardima racionalnosti. Verovanja su, manje ili više, adekvatna u zavisnosti od stepena evidencije i iskustva. Ono što određuje adekvatnost verovanja su upravo opšta pravila (Espínosa: 2016: 288). Posredstvom refleksije, epistemički subjekt, dolazi do zaključka da su uputstva za formiranje verovanja, odnosno norme, prirodne kao i pomenuto disanje. Ako nam uputstva obezbeđuju, u većoj ili manjoj meri, formiranje istinitih verovanja, onda je njihovo usvajanje sasvim prirodno. Istina korisno doprinosi našem svakodnevnom iskustvu, bilo da se radi o bazičnim biološkim potrebama, ili o sofisticiranim aspektima društvenog života. U krajnjoj liniji, ignorisanje uputstava može pukim slučajem da nas odvede ka istinitim verovanjima, ali je veća verovatnoća da nas epistemička neopreznost može dovesti u bolne okolnosti, bilo da se radi o vreloj ringli ili nepoloženom ispitu.

Prema Hjumu, uzročna relacija je neizbežna i nužno je usmerena ka realnosti. U skladu sa tim, možemo da zaključimo da je Hjum smatrao da svi rasuđuju u skladu sa

6 Hjum u *Raspravi* ne koristi termin „istina“, umesto toga koristi termin „realnost“. Ukoliko istinu predstavimo kao korespondenciju i pokušamo da rekonstruujemo mesto istine u Hjumovoj epistemologiji, ne bismo ostvarili korisne uvide. Međutim, ako o istini, kao mestu u Hjumovoj epistemologiji, govorimo kao o epistemičkom cilju onda možemo da izjednačimo realnost i istinu, jer za Hjuma realnost predstavlja epistemički cilj.

opštim pravilima. Međutim, time što svi rasuđuju u skladu sa pravilima to znači da svi, takođe, prave greške u koje ih vodi neispravno korišćenje pravila. Na kraju, pozvaću se na delove Hjumove *Rasprave*: potrebno nam je da rasuđujemo ispravno zato što želimo stvari, a da bismo dobili ono što želimo moramo da identifikujemo efikasno sredstvo kojim možemo da ostvarimo svoje ciljeve. Ispravno uzročno rasuđivanje je nužan uslov ostvarivanja ciljeva koje želimo. Stoga, kao odgovorni epistemički subjekti, moramo da uskladimo svoje rasuđivanje sa epistemičkim normama kako bismo zadovoljili svoje želje (Hjum, 1983: 247, 270, 389).

2.2 Da li je Hjum doksastički involuntarista?

U prethodnom potpoglavlju predstavio sam Hjumova opšta pravila kao prirodne principe u skladu sa kojima bi trebalo da formiramo verovanja. Izneo sam razloge zbog kojih smatram da je, bez obzira na Hjumov naturalistički pristup epistemološkim pitanjima, posredstvo refleksije moguće. Prema Hjumu, refleksija predstavlja ono što razlikuje mudre od vulgarnih. Pitanje na koje želim da ponudim odgovor u ovom potpoglavlju tiče se Hjumovog doksastičkog involuntarizma. Da bi refleksija mogla da posluži kao osnov za uspostavljanje korektivnih opštih pravila, ona mora da bude voluntarna. Hjum se često, zbog naturalističkog pristupa saznanju, tumači kao doksastički involuntarista. Ukoliko uspem da pronađem način da Hjuma okarakterišem kao doksastičkog voluntaristu, moći ću da ostvarim cilj ovog poglavlja, odnosno, da pokažem zašto Hjumov epistemički naturalizam ne stoji u suprotnosti sa epistemičkom normativnošću.

Pitanje u naslovu ovog potpoglavlja glasi „Da li je Hjum doksastički involuntarista?“. Odgovor na to pitanje je „Da“. U *Raspravi* postoji dovoljno tekstualne evidencije koja ukazuje na Hjumov involuntarizam u pogledu verovanja. Takođe, veliki broj hjumovaca smatra da mu etiketa involuntariste pristaje. Međutim, u ovom potpoglavlju želim da pokažem da Hjum, ako njegov projekat okarakterišemo kao involuntaristički, nije uspeo u svojim namerama. Kao i da pokažem zašto se Hjumu ne može pripisati involuntarizam bez problema koji bi pratili takvo tumačenje.

Iskoristiću definiciju modalnog doksastičkog involuntarizma, koju je ponudio Rajan Hikerson [Ryan Hickerson] (2015: 1135). Prema definiciji modalnog doksastičkog involuntarizma, verovanja ne mogu da budu formirana na osnovu slobodnog izbora. Sa druge strane, pristalica doksastičkog voluntarizma smatra da posedujemo mogućnost da verujemo, ili da ne verujemo, na osnovu sopstvenog izbora, odnosno, na osnovu volje. Na osnovu trećeg dela, druge knjige, Hjumove *Rasprave* (naročito u prva tri poglavlja) i Hikersonove definicije, možemo izdvojiti globalnu i lokalnu verziju modalnog doksastičkog involuntarizma.

Globalni doksastički involuntarizam⁷

Prema globalnoj verziji doksastičkog involuntarizma, ono što je predmet volje, odnosno ono što slobodno želimo, nije od značaja za sadržaj naših verovanja (Hickerson: 2015: 1135). Globalni doksastički involuntarista smatra da je verovanje, u odnosu na volju, odvojena kognitivna aktivnost. Drugim rečima, kakvi god da su mehanizmi kojima formiramo verovanja, mehanizmi koje, prema Hjumovom mišljenju, delimo sa životinjama i koje je moguće ispitati kroz naučne eksperimente (Hjum: 1983, 342-348), involuntarista smatra da oni funkcionišu nezavisno od volje. Dakle, ako se globalna verzija poklapa sa pravim stanjem našeg doksastičkog života, onda je psihološki nemoguće formirati verovanja slobodnim izborom. Takođe, globalna verzija se odnosi na sva naša verovanja. Međutim, potrebno je razmotriti verziju modalnog doksastičkog involuntarizma koji se ne odnosi na sva, nego samo na deo naših verovanja.

Lokalni doksastički involuntarizam

Lokalni doksastički involuntarizam predstavlja manje radikalnu verziju, prema kojoj određeno verovanje Z , ili određeni skup verovanja f , ne mogu da budu formirani na osnovu slobodnog izbora (Hickerson, 2015: 1135). Ako razmotrimo svakodnevne okolnosti u kojima se nalazimo, pretpostavka da su neka od naših verovanja, manje ili više, pod našom voluntarnom kontrolom, deluje prihvatljivo. Imam slobodu da izaberem da li ću da verujem u svedočanstvo svog prijatelja ili neke druge osobe, ali kada je reč o neposrednim čulnim iskustvima, verovanju da je automobil ispred mene crvene boje, onda je pitanje da li imam slobodu da poverujem u svoje neposredne čulne opažaje, deplasirano. Ova distinkcija nam dozvoljava da razmotrimo nad kakvim verovanjima imamo doksastičku kontrolu, kao i da postavimo pitanje o epistemičkoj odgovornosti, ukoliko postoje verovanja koja sam formirao slobodnim izborom.

U *Raspravi* možemo da pronademo nekoliko paragrafa na osnovu kojih možemo Hjumu da pripišemo zastupanje, kako globalne tako i lokalne verzije, modalnog doksastičkog involuntarizma.

Drugo, um ima vlast nad svim svojim predstavama i može da ih razdvaja, sjedinjuje, meša i menja kako god mu se sviđa: tako da, kad bi se verovanje sastojalo samo u novoj predstavi prisajedinjenoj poimanju, bilo bi u čovekovoj vlasti da veruje šta hoće. Stoga možemo zaključiti da se verovanje sastoji prosto u izvesnom osećanju ili čuvstvu, u nečemu što ne zavisi od volje, već mora da nastane od izvesnih određenih uzroka i principa kojima mi ne gospodarimo (Hjum, 1983: 524).

Dakle, jasno je da Hjum sugerise da ne možemo da verujemo u šta god poželimo. Sličnu tezu možemo da prepoznamo u četvrtom delu, prve knjige, *Rasprave*.

7 Naravno, Hjum bi bio vrlo zbunjen ovakvom upotrebom termina „modalno“. Hjum je bio kompatibilista, međutim, ovde ću sebi dati malo više slobodnog prostora, u svrhu moguće epistemičke koristi kao posledice ovako dopuštene diskusije.

Priroda nas je, apsolutno i nesagledivom mižnošću, opredelila da rasuđujemo kao god i da dišemo i osećamo; i mi ne možemo izbeći da sagledamo izvesne predmete u jačoj i potpunijoj svetlosti, iz razloga njihove uobičajene povezanosti sa nekim datim utiskom, isto onako kao što ne možemo sprečiti sebe da mislimo dok smo budni, ili da vidimo okolna tela kad ka njima okrenemo oči pri punoj sunčanoj svetlosti (Hjum, 1983: 168-169).

U ovom paragrafu, Hjum govori o snazi i živosti neposrednih čulnih utisaka. Involuntaristički ton Hjumovih pojmova, poput „snage“ i „živosti“, sugerišć da ne možemo da sprečimo da formiramo verovanje kada se nađemo u okolnostima koje su prirodne za formiranje verovanja (Hickerson: 2015: 1137). Verovanje upravo i jeste samo posebno živa ideja. Ono što je dovoljno za ostvarivanje cilja ovog potpoglavlja, odnosno ono što je dovoljno da okarakterišemo Hjuma kao modalnog doksastičkog involuntaristu (u skladu sa definicijom koju sam predstavio) je pozivanje na sintagmu u okviru prethodnog navoda, „apsolutna i nesaglediva nužnost“. Ovakva vrsta nužnosti, prema Hjumu, ista je kao i nužnost disanja, nužnost nadražaja topline kada stojimo pored vatre, prirodna i neodoljiva.

Kako bih pokazao da Hjum nije bio dosledan u shvatanju verovanja kao doksastičke kategorije van domena naših izbora, predstavicu Prajsovo [H.H. Price] tumačenje Hjumovog involuntarizma. Prema Prajsu, Hjum, deli naša verovanja u dve klase (Price, 1969: 239-240):

- (i) Verovanja koja poseduju snažnu induktivnu zasnovanost, formirana na osnovu dugog iskustva stalne združenosti; i
- (ii) Verovanja koja poseduju slabu, ili nikakvu, induktivnu zasnovanost.

Prajs primećuje da Hjum, kada nije u svom uobičajenom skeptičkom maniru, razlikuje zdrava verovanja i, sa druge strane, besmislena i sujeverna verovanja. Hjum takođe smatra da je bolje posedovati zdrava verovanja, sa snažnom induktivnom zasnovanošću na prethodnim iskustvima, nego sujeverna verovanja bez induktivne potpore. Ne samo što Hjum nije bio dosledan doksastičkom involuntarizmu, nego je i smatrao da se verovanja mogu suspendovati (vrlo značajno za Hjumov skepticizam) našim slobodnim izborom⁸ (Price, 1969: 240). Iz Prajsovog tumačenja možemo zaključiti da je Hjumovo uzdržavanje od rasuđivanja, u okolnostima u kojima to nije prirodno, u suprotnosti sa involuntarističkim tumačenjem.

Kao što sam ranije naveo, srednji put, koji dozvoljava postojanje epistemičke normativnosti uprkos Hjumovom naturalizmu, je tumačenje Hjuma kao lokalnog modalnog doksastičkog involuntariste. Ovakvo tumačenje nam dozvoljava slobodu da pratimo

8 Iako bi hjumovci ovde doskočili primedbom da se sloboda, kod Hjuma, može okarakterisati kao spontanitet, budući da Hjum ne govori o slobodi u libertarijanskom smislu, u svrhu prethodno navedenih ograda nastaviću sa razmatranjem lokalnog modalnog doksastičkog involuntarizma.

normativna uputstva i korigujemo naša verovanja, ali i ostavlja naturalistička ograničenja u pogledu verovanja koja nisu pod našom doksastičkom kontrolom. Da li ćemo Hjuma nazvati kompatibilistom, drugorazrednim doksastičkim voluntaristom ili modalnim doksastičkim involuntaristom, predstavlja stilsko opredeljenje. Navođenjem određenih paragrafa *Rasprave*, kao i Prajsovim tumačenjem, predstavio sam normativne elemente Hjumovog naturalizma, bar u dovoljnoj meri za ostvarivanje cilja ovog poglavlja.

2.3 Problem verovanja mudrih

Da li je Hjum mudar? Ako jeste, onda Hjum koristi funkciju refleksije. Ukoliko koristi funkciju refleksije, onda nije primoran da to čini, već je koristi svojim slobodnim izborom. U prethodnom potpoglavlju pokazao sam zašto Hjuma možemo smatrati lokalnim modalnim doksastičkim involuntaristom. Uspostavljanje opštih pravila i razmatranje doksastičkog involuntarizma je neophodno kako bismo mogli da nađemo rešenje problema verovanja mudrih.

Objasnio sam zašto Hjum, i u kojoj meri, smatra da nemamo slobodu upravljanja verovanjima. Ovo predstavlja poteškoću za Hjumov evidencijalizam, tezu prema kojoj bi trebalo da verujemo samo u razmeri sa pouzdanom, induktivnom, evidencijom. Evidencija stoji u suprotnosti sa sujeverjem i predrasudama. Centralni problem ovog potpoglavlja predstavlja dodatno usaglašavanje elemenata epistemičke normativnosti u Hjumovoj epistemologiji sa njegovim doksastičkim involuntarizmom. Taj problem možemo da nazovemo „Problem verovanja mudrih“. Prema Hjumu, trebalo bi da verujemo na način na koji mudri formiraju verovanja. Odgovorom na problem verovanja mudrih otkrićemo na šta Hjum tačno misli. U potpoglavlju 2.2.1. predstavio sam Prajsovo tumačenje, odnosno distinkciju koju Hjum pravi između različitih verovanja. Ne samo što Hjum razlikuje zdrava i sujeverna verovanja, nego nam savetuje da verujemo na način na koji mudri ljudi veruju. Ovom normativnom preporukom, Hjum savetuje da bi trebalo da verujemo u ono što ima snažnu induktivnu zasnovanost, i obratno.

Hjumovo korišćenje normativnog jezika je prisutno i u zaključku *Istraživanja o ljudskom razumu*, kada Hjum kritikuje sujeverje i podstiče nas na spaljivanje dela koja ne sadrže apstraktno rasuđivanje o kvantitetu, niti eksperimentalno rasuđivanje o činjenicama, to su, prema Hjumu, dela u koja ne bi trebalo da verujemo (Hjum, 1988: 155).

U tradicionalnom smislu, odmeravanje verovanja spam evidencije je takođe predstavljalo odlike mudrosti. Ovo podrazumeva uzdržavanje od rasuđivanja do trenutka kada će nam biti dostupne relevantne informacije, koje ćemo zatim razmotriti i usvojiti (ili odbaciti) kao istinite. Rasuđivanje, u tradicionalnom smislu, predstavlja mogućnost slobodne kontrole mehanizama za formiranje verovanja. Da bismo mogli mudro da rasuđujemo, potrebni su nam dobri prirodni instinkti, kao i racionalna kontrola nad sopstvenim verovanjima (Stroud, 1977: 10). Ovo znači da je moguće da se izdignemo iznad „životinjskog instinkta“. Međutim, kao što sam napomenuo, Stroud [Barry

Stroud] ovo tumačenje naziva tradicionalnim. Ovo nije Hjumovo tumačenje, budući da je Hjum smatrao da se opšta pravila mogu primeniti, kako na mudre, tako i na životinje, decu i obične ljude. Hjum se udaljio od tradicionalnog uspostavljanja veze između onog u šta verujemo i slobodnog izbora. Smatrao je da su tradicionalne teorije nedovoljno opšte i usmerene na mali deo „izvrsnih“ pojedinaca, što ne odražava činjenicu da svi ljudi poseduju verovanja, i da samim tim, prateći normativna uputstva, poseduju mogućnost da koriguju svoja verovanja.

Obični nedostatak tih sistema, koji su filozofi upotrebljavali da objasne radnje uma, jeste taj što oni pretpostavljaju takvu tananost uma da to prevazilazi ne samo sposobnost prostih životinja već i sposobnost dece i običnog sveta naše vlastite vrste, koji su, uprkos tome, podložni istim emocijama i efektima kao i osobe najsavršenijeg duha i inteligencije. Takva tananost jasan je dokaz lažnosti jednog sistema, kao što je suprotna prostota dokaz njegove istinitosti (Hjum, 1983: 163-164).

Bez obzira što se Hjumova opšta pravila odnose na sve, ukoliko ih se pridržavamo onda možemo da postanemo mudri, njegovi epistemički standardi su vrlo rigorozni. Svako ima pristup opštim pravilima, ona su sastavni deo naših doksastičkih stanja. Međutim, vrlo teško ih je slediti i potrebno je da budemo epistemički disciplinovani da bi nam opšta pravila donela korist. Štaviše, Hjum navodi da nas opšta pravila vrlo često mogu odvesti u greške, kao što je slučaj sa lakovernošću.

Kao što sam pokazao, doksastički voluntarizam drugog reda (lokalni modalni doksastički involuntarizam) predstavlja nužan uslov za Hjumovu epistemičku normativnost. Moguće je da nemamo doksastičku kontrolu nad verovanjima koja su formirana na osnovu neposrednih čulnih utisaka, ali ono što je bitnije je kontrola nad principima u skladu sa kojima možemo da korigujemo neistinita verovanja. U okolnostima koje su prirodne za formiranje verovanja, nemoguće je odupreti se Hjumovom doksastičkom determinizmu. Međutim, onda kada formirano verovanje, moguće je, na osnovu korektivnih opštih pravila, uzdržati se od rasuđivanja, sakupiti dodatnu evidenciju i nakon toga prihvatiti ili odbaciti verovanje. Upravo ovaj proces možemo da okarakterišemo kao lokalnu verziju modalnog doksastičkog involuntarizma. Zahvaljujući slobodnom izboru da korigujemo verovanja, moguće je razmatranje epistemičke normativnosti u Hjumovoj *Raspravi*. Zajedno sa normativnošću možemo da razmatramo epistemičke ciljeve, izvore epistemičke normativnosti kao i verovanja mudrih ljudi. Zahvaljujući slobodi rasuđivanja, možemo da pratimo normativna uputstva i da ih delimo sa drugim pripadnicima svoje epistemičke zajednice. Da bismo verovali kao mudri ljudi, potrebno je da ne dozvolimo lakovernost, sujeverje i predrasude. Ono što je preporučljivo, prema Hjumu, je rasuđivanje u skladu sa relacijom uzročnosti, a ne na osnovu navike, kontigviteta i drugih elemenata imaginacije⁹.

9 Hjum je skeptik po pitanju toga u šta treba da verujemo. Ali nije skeptik jer smatra da je nauka u ljudskoj prirodi moguća, a ona nam objašnjava zašto moramo da verujemo u neke stvari. Međutim, to nije savremena kognitivna nauka (na razočaranje Džerija Fodora).

3. *Sapere aude!*

U „*Drugoj analogiji*“, *Kritike čistog uma*, Kant zastupa tezu da nije moguće formirati objektivni vremenski sled, ako naši mentalni sadržaji ne sadrže pojam uzročnosti. Prema Kantu, pojam uzročnosti omogućava da određeno uređivanje predstava, u vremenu, smatramo nužnim. Smatram da ova nužnost, i objektivnost određenog vremenskog sleda predstava, predstavlja izvor normativnosti u Kantovoj epistemologiji. Pokazaću zašto Kant smatra da bi iracionalno rasuđivanje u pogledu uređivanja predstava u vremenu predstavljalo „bolno“ izbegavanje normativnih obaveza. I zašto smo, usled neodrživosti iracionalnog rasuđivanja, primorani da postavimo svoje predstave u određeni sled. Nameravam da pokažem koje mentalne operacije su potrebne da bi naše predstave posedovale objektivni vremenski sadržaj. Takode, pokušaću da obrazložim zašto je baš epistemička normativnost vrsta modalnosti koja određeni subjektivni red predstava čini nužnim.

3.1 Kantovo shvatanje uzročnosti u *Drugoj analogiji*

Za razliku od Hjuma, normativnost predstavlja uobičajenu perspektivu tumačenja Kantove teorijske i praktične filozofije (Alison, 2004; McDowel, 1994; O'Neill, 1989). Odnos heteronomije i autonomije predstavlja centralni problem Kantove etike, dok pitanja o sadržaju naših predstava, kao i odnosu između sveta i čoveka, predstavljaju osnovna pitanja Kantove epistemologije. Normativnost predstavlja izlaz iz oba navedena škripca. Međutim, potrebno je ispitati o kakvoj normativnosti je reč, i koliki domen Kantove filozofije normativnost uspešno pokriva. Smatram da je ovde reč o epistemičkoj normativnosti. Pre svega, ispitaću elemente epistemičke normativnosti u *Drugoj analogiji*, nakon čega ću pokušati da redukujem sve upotrebe normativnosti u Kantovoj filozofiji na epistemičku normativnost.

U *Drugoj analogiji*, Kant ispituje preduslove uspešnog predstavljanja objektivnog vremenskog sleda. Iskoristiću primer kojim je Hutton [James Hutton] ilustrovao Kantovo shvatanje relacije uzročnosti. Zamislimo Džona koji posmatra Sneška Belića kako se topi (Hutton, 2018: 3). Da bi Džonovo posmatranje bilo moguće, on mora da poseduje tri osobine predstavljanja:

- (i) Mora da poseduje predstavu početnog stanja, Sneška koji stoji uspravno;
- (ii) Mora da poseduje predstavu stanja kao posledice, otopljenog Sneška; i

To je folk psihologija iz fotelje i prvog lica, što je potrebno imati u vidu kao razlog za uključivanje Kanta u diskusiju o epistemičkoj normativnosti. Na osnovu rešenja problema uzročnosti, u *Drugoj analogiji*, pokušaću da ispitam da li je Kantovo shvatanje normativnosti u *Kritici čistog uma* drugačije od Hjumovog, i ako jeste, na koji način. Odgovor na ovo pitanje je vrlo značajan, budući da naše znanje o činjenicama zavisi od znanja o uzročno posledičnim vezama. Bar prema Hjumu.

(iii) Mora da poseduje predstavu početnog stanja koje prethodi stanju posledice.

Kant smatra da pitanje, kako možemo da objasnimo mentalna stanja koja predstavljaju (iii) kao objektivnu relaciju između (i) i (ii), nimalo nije jednostavno.

Kant najpre iznosi negativno tumačenje: predstava objektivnog vremenskog sleda ne može da bude ostvarena na osnovu činjenice da se predstave (i) i (ii) dešavaju sukcesivno (Kant, 1970: 189). Iako Džon, najpre, opaža uspravnog Sneška, a zatim, istopljenog Sneška, ova sukcesivnost nije dovoljna da bismo je smatrali objektivnim vremenskim sledom. Prema Kantu, *aprehenzija raznovrsnosti pojave jeste uvek sukcesivna* (Kant, 1970: 191). Ovo je slučaj i kada posmatramo kuću, odnosno različite delove kuće – predstave različitih delova kuće su sukcesivne, iako se radi o jednom objektu. Dakle, sukcesija je arbitrarna za naš zadatak, ne možemo na osnovu sukcesije da rešimo problem objektivnog vremenskog sleda predstava. Takođe navodi:

Međutim, spajanje nikako nije neka tvorevina samoga čula i opažanja, već je ovde proizvod jedne sintetične moći uobrazilje koja određuje unutrašnje čulo u pogledu vremenskog odnosa. Uobrazilja pak može dotična dva stanja da spoji na dva načina, tako da ili jedno ili drugo stanje dolazi prvo u vremenu; jer vreme po sebi ne može se opaziti niti se u odnosu prema njemu može tako reći empirijski odrediti šta prethodi, a šta sleduje na objektu (Kant, 1970: 190).

Arbitrarnost, koju sam pomenuo, je prouzrokovana time što su vremenski odnosi između sadržaja naših predstava uvedeni imaginacijom. Da bi Džon imao predstavu Sneška koji se topi, on prethodno mora da ima predstavu uspravnog Sneška. Upravo imaginacija proizvodi predstavu prethodnog stanja, uspravnog Sneška. Međutim, imaginacija može slobodno da kombinuje čulne opažaje, kao predstavu uspravnog Sneška koja prethodi predstavi istopljenog Sneška, i obratno. Drugim rečima, Kantu je potrebno nešto što može da ukloni ovu arbitrarnost subjektivnog sleda.

Kantovo pozitivno tumačenje počinje, čuvenim, primerom lađe koja plovi nizvodno:

Ja, na primer, vidim neku lađu da ide niz reku. Moj opažaj njenoga mesta na donjem toku reke dolazi posle opažaja njenoga mesta na gornjem toku, i nemoguće je da se u aprehenziji ove pojave lađa opazi prvo na donjem, pa tek onda na gornjem toku reke. Ovde je, dakle, red u sledovanju opažaja u aprehenziji određen i aprehenzija je za njega vezana (Kant: 1970: 192).

Kada je subjektivni sled predstava nužan, onda možemo da zaključimo da se radi o objektivnom vremenskom sledu. Pod određenim uslovima, subjektivni sled, postaje nepovratan, odnosno nužan, a ne arbitraran. Ove, određene uslove, određuje upravo relacija uzročnosti.

Alison (2004, 252), rekonstruiše Kantov uzročni princip na sledeći način:

- (i) Da bismo imali predstavu nekog događaja, subjektivni sled predstava mora da bude nepovratan;
- (ii) Da bi subjektivni sled predstava bio nepovratan, moramo da ga podvedemo pod šemu uzročnosti;

(iii) Stoga, primena šeme uzročnosti predstavlja nužan uslov postojanja nekog događaja u našem iskustvu;

(iv) Stoga, ograničivši domen na pojave (predmete mogućeg iskustva), možemo da zaključimo da svaki događaj ima svoj uzrok.

Razmatranje uzročnog principa u Kantovoj *Drugoj analogiji*, predstavlja prvi korak u ostvarivanju cilja ovog poglavlja. Nakon uklanjanja arbitrarnosti u uređivanju naših predstava, preći ću na dalje ispitivanje pravila na osnovu kojih možemo da uspostavimo kontrolu nad našim verovanjima. Uspostavljanje ovih pravila predstavlja drugi korak ispitivanja epistemičke normativnosti u Kantovoj filozofiji.

3.2 Epistemičke maksime

Kao što sam nagovestio, u ovom potpoglavlju nastaviću da razmatram Kantovo shvatanje epistemičke normativnosti. Najpre ću predstaviti Koenovu [Alix Cohen] tezu da epistemička autonomija predstavlja centralni deo Kantove epistemičke normativnosti a zatim ću preći na razmatranje epistemičkih pravila na osnovu kojih bi trebalo da uređujemo svoj doksastički život.

Kao što bi formula autonomije trebalo da uređuje naše slobodne izbore u pogledu praktičnih aspekata našeg života, tako bi epistemička verzija ove formule trebalo da uređuje naša verovanja i doksastički život. Iako su verovanje i volja različita stanja, Koen (2018: 3) smatra da oba podležu istim normativnim zahtevima. Na osnovu toga, možemo da zaključimo da se zahtev za autonomijom odnosi, kako na moral, tako i na kogniciju.

Pre toga, želim da napomenem da se, prilikom razmatranja epistemičke normativnosti kod Kanta, suočavamo sa sličnim problemima koje sam pokušao da rešim prilikom razmatranja epistemičke normativnosti u Hjumovoj filozofiji. Ovi problemi se odnose na doksastički voluntarizam. Da bismo uopšte mogli da govorimo o normativnosti, odnosno onome što bi „trebalo“, moramo da razmotrimo pitanja koja se tiču naše slobode da pratimo normativne preporuke. Slično kao kod Hjuma, ovde nam je dovoljno da su neka verovanja pod našom kontrolom. Odnosno, dovoljan nam je drugi stepen voluntarizma (ili lokalna verzija modalnog doksastičkog involuntarizma). Dovoljno je da posedujemo kontrolu nad pravilima na osnovu kojih formiramo verovanja. U duhu Kantove filozofije, epistemička pravila ili normativna uputstva o kojima ću nadalje govoriti, nazvaću epistemičkim maksimama.

Dakle, iz prethodnog pasusa postaje jasno da se epistemička odgovornost ne zasniva na verovanjima nego na maksimama koje bi trebalo da ih regulišu. Prema Kantu, kada usvojim neki princip, on postaje moja maksima (Kant, 2008: 5). Epistemičke maksime obrazuju naše epistemičke strategije. Epistemičke strategije bi trebalo da koriguju način na koji saznavamo, kao i da nam pomognu da što bolje iskoristimo svoje kognitivne kapacitete. Slično Hjumovim opštim pravilima, maksime, između ostalog,

mogu da predstavljaju evidencijalistička pravila prema kojima bi trebalo da sameravamo svoja verovanja spram evidencije koju posedujemo. Možemo da navedemo neke od maksima (Cohen, 2018: 4):

- (i) Ne bi trebalo da ignorišem evidenciju u slučajevima kada je moje verovanje u suprotnosti sa njom;
- (ii) Ne bi trebalo da formiram verovanja na osnovu toga što čine da se osećam dobro.

Dakle, verovanje ne predstavlja normativno neutralnu upotrebu mojih kognitivnih kapaciteta, već je podložno brojnim normativnim ograničenjima. Da bismo verovali odgovorno, moramo da budemo sigurni da su epistemičke maksime, na osnovu kojih formiramo verovanja, u skladu sa normativnim ograničenjima.

Epistemičke norme predstavljaju epistemičke principe drugog reda. Slično kao kod Hjuma, opšta pravila su prirodna posledica našeg rasuđivanja, ali nam je potrebna funkcija refleksije (princip drugog reda) da bismo ustanovili da li su pravila u skladu sa normama. Kod Kanta, norme, kao principi drugog reda, regulišu maksime, kao principe prvog reda (Cohen, 2018: 4).

Da bih formulisao epistemičku verziju formule autonomije, razmotriću Kantovu formulaciju iz *Zasnivanja metafizike morala*:

Postupaj tako kao da bi trebalo da maksima tvoga delanja postane tvojom voljom opšti prirodni zakon (Kant, 2008: 61).

Ovde možemo da primetimo da se normativnost, u praktičnom smislu, zasniva na subjektima koji postavljaju zakone. Naši kognitivni kapaciteti bi trebalo da budu izvor maksima koje nas obavezuju, čime se uspostavlja autonomija i univerzalnost. Prema navedenom, epistemičku verziju formule autonomije možemo da formulišemo na sledeći način:

Def: Veruj tako da tvoji kognitivni kapaciteti mogu da predstavljaju izvor univerzalnog zakona za sve tvoje maksime (Cohen, 2018: 5).

Na sličan način, kao u prethodnoj verziji formule, epistemičku normativnost možemo da zasnujemo na racionalnom subjektu koji svoje kognitivne kapacitete smatra izvorom epistemičkih maksima koje ga obavezuju. Ove maksime, kao i Hjumova pravila, mogu svi da usvoje. Ako verujemo u skladu sa univerzalnim epistemičkim maksimama, koje sami sebi propisujemo, onda verujemo autonomno.

U *Kritici moći suđenja*, Kant predrasude opisuje kao težnju ka heteronomiji rasuđivanja (Kant, 1975: 294). Ovde možemo da primetimo još jednu sličnost sa Hjumom. Iako se predrasude, uobičajeno, smatraju neopravdanim verovanjima, za Hjuma i Kanta, one predstavljaju nelegitimni princip koji smo usvojili kao epistemičku maksimu (ili pravilo). Za njih, predrasude predstavljaju maksimu/pravilo objektivnog rasuđivanja zasnovanog na subjektivnim osnovama. Hjum, kao elemente subjektivne osnove rasuđivanja navodi naviku, sličnost i kontigvitet, dok Kant (Cohen, 2018: 5) razlikuje inklinacije (verujem u ono za šta želim da je istinito), navike (verujem u ono

u šta sam oduvek verovao) i imitacije (verujem u ono u šta moji roditelji veruju). Iako navedene maksime predrasuda, kako kod Hjuma tako i kod Kanta, deluju različito, možemo da ih smatramo nedopustivim iz istog razloga: preporučuju upotrebu subjektivnih osnova rasuđivanja kao objektivnu. Ukoliko usvojimo ove maksime, verovaćemo heteronomno. Nasuprot tome, odgovorni epistemički subjekti bi trebalo da formiraju verovanja zasnovana na elementima objektivnih osnova rasuđivanja: evidenciji, dokazima, pouzdanom svedočanstvu.

U ovom, i prethodnom potpoglavlju, predstavio sam Kantovo shvatanje relacije uzročnosti, epistemičke maksime i epistemičku normativnost kao „zahtev uma za autonomijom“. Takođe sam ukazao na sličnosti između Hjuma i Kanta u pogledu shvatanja uzročnosti, uporedivši *Raspravu* i *Drugu analogiju*. Postoje velike sličnosti u pogledu shvatanja objektivnih osnova u skladu sa kojima bi trebalo da formiramo opšta pravila/epistemičke maksime. Hjum i Kant na sličan način shvataju greške koje neodgovorni epistemički subjekti prave u svom rasuđivanju, ali obojica pružaju normativne preporuke koje mogu da koriguju naša verovanja i usklade našu doksastičku stvarnost. U narednom poglavlju pokušaću da sumiram Hjumovo i Kantovo shvatanje epistemičke normativnosti kroz prizmu razdoblja kojem su obojica pripadali, dobu prosvetiteljstva.

4. Umesto zaključka: vile i neuro-naučnici

U prethodnom delu rada pokušao sam da pokažem da, za Hjuma i Kanta, verovanja podležu sledećim normativnim ograničenjima:

- (i) Epistemički subjekti ne bi trebalo da formiraju verovanja zasnovana na subjektivnim osnovama; i
- (ii) Proces formiranja verovanja bi trebalo uskladiti sa epistemičkim pravilima/maksimama koja su univerzalna (važe za sve).

Prema Kantu, izvor epistemičke normativnosti, kao što sam ranije pokazao, leži u zahtevu uma za autonomijom. Sa druge strane, iz Hjumovog shvatanja verovanja, i njima srodnih doksastičkih stanja, možemo da zaključimo da Hjum smatra da izvor epistemičke normativnosti leži u prosto činjenici da svi ljudi poseduju želje. Samim tim što poseduju želje, ljudi nastoje da ostvare te želje, a to čine kroz opšta pravila na osnovu kojih formiraju verovanja. Istinitost ovih verovanja je vrlo korisna za ljude i vodi ih ostvarenju njihovih ciljeva i želja. Smatram da se u osnovi Hjumovog i Kantovog shvatanja nalaze iste pretpostavke i isti zaključci.

Naslov trećeg poglavlja ovog rada glasi *Sapere aude!*, što znači hrabrost korišćenja sopstvenog razuma. Ovaj moto adekvatno predstavlja Kantovo shvatanje epistemičke normativnosti, odnosno zahtev uma za autonomijom.

Prosvećenost je čovekov izlazak iz maloletnosti za koju je sam kriv. Maloletnost je nesposobnost služenja vlastitim razumom bez nečijeg vođstva. Čovek je sam kriv za

ovu maloletnost, ako njen uzrok nije pomanjkanje razuma, nego rešenosti i hrabrosti da se njime služi bez nečijeg vođstva. Sapere aude! Imaj hrabrosti da se služiš vlastitim razumom! Ovo je, dakle, moto prosvete. (Kant, 1972: 41)¹⁰

Pokušaću da obrazložim zašto ova „lozinka prosvetiteljstva“ može isto tako da važi i za Hjuma. Kako bih to učinio iskoristiću misaoni eksperiment koji se često koristi prilikom razmatranja epistemičkog konsekvencijalizma (Elstein i Jenkins, 2017). Zamislimo Vilu Istinović koja može da nam ponudi vrlo povoljnu epistemičku situaciju; mnogo istinitih verovanja i tek par neistinitih. Međutim, Vilin uslov je da moramo da poverujemo u neko *p*. Samo u tom slučaju će Vila da pristane da nam, svaki put kada se nađemo u okolnostima prirodnim za formiranje verovanja, ponudi verovanje koje je, sa velikom verovatnoćom, istinito. Pre nego što pređem na razmatranje epistemičke situacije u kojoj bi se Hjum i Kant našli pred Vilom Istinović, predstavicu još jedan, drastičniji, misaoni eksperiment¹¹. Zamislimo neuro-naučnika koji nam nudi još povoljniju epistemičku situaciju nego Vila. Bez traženja ičega za uzvrat, neuro-naučnik nudi da, u našu svest, usadi epistemičku maksimu/pravilo koje glasi *Sapere aude!*. Ovakva epistemička situacija bi bila znatno povoljnija nego u slučaju Vile, budući da bismo svaki put, prilikom formiranja verovanja, verovali autonomno. Međutim, da li je to zaista tako?

Zašto Kant, ili bilo ko drugi, ne bi prihvatio Vilinu ponudu? Iz perspektive epistemičkog konsekvencijalizma, ova ponuda deluje vrlo povoljno. Međutim, Kant nije epistemički konsekvencijalista. Ako bih prihvatio Vilinu ponudu posedovao bih veliki broj istinitih verovanja, međutim, samim tim bih se odrekao sposobnosti da formiram verovanja. Ovo odricanje od sposobnosti formiranja verovanja se ne odnosi samo na *p*, za koje Vila traži da ga usvojim, nego i na sva buduća istinita verovanja koja bih usvojio. Pretvorio bih se u mehanizam za proizvođenje istinitih verovanja. Prema Kantu, znanje ne predstavlja puko posedovanje istinitih verovanja, nego njihovo formiranje u skladu sa korišćenjem naših kognitivnih kapaciteta. Stoga, smatram da Kant ne bi pristao na Vilinu ponudu, čak i da se radi o ponudi beskonačnog broja istinitih verovanja.

Bilo bi očekivano da Hjum, kao epistemički naturalista, prihvati Vilinu ponudu. Ukoliko posmatramo ponudu iz pragmatičke perspektive, nije bitno kako smo formirali verovanja, nići na kakvim osnovama, sve dok su ta verovanja istinita. Međutim, predstavicu Hjumovu kritiku vaspitanja, na osnovu koje će postati jasno zašto bi Hjum postupio slično kao Kant.

10 U prevodu Danila Baste, umesto „maloletnosti“ koristi se termin „samoskrivljena nezrelost“. Nažalost, ovaj prevod nisam uspeo da pronađem. Umesto toga koristio sam prevod Julijane Beli-Genc.

11 Ovaj misaoni eksperiment predstavlja moj pokušaj radikalizacije primera sa Vilom. Ilustracija u kojoj figurira neuro-naučnik predstavlja pokušaj da nastavim dugu tradiciju fetišizacije neuro-naučnika u epistemičkoj literaturi.

Ako ovaj argument iz vaspitanja razmotrimo u pravoj svetlosti, pokazaće da je on vrlo uverljiv, tim više što se on osniva na jednoj od najobičnijih pojava na koju čovek nailazi [...] Kao što lašci čestim ponavljanjem svojih laži, najzad dođu dotle da im one izgledaju kao sećanja, tako i rasuđivanje ili bolje reći uobrazilja, na sličan način, može imati predstave tako snažno utisnute i poimati ih u tako potpunoj svetlosti da one mogu delovati na um na isti način kao što čine one koje nam pružaju čula, pamćenje ili razum. Ali pošto je vaspitanje veštački, a ne prirodan uzrok i pošto su njegove maksime često suprotne razumu, pa čak i sebi samim u različitim vremenima i mestima, filozofi ga otuda nikada ne priznaju, premda je u stvarnosti ono sazdano bezmalo na istom temelju navike i ponavljanja kao i naša umovanja iz uzroka i iz posledica (Hjum, 1983: 113-114).

Dakle, Hjum ne bi prihvatio ponudu Vile Istínović, budući da bi, u suprotnom, sva njegova istinita verovanja bila zasnovana na veštačkim, a ne na prirodnim uzrocima.

Razlika između Vile i neuro-naučnika leži u tome što nam Vila pruža istina verovanja kroz zaobilaženje naših doksastičkih sposobnosti, dok nas neuro-naučnik, kroz usadivanje ispravne epistemičke maksime/pravila u našu svest, pretvara u heterononne epistemičke subjekte. Princip kojim regulišemo naša verovanja, a koji nam je neuro-naučnik usadio u svest, ne predstavlja maksimu/pravilo koje smo sami sebi propisali. Dakle, Kant bi razočarao neuro-naučnika na isti način na koji je razočarao Vilu. Prihvatanjem ponude neuro-naučnika, izgubili bismo autonomnost, bez koje nema epistemičke normativnosti.

Kao što sam u prethodnom delu rada naveo, za Hjuma opšta pravila predstavljaju prirodnu posledicu naših kognitivnih kapaciteta. U slučaju Viline ponude, pomenuti kognitivni kapaciteti ne bi postojali, mi ih ne bismo koristili. Posedovali bismo istinita verovanja pukim slučajem a ne na osnovu toga što smo ih formirali u skladu sa opštim pravilima. Međutim, neuro-naučnik ne zaobilazi naše doksastičke sposobnosti, naprotiv, on nam pruža opšta pravila koja bi, svejedno, postojala u našoj svesti kao prirodna posledica. Zašto Hjum ne bi prihvatio ovakvu ponudu? Baš zbog toga što nam neuro-naučnik nije uskratio kognitivne kapacitete kao deo pogodbe. U slučaju prihvaćene ponude i dalje bismo imali na raspolaganju funkciju refleksije. Ovde ću navesti Hjumovo shvatanje osećaja *nužne određenosti uma*:

[...] Ali um se ne zaustavlja ovde. Jer, uviđajući da se ovim sistemom opažaja ima jedan drugi povezan navikom, ili, ako hoćete, odnosom uzroka ili posledice, on nastavlja da razmatra njihove predstave; pa kako oseća da je na neki način mišno određen da sagleda ove pojedinačne predstave, a da navika ili odnos, kojim je određen, ne dopušta ni najmanju promenu, on ih obradjuje u jedan novi sistem koji isto tako udostojava nazivom stvarnosti (Hjum, 1983: 106).

Dakle, ono što nam omogućava da razlikujemo prirodne i veštačke uzroke predstavlja osećaj *nužne određenosti uma* da pređe sa jedne ideje na drugu. Ovu nužnost proizvodi relacija uzročnost. Kada se nademo u okolnostima u kojima formiramo

verovanja na osnovu sličnosti ili navike, ovaj osećaj nužnosti ne postoji, budući da u ovom slučaju ne formiramo verovanja na osnovu relacije uzročnosti. Neuro-naučnik nam je, za razliku od Vile, ostavio na raspolaganju naše kognitivne sposobnosti. Upravo zbog toga. Hjum bi bio svestan da pravilo na osnovu kojeg formira istinita verovanja, a koje mu je u svest usadio neuro-naučnik, ne proizvodi osećaj nužnosti kao što bi to bio slučaj sa pravilima izvedenim iz relacije uzročnosti. Stoga, Vila i neuro-naučnik ne bi bili zadovoljni susretom sa Hjumom i Kantom.

Na kraju, želeo bih da napomenem da su i Hjum i Kant bili *sensus communis* filozofi. Hjum i Kant su smatrali da principi i maksime, na osnovu kojih bi trebalo da formiramo verovanja, moraju biti takvi da svi mogu da ih usvoje. Ukoliko opšta pravila i epistemičke maksime nisu takvi da naše opažanje i rasuđivanje, zasnovano na njima, ne možemo da podelimo sa svima, onda nisu univerzalni. A ako pravila i maksime nisu univerzalni, onda ne možemo da govorimo o zasnivanju bilo kakve nauke. Upravo zbog *sensus communis* pristupa filozofiji. Hjum i Kant predstavljaju vrlo značajne filozofe, toliko značajne da, s pravom, možemo da kažemo da bez njihovih uvida ne bi došlo do razvoja savremene nauke.

Petar Nurkić
Institut za filozofiju
Filozofski fakultet Univerziteta u Beogradu

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Petar Nurkić

Hume's and Kant's Understanding of Epistemic Normativity

(Summary)

Question (d) how do we form beliefs?, implies descriptive answers. On the other hand, the question (n) how should we form beliefs?, implies normative answers. Can we provide answers to (n) questions without answering (d) questions? This (n) - (d) relation can be characterized as epistemic normativity. Hume and Kant provide answers to both questions. Hume is more inclined to psychologize these answers through an empirical approach to questions related to beliefs. While Kant is more inclined to consider *a priori* conditions of our reasoning. Through general rules and epistemic maxims. Hume and Kant provide normative guidelines in accordance which we should form beliefs. However, in order to be able to talk about normativity, at all, we need to answer questions related to doxastic voluntarism. For Kant, the question of freedom is, to some extent, an obvious precondition for his critiques (especially of the practical mind). While with Hume, precisely because of his empirical approach to beliefs and desires, the matter is more obscure, and it seems as if Hume advocates doxastic involuntarism. In this paper, I will try to present the similarities between Hume and Kant in terms of epistemic normativity. Where it seems as if their views are incompatible. I will try to examine why this is the case. I will focus on Hume's *Treatise of Human Nature* and Kant's *Second Analogy*. In the end, I will present a couple of thought experiments and try to "test" Hume and Kant. If I manage to confirm the initial

hypotheses, then this paper will be a successful epistemic endeavor. However, if I fail to find the expected similarities between Hume's and Kant's understanding of epistemic normativity, then this work can be characterized as a historical approach to the normative framework of "dogmatic slumber".

KEYWORDS: Hume, Kant, epistemic normativity, doxastic voluntarism, general rules, epistemic maxims

NORMATIVE FORCE AND NORMATIVE FREEDOM: HUME AND KANT, BUT NOT HUME *VERSUS* KANT

Peter Railton

Abstract

Our notion of normativity appears to combine, in a way difficult to understand but seemingly familiar from experience, elements of force and freedom. On the one hand, a normative claim is thought to have a kind of compelling authority; on the other hand, if our respecting it is to be an appropriate species of respect, it must not be coerced, automatic, or trivially guaranteed by definition. Both Hume and Kant, I argue, looked to aesthetic experience as a convincing example exhibiting this marriage of force and freedom, as well as showing how our judgment can come to be properly attuned to the features that constitute value. This image of attunement carries over into their respective accounts of moral judgment. The seemingly radical difference between their moral theories may be traceable not to a different conception of normativity, but to a difference in their empirical psychological theories – a difference we can readily spot in their accounts of aesthetics.

Introduction

‘Normativity’ is, for better or worse, the chief term we philosophers seem to have settled upon for discussing some central but deeply puzzling phenomena of human life. We use it to mark a distinction, not between the good and the bad (or between the right and the wrong, the correct and the incorrect), but rather between the good-or-bad (or right-or-wrong, . . .), on the one hand, and the actual, possible, or usual, on the other. Ethics, aesthetics, epistemology, rationality, semantics – all these areas of philosophical inquiry draw us into a discussion of normativity. And they do so not because we philosophers import this notion into our inquiries, but because – sometimes rather belatedly – we discover it there whether we went looking for it or not.

I said ‘for better or worse’ because, while it is useful to bring these various normative phenomena together, the term ‘normativity’ itself bears the stamp of but one aspect of such phenomena:

norms – rules or standards. The etymology of the English term *norm* traces it back to the Latin *norma*, a builder's square. The term *rule* also seems to come to us from the building trade – it descends from the Latin *regulus*, a straight-edge or ruler. Now anyone who has sawn a board or chiseled a stone recognizes what it is to take a square or a ruler as a guide in cutting, and thus to treat gaps between the actual cut and the square or ruler to show there is something to be “corrected” in the cut rather than the tool. So we have here a seemingly concrete example of “action-guidingness” and an associated “standard of correctness”, different from the merely actual, at work.¹

Because the *norma* (or *regulus*) is a tool whose application is so transparent to us, it can prove a useful example. But there is a danger as well as an aptness in using such a model when we attempt to construct a philosophical account of normativity. A builder can consult his *norma* to guide himself in making cuts and to judge whether his work “measures up”, but does this tool, or any tool, tell him why or when his cuts should measure up to the *norma*? In most cases it is of course evident why they should, and there certainly is no mystery why the builder's square is ubiquitous in the building trade. But what if an arch is needed, or a compound curve – is it still the case that cuts are always *to be made* following the *norma*?

Understanding how a *norma* or a norm could possess legitimate regulative standing thus also requires us to ask: What is it in general for a rule or standard to *apply*? There is no special difficulty about saying what it is for a rule to apply in (what we might call) a “formal” sense. A *norma* can be applied to a cut and we can find the cut to fit or not. But in this sense the *norma* applies even when we needed to cut a curve. So when do we say a rule *applies* or is *in force* in the sense that it is *to be followed*? Clearly, we have simply re-encountered the question of action-guidingness, now in the form of a distinction between “formal” and (and what we might call) “normative” applicability. If at this point we ask for

¹ Moreover, we have an equally concrete way of illustrating part of what Kant had in mind in insisting that the normative is *a priori*. A *norma* (or *regulus*) has its form “before the fact”, giving the builder a “standard of correctness” for the cut, but not staking a claim as to how the cut will in fact be made. His subsequent cutting performance is “guided” but not “predicted” by it, so actual failure on his part to conform to the *norma* does not impugn or discredit the *norma a posteriori*. For further discussion of these examples, and their relation to the *a priori* status of norms and rules, see P. Railton, “*A Priori* Rules: Wittgenstein on the Normativity of Logic”, forthcoming.

another rule, a “rule of application”, the threat of regress emerges at once – for how to distinguish those cases in which the rule of application itself normatively applies among those in which it merely formally applies?

We could block the regress if there were a super-rule (rationality?) that always normatively applies and that directs us regarding the applicability of all other rules. Unfortunately, however, the useful transparency of anything like the *norma* – or of such familiar examples as rules of a game – is lost once we speak of super-rules. For we can intelligibly ask when to use the *norma* – or when to play a game – and why. But somehow, a super-rule is supposed to prevent such questions about itself from arising. Even as strong a proponent of rules and rationality as Kant seemed able to see the sense of asking what might be “the purpose of nature in attaching reason to our will as its governor” (G 305).² This is a question about the *normative* applicability of “rules of reason”, that is, a question about the source of reason’s normative authority.

Normative authority

Authority is an impressive thing. At least, it is when it works. We speak of rules *binding* us, or being *in force*, even when we would rather not comply. This suggests a certain image of what it would be to explain or ground normative authority. But though sheer force is sometimes called upon to enforce norms, but it is not much of a model of the “coercive power” of norms as such. Rousseau noted that “If force compels obedience, there is no need to invoke a duty to obey”.³ A sufficiently great actual force

² Herein I will use the following abbreviations in citing work of Immanuel Kant: CJ = *Critique of Judgment*, trans. by Werner S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987); CJm = *Critique of Judgment*, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon, 1952); CPrR = *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. by Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956); CPrRm = *Critique of Practical Reason*, trans. by Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); G = *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. by H. J. Paton, 3rd ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1956); LoE = *Lectures on Ethics*, ed. by P. Heath and J. B. Schneewind, trans. by P. Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); MM = *Metaphysics of Morals*, ed. and trans. by Mary Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); OBS = *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime*, trans. by John T. Goldthwait (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1960); SRL = “On a Supposed Right to Lie from Philanthropy”, in *Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy*, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). All page numbers are to the Academy edition; Academy volume numbers are given only for the *Lectures on Ethics*.

³ Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*, trans. Maurice Cranston (Baltimore: Penguin, 1968), Bk. I, ch. 3, p. 53.

simply *is* irresistible. Familiar rules and *oughts*, even stringent ones, are not like that – we can and do resist them, as Kant noted:

The moral law is holy (inviolable). Man is certainly unholy enough, but humanity in his person must be holy to him.
[CPrR 87]

Clearly the *must* here is not the *must* of something irresistible – the moral law is normatively, not actually, “inviolable”. Since an *ought* is to apply to us even when we fall short, its force (and recognition thereof) must leave that option open. If “guidance by norms” is to play a nontrivial role in the explaining the an individual’s or group’s behavior, then the normative domain must be a domain of freedom as well as “bindingness”.

This need for a “possibility of incorrectness” is often remarked upon in philosophical discussions of normativity, usually in connection with physical or causal possibility. But it is no less important to make room for the *logical* or *conceptual* possibility of error. It is sometimes said, for example, that a *free agent* is by definition guided by rationality or a good will. There is no objection to this kind of definition as such, but it does not capture the sense of ‘freedom’ we need here.

Consider a more mundane example. Suppose that I have written you a letter and have spelled ‘correspondence’ correctly, rather than as the often-seen ‘correspondance’. You, the reader, aware that my spelling is at best uncertain, remark upon my unexpected success to a colleague and wonder aloud whether it was accident or competence. You are, in effect, assessing two explanations, according to one of which I spelled it with an ‘e’ by chance, while according to the other I did it on purpose (though perhaps without explicit deliberation) – as a manifestation of my internalization of, and deference to, this particular norm of English spelling. Suppose your friend replies, “No, there simply is no question of why Railton spelled ‘correspondence’ with an ‘e’. *Spelling* is a normative concept – acts of spelling constitutively involve satisfying the norms of spelling. So he *couldn’t* have spelled the word with an ‘a’ – to have written ‘correspondance’ wouldn’t have counted as a spelling of ‘correspondence’ at all.”

Now there certainly is a “normative sense” of spelling, according to which ‘correspondance’ cannot count as a spelling of ‘correspondence’. In this sense, it is analytic that spelling is correct, and even losers in spelling bees never spell incorrectly. That’s why, though it may sound odd to say so, when we ask why or how

someone spelled correctly we typically are *not* using the term in this “normative sense”. As you intended your question to your colleague, my spelling ‘correspondence’ with an ‘e’ was either a happy accident or a pleasant surprise, not an analytic truth.

If a normative *must* is to have a distinctive place in the world, then, it cannot be the *must* either of natural law or of conceptual necessity. Natural law and conceptual necessities are “always at work”, even when we’re tired, weak-willed, lazy, disobedient, evil, or ignorant. No worry about anyone violating *them*. But normative guidance requires some contribution on our part, in a domain where freedom in the “non-normative” sense makes some vigilance or effort necessary.

However, having escaped the danger of missing the phenomenon of normative guidance altogether by assimilating it to a kind of unfreedom, we had better be careful not to think of it as simply a matter of free willing. First, many of the *attitudes* (and associated motives and emotions) basic to normative conduct – attitudes of belief, desire, admiration, regret, approval, anger, and so on – appear not to be wholly within the scope of direct willing.⁴ Kant, for example, distinguishes attitudes of love and reverence (*reverentia*), which are not directly subject to the will and cannot strictly be objects of duty (MM 401–403), from attitudes that accord to others a respectful observance (*observantia*) of their rights or goals, which can be required of us as a duty (MM 449, 467–468; compare G 399).⁵ Kant does not conclude that attitudes of the first sort are therefore irrelevant to the domain of normative governance – on the contrary, according to the interpretation to be discussed below, they are to be found at the very bottom of his view, as a source or “basis” of duties (cf. MM 402–403).

Second, even if we restrict attention to those areas of normative governance in which the will seemingly can be effective – in selecting among acts, in regulating the more voluntary attitudes (such as acceptance or acknowledgement), and in shaping indirectly over time the less voluntary attitudes and motives (such as

⁴ Perhaps *judgments* concerning these attitudes are more directly within the scope of will, but it is one thing to form a belief or feel an emotion, and another to form a judgment of it. Although our judgment is supposed to guide our belief, our beliefs might in fact prove recalcitrant. Thus we say: judgment is *normative for* attitudes like belief or feelings like appreciation. For a seminal discussion of evaluation as normative for attitudes, see Elizabeth Anderson, *Value in Ethics and Economics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993), ch. 2.

⁵ I am grateful to Peter Vranas for bringing to my attention this discussion in Kant of *reverentia* vs. *observantia*.

esteem, reverence, or liking) – it seems we cannot capture all of normative guidance with the notion of freely willing. For though the will may guide us, what guides the will? If we say, simply, “We do – we exercise our normative freedom and choose”, this appears to get at only half the truth. For what makes an exercise of will a *choice*, rather than a mere *fiat*? And what would make a choice a moral one – or a rational, aesthetic, prudential, or epistemic one? Could the bare fact that a will is *my* will make it (say) a *good* will?

Reason and normativity

Kant tells us that reason’s “highest practical function” is to enable us to discover and “establish” the good will (G 396), but speaking of reason and rationality can be ambiguous, at least in ordinary discourse. Let us distinguish, roughly, two senses of ‘rational choice’.

In the first sense, a rational choice is a *well-reasoned* choice, one that is (or, perhaps, could in principle be) supported by a chain of deliberation in accord with norms of good reasoning. In the second sense, a rational choice is a choice *appropriately responsive to reasons*, whether or not it is (or, perhaps, even could in principle be) supported by such deliberation.

A simple example might help here. Consider a circumstance in which it would be best to pick an option from among those saliently available, rather than to deliberate – perhaps time is short, or perhaps the question is of little significance. To be “appropriately responsive to reasons” would involve prompt and decisive selection of one option and moving on. If we were even to stop and deliberate about *whether* to deliberate, we might miss our chance, or waste valuable time. In such cases, the two senses of ‘rational choice’ come apart in practice.

Yet we might hold that this represents no deep ambiguity in our basic thinking about practical rationality. For it seems we could, in principle, in a retrospective “context of justification”, give a well-reasoned argument in favor of selecting without deliberation in certain circumstances. Indeed, it is not uncommon to find philosophers supposing that the two senses of ‘rational choice’ always come to the same thing, at least once we understand “well-reasoned” in terms of an in-principle constructable argument in the context of justification rather than a piece of actual cogitation in heat of the moment. And in this coming

together of “well-reasoned” and “responsive to reasons” we might hope to find the secret to explaining how the free and forceful elements of normativity can be combined. Perhaps we can understand normative force on the model of appreciating *the force of argument*.

The force of argument has many features that make it an appealing general model for normative guidance. Unlike an irresistible coercive or natural force, the force of argument is one we can fail to follow. We have all departed from laws of logic by reasoning fallaciously, and we have all had the experience of finding our actual belief tendencies somewhat recalcitrant in the face of an argument whose validity and premises we cannot fault. The connection between the force of argument and belief is a normative one, rather than a matter of nomic or conceptual necessity.

At the same time, our response to the force of argument seems appropriately free without being arbitrarily willful. When we feel “trapped” by an argument or “caught” in a contradiction, we want out, but we are not inclined to think that we can, with sufficient power of will or strength of desire, bend the logical relations and escape. Moreover, even though logical relations thus stand independent of our will and wishes, recognition of them does not seem to be at odds with our capacity for autonomy in thought and belief. Since we take our beliefs to aim at truth and to be responsive to logic and evidence – one might even say this sort of commitment is *constitutive* of belief as an attitude⁶ – we do not need to be subject to some further coercion or external sanction in order for self-acknowledged logical implications to be felt as putting normative pressure on us. We think we can see responsiveness to argument as a form of *epistemic attunement* of just the sort belief presents itself as having – attunement to content, to relations of implication and evidence, and so on.

“The force of argument” is indeed a central example of the peculiar mixture of force and freedom that we take normative guidance to involve. If it were possible to understand all normative guidance on this model, then we might hope that the two senses of ‘rational choice’ would never lead to genuinely divided

⁶ For discussion, see David Velleman, “The Guise of the Good,” *Nous* 26 (1992): 3–26, and “On the Possibility of Practical Reason”, *Ethics* 106 (1996): 694–726; also, P. Railton, “On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Belief and Action”, in G. Cullity and B. Gaut (eds.), *Ethics and Practical Reason* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997).

loyalty and that we had gotten to the bottom of things normative. No doubt the lasting appeal of rationalism in philosophy is partly explained by this.

But I will spend most of the balance of this paper discussing – in a very preliminary way – some ways in which the force of argument seems unable to afford a general model of normative guidance, or to take us to the bottom of all things normative. I will look first at what might seem the most hospitable territory for the force of argument: epistemology, or reasons for belief. Second, I will look at another domain of judgment, which might at first strike us as peripheral but instead emerges as central: aesthetics. Third, I will consider the classic turf for normativity: morality.

Normative authority for belief

We face a problem at the very outset attempting to understand normative authority in the domains of theoretical or practical reason in terms of the force of argument. For arguments and the logical relations they involve operate on, and conclude in, *propositions*. But according to a long tradition that seems worth maintaining, the conclusion of a piece of practical reasoning is an action and the conclusion of a piece of theoretical reasoning is a belief, and neither a belief nor an action is a proposition. If we are somehow to connect the propositional conclusion of an argument to a phenomenon like belief or action, it seems as if some non-argumentative but nonetheless *justifying* or “*rationalizing*” relationship must be found. Can we do this without already introducing a species of normative authorization not encompassed by the power of argument?

This is a contested matter. For example, we are inclined to speak of sensory experience as paradigmatically justifying perceptual belief, yet it is far from obvious that the content of experience itself is propositional, or that the justificatory relationship of this content to perceptual belief can fully be captured in deductive or inductive relations among propositions. To explore these questions would take us into deep waters. But perhaps we can give a less controversial example of justified belief to illustrate how difficult it would be to reconstruct all epistemic justification propositionally.

So as not to prejudice matters against “propositionalism”, let us make some favorable assumptions. Suppose that we were able to give an uncontroversial account of “the force of argument” in

the inductive case, that is, of what it is for a hypothesis to be inductively supported to a certain degree by a given body of evidence. And suppose as well that we can state the "rationalizing" relationship linking justified belief to inductive argument by a simple formula: a *belief that h* of strength *r* is justified in epistemic context *C* if *h* is inductively supported in *C* to degree *r*.

Focus now on beliefs that ascribe self-identity. Some such beliefs, I trust, are in fact epistemically justified. Can we give an account of this justification in propositional terms, even under our favorable assumptions? Perhaps, one might suppose, they are justified on the basis of an inductive inference from certain coherences and continuities among one's experiences. Consider an argument of the form:

- (SI) I have experience *e*₁ at *t*-3
 I have experience *e*₂ at *t*-2.
 I have experience *e*₃ at *t*-1.
 I have experience *e*₄ at *t*.
 Experiences *e*₁–*e*₄ exhibit coherence and continuity.
 I therefore conclude (with strength *r*) that I am self-identically me throughout the time interval (*t*-3) to *t*.

Yet it is clear that this argument simply *presupposes* self-identity, since it is formulated in terms of (a presumably unequivocating) first-personal 'I'. Now propositions are essentially third-personal, so we would have to reformulate the argument replacing 'I' and 'me' with 'Peter Railton'. Suppose this done, and suppose there is no doubt about the truth of the premises or the argument's inductive legitimacy. We now have a conclusion about Peter Railton, but it tells me nothing yet about *my* identity. That is, it does not yet sustain a conclusion licensing a *de se* self-identity ascription on my part.⁷ It does not tell me that 'Peter Railton' refers to me.

If experiential induction, propositionally construed, will not suffice, where does my sense of self-identity and my entitlement (if any) to the first-personal 'I' come from? Presumably I arrive at a *sense* of being me (and here, and now) in part from something like what has been called *proprioceptive* aspects of my experience (both conscious and nonconscious) – a kind of feeling or expectation that pervades my mental life and which, so far as I can see, cannot in principle be rendered as a third-personal

⁷ See David Lewis, "Attitudes *De Dicto* and *De Se*", in his *Philosophical Papers*, vol. I (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983).

propositional content.⁸ Now, if we dismiss this as no more than my "sense" of self-identity, and insist that we would need *evidence* reconstructable in argumentative form in order to *warrant* such a conclusion, we will find ourselves cut off from any possible avenue of justification. This could leave us stranded as theoretical reasoners, since without any entitlement to the 'I', how am I ever to be responsive in my belief to the evidence *I* have? – A lot of people have a lot of evidence, much of it conflicting, but whose should weigh with me? To justify my beliefs I need to identify myself in the space of epistemic reasons.

Hume himself seems to have become sensible of such a defect in any purely continuity-and-coherence-based approach to personal identity, such as the one he experimented with in the *Treatise*. He reflected in an Appendix:

If perceptions are distinct existences, they form a whole only by being connected together. But no connexions among distinct existences are ever discoverable by human understanding. We only *feel* a connexion or determination of the thought . . . the ideas are felt to be connected together, and naturally introduce each other. [T 635]⁹

He is at a loss to describe this feeling, or to explain it as based upon principles. "[T]his difficulty," he concedes, "is too hard for my understanding" [T 636].

Just what a fix we could end up in is seen at the end of Part I of the *Treatise*, where Hume gives a perhaps inadvertent intimation of the problem his later reflection brought clearly into focus.

⁸ There is some experimental evidence in the literature on autism that autistic individuals may experience deficits in developing a feeling for the self, much as individuals can experience color deficits in ordinary perception. Autistic individuals, for example, experience difficulty with first- vs. third-person asymmetries in so-called "false belief tasks", and are known to lose track of first- and second-personal pronouns in conversations, as in the phenomenon of "echo-location". After reviewing a description of a cognitively very high-functioning autistic individual, Temple Grandin, who herself professes finding ordinary social language and exchange baffling, but technical or scientific language much clearer, Simon Baron-Cohen writes:

And her own explanation . . . ? "She surmises that her mind is lacking in some of the 'subjectivity,' the inwardness, that others seem to have.

From *Mindblindness* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1995), pp. 142–143.

⁹ Here are the abbreviations used in the text for Hume's writings: Inq = *Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*, ed. by C. W. Hendel (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957); T = *Treatise of Human Nature*, ed. by L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1888); ST = "Of the Standard of Taste", in *Of the Standard of Taste and Other Essays by David Hume*, ed. by John W. Lenz (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).

Hume is describing the depths of the mental distress he reaches as a result of an “*intense*” commitment to following the rationalistic maxim to restrict belief to those matters where we can give a reasoned justification. He finds that, as a result, he loses any entitlement to confidence in induction, memory, external body, or even deduction. Eventually he “can look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely than another”, and calls out in desperation, “Where I am I, or what?” (T 269). Rigorous adherence to the self-imposed rationalist maxim prevents him from attributing any epistemic authority to his “natural introduction” to the self via an unreasoned “feeling” of it – and he thus loses his grip on self-location and self-identity.

Having seen what it would be to reach this point, Hume cannot convince himself that epistemology would be well-served by unqualified obedience to the rationalistic maxim. Why is it, he wonders, that

. . . I must torture my brain . . . at the very time I cannot satisfy myself concerning the reasonableness of so painful an application, nor have any tolerable prospect of arriving by its means at truth or certainty? Under what obligation do I lie . . . ? [T 270]

Hume remains concerned with reasonableness, truth, and probability. He is, however, “sceptical” that trusting *only* the force of argument will enable us to be fully responsive to these concerns.

. . . understanding, when it acts alone, and according to its most general principles, entirely subverts itself, and leaves not the lowest degree of evidence in any proposition, either in philosophy or in common life. . . . I am ready to reject all belief and reasoning Whose favor shall I court, and whose anger must I dread? What beings surround me? and on whom have I any influence, or who have any influence on me? I am confounded . . . and begin to fancy myself . . . utterly depriv’d of the use of every member and faculty. [T 268–269]

Far from consolidating belief around a core of rational certainty like the Cartesian *cogito*, Hume finds himself in a complete collapse of normative epistemic guidance – there remains no discernment concerning evidence or probability, no sense of anyone’s authority, even one’s own. His “distribution of credence” has become entirely indiscriminating, even with respect to logi-

cal relations and “the force of argument”. How, for example, are we to *reason* in the “context of justification” about the relationship between our beliefs and their grounds if we accord immediate experience no *prima facie* authority to support belief even concerning the content of our own thoughts?

If belief and reasoning are to be resurrected, we will need to authorize ourselves to draw directly upon a wider base of epistemic resources, without asking for reconstructability as argument, even in the context of justification. But what to add? Belief, we’ve noticed, is not a bare proposition, but an *attitude* toward propositions. Hume puts it starkly: “*belief is nothing but a peculiar feeling, different from the simple conception [of its object]*” (T 624). If we consider *de se* belief, Hume’s suggestion would seem to be that this attitude is a feeling that is *to be regulated* (at least in part) by “self-introducing” (we might say “self-intimating”) feelings. A feeling regulating a feeling? Hume writes that “*belief is more properly an act of the sensitive, than of the cogitative part of our natures*” [T 181]. Hume appears to apply this idea well beyond self-identifying belief, stressing the role of feelings in shaping belief concerning external objects, and observing:

Nature has . . . doubtless esteem’d it an affair of too great importance to be trusted to our uncertain reasonings and speculations. [T 187]

But what is such regulation of feeling by feeling like, and, if it cannot be reconstructed as a argument, how can it constitute justification? It seems we will need to supplement the normative “force of argument” in epistemology with something like a normative “force of feeling”, if we are to resuscitate epistemic discrimination or even self-discernment. How can feeling be appropriately discerning to possess epistemic authority? To have some idea of how this might go, we will turn to another work of Hume’s – on discerning, knowing, appreciative feelings.

Normative authority and appreciation

We encounter a structurally similar problem – of how to find the resources necessary to support a domain of appropriate discrimination in judgment – in Hume’s late essay, “Of the Standard of Taste”, which apparently is a survival of a systematic project he had undertaken on the nature of “criticism”, to include morality

as well.¹⁰ After observing that we cannot ground aesthetic distinctions on “reasonings *a priori*” (ST 231), he begins to consider the possible contribution of sentiment. Yet he quickly finds that mere *acquiescence* in sentiment would equally leave aesthetic distinctions groundless:

There is a species of philosophy, which cuts off all hopes of success in such an attempt, and represents the impossibility of ever attaining any standard of taste. The difference, it is said, is very wide between judgment and sentiment. All sentiment is right; because sentiment has a reference to nothing beyond itself [E]very individual [therefore] ought to acquiesce in his own sentiment, without pretending to regulate those of others. . . . [And thus it is] fruitless to dispute concerning tastes. [ST 230]

This species of philosophy has the wholly “sceptical” result that we cannot even say that Milton is better than Ogilby, and any such philosophy effectively undermines the discrimination upon which taste must be based. Agreeable as this “levelling” sort of skepticism may be to some strands of common sense, common sense on the whole, Hume notes, does not really take it to heart:

Whoever would assert an equality of genius and elegance between OGILBY and MILTON, or BUNYAN and ADDISON, would be thought to defend no less an extravagance, than if we had maintained a mole-hill to be as high as TENERIFE, or a pond as extensive as the ocean. Though there may be found persons, who give preference to the former authors; no one pays attention to such a taste; and we pronounce without scruple the sentiment of these pretended critics to be absurd and ridiculous. [ST 230–231]

Hume isn’t personally threatened by a “species of philosophy” that would forced us to give up aesthetic distinctions. “The principle of natural equality of tastes”, he believes, can hold sway only in disputatious or esoteric settings where we are not actively relying upon taste to guide us. In ordinary life, it is “totally forgot” (ST 231). Unlike the younger Hume, who wrestled nearly to the point of exhaustion with reason’s normative force, worrying

¹⁰ See David Fate Norton, “Introduction to Hume’s Thought”, in his edited collection, *The Cambridge Companion to Hume* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 27.

aloud "For my part, I know not what ought to be done" (T 268), the older Hume who wrote "Of the Standard of Taste" seems confident that he knows reason's place and unafraid of the world of normative discrimination tumbling into ruin around him. Any aesthete – rationalist or sentimentalist – who cannot find a basis for distinguishing a Milton from an Ogilby will simply find himself without authority in Hume's eyes, or ours.

To whose taste, then, *do* we actually pay some attention, i.e., attribute some normative force, and why would this count as authority about *beauty*? Hume identifies two sources of authority, convergence of "expert opinion" among those with relevant knowledge and sensory discriminative capacities, and convergence of general, experienced opinion in the "test of time". In both cases, we are seen to accord some authority to these sources, beyond our own simple likings. After all, we know that our own simple likings, convincing though they may be as feelings of attraction, may nonetheless be attributable to our own partiality, ignorance, fashion, novelty, lack of sensory discrimination, or distaste for (or perverse fascination with) the odd or *déclassé*. Why should this matter – isn't it up to us what we like? Yes, but when we judge beauty, we attribute something to an object or event, not merely to ourselves; and we accord ourselves authority concerning it. Partiality, fashion, lack of sensory discrimination, etc., are all ways in which the pleasure one takes in the experience of a landscape or of a work of art might simply be unrelated to the "beauties" (in Hume's terminology) it possesses – since we do not think self-interest, fashion, and the like are, or "make for", genuine beauty.

Well then, what sorts of features do we uncontroversially take to have a constitutive role in beauty-making, in both natural and man-made objects? Where do we expect to find the "beauties"? Surely, if there is anything at all to our notion of beauty, then among these features are: form, proportion, color, texture, composition, melody, harmony, rhythm, progression, and the like. When these features of an object are of a kind that our sensory and cognitive engagement with them seems reliably to yield experiences we find intrinsically enjoyable, we seem to have (to that extent) a candidate for beauty. That such features do figure in our assessments of beauty is reflected in ways we typically attribute lesser or greater aesthetic authority to our own likings or the likings of others. For example, I do not take my likings concerning Middle Eastern music to have much authority – I am

inexperienced with it, unable to discern its shades of tonality, structures, progressions, or variety (the different pieces sound too much alike to me), I don't claim to be exercising taste or discernment in when I express sporadic likes and dislikes of what I happen to hear. And I certainly claim no authority over others. By contrast, there are those whose likings in Middle Eastern music I find much more authoritative than mine, and whom I would consult for guidance. Now someone I take to be expert could lose some standing in my eyes if I came to learn that he plays favourites, judges music by its ideological content, lacks sensory discernment, or cannot find other individuals seriously engaged in making or judging such music who take his judgment seriously. Our practices – including our patterns of normative deference – reveal that we do have some idea of what it would be for a feeling (an appreciative delight) to be more or less attuned to objective, beauty-making features of objects, even though this attunement is effected in part via careful cultivation of, and attention to, subjective feelings or sensations.

A degree of deference to experts who possess demonstrable skills of discernment, greater knowledge of genre or context, wider experience, and so on, enables me to extend my “critical” power in detecting beauty-making features – they help me form a better idea of what I'd find delightful were I to gain greater experience. As a result, they help attune me to the “beauties” of objects, features which can be rich and lasting sources of sensorily-based, cognitively-engaging delight. Hume puts it thus:

Those finer emotions of the mind are of a very tender and delicate nature, and require the concurrence of many favourable circumstances to make them play with facility and exactness, according to their general and established principles. The least exterior hindrance to such small springs, or the least internal disorder . . . and we shall be unable to judge of the catholic and universal beauty. The relation, which nature has placed between the form and the sentiment, will at least be more obscure; and it will require greater accuracy to trace and discern it. [ST 232–233]

A similar sort of authority, also related to an authority we already accord ourselves, attaches to the “test of time”. Hume writes, concerning the relation “nature has put between form and sentiment” which underlies beauty:

We shall be able to ascertain its influence not so much from the operation of each particular beauty, as from the durable admiration, which attends those works, that have survived all the caprices of mode and fashion, all the mistakes of ignorance and envy.

The same HOMER, who pleased at ATHENS and ROME two thousand years ago, is still admired at PARIS and at LONDON. All the changes of climate, government, religion, and language, have not been able to obscure his glory. [ST 233]

Long exposure, developed sensibilities, the authority of countless experiences on the part of different individuals – how far we are from my inexperienced self overhearing a snatch of Middle Eastern music at lunch and saying “Hmm, don’t care much for that”. It is natural to see this as a difference in attunement to musical value.

Over the course of a life, we participate in a complex critical and appreciative practice, attributing some authority to our own growing experience (“In the end, the proof of the pudding . . .”), making recommendations and seeking confirmation in the opinions of others (“Try it, you’ll see for yourself”), and also showing some deference to various external sources of authority (“After what I’ve heard about it, I’m eager to try this place”). Situated within such a practice, which extends across societies and times and is held together both by our fundamental human sensory and cognitive similarities and by our reciprocal deferences, my judgments of beauty have at least a chance to be “normed by” the sources of aesthetic value, and words like ‘beautiful’ in my mouth have a chance of expressing genuinely aesthetic evaluations, even when I get things wrong.¹¹ We manage, that is, to have a domain of real distinctions concerning beauty, a domain of genuine taste, even though “subjective feelings” play an essential role in its shape.

Kant was also concerned to underwrite the possibility of objectivity in the domain of taste. Like Hume, he worried about various ways in which appreciation might be attuned or disattuned to genuine value. Kant writes:

¹¹ A common standard of time and shared conventions about when to arrive for (say) a noon engagement make it possible for me to be *on time*, but also *late*. In the case of good – and bad – taste, something more than this conventional infrastructure is required, e.g., Hume’s account of *beauties* to be attuned to.

. . . everyone says: Hunger is the best sauce; [but] to people with a healthy appetite anything is tasty provided it is edible. Hence if people have a liking of this sort, that does not prove that they are selecting by taste. Only when their need has been satisfied can we tell who in a multitude of people has taste and who does not. [CJ 210]

Hunger makes our likings unreliable. But when, for Kant, could a subjective condition such as liking be a reliable guide to a purportedly objective matter, such as aesthetic value?

Kant could not pursue Hume's solution, of looking to the refinement and qualification of empirical faculties and sentiments. Hume's psychology attributes to "the internal frame and constitution of the mind" appetites and passions that are *directly* aimed at features of the world independent of the self, and are "antecedent" to self-interest or happiness (Inq 113–119). But in Kant's empirical psychology, by contrast, appetites and passions are always guided at base by one's own pleasure:

All the inclinations together (which can be brought into a tolerable system and the satisfaction of which is then called one's happiness) constitute regard for oneself (*solipsismus*). [CPrRm 73]¹²

Within such a psychology, to become ever more delicately attuned to nuance in one's empirical feelings would simply be to become ever more attentive to promoting personal pleasure, regardless of how the pleasure is produced, whether any appreciative or cognitive faculties are engaged, and whatever the nature of the cause of the pleasure. Pleasure and affect are in this sense "blind" for Kant (CJ 272), since "if our sole aim were enjoyment, it would be foolish to be scrupulous about the means of getting it" (CJ 208). An Oriental massage in which the joints and muscles are agreeably "squeezed and bent" would be lumped together with a stirring Greek tragedy (CJ 274).

In aesthetics, we must focus not on which phenomena produce the greatest or most intense pleasure, but rather on the

¹² We can see an analogy with the case of theoretical reason. If we thought that all *inclination to believe* was essentially self-regarding (*solipsismus*), and attuned to gratification rather than objective conditions, truth, or evidence, then we would find genuine "epistemic worth" only in a dutiful capacity to resist epistemic inclination and regulate belief by epistemic principle alone. This would not make "epistemic dutifulness" into the "highest end" of epistemic activity – that would remain the marriage of justified belief with truth that constitutes knowledge – , but into an indispensable condition of it.

“presentation” of objects to the senses: we must be able to see the object “as poets do”, and “must base our judgment regarding it merely on how we see it” (CJ 270), that is, on the genuinely beauty-making characteristics. Self-oriented and pleasure-seeking, our empirical sentiments are careless as to modality. Kant thus foretold the fate that awaited aesthetics in the hands of that redoubtably thorough-going proponent of egoistic hedonism, Bentham: the only ground of discrimination would be *quantity*, the “mass of agreeable sensation” (CJ 266) – and pushpin (or Oriental massage) would indeed be deemed as good as poetry.

Moreover, Kant joined Hume in insisting that aesthetic judgments purport to be “non-personal” and communicable to others – in the sense not only of *informing* others concerning what we like, but of *recommending*, where each of us purports to have potential authority for others. “But,” Kant argues,

if we suppose that our liking for the object consists merely in the object’s gratifying us through charm or emotion, then we also must not require anyone *else* to assent to an aesthetic judgment *we* make; for that sort of liking each person rightly consults only his private sense. [CJ 278]

For similar reasons, Kant insists that in order to ensure that our account is “concerned solely with aesthetic judgments”, “we must not take for our examples such beautiful or sublime objects of nature as presuppose the concept of a purpose” (CJ 269–270). To the extent that the force of an example can be attributed to purpose (e.g., self-interest), the judgment will not be aesthetically attuned – we might substitute for the object of appreciation anything that would bring about the sought-after result equally well.

. . . the purposiveness would be either teleological, and hence not aesthetic, or else be based on mere sensations of an object (gratification or pain) and hence not merely formal. [CJ 270]

Therefore:

It seems, then, that we must not regard a judgment of taste as *egoistic*. . . we must acknowledge it to be a judgment that is entitled to a claim that everyone else ought also to agree with it. But if that is so, then it must be based on some a priori principle (whether objective or subjective) . . . [J]udgments of taste presuppose such a command, because they insist that our liking be connected *directly* with a presentation. [CJ 278]

If our judgment is to be attuned to the sources of aesthetic value by a “liking” that is “connected *directly* with a presentation”, but empirical likings cannot do this, where then is taste’s infrastructure, where to turn for regulation of our feeling of appreciation – for Kant insists that appreciation, even of the beautiful and the good, is a *liking*, a feeling (CJ 210)?

Kant looks to reason. The seeming peculiarity of Kant’s aesthetic, that it sees aesthetic judgments as “demands of reason”, can be understood in this light. But we must be careful, for such demands of reason are *not* demands based upon argument, rule, or conceptual demonstration:

... the beautiful must not be estimated according to concepts, but by the final mode in which the imagination is attuned so as to accord with the faculty of concepts generally; and so rule and precept are incapable as serving as the requisite subjective standard for that aesthetic and unconditioned finality in fine art which has to make a warranted claim to being bound to please. Rather must such a standard be sought in the element of mere nature of the Subject, which cannot be comprehended under rules or concepts, that is to say, the supersensible substrate of all the Subject’s faculties (unattainable by any concept of understanding) [CJm 344]

Here, then, we have Kant’s version of the subjective attunement that affords reliable guidance concerning the beauty-making features of the world: the pleasure afforded by activity on the part of the self’s supersensible substrate, when directly engaging the sensory “presentation” of the object. This substrate, shared as it is by all rational humanity, helps supply the needed infrastructure for a domain of objective taste. Now an invocation of a supersensible substrate may sound like hocus-pocus, but Kant deserves credit for refusing to be false to the “non-personal” compellingness of the experience of aesthetic appreciation, in order to satisfy an allegedly scientific egoistic, hedonist psychology. Not hiding its “unfathomableness”, Kant gives the best explanation he can: only the rational self has the requisite formal, disinterested, “non-personal”, and universal character to be the source of such a pleasure.

But Kant’s rational self is not simply a *reasoning* self. Beauty is a “way of presenting” that requires concepts, yet Kant recognizes that aesthetic appreciation is not simply a matter of being “brought to concepts” (CJ 266). If we were nothing but “pure

intelligences", "we would not present in this way" and could not see beauty (CJ 270). Nor is the rational self the whole infrastructure. According to Kant, beauty "holds" – presumably, is capable of "norming" judgment through feelings of appreciation and the practice of taste – only for "beings who are animal and yet rational, though it is not enough that they be rational" (CJ 210).¹³

Despite the indispensable role of reason, then, in attuning us to the beautiful, the normative force of judgments of beauty, even for a rationalist aesthetic such as Kant's, is not the force of argument. We therefore cannot expect that we could *reconstruct* aesthetic justification in propositional terms. As in the case of *de se* attitudes, an attitude (in this case, aesthetic appreciation) may stand in a justified relationship to its proper object even though this relationship is not mirrored in an argumentative relationship among propositions.

In appreciation we find the right mix of force and freedom for normative guidance. On the one hand, "the liking involved in our taste for the beautiful is disinterested and *free*" (CJ 210). On the other hand, we all know the *compelling* character of aesthetic appreciation and good criticism: we find in our first-personal experience of the object, as informed by the contributions of the critic, something both likeable and convincing. "Ah, *now* I see it," we think, thereby feeling the force of aesthetic authority: a force of credible influence from the critic ("He helped me see it"), of convincing experience from our own case ("Now I get it"), of a compelling work ("There was a lot more in it than I thought"), and of a discovery of value that we can share with others ("You must try this" or "You must read his essay, it'll change how you look at Miró").

Wittgenstein, in his "Lectures on Aesthetics", gives as his model of aesthetic appreciation an example of this process, drawn from his own case:¹⁴

Take the question: "How should poetry be read? What is the correct way of reading it?" . . . I had an experience with the 18th-century poet Klopstock. I found that the way to read him

¹³ According to Kant, an appreciation of the *sublime* also depends upon a "way of presenting", and so is not available to a pure intelligence (CJ 270). However, he also believes that our capacity to appreciate the sublime does not depend upon our animal nature. More on the sublime, below.

¹⁴ Ludwig Wittgenstein, "Lectures on Aesthetics", in Cyril Barrett (ed.), *L. Wittgenstein: Lectures and Conversations* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966). Hereinafter, LA.

was to stress his metre abnormally. Klopstock put - - - (etc.) in front of his poems. When I read his poems in this new way, I said, "Ah-ha, now I know why he did this." What had happened? I had read this kind of stuff before and had been moderately bored, but when I read it in this particular way, intensely, I smiled, said "This is *grand*", etc. But I might not have said anything. The important fact is that I read it again and again . . . that I read the poems entirely differently, more intensely, and said to others: "Look! This is how they should be read." [LA, 4-5]

Kant and Hume agree that, underlying aesthetic evaluation, there must be some form of "liking" or "enjoyment". Moreover, the liking in question must be sensorily-based, cognitively-engaging, discerning, disinterested, and communicable. If Hume is right, our essentially similar "internal fabric" – our empirical psychology and sentiments – can afford much of the ground for such a liking, since many of our appetites and passions take external conditions or sensory "forms or qualities" as their immediate objects and are disinterested in character, even though satisfying them will also yield pleasure. Thanks to additional qualification of feeling by the influence of reason, understanding, and the commerce of opinion, we can develop on this psychological "common ground" a domain of discernment and knowledge, where we can recognize and possess authority, and 'beauty' can have its true meaning – apart from fashionableness, novelty, endearing schlock, ponderous "importance", snobbish over-refinement, and so on. In Hume's account, as in Kant's, what possesses ultimate aesthetic authority is a *qualified appreciative attitude* and not a mere liking. In Hume's account, as in Kant's, much of the qualification of attitude is supplied by reason. And in Hume's account, as in Kant's, it seems we could not reconstruct aesthetic justification in terms of the force of argument.¹⁵

The normative authority of moral rules

Perhaps no one is really tempted by the idea that the normative force of aesthetic appreciation rests upon argument. But things might be different in the moral case, where the supremacy of

¹⁵ For further discussion of Hume's aesthetic theory, see P. Railton, "Aesthetic Value, Moral Value, and the Ambitions of Naturalism", in Jerrold Levinson (ed.), *Aesthetics and Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

reasoning and rules is often invoked. Perhaps in morality at least we will find it possible to account for normative force in terms of the force of argument.

Let us set aside for now a very general worry about this line of thought, briefly touched on in the introduction: any appeal to rules as a foundation for justification runs the risk of regress or circularity unless we can appeal to a super-rule of a mysterious kind. For now let us cheerfully assume that we don't mind mystery, as long as its name is *rationality*.

Kant's moral philosophy is often taken to be the *locus classicus* for the idea that normativity resides in rationality itself, and the moral law it prescribes. Perhaps this is indeed how we should understand his view: there is a super-rule, and it commands our obedience as a rational obligation. But is it obvious that this is how *he* understands his own most basic approach to normativity? We are told to have respect (*reverentia*) for the moral law, but Kant observes:

Respect (*reverentia*) is, again, something subjective, a feeling of a special kind, not a judgment about an object that it would be a duty to bring about or promote. For, such a duty, regarded as a duty, could be represented to us only through the *respect* we have for it. A duty to have respect would thus amount to being put under obligation to duties [MM 402–403]

So it seems we must look for “a feeling of a special kind”, not obligation, at the bottom of moral duty. What is this feeling like? Here is an example of the sort of reverential appreciative feeling Kant appears to have in mind:

. . . to a humble, plain man, in whom I perceive righteousness in a higher degree than I am conscious of in myself, *my mind bows* whether I choose or not, however high I carry my head that he may not forget my superior position. . . . Respect is a tribute we cannot refuse to pay to merit whether we will or not; we can indeed outwardly withhold it, but we cannot help feeling it inwardly. [CPrR 76–77; compare G 454]

What we perceive in this individual is not simply more severe dutifulness than our own. We are all familiar with individuals who turn sensible everyday rules into severe duties that rise above all inclination, but our mind does not bow to that.¹⁶ What we perceive,

¹⁶ For a description of dutifulness of this kind, see David Schapiro, *Autonomy and Rigid Character* (New York: Basic Books, 1981), pp. 83–86.

according to Kant, is greater *righteousness*, dutifulness that “includes” a good will (G 397).

In our appreciative encounter with it, we once again encounter the mixture of force and freedom characteristic of normative force. On the one hand, the respect is “freely paid” – for Kant, nothing in our experience suggests that any self-interested incentive or external coercion lies behind our appreciation. On the other hand, the respect is in a way compelled, it is something “we cannot help feeling”, even when it comes in the face of interest. Kant writes:

Duty! Thou sublime and mighty name that dost embrace nothing charming or insinuating but requirest submission and yet seekest not to move the will by threatening aught that would arouse natural aversion or terror which of itself finds entrance into the mind and yet gains reluctant reverence [CPrR 86]

Now this impressive paean might suggest an *intrinsic* evaluation of duty. But, as Paul Guyer reminds us,¹⁷ Kant continues, still addressing “Duty”:

. . . what origin is there worthy of thee, and where is to be found the root of thy noble descent which proudly rejects all kinship with the inclinations and from which to be descended is the indispensable condition of the only worth which men can give themselves?

It cannot be less than something which elevates man above himself as a part of the world of sense, something which connects him with an order of things which only the understanding can think and which has under it the whole system of all ends which alone is suitable to such unconditional practical laws as the moral. [CPrR 86–87]

Notice that the practical laws of morality, and even duty itself, are not self-subsistent sources of unconditional worth – their worth arises from their “descent”, which does secure the noble standing of morality.¹⁸

At the bottom of morality’s normative authority, then, Kant

¹⁷ See Paul Guyer, “Kant’s Morality of Law and Morality of Freedom”, in R. M. Dancy (ed.), *Kant and Critique* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1993), p. 70.

¹⁸ Guyer emphasizes the consistency with which Kant, over the course of his philosophical career, recognized that all evaluation presupposes some values-in-their-own-right. The value Guyer identifies is the special *freedom* Kant attributes to human agents. See his “Kant’s Morality of Law and Morality of Freedom”.

speaks not of an analytic demand of consistency nor a willful exercise of our capacity to govern ourselves by rules, but of an experienced synthetic demand and a free acknowledgement, the subjective expression of which is a feeling of a more aesthetic character, akin to the demand upon us that the appreciation for the sublime in nature involves:

It is in fact difficult to think of a feeling for the sublime in nature without connecting it with a mental attunement similar to that for moral feeling. [CJ 128]

For Kant, as we saw in the aesthetic case, human inclination and appetite cannot attune us to *this* sort of demand, because they are by nature self-interested (*"solipsismus"*, CPrR 73) rather than non-personal and disinterested, and thus "human nature does not of itself harmonize with the good" (CJ 271). Kant therefore must find a faculty internal to us, capable of evincing or guiding a special sort of liking, a "moral feeling", that is attuned to the moral-value-making features of the world, the sources of moral *worth*. We can, he writes, be attuned to the good "only through the dominance that reason exerts over sensibility" (CJ 271). So, as in aesthetics, to underwrite a rational demand as grounded in the right sort of attunement, we must have recourse to a "supersensible substrate", a noumenal self. Moral judgments are akin to aesthetic judgments of sublimity – judgments of beauty draw in part upon our "animal" nature; for the moral and the sublime, reason alone, the "supersensible substrate", suffices.

Now for Hume, the "substrate" for moral and aesthetic judgment can be our empirical psychology, since it contains sentiments of a suitably "impersonal" and non-self-interested nature. For example,

We are certain, that sympathy is a very powerful principle in human nature. We are also certain, that it has a great influence on the sense of beauty, when we regard external objects, as well as when we judge of morals. We find, that it has force sufficient to give us the strongest sentiments of approbation [T 618]¹⁹

Thanks to sympathy, among other sentiments, our sentiment of

¹⁹ A more contemporary psychological account would notice that Hume's sympathy involves two elements: empathy (a direct internal simulation of the circumstances and mental states of others) and sympathy (a direct positive concern for their well-being).

direct approval can be attuned to the ends of others as such, and to the general interest, even when we have no personal interest at stake: reading ancient history, we wince at a tyrant's cruelty, and root for the hero to save the populace from him. And much aesthetic judgment, likewise, depends upon a capacity to feel the feelings of others. If well-developed, well-informed, and attentively listened to, such "impersonal" sentiments can attune us to – "harmonize" us with – the good and the beautiful.

We may observe, that all the circumstances requisite for [sympathy's] operation are found in most of the virtues; which have, for the most part, a tendency to the good of society, or to that of the person possess'd of them. [T 618]

Sympathy can of course be misled, and may lead us astray. It may fail to be engaged in unfamiliar or misunderstood surroundings. Or it may immediately attune us to the evident pain of animal undergoing an emergency veterinary procedure, making us wish fervently that the procedure would stop, even though this operation is necessary for the animal's survival. Sympathy – like aesthetic admiration – therefore must be assisted and qualified by knowledge, understanding of cause and effect, and reason, and by participation in a community in which our judgments may be challenged and improved if (as we tend to do) we launch our opinions into the public world and also to defer to some degree to the judgments of others and to social practices hammered into shape over the generations. Thus – once again, as in the aesthetic case – our feelings can develop greater freedom from prejudice, finer discrimination, and closer attunement to genuine moral distinctions.

By contrast Kant, as an egoistic hedonist in psychology but a universal humanist in morality, could no more entrust moral attunement to "solipsistic" empirical sentiment (cf. CPrR 73) than he could aesthetic attunement.²⁰ And thus we arrive at Kant's answer to the question why nature attached reason to will (which

²⁰ Contemporary empirical psychology on emotion, motivation, and moral development tends to favor a more Humean view. See for example, J. H. Barkow, L. Cosmides, and J. Tooby (eds.), *The Adapted Mind* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Baron-Cohen, *Mindblindness*; Antonio Damasio, *Descartes' Error* (New York: Putnam, 1994); N. Eisenberg and J. Strayer (eds.), *Empathy and its Development* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); N. Eisenberg and P. Mussen (eds.), *The Roots of Prosocial Behavior in Children* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Joseph LeDoux, *The Emotional Brain* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); L. May, M. Friedman, and A. Clark (eds.), *Mind and Morals* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996); and David G. Myers, *The Pursuit of*

is, for Kant, also a *liking*, CJ 209): without the “substrate” of reason to ground impersonal feelings, we would arrive only at a personalistic willfulness, not a good (i.e., *général*) will. Hume gave us a story as to how the empirical, psychological “substrate” we share as humans generates likings that can be attuned to beauty and the general good. What mechanism does Kant give to explain how a “supersensible substrate” can function similarly? Here Kant is, as befits his penetration as a philosopher, entirely frank: he has no positive idea – the matter involves an “unfathomable depth of [a] supersensible power” (CJ 270; G).

Note, however, that Kant is also clear that reason cannot operate here by argument alone:

... when in intuiting nature we expand our empirical power of presentation (mathematically or dynamically [a “might over the mind”]), then reason, the ability to [think] an independent and absolute totality, never fails to step in and arouse the mind to an effort, although a futile one [W]e are compelled to subjectively *think* nature itself in its totality as the exhibition of something supersensible, without our being able to bring this exhibition about *objectively*.

... We cannot determine this idea of the supersensible any further, and hence cannot *cognize* but can only *think* nature as an exhibition of it. . . . This judging strains the imagination because it is based on a feeling that the mind has a vocation that wholly transcends the domain of nature (namely, moral feeling), and it is with regard to this feeling that we judge the presentation of the object subjectively purposive. [CJ 268]

Our mind, in its “supersensible vocation”, is here functioning in a way Hume would have recognized despite the heavily Kantian language: feeling and imagination are regulating judgment, beyond the scope of cognition and argument alone. Within this scheme, as within Hume’s, we may *use* arguments to help us attain or correct a moral feeling or sentiment. For Kant, the “contradiction in conception” and “contradiction in will” tests of our practical maxims can place a purportedly good will face-to-face with its potential own limitations, deflating or affirming its

Happiness (New York: William Morrow, 1992). Empathy has been credited in some historical cases with greater efficacy than principles in inhibiting compliance with cruelty commanded by authority. See Roy F. Baumeister, *Evil: Inside Human Violence and Cruelty* (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1997).

self-representation as perfectly general. For Hume, understanding and general rules help to extend or correct untutored sympathy.

If reason's functioning as a supersensible substrate for feeling remains for Kant something of which he cannot give a positive account, he nonetheless believes we can convince ourselves of its possibility: we know from first-hand experience the "striking down" of our pretenses and humiliating acknowledgement of our own limitations, and we also know that reason alone among our faculties possesses the qualities necessary for such experience – it alone can furnish guidance that is impersonal. There is no mystery about this when we confront the sublime in nature or morality. The peculiar awe we experience when we come upon "a mountain whose snow-covered peak rises above the clouds" (OBS 47) or when we observe an act of genuine duty performed in spite of conditions of extreme "subjective limitation", has extraordinary power to move us, yet cannot be attributed to empirical sentiment. We find our own self-conceit "humiliated" or "struck down" (CPrR 73) in the presence of the sublime. Fortunately, we are not merely flattened. Instead, we are awakened to a value "beyond price", carried beyond ourselves for the moment to sense a "direct liking", a liking even of that which strikes at the very heart of our own prideful self-interest. Thus it recruits our fundamental allegiance, despite any personal interest to the contrary.

To behold virtue in her proper shape is nothing other than to show morality stripped of all admixture with the sensuous and of all the spurious adornments of reward or self-love. How much she then casts into the shade all else that appears attractive to the inclinations can be readily perceived by every man if he will exert his reason in the slightest [G 61–62n]

No wonder such a "presentation" moves us, and yields not the "cold and lifeless approval, without any moving force or emotion" (CJ 273, 274) that we would otherwise expect from any merely un-self-interested presentation. Confronted with the sublime, we are not tempted to think, "Yeah, but what's it to *me*?" No wonder such a "presentation" is regulative for our wills when we are rational, i.e., attuned via our "supersensible substrate".

This has an important implication for our normative life together: since it owes nothing to personal interest, our sense of the sublime in nature and in conduct should be "subjectively"

confirmable by other rational beings in their own experience. Others, too, Kant is confident, will stand in awe before the Alps during a storm or find that their mind bows when observing a humble person doing his duty in the face of great temptation. Our moral understanding, like our aesthetic understanding, will be communicable to others in the form of a recommendation, and it will afford a compelling ground for life together that conflicting individual interests do not. The compulsion here is not at bottom that of will, or law, or rule, or consistency. Instead, it is a kind of liking that is free but not simply chosen, and that is regulative for action. It is, then, *our* attitude when we are “mentally attuned” by reason, and no mere submission – even though we precisely recognize that it is not simply up to us what we make of it. This is the experience of normative authority.

The rule-breaking considerations

Duty belongs to a family of rule- or consistency-based notions. And indeed we typically assume that morally good conduct will follow rules and exhibit consistency. But if Kant is right, then behind these rules – exceptionless, in his system – lies something quite different: a kind of direct liking akin to the experience of the sublime. We do not have rules “all the way down”, but must instead encounter a substantive appreciation of value and associated feelings.

Hume was acutely aware of the potential this affords for conflict. If following “the rules of reason” led always to conclusions that substantive evaluation and feeling also embraced, we’d have no difficulty. But at least in epistemology, Hume finds that following the strictest epistemic duties, to accord epistemic respect (“rational credence”, we might say) only to conclusions justifiable by reason alone, leads him to an epistemic condition that he cannot find stably credible or genuinely compelling in the guidance of his overall epistemic life. Might the same be true in the moral case?

Consider Kant’s discussion of obedience to a tyrannical ruler.

. . . a people has a duty to put up with even what is held to be an unbearable abuse of supreme authority [since] its resistance to the highest legislation can never be regarded as other than contrary to law For a people to be authorized to

resist, there would have to be a public law permitting it to resist, that is, the highest legislation would have to contain a provision that is not the highest and that makes the people, as subject, by one and the same judgment sovereign over him to whom it is subject. This is self-contradictory [MM 320]²¹

Here Kant appeals to a consideration of consistency to ground a claim of duty. And he has an excellent point, emphasized earlier and in a characteristically different way by Hobbes: a sovereign can benefit us by solving the problem of potentially unending social conflict only if our agreement to obey does not contain a clause reserving to each the right to decide on his own authority when to obey.

Hume, likewise, is aware that “the *advantage* we reap from government” will be imperilled if each allows himself to regulate his own obedience in accord with his own ideas of what is just or beneficial. The result could only be “endless confusion, and render all government, in a great measure, ineffectual” (T 555). “We must, therefore, proceed by general rules and regulate ourselves by general interests” (T 555). But how is it possible for advantage-based duty to take on a life of its own?

. . . there is a principle of human nature, which we have frequently taken notice of, that men are mightily addicted to *general rules*, and that we often carry our maxims beyond those reasons, which first adduc’d us to establish them. . . . It may, therefore, be thought, that in the case of allegiance our moral obligation of duty will not cease, even tho’ the natural obligation of interest, which is its cause, has ceas’d [T 551]

Hume, political conservative that he was, has here a golden opportunity to embrace a Kant-like principle of passive obedience, and even continues “It may be thought that . . . men may be bound by *conscience* to submit to a tyrannical government” (T 551). But he shrinks from this conclusion:

Those who took up arms against *Dionysus* or *Nero*, or *Philip the second*, have the favour of every reader in the perusal of their history; and nothing but the most violent perversion of common sense can ever lead us to condemn them. ‘Tis certain, therefore, that in all our notions of morals we never entertain such an absurdity as that of passive obedience, but make

²¹ I am grateful to Tamar Schapiro for bringing this passage to my attention.

allowances for resistance in the more flagrant instances of tyranny and oppression. [T 552]

How, then, does Hume block the unwanted conclusion of passive obedience? What general rule or practical maxim does he formulate for the citizen to follow to replace the rule of passive obedience? He offers none, only a general suggestion that "the obligation to obedience must cease" when it sufficiently loses its point, that is, "whenever the [common] interest ceases, in any great degree, and in a considerable number of instances" (T 553).

How, then, is this to work? "The common rule requires submission", but "grievous tyranny and oppression" allows individuals to make "exceptions" (T 554). Here we have a discontinuous change, a departure from own conscientious dispositions to obey which "bind us down", as we rise up in active resistance to government. It looks as if the chief mechanism that awakens us from our "addiction" to general rules is a sympathetic sense of the violation of the general interest. Indeed, sympathy is strong enough that, however much we dislike mayhem and disorder, our approval is excited by rebellions against tyranny of which we hear only in histories or fiction. A morality that would put a people at the mercy of its rulers will not win our wholehearted admiration or esteem. Here we follow no maxim or rule, but a developed sentiment.

It is important to see, however, that the sentiment *is* developed. Self-love and sympathy alone do not yield any comprehension of when a complex political system is abusive or when such abuses have become too considerable. Justly and unjustly inflicted punishment alike look and feel painful; just and unjust war alike are costly and terrifying. An attunement to the general interest calls for complex awareness of cause and effect, and of long- vs. short-term, as well as sympathy for victims. Nonetheless, Hume's account is, in the Kantian sense, heteronomous, since it gives sentiments an essential role, and moreover it yields no strict maxim that individual's could legislate for themselves.²²

²² The difficulty of formulating a decision rule to be used by individuals here may be a difficulty *in principle*. Whether it makes sense for you to disobey a tyrant, for example, depends upon whether others will disobey, and their reasoning has a similar dependence upon yours. Problems such as this may admit of general criteria for evaluation (such as a standard of the general interest), but no decision rule or maxim that individuals can self-legislate that would satisfy those criteria. For discussion, see Donald Regan, *Utilitarianism*

But, stepping back from a model of autonomy as maxim-based self-legislation, if we reflect upon Hume's position on passive obedience vs. Kant's, which of the two, in fact, seems to provide greater practical or political autonomy? Which affords us, as citizens or as moral agents, greater scope to deploy and act on the full range of our human critical faculties?

Suppose Kant were to abandon his egoistic hedonism about human psychology and accept instead the Humean view that sentiments can help attune us to be attuned to legitimate grounds for moral, aesthetic, or epistemic evaluation. Would he still insist that our only hope for genuinely moral, aesthetic, or epistemic conduct – or autonomy – lies in imposing over sentiment a regime of exceptionless rules?

Of course, I cannot answer on Kant's behalf, but I can attempt this: apply Kant's own test of *fundamental* normative authority, and see where it might lead. How is this possible? Kant's test, recall, involves a special sort of first-personal confirmation: when (for example) we confront the humble man who insists on being honest despite personal costs that we realize would likely overwhelm us, "the mind bows"; when we attend perceptually to sublime scenes in nature, we cannot help but be awed.

Return now to the tyrannical ruler and the obedient citizenry, who accept without resistance all forms of abuse and humiliation. Does "ordinary reason" (G 394) find passive obedience to tyranny sublime – does the mind indeed bow?

I'm willing to bet with Hume that in this case it does not. Impressive as the spectacle may be of passive obedience in the face of great abuse, and powerful as the will must be to restrain an individual feeling the tugs of inclination to strike back at the tyrant, does our mind really bow before this sight? Suppose that the peculiar abuse by government is an order to inform on our friends, to reveal their location to an authority whose plan is to eliminate or torture dissidents or religious minorities. It seems, perhaps, that we know Kant's answer: obey authority; never lie, even to conceal a friend (cf. SRL). And this is the sort

and Cooperation (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980). More generally, significant limitations of decidability and computability arise for any attempt to give individuals non-self-defeating maxims to guide their conduct in collective settings requiring coordination "autonomously" (in the literal sense – each following his or her own rule).

of example that has often enough been used by critics of Kant as a *reductio* of his conception of the ground of morality.

But Kant deserves better treatment. Those of us who find in Kant's writings a deep insight into the authority of moral experience should not betray this insight by allowing critics to focus instead on his attempts to apply a multi-layered theory in practice, mediated by a defective empirical psychology. His application may go wrong in cases like "passive obedience", but the fundamentals may yet be sound.

At the fundamental level, I suspect, our mind simply does not bow at the spectacle of the citizen who, despite strong ties of family and friendship, reveals their location to a tyrannical authority. Such an act of will may be monumental, but it is not majestic, and even seems to us peculiarly self-contained or blind. Can we attribute this response on our part to self-interest? No, the response seems to be the same even when we consider a case from history or fiction. Is it then merely an unconsidered reflex? No, Hume is right that our initial reaction to disobedience is usually discomfort. But we reflect further. The deep normative distress we feel when Germany's greatest moral philosopher defends the unalterable necessity of obedience to the state, and the exceptionless duty never to lie to conceal the location of a friend, is an impersonal and historical shudder. It arises from the full range of Humean faculties, developed through experience: reason, imagination, sense, sympathy, memory, and a feeling for one's place in history.

How different our reaction when we learn that Kant failed on one notable occasion to keep to his habit of regular afternoon walks – the afternoon he received Rousseau's *Emile*, and would not put it down. We might be less impressed by the iron will of Kant upon hearing this story, but we are more impressed by the man and his mind.

Let us conclude with a thought experiment using Kant's own division of the "three different relations that presentations have to the feeling of pleasure", namely, the *agreeable*, the *beautiful*, and the *good*, to understand our reactions and their normative force (CJ 210).

Suppose we had learned that Kant missed his afternoon walk only once, but not to read *Emile* – rather, to avoid a pesky visitor to town whom he knew to be lurking in wait for him with an embarrassing question he preferred not to answer. As a result we

might like Kant better – he would be more amiable for showing this human tendency to indulge a desire to avoid an uncomfortable truth. But our self-conceit would not be struck down by this realization – instead, we would find it gratifying to our sense of ourselves that even Kant could be self-indulgent when it comes to allowing oneself to side-step an awkward truth. This we would find *agreeable*, but not in an altogether admiring way. Especially, the critic who finds Kantian moral rigorism excessive would smile inwardly, with perhaps a touch of condescension.

Suppose instead we had learned that he missed his afternoon walk on that one occasion in order to avoid spoiling the end of lovely afternoon tea with a visitor whom Kant rarely saw but personally admired. Then we would like the act, and also Kant, yet better. Moreover, we would like him and his act impersonally as well as personally – for someone to break from routine or personal resolution for such a reason shows a kind of gracefulness or *beauty* of gesture. Even those Kantian critics who find it gratifying to view him as a cold, “clockwork” Prussian would be taken a bit aback, and find a bit of appreciation of Kant creeping in.

But when we learn that in fact Kant missed his afternoon walk but once, in order to continue reading Rousseau’s *Emile* – Rousseau! whose unruly mind, scandalous conduct, and colorfully inconsistent prose contrast so sharply with Kant’s, but whose insights we know nonetheless reached to the core of Kant’s thinking – we like this because it possesses something of the sublime. And we like Kant better, impersonally as well as personally, for showing in a concrete but dramatically appropriate way just how attuned he was to the insights that awaited him in Rousseau, how capable he was of being displaced from the ruts the mind is wont to settle into. We here find in both Kant and his mind something *good*, something estimable in its own right. That afternoon’s display of “mental attunement” is much more impressive than would be the strength of will, consistency, or resistance to inclination that Kant would have exhibited had he instead overcome the desire to continue reading *Emile* and maintained above all a resolve to take an afternoon walk each day, exactly at the same time. Thus does Kant’s omission strike a bit at the self-conceit of critics who might attempt to look upon him with intellectual condescension as hermetic, narrowly moralistic, trapped within his own technical language and scheme of categories. For when we appreciate this story, we

cannot help but feel, freely, a kind of admiration for Kant as an intellect. And thus does the experience of normativity combine force and freedom.²⁸

Department of Philosophy
2215 Angell Hall
University of Michigan
Ann Arbor
MI 48109-1003
USA

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General rules and the normative dimension of belief in Hume's epistemology

As regras gerais e a dimensão normativa da crença na epistemologia de Hume

Ruth Marcela Espinosa¹

ABSTRACT

The main concern of this paper is whether Hume's account of belief has a normative dimension, especially concerning his account of general rules of reasoning in his *Treatise of Human Nature*, and consequently, whether it is possible to offer an account of the normative force of those rules in spite of his naturalist framework. I conclude that there are many normative elements in his conception of belief and reasoning, and that, as many authors in recent studies of normativity have suggested, naturalism can sufficiently account for the normative structures of our cognition and their normative authority. Such a view of the normative dimension of belief in Hume's epistemology also shows an interesting and close connection with the moral dimension of his thought, which I believe is of fundamental importance for understanding his thought in general.

Keywords: Hume, general rules, normativity, belief.

RESUMO

O principal objetivo deste artigo é discutir se o relato da crença de Hume tem uma dimensão normativa, especialmente no que se refere ao seu relato de regras gerais de raciocínio em seu Tratado da Natureza Humana e, conseqüentemente, se é possível explicar a força normativa destas regras apesar de sua estrutura naturalista. Concluo que há muitos elementos normativos em sua concepção de crença e raciocínio e que, como muitos autores de estudos recentes de normatividade sugeriram, o naturalismo pode explicar as estruturas normativas de nossa cognição e sua autoridade normativa. Esta visão da dimensão normativa da crença na epistemologia de Hume também mostra uma conexão interessante e próxima com a dimensão moral de seu pensamento, que acredito ser de fundamental importância para a compreensão de seu pensamento em geral.

Palavras-chave: Hume, regras gerais, normatividade, crença.

¹ Universidad Andres Bello.
Departamento de Humanidades.
Avenida Republica 252, Santiago,
8370134, Santiago de Chile.
E-mail: ruth.espinosa@unab.cl

In recent decades, Hume's apparent concern for normative issues in his philosophical writings has been of increasing interest among scholars (see Hearn, 1970, 1976; Martin, 1993; Falkenstein, 1997; Lyons, 2001; Searjeantson, 2005; Morris, 2006; Schliesser, 2007). One of the main questions seems to be whether his account of general rules in his *Treatise* and subsequent writings is an expression of normative claims concerning epistemic and moral judgment, or, on the contrary, whether appealing to rules is nothing more than a careless use of normative language within a naturalist framework, which cannot provide a foundation for the normative force of epistemic rules (see Lyons, 2001, p. 270, 273, n. 14; Falkenstein, 1997, p. 30).

Even from the very beginning of the discussion one could call the matter a "pseudo problem" based on an anachronism. In fact, the concern with rules was common throughout early modern philosophy, at least since Descartes's *Regulae ad directionem ingenii*, and especially in early modern logic² (see Easton, 1997; Serjeantson, 2005, p. 188), while normativity is itself a 20th-century concern of philosophers.

In this paper, I will be dealing with some difficulties concerning how to articulate a normative view of Hume's account of general rules. In order to do this, I will try to support the following three claims: (i) Hume uses the concept of rules in at least three different ways, one of which is normative in a strong sense. To support this statement it will be necessary to recall what a general rule is and to examine its relation to belief and normativity; (ii) If there is a source of the normative force of general rules in Hume's thought, then this means that the theory is in itself normative, even though neither the general rules nor their normativity are explicit subjects of analysis in the *Treatise*, but instead serve as operative concepts; and (iii) Hume's novel view of philosophy and reason explain to some extent the generation of normative structures in his philosophy.

Rules in Hume's philosophy

That Hume's thought is concerned with the problem of rules in its central parts has been well known since Hearn's two papers on general rules from the 1970's, in which he shows that general rules play a systematic role in the *Treatise*, being present in each of its three books (Hearn, 1970, p. 404-406³). In this paper, however, I will be dealing only with the problem of the normativity of general rules in Hume's epistemology, mostly in part 3 of book 1 of the *Treatise*. There we find for the first time an

extensive exposition of general rules and their influence on our judgment and belief.

General rules are, as described by Hume in T 1.3⁴, generalizations concerning the behavior of a kind of phenomenon of our experience that can be expressed by proposition in the form "every X is/has the property/ is predicable-of Y". This kind of general statement appears within the analysis of probabilities, for they lack the universality of mathematical and logical propositions and they cannot be demonstrated (as Hume understands the term, probabilities are both our beliefs of matters of fact, as well as the statements themselves that articulate such beliefs). Instead, they are conveyed by the imagination's tendency to generalize, based on past experience and custom. Nonetheless, not every generalization has the same status, and this fact reinforces the distinction commonly drawn in the secondary literature between general rules of prejudices (also referred to as "extensive general rules") and the so-called corrective general rules.

The way in which general rules affect our judgment is also addressed by Hume in his treatment of probability in the *Treatise* since it also belongs to the topic of belief and belief-formation mechanisms. According to Hume, a belief is a "strong and steady conception of an idea" that includes a claim to truth and with a number of different causes, such as memory, imagination, and causal inference: "we join belief to the conception, and are persuaded of the truth of what we conceive" (T 1.3.7; SBN 96-7 footnote). Hume naturally endorses some of those mechanisms which are in a better position to fulfill that expectation (see Loeb, 2002, p. 13) and prevent our ideas from being the mere "offspring of the imagination" (see T 1.3.9.4; SBN 108). Besides, considering the probability of causes, Hume holds that our judgments take place by virtue of custom and general rules (see T 1.3.12.24; SBN 141), and that "custom can lead us into false comparison of ideas" (T 1.3.9.17; SBN 116. See also T 1.3.13.2; SBN 143-144), especially when we, as a result of the imagination's propensity to generalize, form general rules of the following type: "An Irishman cannot have wit, and a Frenchman cannot have solidity". This kind of judgment is called an "unphilosophical species of probability" and "is that deriv'd from general rules, which we rashly form to ourselves, and which are the source of what we properly call prejudice" (T 1.3.13.7; SBN 146; for another example see T 2.2.5.12-13; SBN 362). This first kind of general rule leads to false reasoning in so far as the rule is caused by the "propensity of the imagination to extend the scope of judgments formed in one set of circumstances to other resembling but non-identical circumstances" (Hearn, 1970, p. 405).

² See for example Hutcheson, *Logicae Compendium* (1756), Watts, *Logic* (1724) or Arnauld et al., *La Logique ou l'art de penser* (2011 [1662]). The latter works were probably very well known by Hume.

³ Hearn barely mentions the issue of the value of general esthetic judgment, which Railton addresses (2000, p. 10-16)

⁴ I cite Hume's *A Treatise of Human Nature* (T) according to the critical edition of Oxford Philosophical Texts by D. Norton and M. Norton, using the abbreviation T and four numbers (book, part, section, paragraph) and according to the traditional edition of Selby-Bigge/Niddich using the abbreviation SBN followed by the number of the page. In all quotations of Hume's work, I respect the original orthography

Although every judgment on probability is a function of custom, i.e. past experience and the projection of the imagination, the mind is not condemned to follow its faulty natural tendencies. It is possible to prevent the mind from forming false beliefs founded on rules of prejudices and from "the reposing any assurance in those momentary glimpses of light, which arise in the imagination from a feign'd resemblance and contiguity" (T 1.3.9.6; SBN 110), by means of the reflective mediation of second level judgments.⁵ Thus, the same propensity of the imagination to generalize can result in 'philosophical probability' when it is mediated by reflection. Reflection is a pivotal element in Hume's account of mental activity, it explains some aspects of our cognition by playing a twofold roll: transforming some instances of the generalization tendency of the imagination into patterns of adequate judgments, i.e. proper "general rules"; but it also distinguishes, by means of correction, between those cases that are in accordance with those rules. That is why Hume suggests that mediation in judgment leads to the so-called corrective general rules, which are allowed "to influence their judgments <of men> even contrary to present observation and experience" (T 1.3.13.8; SBN 147, clarification added). In a very central passage for this investigation Hume claims that

We shall afterwards take notice of some general rules, by which we ought to regulate our judgment concerning causes and effects; and these rules are form'd on the nature of our understanding, and on our experience of its operations in the judgments we form concerning objects. By them we learn to distinguish the accidental circumstances from the efficacious causes [...] The

*general rule is attributed to our judgment; as being more extensive and constant*⁶ (T 1.3.13.11; SBN 149, emphasis added).

Hume continues: "Sometimes the one, sometimes the other prevails, according to the disposition and character of the person. The vulgar are commonly guided by the first, and wise men by the second <kind of rules>" (T 1.3.13.12; SBN 150). It seems that the character of the beliefs a person forms, that is, the way someone structures his or her doxastic life, reflects the extent to which he or she is actually influenced by epistemic norms, the extent to which his or her beliefs express rationality or irrationality.⁷ Thus for Hume, the rational epistemic agent is the one who is able to assume a critical philosophical perspective. A wise person is someone whose beliefs are reliably formed due to a reliable disposition to judge reflectively, and justified for the same reason (setting aside the problem of the criteria for justification of belief). This is because, according to the corrective general rules account, a rational belief not only expresses a healthy mental attitude of a believer, but it is also somehow related to the content of the beliefs.⁸ Thus, according to Hume, more extensive and constant experience is "of a grosser and more stubborn nature, less subject to accidents, and less influenced by whim and private fancy" (Essays⁹ 1. XIV, p. 112; G&G, p. 175).¹⁰ An extended and constant experience of the same phenomenon or kind of phenomenon in the light of certain evidence (copy principle) is of a nature that can be expressed by general rules: "But however intricate they may seem, it is certain that general principles, if just and sound, must always prevail in the general course of things, though they may fail in particular cases; and it is the chief business of philosophers

⁵ The first use of reflection in the Treatise concerns impressions. Thus Hume distinguishes between first order perceptions – also called impressions or ideas of sensation, which are directly related to sense perception – and second order perceptions, that is, impressions and ideas of reflection that result from the affection produced by the mind on itself. This kind of perception implicitly recalls some kind of self-consciousness or self-experience as a source of representations. This distinction seems similar to the one that Hume is accused of making in his appeal to reflection at the level of judgments. Those general statements that the mind proceeds to form without any mediation of reflection, and which can be false (the case of prejudices) or, and may also be subject to a second order judgment which can only arise as a result of reflection. Wilson (2008, p. 416) grasps the chief role of reflection in Hume's thought, writing that for Hume "the mind arrives at standards of rationality through a process of reflection upon the world as it is experienced and, equally importantly, upon itself as it is experienced".

⁶ Constancy and extensiveness are criteria for justifications and rationality of belief. But these terms belong more properly to a cluster of terms; frequency, stability, and stubbornness are also to be mentioned. (For the discussion of these criteria see Lyons, 2001; Loeb, 2001; Guerrero del Amo, 2005, for three different positions). These concepts are the fruit of reflection, in so far as they arise from the analysis and abstraction of properties of our experience. Furthermore, reflection is a topic of great relevancy in current discussions about belief and normativity (Owens, 2000).

⁷ This is what Owens calls the problem of "doxastic control" (2003, p. 284). For a discussion of epistemic norms in Hume, see Lyons (2001). He distinguishes between "criteria for epistemic norm correctness" and the "defense of the criteria". This is an important distinction that is assumed in this paper.

⁸ It appears that Hume's theory of justification of belief includes an interesting confluence of different elements of reliabilism, coherentism and foundationalism.

⁹ I quote both Eugen Miller edition (1985) and T.H. Green and T.H. Grosse (G&G) edition (1889): Essay part 1, XIV. Of the Rise and Progress of the Arts and Sciences. Essay part 2, I: Of Commerce.

¹⁰ I agree that there is a doctrinal continuity between Hume's Treatise and the subsequent Essays. Immerwahr (1991) shows the harmonic continuity and coherence of both works, and moreover, the complementing nature of both approaches to human nature and business.

to regard the general course of things" (Essays 2. 1, p. 254; G&G, p. 287)¹¹.

As we can see above, there is an underlying connection between what can properly be an object of our knowledge and the method that can lead a reasoner to that knowledge; a connection that we can make sense of only by appealing to Hume's account of general rules. Along this path, I argue that in order to fully understand the aforementioned connection, it is necessary to distinguish not two (as has been often done), but three different categories within the concept of "general rule." Firstly, there are extensive general rules of prejudice. Secondly, there are general principles, which are, so to speak, materially determined, for they express specific properties or characteristics of phenomena (in physics, politics, economics, moral, for example) and correspond to the distinction between "what is owing to chance, and what proceeds from causes" (Essays 1. XIV, p. 111; G&G, p. 174; also T 1.3.11.12; SBN 128-9) or, according to Hume, "between particular deliberation and general reasoning" (Essays 2. 1 p. 254). The conditions for the achievement of this kind of knowledge¹² – which corresponds to Hume's philosophical probability – are "the greater refinements and improvements of human reason" (Essays 1. XIV, p. 118; G&G, p. 180). This also supports Hume's claim that politics, metaphysics and morals "form the most considerable branches of science. Mathematics and natural philosophy, which only remain, are not half so valuable" (Essays 1. XIV, p. 126; G&G, p. 186). These first two kinds of rules make space for the third, the one we have been calling "corrective." These general rules are "the logic" of probable reasoning and is required to achieve justified and reliable belief, on which all valuable sciences are based. Corrective general rules have therefore at least a threefold function: (1) they display a model of reliable belief formation and correction; (2) they can also correct judgment produced by the first kind of general rules (T 1.3.13.12; SBN 149-50); and (3) they make it possible to return irreflective judgment or belief to its cognitive sources and foundations and, thus, to identify false belief as such (see T 1.3.8.14; SBN 104-5).

General rules for causal reasoning

After developing his theory of philosophical probabilities and its dependency on causal inference, Hume outlined his famous set of Rules by which to judge causes and effects (T 1.3.15; SBN 173). They are 8 criteria that allow us to distin-

guish between a relation of constant conjunction that describes a causal nexus and an apparent causal relation. They should permit us to discern the correctness of inferences and beliefs based on causal reasoning. Furthermore, Hume affirms that the 8 rules are "all the logic I think proper to employ in my reasoning" (T 1.3.15.11; SBN 175). They should rule our causal reasoning so that they resemble as much as possible the *Proof*¹³ horizon. The general rules for causal reasoning are the natural conclusion of Hume's treatment of probabilities and probable belief in the Treatise (and not the skeptical conclusion of T 1.4). This is not only because of the plain fact that, according to Hume, every reasoning concerning matters of fact relies on causal inference, but also and mostly, because despite this reliance "the relation of cause and effect has all the opposite advantages" compared to reasoning based on "feign'd resemblance and contiguity" since "the objects it presents are fixt and unalterable" (T 1.3.9.7; SBN 110). There are many other principles that enlivened our ideas similarly bringing us to believe "and command our assent beyond what experience will justify; which can proceed from nothing beside the resemblance between ideas and facts" (T 1.3.9.12; SBN 113), for example, credulity ("easy faith in the testimony of other") and education, which rest "almost on the same foundation of custom and repetition as our experience or reasoning from causes and effects" (T 1.3.9.19; SBN 117). As a result, accuracy in the determination of causes is needed to avoid the "inaccuracy," which is "contrary to true philosophy" (T 1.3.9.19 footnote; SBN 117). The corrective principles for causal reasoning, which are "a true species of reasoning and the strongest" (T 1.3.7 footnote), are all the logic necessary in order to "rectify non philosophical probabilities into causal probabilities" thus achieving a true philosophy, upon which, according to Hume's project, depends the real possibility of reaching "a system of proofs,"¹⁴ or in other words: science.

As can be seen, this set of rules has a unique character. Since cause and effect is, properly speaking, the only relation of matters of fact that results in reasoning (T 1.3.2; SBN 73) – that is, drawing a conclusion from given premises, or the generation of new beliefs from given ones – the rules for judging cause and effect relations have to mediate this process of forming beliefs in order for that judgment to be an expression of an adequacy between the natural tendency of the mind and the "stubborn nature" of the object of its judgment, both of which are necessary for developing science. They rectify judgments in so far as they evaluate if they are "subject to accidents or influenced by whim and private fancy" (Essays 1. XIV, p. 112; G&G, p. 175).

¹¹ See also the following quotation from the Treatise "in order to establish a general rule, and extend it beyond its proper bounds, there is requir'd a certain uniformity in our experience, and a great superiority of those instances, which are conformable to the rule, above the contrary" (T 2.2.5.12-13; SBN 362).

¹² I am using the word in its general sense and not specifically in reference to the demonstrative scope of reasoning.

¹³ For the meaning of this concept in Hume's thought see T 1.3.11.2; SBN 124.

¹⁴ Salliel (1999, p. 44, the English translation is my own) "redresser les probabilités non philosophiques en probabilités causales, ou en système de preuves".

That is why I ultimately think Hume's account of corrective general rules, though terminologically akin to the use of modern logic, is different in nature in so far as it is the result of an inquiry into the deep nature of believing and judging. Those rules are not mere recommendations or simply an instrument for reaching certainty. They represent instead the structure of a corrected natural faculty of reason; in other words: a standard. Precisely on this point rests the origin of their normativity¹⁵. I agree with Hearn's claim that "these rules come for Hume to occupy a different status [...] the function of the causal rules is to correct and stabilize the sentiment of belief which is generated by certain natural, causal factors" (1976, p. 65). It seems to be the case that corrective general rules are normative rather than descriptive, that is, they are prescriptions about how we ought to form and correct states of belief. Now, this is still insufficient to prove that general rules have normative force, indeed, someone could insist that Hume is just describing the way we form more stubborn and reliable beliefs, as he did with false beliefs. Hence the important issue here is to determine the extent to which the account of general rules belongs to this level of discourse, that is to say, whether the rules are meant to account for the doctrine of natural causes of belief or if there is something else to say about them.

General rules and the normative dimension of belief

The question concerning the normative dimension of belief runs into the intricate relationship between belief and truth. This relationship can be described as follows: to believe that *p* is to believe that *p* is true. Thus, *prima facie*, a correct belief, that is, one that fulfills that pretension, is ultimately a true belief¹⁶. It follows, therefore, that a rational agent should believe *p* if and only if, there is enough evidence for the truth of *p*. The same would apply for the case of rules: if *A*, *B* and *C* are principles for forming true beliefs, it follows that in rea-

soning (coming to a correct conclusion) we have to consider beliefs that are consistent with those rules to be more reliable than ones that are not.¹⁷

Yet by itself, this relationship does not seem adequate to account for the source of normativity of belief. In fact, the assumption outlined in the above paragraph is exactly what needs to be proved here. For even if belief aims at truth, the following naturalist objection cannot be easily avoided: "To elevate this trivial fact to the status of a 'norm' is to transform an innocent platitude into a pompous falsehood. For there is nothing normative about believing: neither we believe with an eye fixed on the horizon of an ideal of truth nor we obey any prescription to believe the truth" (Engel, 2007, p. 179)¹⁸. In other words, the relation that our beliefs have to truth can be seen as a plain fact; it expresses the fact wherein one believes *p*, rather than a compulsory prescription about what to believe.

I would like to draw attention to the problem concerning the scope of normativity as a first step to present my response to the naturalist objection. Normativity, at least in a philosophical sense, is not mere necessity (logical or physical). Rather, it concerns what is not absolutely necessary and, accordingly, it would be pointless to attach in any way normativity to a plain fact as breathing or sunshine. The proper scope of normativity, in the sense I am interested in, is that of practice (see, for example, Stemmer, 2008, p. 32; Railton in Dancy, 2000, p. 4). If believing and breathing are not two different kinds of phenomenon I would agree that there is no point in ascribing normativity to the realm of belief. But I think that there is certainly a difference between them, in so far as belief is the result a typical kind of agency, namely, epistemic agency, which involves other typical components of the realm of normative facts, such as judgment, will, epistemic freedom and, in short, rationality. Now, the claim that believing is a subject of the will is – for good reason – controversial (see Owens, 2000), and though I cannot address this controversy here, I will instead, assume a position very close to McDowell's (1998, p. 434f) and O'Hagan's (2005, p. 45f).

¹⁵ Lyons rejects the claim that the general rules for causal reasoning are second order mental states, evident by their reflective character (T 1.3.13.11; SBN 149). Instead he holds that they are about objects (Lyons, 2001, p. 273, n. 13). I believe Lyons's claim is wrong since according to Hume causation cannot be objectively predicated on objects, but only as a projective function of the intellectual power of men. General rules are explicitly rules "to judge", thus, they refer to acts of the mind rather than to objects. Nevertheless, I agree with Lyons that they are reflective in the sense that they involve the idea of causation, which is an idea of reflection.

¹⁶ In a deeper analysis this claim has to be qualified. Epistemic norms are in a sense standards of correctness of belief. Norms governing beliefs are nonetheless still related to their characteristic aim: truth. Nevertheless from the perspective of real epistemic agency, believing is not necessarily a matter of "all or nothing", but of degrees of rationality, certainty, correctness, evidence, assurance, confidence. This is also something that Hume has permanently in mind while dealing with probability (see for example T 1.3.7.2; SBN 130-31; 1.3.13.2; SBN 143). For Hume, different degrees of evidence constitute important epistemic distinctions, as is the case, for example, between probability and proof. For Hume there are some states of belief which are justified, and that justification is a function of their sources (if they are reliable or not), their stability and the dispositions of the epistemic agent to believe.

¹⁷ For further developments on this issue see, in particular, Stemmer (2008, p. 77-79, 99). For the topic of normativity and epistemic norms, as well as norms of truth, see Lyon (2001), Owens (2003, p. 285-289) and Engel (2007, p. 182 ff).

¹⁸ The objection is formulated by Engel, although he does not contend it. For a contrary position see O'Hagan (2005, p. 44) and Stemmer (2008). Basically, these authors will sustain a "constitutive argument" in the sense that, as Stemmer for example put it, "it appears that the will-to-be-rational is an intrinsic goal of reasoning" ("Es kommt hinzu, dass das Rational-sein-wollen ein intrinsisches Telos des Überlegens ist", Stemmer, 2008, p. 60, the English translation is of my own).

in the sense that even if belief is not typically the result of our deciding what to believe, its occurrence is inseparable from, even constitutive of, the exercise of judgment, which cannot take place outside of the space of reasons

Hence, in so far as freedom and rationality are involved in how we structure our doxastic lives, there are *prima facie* good reasons to assume that there is also a normative dimension involved. Hume's theory penetrates this dimension by moving from a descriptive account of natural causes of belief formation to a deeper level, where reflective mechanisms of belief correction and formation reveal that belief is not a mere mechanical response¹⁹, but also a matter of rational deliberation. Corrective general rules are mechanisms of reflective thinking, directed to judgment and, therefore, standards of rational thinking. Now, standards belong naturally to the practice of reasoning itself, but they only become explicit if we assume a critical perspective and pay attention to what underlies the mere possibility of the practice. Reflection shows that it is inherent to epistemic agency to be normative, and this fact does not contradict in any measure the fact that real epistemic agents are most of the time insensible to their being "responsive" to reasons.

Corrective general rules are called upon to determine the standards of correction of causal judgment, and with it, the standards of correction of belief. A belief, accordingly, can be more or less adequate, depending on the degree of evidence and experience available. Furthermore, general rules help to determine the level of adequacy, since those experiences that can be captured (let themselves be explained) by general rules are what concerns science. It is important to keep this point in mind. Given a statement, there are certain conditions under which it should or should not be believed, that is, taken as true. Nonetheless, these conditions, according to my reading of Hume's epistemology, are deeply related to a demarcation criterion, much more than a truth theory. A belief can report different levels of certainty, depending on its nearness to the pool horizon. Proofs are basically beliefs for which there has been no exception in experience, which is what general rules try to secure. We also know that Hume believes that those rules are "very easy in their invention, but extremely difficult in their application" (T 1.3.15.11; SBN 175). In my opinion, the account of general rules is far from being about how to ensure that one's belief is true, as is the case with Descartes, for example; rather, it concerns the conditions under which a doxastic item can count as knowledge in Hume's "liberalized" non-rationalistic sense, which somewhat "divorces questions of justification from questions of truth" (Lyons, 2001, p. 270)²⁰.

All this however, does not solve the problem of the normative force of epistemic rules, as guide of processes of belief

formation and justification, i.e., why should we follow these rules, and where does their normative constraint lie.

Normative force

General rules are corrective, in so far as they state the standard of certain knowledge of causes. Furthermore, since generalization is a natural tendency of the mind, it follows that general rules are the consummation, the *telos*, of such a natural tendency. In other words, nobody expects or intends to fail at reasoning (in the broad, Humean sense of the word), even when the roots of that reasoning are not actually present to the mind. Everyone assumes that he or she reasons correctly – at least aspires to reason correctly – and thereby, that the beliefs he or she forms are correct, in the same sense that believing *p* necessarily involves believing its truth. Believing, as well as reasoning, aim at truth as their intrinsic condition. Since causal reasoning (or causal inference or generalization) is inevitable, and since it naturally involves the intention of truth, it follows that everyone must reason in accordance with general rules. In other words, "the authority of reasons is found within the practice of reasoning itself. We reasoners are bound by rational standards because to engage in reasoning just is to be accountable to rational standards" (O'Hagan, 2005, p. 43). Specifically, since all matter of fact reasoning is a causal reasoning, one ought to pay heed to the 8 causal rules by which one may judge cause and effect in order to avoid false beliefs²¹.

I claim that believing and belief formation by probable reasoning would constitute in themselves what Peter Stemmer has called a "normative situation" (Stemmer, 2008, §4), that is, a situation in which a normative ought-ness is implied, even if that situation is not epistemically present to the agent. The situation can be described as a hypothetical statement: "if we wish to achieve correct beliefs, we should reason according to some G rules." If we wish the end, we are "normatively" required to act – to reason – in a certain way. The aim at truth of belief configures, so to speak, the normative situation. Now, for general rules to have normative force, it must be a condition that we do wish to have correct beliefs, so that they express not merely descriptive value, but also normative authority. This leads to the following question: why should we want to have true beliefs? Why should we be motivated to reason according to general rules?

I think Hume also has an answer to this question, a question that is deeply connected with his naturalist conception of human reasoning: we need to reason correctly, because as agents we desire things, and in order to reach what we want, we need to identify the efficient means for obtaining them. Correct causal reasoning is a necessary condition for achieving the ends

¹⁹ Hume is often taken as the paradigmatic case of an author who neglects the existence of intellectual freedom. See, for example, the introduction of Owens' work (2000).

²⁰ But only somewhat, as Martin has noted (1993, p. 256). Both authors use the same texts as support, see T 1.4.7.14; SBN 272.

²¹ Indeed, the 8 rules are not the only epistemic norms of Hume's epistemology. Besides logical principles, the so-called *copy principle* deserves particular attention. See, for example, Schliesser (2007).

we desire; thus, being responsible epistemic agents by reasoning according to basic epistemic norms is something we must do in order to satisfy our desire. This is also, according to Hume, the primary reason for why we engage in reasoning. Science and truth are secondary targets of reasoning, but certainly not of less importance; the first target, however, is instrumental. This conclusion shows, moreover, how deeply Hume's epistemology is oriented to his Moral theory, and that an understanding of Hume's account of reasoning and general rules sheds light on those passages in book 2 and 3 which at first sight seem to conflict with the "skeptical conclusion" of book 1 (see for example, T 2.3.3.6/7; SBN 416, T 2.3.10.1; SBN 449, T 3.1.1; SBN 458-9. In the secondary literature see especially Winters, 1979).

But since much of our causal reasoning is not conscious, most people do not manage to know that they have to follow general rules in order to reason correctly, for this activity is already normative oriented. Even if they recognize that they have to reason carefully and according to general rules, they may choose not to do it, because they are influenced by other passions. But this is another matter, which has to do with rational deliberations and rational decisions.

Lyons (2001, p. 270) has argued that "the normativity in Hume's epistemology" lies in that "the philosophical method derives its greater value from being a better means of satisfying curiosity (and keeping it satisfied) as well as meeting other, daily, pragmatic ends." I consider this to be correct, but instead of under-valuing it as a case of just "instrumentally-inspired" normativity, I believe, with Stemmer (2008, p. 33-44), that the source of normative ought-ness is – in most cases, at least – a relation of "necessary condition" to which is attached a wish/desire/want that actualizes the normative force of the condition²² in as much as not following it, necessarily means not achieving what is desired. Here rests one of the most important of Hume's legacies: we are not able to deeply understand (even) our most abstractive cognitive processes without reference to the affective scope of human nature. In other words, there is an active exchange between the "sensitive" and the "cognitive" part of our nature. This exchange also takes place in the constitution of the normative, as described by Fred Wilson: "Reflecting upon [...] experience we adopt goals that are attainable and means that are efficient. Self-reflection leads to standards of practice that define the (cognitive) virtue of rationality; it leads to standards that are attainable and efficient. In other words, self-reflection leads to a reasonable standard of rationality. Or at least, it does so if one is wise" (2008, p. 416).

Conclusion

The rudimentary tools with which Hume's philosophy and epistemology is equipped make it, at first sight, look very

unfit to be a contribution to the actual debate concerning epistemic normativity. However, his account of corrective general rules provides a more or less persuasive account of the sources of the normative dimension in belief formation and correction, and it also provides a solution to the problem concerning motivation. Hume's ideas seem to be supportive of certain ways of addressing the issue of normativity and epistemic agency, namely, constitutive strategies. Reflection thus uncovers the normative structure of belief itself, and belief's aiming at truth implies a normative relation between epistemic norms and doxastic items. That is the way I think we have to understand Hume's claim that there are some "general rules, by which we ought to regulate our judgment concerning causes and effects; and these rules are form'd on the nature of our understanding, and on our experience of its operations in the judgments we form concerning objects". But also the origin of their normative force is uncovered as lying ultimately in the inner psychology of human nature, deeply embedded in the facticity of life. For Hume, believing rightly, that is, believing what is "more probably" true, is determined significantly by utility, and by passions like the love of truth and curiosity. Now, as he stresses, "the question is after what manner this utility and importance operate upon us?" (T 2.3.10.4; SBN 450). This issue is no longer a question for epistemology, but instead for the science of man as a whole. Natural dispositions, psychological mechanisms of the mind, and social and cultural constructions are called upon to answer it.

All these nuances seem to configure the normative dimension of Hume's epistemology, which from the very natural ground of our "aiming at truth," is oriented toward the improvement of the understanding and human character. Its significance is not diminished because of the distance of Hume's theory from the question of an objective truth, for as Owens (2003, p. 287) states: "Rational belief is rarely based on conclusive evidence." Nonetheless, and from a certain technical perspective, Hume's epistemological approach is weak, because relevant questions, such as how much evidence, beyond his very general demarcation criteria, is necessary to call a belief "true," are never settled. This lack of tidiness also shows that Hume's first concern was neither epistemological nor logical, but rather moral in the broad sense of the word.

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²²A similar idea was also defended by MacIntyre (1959) with respect to the is-ought problem.

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ARTICLE

WHAT THE WISE OUGHT BELIEVE: A VOLUNTARIST INTERPRETATION OF HUME'S GENERAL RULES

Ryan Hickerson

This paper advances an interpretation of what Hume called 'the general rules': natural principles of belief-formation that nevertheless can be augmented via reflection. According to Hume, reflection is, in part, what separates the wise from the vulgar. In this paper, I argue that for Hume being wise must therefore be, to some degree, voluntary. Hume faced a significant problem in attempting to reconcile his epistemic normativity, i.e. his claims about what we *ought* to believe, with his largely involuntarist theory of the mind. Reflection on the General Rules, and an interpretation of that reflection as voluntary, helps explain not only Hume's theory of belief, but also how he hoped to reconcile epistemic normativity with naturalism about the mental.

KEYWORDS: Hume; general rules; belief; doxastic involuntarism; epistemic normativity

A general rule is only a propensity; at the same time it is the great scourge of propensities.

—John Passmore

1. INTRODUCTION

The task of this paper is an interpretation and statement of a deep problem in Hume's theory of belief. So I will begin with a summary of what I take to be that theory's central doctrines. In this paper, I am principally concerned with Hume's *doxastic involuntarism*, i.e. his suggestion that belief *cannot be willed*. That claim creates particular difficulties for Hume's *evidentialism*: the doctrine that we ought to believe only in proportion to reliable inductive evidence, rather than on the basis of superstitions or prejudice. I will call the

problem of reconciling Hume's epistemic normativity with his doxastic involuntarism 'The Problem of Believing Wisely' (because according to Hume we ought to believe as 'the wise' do.) Ultimately, whether a Humean can resolve this problem depends upon the viability of what Hume called 'the general rules'.

Hume's theory of belief can be summarized in about a half-dozen claims: (i) belief is a manner of conception, characterized by (ii) forceful and vivacious feeling. It is (iii) analogous to the feeling of *impressions*, but also the memories, and is (iv) capable of being transferred to other 'weaker' ideas via association. It (v) arises in us naturally, as (vi) an observation of causation produced by custom. It is belief in (vii) an existence. While it is (vi) that has been most forcefully inscribed on our own memories and imaginations, not to mention the extant literature on Hume, in this paper my concern will be with (v), and how Hume can make good on his naturalism. I argue below that Hume can only make good on (v) by treating it as a process capable of being influenced by reflection, when that reflection is construed as *voluntary*. This is a bit surprising, given Hume's frequent emphasis of the *involuntary* nature of belief, but that will be my thesis.

In the first section, I begin with a presentation of the *prima facie* evidence for reading Hume as a *doxastic involuntarist*, and with it a pair of distinctions necessary for understanding what that doctrine amounts to. In the section following, I present what I call 'The Problem of Believing Wisely', a problem that any thoroughgoing involuntarist (Humean or otherwise) must face. That problem is, roughly, making one's epistemic normativity consistent with one's naturalism. In conclusion, I advance a novel interpretation of Hume's so-called general rules, and couch it as Hume's best chance at resolving the Problem of Believing Wisely. I will argue that the General Rules were treated by Hume as natural principles of belief-formation that nevertheless can be refined and corrected by thoughtful consideration. Successful or not, Hume hoped to explain our beliefs naturalistically, but also hold us accountable for them. It is an important philosophical task, if not one easily accomplished.

2. WAS HUME A DOXASTIC INVOLUNTARIST?

He was. Or at least he meant to be. The degree to which he was unable to be is what I hope to demonstrate in this paper. My immediate task in this regard is simply defining doxastic involuntarism and presenting some evidence that Hume committed himself to the doctrine. Before beginning that task, however, it is important to point out that 'involuntarist' was not a label Hume self-applied, and it is likely (in my estimation) that he would have rejected such a branding. The main reason for suspecting so is Hume's famous *compatibilism* with respect to questions concerning the freedom of the will. One of the first philosophers to articulate compatibilism forcefully,

Hume may be most responsible for the popularity of that approach today. It seems likely, were we to confront Hume with the charge that he treated beliefs as incapable of being voluntarily held, he would seek to similarly explode our voluntarist/involuntarist dichotomy.¹ Nevertheless, I argue here (in this section and the next) that the view of him as an involuntarist is appropriately, if problematically, ascribed.

Let us begin by defining *modal doxastic involuntarism* as the view that beliefs *cannot* be acquired as a result of determination by the will. In somewhat more Humean language we might say the modal doxastic voluntarist believes humans have a 'power', i.e. the ability to believe (or not believe) on the basis of willing. The modal doxastic involuntarist, on the other hand, is someone who would deny humans have such a power. According to (global) modal doxastic involuntarism, what is willed is entirely irrelevant for what is believed. Believing is treated as a separate cognitive activity. Whatever natural mechanisms produce beliefs, mechanisms surely shared with other animals and discoverable through scientific investigation, the involuntarist understands them to be operating independently of our willing.

Before we proceed further, I should make a pair of comments about the proposed definition. First, it is stronger than the mere claim that beliefs are *in fact* not held as the result of willing. The claim that I am associating with the label 'modal doxastic involuntarism', for purposes of this paper, is that it is *psychologically impossible* to believe willfully. Second, doxastic involuntarism is normally taken to be a *global* thesis, i.e. a thesis about *all* beliefs. This should be distinguished from more specific claims about the involuntary origination of a particular belief or set of beliefs. *Global doxastic involuntarism* is the thesis that there are *no* beliefs that can be (or are) acquired as the result of willing. *Local doxastic involuntarism* would merely be the thesis that for some particular belief ϕ , or some set of beliefs type Φ , the particular belief or set of beliefs cannot be (or are not) held as the result of willing.

The two distinctions are important because of the plausibility of the view that *some* of our beliefs are *more or less* within voluntary control than others, or than they may have been otherwise. We may eventually discover that it is

¹Hume's discussions of liberty and necessity consider whether an 'object' or 'event' can be construed as 'necessitated' by constant conjunctions witnessed in nature, including human nature, or whether that object or event is the result of 'liberty,' insofar as it is the product of the will. Famously, Hume argued both. But Hume was in those places addressing a more general question than the one presently concerning us regarding the origination of belief. Can believing, also, be subsumed under Humean compatibilism? Is believing an act? Can it, also, be construed as an 'object' or 'event' subject to determination by the will? Here, it is important to avoid being overbasty in attributing Hume a position. It would be perfectly possible for a philosopher to be compatibilist with respect to first-order acts, yet remain unconvinced that beliefs are appropriately construed as acts, and hence think belief inapt for similar analysis. The mere fact that Hume was a first-order compatibilist does not, by itself, establish that he was a doxastic compatibilist.

more within my voluntary control to believe what I will about an abstruse subject for which I rely on dubious human testimony, for example. It might be less within my control to believe what I will about a subject of immediate sensory awareness, for example. The distinction between *global doxastic involuntarism* and *local doxastic involuntarism* makes it possible to suggest that some beliefs or sets of beliefs cannot be or are not the product of willing while others can be or are. The distinction between modally robust and contingent *doxastic involuntarism* makes it possible to suggest that some or all of my beliefs are involuntarily held, but need not have been.

The two distinctions are important for my interpretive conclusion below. But only one is strictly necessary for attributing a baseline view about doxastic involuntarism to Hume. There is a good deal of textual evidence for interpreting Hume as a *modal doxastic involuntarist*, whether local or global. The evidence can be found in passages like the following:

Secondly, The mind has the command over all its ideas, and can separate, unite, mix, and vary them, as it pleases; so that if belief consisted merely in a new idea, annex'd to the conception, it wou'd be in a man's power to believe what he pleas'd. We may, therefore, conclude, that belief consists merely in a certain feeling or sentiment; in something, that depends not on the will, but must arise from certain determinate causes and principles, of which we are not masters.

(T Appendix 2; SBN 623)²

When Hume wrote: 'if belief consisted merely in a new idea, annex'd to the conception, it wou'd be in a man's power to believe what he pleas'd', I take him to be expressing (quite generally, at least about *some* type of belief) that we *cannot* simply believe what we please. Note particularly his phrase: 'depends not on the will, but must arise from certain determinate causes and principle, of which we are not masters'. And that is not the only bit of textual evidence. Similar passages can be found throughout Hume's work.³ Another particularly pointed statement is the following:

Nature, by an absolute and uncontrollable necessity has determin'd us to judge as well as to breathe and feel; nor can we any more forbear viewing certain objects in a stronger and fuller light, upon account of their customary connexion with a present impression, than we can hinder ourselves from

²The source here is Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* [1739–40]. Hereafter abbreviated 'T' and cited by book, part, section, and paragraph numbers. I also include the page number from the traditional Selby-Bigge edition, revised by Niddich, abbreviated 'SBN'. A nearly identical version of this argument is T Abstract Abs. 20; SBN 653. Cf. T 1.1.4.4; SBN 12.

³See T 1.3.7.3, 1.3.7.7, 1.3.9.2–1.3.9.3, 1.3.9.17, 1.3.10.4, 1.3.10.8, 1.3.12.23, 1.3.13.8, 1.4.1.8, 1.4.2.12, 1.4.2.51, 1.4.2.57, 1.4.7.9–1.4.7.10, 2.3.1.13–2.3.1.14, App. 2, Abstract Abs. 20–21 (SBN 95, 628–9, 107–8, 116, 120, 122–3, 140–01, 147, 183–4, 192, 214, 218, 269–70, 404, 623–4, 653–4, respectively).

thinking as long as we are awake, or seeing the surrounding bodies, when we turn our eyes towards them in broad sun-shine.

(T 1.4.1.7; SBN 183)

In this passage, Hume is clearly drawing out his famed analogy between the *force and vivacity* of belief and the *force and vivacity* of present impressions. But in passages like this one the involuntarist overtones, even in Hume's choice of terminology 'force' and 'impression', are also evident. What is important for my argument below is simply to draw your attention to Hume's claim that we *cannot* forbear believing when we find ourselves in the circumstances natural for belief.⁴ This is just what I mean when I call him a *modal doxastic involuntarist*. According to Hume, when faced with believable circumstances we confront an 'absolute and uncontrollable necessity' of the same sort that compels us to breathe, or that compels us to feel warmth when standing next to a fire. Our compulsion to believe in such circumstances is, according to Hume, quite natural and irresistible.

3. THE PROBLEM OF BELIEVING WISELY

It has already been said, by scholars considerably more erudite than myself, that Hume was not entirely consistent in his claims that belief cannot be willed. The identification of an 'inconsistency' in this regard dates back at least to H.H. Price and the Gifford lectures of 1960.

...it is worth while to point out that though Hume does say that belief is wholly involuntary – 'depends not on the will', arises from principles 'of which we are not masters' – yet he is not wholly consistent about it.

First, what we may call his own philosophical practice seems to contradict his anti-Cartesian theory. If anyone ever went in for Cartesian doubt on the grand scale, surely Hume did... In that mood, he certainly does refrain from assenting to the propositions which he says elsewhere that we cannot help believing...

Secondly, in his less skeptical moods Hume is willing to divide our beliefs about matters of fact into two classes. On the one hand, there are the beliefs which have strong inductive support, based on a long experience of constant

⁴Since the classic work by Kemp Smith it is often claimed that Hume treated at least two beliefs as having special epistemic status. Following Kemp Smith, these are now commonly referred to as the *natural beliefs* (see Smith, *The Philosophy of David Hume*, 455). However, I myself cannot find this doctrine in Hume, despite a relatively diligent search, so I do *not* follow Kemp Smith in identifying 'natural belief' as a unique kind of belief, several in number and with privileged epistemic status. As I use the phrase, all Humean beliefs are 'natural beliefs': my calling a belief 'natural' simply emphasizes Hume's naturalistic account of its origination, e.g. in *custom*. Readers should beware my break with common usage in this regard.

conjunctions; on the other, there are beliefs which have very little inductive support or none at all.

... Nevertheless (in this less skeptical mood) Hume clearly does think that there is a distinction between sensible or sober or sane beliefs on the one side, and silly or superstitious beliefs on the other.

Not only that: he clearly thinks that it is better to hold sensible beliefs, those which have strong inductive support from past experience (of constant conjunctions), than to hold superstitious or silly ones which have very weak inductive support or none at all.

(Price, *Belief*, 239–40)

According to Price, Hume was not only committed to doxastic involuntarism, but also to treating beliefs as capable of being *willingly suspended*. Price thought this the case because he thought suspension of belief was a prerequisite for Hume's scepticism. The function of the sceptical arguments was not just depriving beliefs of warrant. On Price's reading, scepticism involved 'refrain[ing] from assenting' to what would otherwise naturally be believed. In addition to this Hume was committed, according to Price, to differentiating beliefs with 'strong inductive support' from those with 'weak inductive support'.⁵ And Price read Hume not only as describing such a difference, but as *counseling* us to believe as the wise person would, i.e. suggesting we *ought* to believe what has stronger inductive support and *ought not* believe what has weaker inductive support. According to Price, such recommendations presuppose *the ability to voluntarily believe or not*, insofar as counselling presupposes that persons counselled have the power to believe or not, according to the determinations of their wills. So the core of the inconsistency Price identified in Hume was Hume's supposed commitment, despite his involuntarist remarks, to *withholding assent*.

Price has not been the only reader to find such a problem in Hume.⁶ We are in very much the same territory when reading Passmore:

A thorough-going mechanical theory will have to argue, rather than what we call 'giving the preference to one argument over another' *simply consists* in a more vivid idea somehow driving out a less vivid idea. If Hume does not say this, it is not merely, I think, because he has momentarily fallen into the language of the vulgar; he has a picture in the back of his mind, a

⁵Whether or not we consider this 'support' to be full blown justification (as Price did), or merely a feature of the psychological mechanism, it clearly falls under Hume's rubric of *custom*.

⁶Though I frame it somewhat uniquely, discussion of what I call the 'Problem of Believing Wisely', may also be found in McCormick, 'Why Should We Be Wise?' 3–19, Owen, *Hume's Reason*, 213–23, Falkenstein, 'Naturalism, Normativity, and Scepticism', 59–62, Passmore, *Hume's Intentions*, 160–76, Flew, *Hume's Philosophy of Belief*, 96–9, Laird, *Hume's Philosophy of Human Nature*, 108, Broad, 'Hume's Theory of the Credibility of Miracles', 91–4, and perhaps many others besides.

picture which he cannot entirely expunge, of a human being's hesitating between two alternative views, uncertain which to accept, and finally deciding between them.

(Passmore, 'Hume and the Ethics of Belief'. 83)⁷

Price and Passmore (and others) have hit upon a general problem facing doxastic involuntarists, like Hume, who would also appeal to normative epistemic distinctions, or otherwise deploy normative language in advising us how we *ought* to believe. Our contemporary literature in epistemology treats this problem under the topic 'epistemic deontology'. But as a simple example of what I mean, in the context of Hume's philosophy, we may follow some of the recent work on Hume and consider his appeal to 'wisdom'.⁸ Wisdom was supposed by Hume to be good. So 'wisdom' not only has an epistemic valence, but also a normative one. Because wisdom is good (i.e. for Hume, 'useful' to oneself and others) it makes sense for him to *counsel* us to be wise, or to tell us we *ought not* be superstitious, or *ought* to prefer one claim over another (insofar as believing it would make us wiser). What I will call the 'Problem of Believing Wisely' is the problem of reconciling this epistemic normativity with Hume's naturalist theory of belief.

Especially in places where Hume champions philosophy and criticizes superstition, but at many key moments, he indeed counsels us to be wise. The *Treatise* and *Enquiries* are replete with normative epistemic language.⁹ Perhaps, the most famous of these is the passage at the finale of the first *Enquiry*, long celebrated (if not self-consciously) by positivists, wherein Hume admonishes us to commit 'to the flames' works that concern neither abstract reasoning about quantities nor experimental reasoning about facts, works that ought not be believed. Another celebrated passage from the first *Enquiry* comes in the context of Hume's famous discussion of miracles:

A wise man, therefore, proportions his belief to the evidence. In such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience as a full *proof* of the future existence of that event.

(EHU 10.4; SBN 110)¹⁰

⁷A revised version is Passmore, *Hume's Intentions*, 165. My discussion here is directly indebted to Passmore.

⁸Here I have in mind particularly McCormick, 'Why Should We Be Wise?' 3–19. See her survey of the 'Problem of Control', 6–9.

⁹The beginnings of a good list are provided by Falkenstein, 'Naturalism, Normativity, and Scepticism', 62–3.

¹⁰The source is Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*. Here and following abbreviated 'EHU'; citation is to section and paragraph numbers. I also include page numbers from the traditional Selby-Bigge edition, revised by Nidditch, abbreviated 'SBN'.

Hume here suggests the *evidentialist principle* that we *ought* to believe only to the degree that we have evidence, i.e. *ought not* to believe to the degree that we do not. As usual, Hume's general counsel was incredulity, i.e. *we ought not to believe* testimony on behalf of miracles, insofar as the miraculous is defined in opposition to heretofore exception-less regularity. How could that conclusion be formulated, if not as a normative epistemic claim?¹¹

This passage about the wise person 'proportion[ing] belief to the evidence' would not be a puzzle had it instead been written by someone who holds what Stroud (rather prosaically) calls 'the traditional conception of the nature of man' (Stroud, *Hume*, 11). On the 'traditional conception' a distinctive feature of human wisdom is our sensitivity to evidence, not insofar as we naturally believe, but insofar as we consciously assess evidence *qua* evidence and come to decisions via deliberation, i.e. provisionally withhold assent until all relevant data have been collected, evaluated, and then *reflectively endorsed* (or dissented from, or judged insufficient, etc.). To judge, in this traditional sense, presumes the ability to voluntarily control one's belief-forming mechanisms, at least to the degree required to postpone belief for purposes of non-prejudicial assessment in a period of *deliberation*. The history of the deep conceptual connection between the deliberative and the voluntary is reflected in etymologies of verbs like 'to deliberate' and adjectives like 'deliberate.' And the ability to form a wise judgement was supposed by many to require not only good instincts, but rational control over one's self; the period of *deliberation* was supposed to end (in cases where it did not degenerate into dithering) in self-conscious *decision*.¹² This process was traditionally construed as 'rising above' the merely animal instincts, including, and perhaps especially, the epistemic ones. Judging wisely meant coming to a 'cool-headed' decision guided by reason, itself traditionally construed as distinguishing *homo sapiens* from our merely sentient brethren. Those who lacked the rational capacity or proclivity, i.e. who were not *deliberate* in their judgements, were classically admonished as impetuous, rash, or even 'animalistic'.

But it should go without saying that this was not Hume's view. One of the advertised features of Hume's newer theory of belief was its *naturalistic* account of belief-formation, not only applicable to the 'subtlety and refinements' of the wise, but to the beliefs of 'mere animals', 'children', and 'the common people'. Hume's theory was set against the traditional account precisely insofar as it broke the traditional linkage between the believed and the voluntary.¹³ Seeking to provide explanation of the beliefs of non-human

¹¹For a good reconstruction of the miracles argument, albeit one that still does not detangle the normative language from the descriptive, see Garrett, *Cognition and Commitment*, 137–62.

¹²A measure of the 'traditional' nature of this theory, including the close conceptual connection between the deliberative and the voluntary, is Aristotle's in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, 30–40.

¹³In this point, I am merely following Stroud, *Hume*, 76–7 and Norton, *Hume: Common-Sense Moralism*, 20.

animals and *all* members of our species, regardless of our capacity or proclivity for rational deliberation, Hume criticized the older theories *as insufficiently general*, suggesting they had mistakenly focused on the activity of only a select few, i.e. 'the wise', and were not truthfully characteristic of the way we *all* believe.

The common defect of those systems, which philosophers have employ'd to account of the actions of the mind, is, that they suppose such a subtilty and refinement of thought, as not only exceed the capacity of mere animals, but even of children and the common people in our own species; who are notwithstanding susceptible of the same emotions and affections as persons of the most accomplish'd genius and understanding. Such a subtilty is a clear proof of the falshood, as the contrary simplicity of the truth, of any system.

(T 1.3.16.3; SBN 176)

In Hume's supposedly less 'subtile' theory there would be no such thing as traditional *deliberation*. Hume's naturalistic account was meant to be distinctive because it would not include the voluntarism entangled in the traditional theories of judgement.

Nevertheless, Hume's less traditional theory may have added as many complications as it cleared. If, as Hume thought, credulity is what happens to us when we 'relax our thought', if beliefs are as he calls them, 'indolent beliefs', then there arises a new, second-order question about whether we may voluntarily attend to philosophical arguments or practical affairs, and hence retain some measure of control over whether we come to believe or disbelieve on at least the *indirect* basis of controlling our own attention. Can we not, through a process of foresight and will, at least situate ourselves in relation to the world around us such that we will (otherwise naturally) come to believe such-and-so?¹⁴

For example, try as I might to believe there is a tiger in the room with me, if I have no present perceptual evidence for that belief, it is doomed. I just do not *feel* it stalking me while my back is turned. And that is what is (or is effectively equivalent to) believing, according to Hume. Contrariwise, were there a tiger in the room, as you read these words (never mind in that circumstance why you would still be reading), then try as you might you would not be able to sustain your belief that it did not exist. In that circumstance your belief would be *impressed* upon you immediately and 'naturally', i.e. entirely outside the influence of your rational faculties, traditionally construed as volitional. Hume's involuntarism here seems particularly good, i.e. when applied to cases of belief based on immediate sensory awareness. Nevertheless, you have at least *some* measure of control over your belief that there is a tiger present. If not by being able to

¹⁴Not everyone thought that this is an important question. Cf. Smith, *The Philosophy of David Hume*, 126.

directly will it, then at least insofar as you are able to voluntarily take yourself downtown to a zoological garden and enter the exhibit marked 'Great Cats of the Amur Region'.

So here is a new question. Hume may have been a staunch doxastic involuntarist, but did he leave room for at least this kind of, let us now call it *second-order doxastic voluntarism*?¹⁵ In which case, each of us would be able to voluntarily decide for ourselves whether we would believe that the objects of the external world exist, or are causally ordered, etc., albeit *indirectly*, i.e. by determining whether we will carefully attended to the sceptical arguments, or instead play a lively game of backgammon and make merry with our friends (see T 1.4.7.9; SBN 269).

A philosopher who insists on reading Hume's naturalism as thoroughgoing mechanism may object to such a suggestion. He or she may say that the supposedly voluntary 'selection' of when and where we attend to philosophical reasoning, as opposed to believing instinctually, is itself determined by nature. It is determined by our so-called hard-wiring. Or it is determined by the particular experiences in a particular past of a particular individual, i.e. those constant conjunctions she witnessed and habits of mind she picked up as a result. In much the way that Hume argues that our actions are predictable and customary, the thoroughgoing mechanist might argue that our habits of thought are too, including the attention we pay to philosophy or science or sceptical argument. Like trips to the zoo, habits of mind might similarly be described, perhaps with even greater explanatory power, as *involuntary*.

Here, again, we should tread carefully. For the remainder of this discussion I will call an interpretation that does not go so far as to deny Hume's second-order doxastic voluntarism, but nevertheless insists on a mechanistic account, even of those actions that produce beliefs indirectly, *thoroughgoing mechanism*. This position should not be confused with someone who reads Hume as a *thoroughgoing involuntarist*, i.e. someone who interprets him as denying not merely that beliefs can be directly willed by us, but also as denying there can be *any* voluntary control in the regulation of beliefs at the second-order. e.g. even insofar as one could indirectly control one's belief that there is a tiger by travelling to see one at a zoo. *Thoroughgoing involuntarists* deny both the first-order and second-order doxastic voluntarism; *thoroughgoing mechanists* need not, they need only provide a mechanistic account of each.

I will not attempt to settle the question between those two interpretations of Hume. Instead I would like to see where we are left with the 'Problem of Believing Wisely'. The most serious version of that problem arises when we

¹⁵Many suggest that he did leave room for it. See, for examples: McCormick, 'Why Should We be Wise?' 7; Owen, *Hume's Reason*, 213–6; Falkenstein, 'Naturalism, Normativity, and Scepticism', 33; Norton, *David Hume: Commonsense Moralism*, 236–8; Penelhum, 'Hume's Scepticism and the Dialogues', 268.

combine Hume's epistemic counsel with *thoroughgoing involuntarism*, i.e. when we interpret him without the liberty of at least second-order doxastic voluntarism. If it is not possible for us to believe or not, willingly, because we are not even free to act in such a way that some particular belief would otherwise naturally result in us, or not, then someone telling us that we 'ought' to believe such and so, on grounds that it would be wise or prudent or useful, *or on any grounds whatsoever*, is at best a kind of clever causal manipulation. In that case we would simply believe or not, per our fully mechanized custom. Hume's normative claims about belief, if not strictly inconsistent with thoroughgoing doxastic involuntarism, cannot in that case be construed as appeals to reason. They would not be 'counsels', because any distinction between practical reasoning and psychological manipulation would be collapsed. In that case reason would not merely be slave to the passions, it would be no more.¹⁶

However, even reading Hume as a thoroughgoing mechanist we would still face a significant challenge. To see that this is so, imagine that we were to take an even more radical step and treat his project as the mere description of human nature, completely ignoring all its epistemic normativity. The Problem of Believing Wisely would not thereby be dissolved. Even in that case there would remain the problem of explaining how, were belief nothing but the automatic result of witnessing more or less constant conjunctions, there could be such a thing as 'wise' beliefs as opposed to 'unwise' ones. There would have to be in that case at least some difference in the mechanisms producing those two different types of belief. We might presume for the sake of argument something totally ludicrous, that Hume could have used the term 'wise' purely descriptively, without even the slightest whiff of benediction. Or we might presume for the sake of argument something much more plausible, that Hume *intended* to use that term descriptively rather than normatively. (I think this might actually have been the case.) But in either case, what would distinguish the mechanism producing the 'wise' beliefs, from the mechanism producing the 'unwise' ones?

What I have called the 'Problem of Believing Wisely' is sometimes framed as a problem of warrant, i.e. a problem of explaining how Hume could have thought that some of our beliefs are *justified*. But what I have shown here is that the Problem of Believing Wisely is quite independent of any consideration of warrant.¹⁷ It raises not only the specter of inconsistency for those who would read Hume as a thoroughgoing involuntarist, it also challenges any thoroughly mechanistic interpretation of his theory of belief, even one that would (implausibly) treat his project as purely descriptive in nature. For if belief is nothing more than a state (for

¹⁶Here is an opportunity to point out another bit of famous Humean normative language, not merely that reason *is* slave, but that it 'ought only to be' (T 2.3.3.4; SBN 414).

¹⁷In this respect, I also follow Owen.

Hume it is a sentiment, but let us generalize for a moment) produced in us automatically by the operations of our psychology, when jogged into effect by the combined input of our immediate perceptual environment and our cognitive history or endowment, then what mechanism is it that accounts for the difference between those who believe 'wisely' and those who do not? Even leaving all normativity out of consideration, the mere distinction of the 'wise' from the 'unwise' presents a challenge for serious interpretation. That challenge can be construed as a purely explanatory one: accounting for the natural mechanism or mechanisms by which beliefs are formed 'wisely' or 'unwisely'.

4. THE GENERAL RULES

Hume's own answer to this challenge lies in his so-called General Rules.¹⁸ It may be the case that Hume hoped to account for the production of belief as a purely mechanical process. It was not, however, supposed by him to be a simple one. It is because 'causal circumstances' can be complex that it is no trivial business to track the regularities of nature. The foundation of Hume's theory in this regard was, of course, *custom* (see T 1.3.13.9; SBN 147). It is because novel causes resemble previously witnessed causes that, through custom, we expect novel effects resembling previously witnessed, more or less constantly conjoined, effects. But Hume here faced a classic problem of causal discrimination. Which parts of the previously witnessed circumstances were essential for the cause and which parts essential for the effect? Which parts were only accidentally correlated? It is quite possible to identify a part or parts of previously witnessed circumstances that were merely 'conjoin'd by accident', and then come by custom (by no other principle than custom itself!) to expect an effect in their presence, even absent an actual cause. *Mutatis mutandis*, we might not expect an effect in the presence of its cause merely because we have, by no other principle than custom itself, identified some superfluous parts of the previously witnessed circumstances.

Hume clearly believed, in cases where ideas conflict, that it is the more forceful and vivacious ideas that swamp the weaker ones. But Hume also clearly recognized the need to explain why the result of such conflicts can be 'unwise' beliefs rather than the most accurate and judicious depictions and predictions. If the only question in such cases were which type of experience a person had had *more* of, then Hume could simply have said the greater force and vivacity always takes the day. But Hume's (mostly) mechanistic account of custom has it that customarily expected ideas can come into conflict with other customarily expected ideas. So Hume needed an account of a

¹⁸Some have denied Hume had an answer to this challenge. Cf. Pears, 'The Naturalism of Book I' 114.

mechanism, *other than custom itself*, by which one customary connection could come to dominate its rivals and become believed. The problem of accounting for that mechanism is only exacerbated when we add to it the demand of differentiating 'wise' from 'unwise' beliefs.

Whether the falsity of all unwise beliefs can be exhaustively explained by our inability to discriminate genuine causes, and whether that requires some additional influence of the passions or failing in the imagination, is beyond my present argument. Hume has a rich and sophisticated theory in this regard, and I have only scratched its surface. The only points necessary for motivating Hume's invocation of the General Rules are that conflicts between customarily reinforced ideas form an essential part of causal discrimination, and Hume thought both wise and unwise, yet fully natural, beliefs result. To advance an explanation of this phenomenon he invoked what he called 'The General Rules'.

We shall afterwards take notice of some general rules, by which we ought to regulate our judgment concerning causes and effects; and these rules are form'd on the nature of our understanding, and on our experience of its operations in the judgments we form concerning objects. By them we learn to distinguish the accidental circumstances from the efficacious causes; and when we find that an effect can be produc'd without the concurrence of any particular circumstance, we conclude that that circumstance makes not a part of the efficacious cause, however frequently conjoin'd with it.

(T 1.3.13.11; SBN 149)

The General Rules were clearly meant to be *regulatory*. Following Lyons, we can understand them as 'belief-like states with the content of statistical or universal generalizations' (Lyons, 'General Rules and the Justification', 254). Despite the fact that their content can be 'supply'd by the natural principles of our understanding' (T 1.3.15.11; SBN 175) their full employment is by no means guaranteed by nature. We should note, in particular, Hume's use of the word 'ought' in this very context. Even were we to treat that 'ought' as a lapse or aberration (or grant such a reading for the sake of argument), Hume clearly viewed the function of the General Rules as the *augmentation* of custom in circumstances of complex causal discrimination. He says here: 'By them we learn to distinguish the accidental circumstances from the efficacious causes.' So while the General Rules might themselves be expressions of basic principles of causation, it is not merely our *use* of them, but also our *learning* by them that is significant. That *learning* is what helps us discriminate the causes from the non-causes, and hence changes the outcome (for the better) in conflicts amongst our ideas, i.e. conflicts that would otherwise be settled solely by the passions or our more parochial custom.

So whether we ought to use the General Rules, or not, Hume clearly thought that the wise have *learned* by them. However, it would be a

mistake to think that the entire difference between the wise and the vulgar is merely that the wise use the General Rules while the 'vulgar' (i.e. the unwise) make no use of them.

When an object appears, that resembles any cause in very considerable circumstances, the imagination naturally carries us to a lively conception of the usual effect, tho' the object be different in the most material and most efficacious circumstances from that cause. Here is the first influence of general rules. But when we take a review of this act of the mind, and compare it with the more general and authentic operations of the understanding, we find it to be of an irregular nature and destructive of all the most establish'd principles of reasoning; which is the cause of our rejecting it. This is a second influence of general rules, and implies the condemnation of the former. Sometimes the one, sometimes the other prevails, according to the disposition and character of the person. The vulgar are commonly guided by the first, and wise men by the second.

(T 1.3.13.12; SBN 149)

Ideas can conflict. And not all of them come to be believed. But as this passage also makes plain, beliefs formed as a result of General Rules, according to Hume, are also capable of conflict with other beliefs formed as a result of the 'second influence' of General Rules. Following Hearn, Falkenstein, and a variety of others, I read Hume's suggestion here, that the wise 'take a review of this act of the mind, and compare it with the more general and authentic operations of the understanding', as an act of *voluntary reflection*.¹⁹ This has consequences, I will now argue, for our reading of Hume. It entails, for example, that Hearn and Falkenstein (and I) treat him as a second-order doxastic voluntarist.²⁰

Unlike Hearn and Falkenstein, I do not think that we need to understand such conflicts as shaping up between two distinct rules or sets of rules with opposing contents, i.e. 'a "second" general rule... that condemns a number of "first" ones' (Falkenstein, 'Naturalism, Normativity, and Scepticism', 48).²¹ Instead the difference that Hume had in mind between the 'first'

¹⁹See Hearn, "'General Rules" in Hume's Treatise', 410. Cf. the footnote to EHU 9.5 (SBN 107), where Hume says the discrimination of causes requires 'great attention'. Cf. also T 1.3.10.12 (SBN 630–3). The interpretation of the 'second influence' as the result of *reflection* is not uncommon in the literature. Cf. Morris, 'Belief, Probability, Normativity', 85–9; and Serjeantson, 'Hume's General Rules', 195. Owen endorses it in *Hume's Reason*, 149, 213ff. It is also argued for by Norton, *Hume: Common-Sense Moralism*, 208–21. Garrett, *Cognition and Commitment*, 205 and Traiger, 'Reason Unhinged', 100–11. Whether all would agree with my interpretation of such reflection as *voluntary* is considerably less likely, or clear.

²⁰Falkenstein is especially clear on this commitment. Cf. 'Naturalism, Normativity, and Scepticism', 32–3.

²¹Also see Hearn, "'General Rules" in Hume's Treatise', 407–11. Capaldi may also commit himself to this reading. See Capaldi, *David Hume: Newtonian Philosopher*, 126. However, Capaldi also suggests the reading I prefer (on the same page) when he writes: 'the real issue is not whether people use general rules but whether they have been *careful* and diligent in the use of general rules'.

and 'second' *influence* of the General Rules is precisely the voluntary act of reflection itself, i.e. reflection that may be upon the very same rule or set of rules otherwise only instinctually employed. On the reading that I am offering here it is because the first influence is *unreflective*, i.e. involuntary, that it is also insufficient. Nevertheless, the application of such rules comes naturally to every sentient creature, at least to some degree. (And of course in more or less degree to different creatures.) The 'second influence', on the other hand, are those very same rules, but now insofar as they are *reflectively willed*, i.e. voluntarily endorsed and applied to one's memories, or voluntarily endorsed and applied to a richly imagined range of alternative possible cases.

As I noted above, the reading of the 'second influence', as associated with *reflection* is not uncommon. What I mean to contribute here is greater clarity about the way that voluntarism sneaks back into Hume's account, via that reflection. Whatever Hume might have meant by 'learning' in this context, learning by a General Rule cannot be a matter of simple habituation. In that case 'learning by the rule' would be nothing more than its repeated application. Consider the important question of when we *ought* to make an inductive generalization. However natural that leap, however frequently we do it, after witnessing however many more or less constant conjunctions, the habit of mind itself is something that can be endorsed or rejected by us, depending upon its circumstances. To reflect on those circumstances means to think about generalizing, and our natural tendency to generalize, and either will it in those circumstances, or will ourselves otherwise. We might catch ourselves generalizing (as we naturally do) in unguarded moments, and search our memories to ask whether similar effects *really have* always followed similar causes. And it would be *wise* for us to scrutinize ourselves in that manner. We ought to do so. But there could be no *normative* question here, at least not of the particular sort that Hume invoked, without the willing. Learning when and how we ought to generalize (first by noticing the circumstances in which generalization comes naturally, but then by noticing that not all such circumstances are those in which we ought to generalize) cannot have been thought by Hume a matter of mere repetition. The task of bringing experience and the rules we naturally use for ordering that experience to full consciousness, i.e. understanding such rules as consistent with other 'establish'd principles of reasoning,' is particularly the purview of sagacity.²²

An advantage of this account is that it makes sense of Hume's association of the 'first influence' of the General Rules with *prejudice*. Consider one example of *prejudice* identified by Hume in the *Treatise*: 'An *Irishman* cannot have wit, and a *Frenchman* cannot have solidity.' Hume clearly

²²Cf. Serjeantson, 'Hume's General Rules, 206–7. The account that I advocate here is also close to the one articulated by Owen at the end of *Hume's Reason*.

claimed that this 'fourth unphilosophical species of probability' is 'deriv'd from *general rules*' (T 1.3.13.7; SBN 146). This has puzzled readers of Hume, who would have thought General Rules were supposed to be *good*, but that prejudices are obviously *bad*. Because prejudices are *unwise* generalizations those readers have been tempted to mistakenly posit an entirely different 'second type' of General Rules, distinct from those Hume endorsed as the rules 'by which we ought to regulate our judgment concerning causes and effects' (T 1.3.13.11; SBN 149). But on my account those are the very same rules. Prejudices are simply poor (i.e. hasty) causal generalizations, the result of instinctually employed, but not reflectively endorsable, and hence insufficiently learned, General Rules. Prejudices remain innocent, even when pernicious and inaccurate, until they are actively willed.

This reading of the General Rules should be contrasted with the account provided by Marie A. Martin. I follow Martin in reading the 'second influence' of General Rules as involving a 'new direction of the very same principle' (T 1.3.13.12; SBN 149), rather than as a conflict between rules or sets of rules with distinct contents. However, Martin does not treat this as a matter of voluntary reflection, so much as a mechanical procedure of 'self-correcting' (Martin, 'The Rational Warrant', 249).²³ According to Martin, just as the 'first influence' of the General Rules involves 'higher-order custom' (Martin, 'The Rational Warrant', 250), by which we come to form causal beliefs on the basis of their conformity with principles (even if those principles are unknown by those who are instinctually employing them), the 'second influence' of general rules is yet 'another, even *higher-order*, set of rules to guide our application of the first general rules' (Martin, 'The Rational Warrant', 250). These 'higher-order' rules are supposedly developed after we *naturally* come to believe that the beliefs formed using only the General Rules in their 'first influence' are frequently false, i.e. prejudicial. As I read Martin this sort of regulation is supposed to be a mechanical feedback mechanism, rather than the result of *voluntary reflection*.

My reading of the General Rules should also be contrasted with the account of them recently provided by Jack C. Lyons. I follow Lyons in reading Hume's General rules as *extensive*, i.e. based on a large number of experiences, and *constant*, i.e. for which experience has provided few or no apparent exceptions (see Lyons, 'General Rules and Justification', 259). But Lyons argues that these two conditions are themselves sufficient for distinguishing the 'good general rules' from the 'bad general rules' (Lyons, 'General Rules and Justification', 258). I instead claim that this is no difference in the rules themselves, i.e. no difference in their *contents*, but only a difference in the degree to which they have been applied to a rich range of remembered and imagined cases. On my reading a prejudice

²³For another interpretation in this family see Baier. *A Progress of Sentiments*, 93–100.

is simply a general rule, naturally applied, but one that has not yet been raised to the level of consciousness. My claim is that this process requires willing to the degree that remembering and imagining require willing. No more, and no less. I generally agree with Lyons that the difference between the 'first influence' and the 'second influence' is a matter of the rules' relative extensiveness and constancy, as Lyons defines those. Each is a slightly more precise way of accounting for how a General Rule can have an application that is more general.²⁴ But what accounts for the enhanced generality of what Lyons calls 'the good rules', as opposed to the prejudices?

In fairness I should point out that Lyons' project is somewhat broader than mine has been here. He sought to explain how the General Rules are related to epistemic norms and can be justified in Hume's epistemology. Reading the same passages I have,²⁵ wherein Hume clearly associates reflection with the 'second influence', Lyons is more hesitant than I am about drawing the conclusion that Hume's official view was that General Rules exercise their regulatory function via that reflection. Claiming that Hume was 'not entirely clear' on this point, Lyons also quotes the following passage to suggest that Hume, in other places, seemed less than enthusiastic about consciously considered rules for the direction of judgement:

Here is all the LOGIC I think proper to employ in my reasoning; and perhaps even this was not very necessary, but might have been supply'd by the natural principles of our understanding. Our scholastic head-pieces and logicians show no such superiority above the mere vulgar in their reason and ability, as to give us any inclination to imitate them in delivering a long system of rules and precepts to direct our judgment, in philosophy.

(T 1.3.15.11; SBN 175)

Because this passage also nicely encapsulates one of Hume's characteristic philosophical attitudes it provides me with an opportunity to explain, in conclusion, why I do not read it as inconsistent with Hume's frequent references to 'reflection' on the General Rules. Nothing Hume wrote (or that I have attributed to him) regarding that reflection would require 'a long system of rules and precepts' in order to direct one's judgement. One of the most important features of Hume's naturalism is that General Rules are 'supply'd by the natural principles of our understanding' rather than by 'scholastic headpieces and logicians'. And one of the most important features of his account as I have interpreted it above is that such rules do *not* have different content in their 'second influence', but are only more thoroughly applied (in Lyons' terminology they are more *extensive* and *constant*) to a broader range of remembered and imagined cases. Lyons is able

²⁴Cf. Owen, *Hume's Reason*, 148–9.

²⁵Lyons cites T 1.3.10.12; SBN 632 and T 3.3.1.15; SBN 582.

(in his own words) to 'remain neutral' on the question of whether the General Rules are consciously reflected upon or tacitly believed (Lyons, 'General Rules and Justification', 257). But I am not: I have argued that Hume thought finer causal discrimination is precisely the benefit of *voluntary reflection*.

5. CONCLUSION

While a number of people have recognized a problem in Hume's theory of belief, a fewer number have exonerated him. We should, at the end of the day, acquit Hume of the inconsistency attributed to him by philosophers like Price.²⁶ I am not unique in providing a defense in this regard; I take myself only to have provided an interpretation of the evidence that makes it uniquely exculpatory. A defense could have been accomplished merely by distinguishing first-order from second-order doxastic voluntarism, i.e. the distinction necessary to preserve Hume's first-order involuntarism and make room for his normative commitments with respect to how we ought to believe. But such a distinction is reinforced by Hume's own account of the General Rules, which despite being 'natural principles of our understanding', *ought* to be reflected upon in order to aid in the discrimination of genuine causes. Even were there no such language in Hume, or were we to otherwise take seriously his attempt at thoroughgoing mechanism, we would have made progress in explaining his account of belief-formation. So whether one reads the General Rules as Hearn and Falkenstein do, or as Martin does, or as Lyons does (or as I do) one will have made some headway with the Problem of Believing Wisely.

The advantage of my reading over those others is that I have also explained why we ought to reflect upon the General Rules and give them their 'second influence', rather than merely leave them to their first. It is because that further step away from prejudice and towards causal discrimination, if not wisdom itself, is not guaranteed by nature. It requires *volunteers*. Wisdom does not simply happen to us, but is instead something we must value and do. There are limits, of course, to such an explanation. While perhaps compatible with some form of mechanism, this voluntarist reading is not itself mechanistic. But even philosophers like Falkenstein and Owen must eventually leave off providing a thoroughly mechanistic account of Hume, e.g. of explaining why he thought some of us naturally possess more curiosity than others, or why some of us choose to appreciate the sceptical arguments while others do not. It is true that some people appear to be naturally, and not merely voluntarily, more reflective. But explanations of such facts were not provided by Hume himself.

²⁶On this point, I simply follow a trail blazed by others. See, for example, Owen, *Hume's Reason*, 213–6.

In conclusion, it might be worthwhile to reflect on the kind of doxastic compatibilism to which the General Rules commit Hume. Famously, he thought a first-order act may be both 'free' and 'necessitated', insofar as it can be simultaneously determined by the will, and fit into a reliable pattern of more or less constant conjunctions. Beliefs, on the other hand, are willed by us insofar as they are both the product of a natural mechanism, i.e. the 'first influence' of the General Rules, but also reflectively endorsed, i.e. willed as the 'second influence' of those very same General Rules. I have argued that Hume thereby denies global doxastic involuntarism, but I have not meant to draw the further conclusion about whether Hume was or was not a local doxastic involuntarist. Is there a particular idea or set of ideas for which no amount of reflection on the natural processes by which it has (or they have) come to be believed can possibly augment or diminish its (or their) believability? A candidate for such a set, over which we have little direct control, are those most closely associated with the present impressions. The involuntarist passages cited above (in Section 2) are suggestive in this regard. But this is not the conclusion that I have sought to establish in this paper.

Despite the textual evidence cited above (in Section 2), David Hume was not a global doxastic involuntarist. This is the conclusion that ought to be drawn from close attention to his General Rules. Unlike others', my reading comes at the price of Hume's involuntarism. But I take myself to have done a bit more than merely emphasize the hidden willing at the heart of Hume's beliefs. I take myself to have also shed light on why it might prove ineluctable. It was not only required by Hume's epistemic normativity, but is also necessary for explaining the mechanism Hume himself posited for distinguishing wise from unwise beliefs. Without voluntary reflection there could be no 'second influence' of the General Rules, hence only instinct, prejudice, and parochial custom. Hume's naturalism, and the linkage of the deliberative with the voluntary in traditional theories of judgement, motivated him to provide a largely involuntarist theory of belief. But Hume was unable to provide a thoroughly involuntarist theory of belief. What I have argued in this paper is that voluntarism sneaks back into his account, through the General Rules.

Hume was a second-order doxastic voluntarist, i.e. he thought that we are free to believe what we will, at least to the degree that we are 'free' to control the environment in which we place ourselves, and consequently the impressions and expectations we naturally form as a result. But it is also important, for anyone who would take Hume seriously, to notice that the statement of *that* position, alone, does not yet fully capture his view. His view, I can say now, was even more *voluntarist* than that. His view was that individual experiences are insufficient to make us wise. What is additionally required is a degree of reflection on the process of experience itself (which is not to rule out such reflection as a consequence of the

process!), including a powerful memory and a rich imagination of possible alternatives, and the true generality of causal knowledge that results.²⁷

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Western Oregon University

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Epistemic normativity in Kant's "Second Analogy"

James Hutton

Pembroke College, University of Cambridge,
Cambridge, UK

Correspondence

James Hutton, Pembroke College, University
of Cambridge, Cambridge CB21RF, UK.
Email: jsh74@cam.ac.uk

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Abstract

In the "Second Analogy," Kant argues that, unless mental contents involve the concept of causation, they cannot represent an objective temporal sequence. According to Kant, deploying the concept of causation renders a certain temporal ordering of representations necessary, thus enabling objective representational purport. One exegetical question that remains controversial is this: how, and in what sense, does deploying the concept of cause render a certain ordering of representations *necessary*? I argue that this necessitation is a matter of epistemic normativity: with certain causal presuppositions in place, the individual is obliged to make a judgment with certain temporal contents, on pain of irrationality. To make this normatively obligatory judgment, the subject must place her perceptual representations in a certain order. This interpretation fits Kant's text, his argumentative aims, and his broader views about causal inference, better than rival interpretations can. This result has important consequences for the ongoing debate over the role of normativity in Kant's philosophy of mind.

1 | INTRODUCTION

This article has two aims: one narrow, one broad. The narrow aim is to resolve an interpretative dispute about Kant's "Second Analogy." The "Second Analogy" gives an account of how we can perceive temporal sequences. However, disagreement remains over the details of the mental operations required for perception to have objective temporal content. In particular, it remains controversial how, according to Kant, deploying the concept of causation renders a certain subjective "order of perceptions" "necessary" (A193/B238) and with what kind of modality this subjective

order of perceptions becomes necessary. Building on existing scholarship, I argue that Kant's account turns on the inferential role of the concept of causation. Moving beyond existing scholarship, I argue that this inferential necessity applies to the subdoxastic level of perceptions as well as to judgments and that the modality in question is that of epistemic normativity.

This narrow exegetical conclusion connects with a broader debate about the role of normative notions in Kant's philosophy of mind. Recent decades have seen numerous attempts to interpret the project of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as fundamentally normative in character. Allison (2004) argues that it "involves a radical reconfiguration of epistemic norms" and "serves as the epistemological counterpart of the shift from heteronomy to autonomy, which is [...] the essence of Kant's 'revolution' in ethics" (p. xvi). O'Neill (1989) holds that, for Kant, a "critique of pure reason" is a "(quasi-)juridical or political task" (p. 9). McDowell (1994) reads Kant as attributing a normative status to all contentful mental representations, thereby giving a promising account of the relation between mind and world. More recently, Pollok (2017) has argued that the central claim of Kant's theoretical philosophy is that "synthetic judgments a priori must be acknowledged as the fundamental norms for our mathematical and empirical cognitions" (p. 2). These normative interpretations of Kant's project have primarily been advanced on the basis of general considerations about KrV. Allison and O'Neill highlight broad structural similarities between Kant's project in KrV and his practical philosophy. O'Neill also cites Kant's general methodological statements in the motto and prefaces to KrV and in its "Doctrine of Method" as well as his obscure doctrine that practical reason has "primacy" over theoretical reason (KpV 5:119). O'Neill, McDowell, and others also point to Kant's extensive use of juridical metaphors both in characterizing his own project and in distinguishing it from the non-normative systems of Locke and Leibniz; and McDowell makes much of an alleged comparison between the "spontaneity" of the understanding and the freedom of practical reason. Pollok's (2017) interpretation is also based on a normative reading of spontaneity (p. 67) and on interpreting Kant's remarks about the "transcendental unity of apperception" as a claim about the normative "imputability" of judgments (p. 64).

The problem with relying on such "big picture" consideration is that they leave indeterminate the scope of normativity in Kant's project. Illustrating this dramatically, these normative interpretations differ widely over the breadth of normative import they find in KrV. O'Neill (1989) holds that only Kant's regulative principles and "maxims of judgment" are normative in character (p. 19), a position also endorsed by Mudd (2016, p. 12). Allison and Pollok hold that all of Kant's principles—the regulative principles of reason, the principles of the understanding, and even the principles of mathematics and science—are normative. Meanwhile, McDowell reads Kant as assigning a normative status to every intentional state, including intuitions. (Pollok [2017] appears also to hold that the "determination of sensibility" is subject to normative constraint [pp. 19, 224], but that this activity is inseparable from judgment [pp. 19, 226].) To move forward, such approaches must be augmented with detail-oriented, bottom up investigations, which examine the viability of normative readings of particular aspects of Kant's philosophy.

Adding to the urgency of adopting a detail-oriented approach, Tolley (2006) has shown that there are tight limitations on the kinds of normative reading that are tenable. Focusing on Kant's logic, Tolley argues that the mind must be capable of deviating from a set of laws, if those laws are to serve as normative imperatives for the mind's operations. The devil is likely to lie in the detail of any normative reading, so proponents of normative interpretations must carefully specify the type of normativity in question and the relation between the normative standards and the actual operations of the mind. Existing work that exemplifies a detail-oriented approach includes O'Neill's (1989) discussion of the "maxims of common human understanding" (pp. 25f.), Ginsborg's (1997) reading of Kant on empirical concept formation, Mudd's (2016) account of the normativity of the regulative principles, and Tolley's (2006), Lu-Adler's (2017), and Leech's (2017) discussions of normativity in Kant's logic. The latter four are especially clear in detailing the relation between normative rules and mental activities. The present article advances the debate over normativity in Kant's philosophy of mind in the same way: by offering a bottom-up account of the role of normativity in the mental activities discussed in the "Second Analogy." My exegetical conclusion has important consequences for identifying the range of mental operations that, according to Kant, are subject to normative constraint. It shows that the mental operations responsible for "empirical cognition" must be subject to normative standards and that this includes certain activities of the "power of the imagination," by means of which a temporal

structure is imposed on sensible material (thus providing some support for views like McDowell's and Pollok's, according to which the "determination of sensibility" is subject to normative standards).

My argument runs as follows. Section 2 sketches the argument of the "Second Analogy" and locates the factor requiring further elucidation: the necessitation of a subjective ordering of perceptions. Section 3 presents the two major routes to explaining this notion—*causal* and *conceptual* accounts—and presents grounds for pursuing the latter. Section 4 provides compelling textual evidence for the existing view that it is the inferential role of the concept of cause that equips it for enabling objective temporal representation and moves beyond existing scholarship to explain how this could impose necessity on a subjective ordering at the pre-judgmental level of perceptions. I argue that, on Kant's account, a subject who makes the presuppositions that Xs cause ABs¹ and that X obtains is thereby "inferentially necessitated" to draw the conclusion that event AB occurs and that making the empirical judgment that AB occurs requires an act of synthesis in which the subject places her perceptions in a certain order. Section 5 clarifies the notion of "inferential necessitation." The text of the "Second Analogy" and Kant's characterizations of logical laws strongly suggest that causal presuppositions make it *normatively* necessary for the subject to judge that AB occurs and hence to place her perceptions in a certain order. In contemporary parlance, the necessity of the "order of perceptions" is a matter of epistemic normativity. Section 6 deals with an objection to the claim that inference could be subject to normative standards. Section 7 concludes by tracing the consequences of the article's findings.

2 | THE ARGUMENT OF THE "SECOND ANALOGY"

The "Second Analogy" examines the preconditions for representing objective temporal sequence. Let's illustrate the problem with an example: Jones watches his beloved snowman melt. For this to happen, Jones must have a mental representation with three features: (a) it must represent the initial state, that is, the snowman standing tall; (b) it must represent the subsequent state, that is, the melted snowman; and (c) it must represent the initial state as preceding the subsequent state. The problem is to explain how a mental state could represent (c), that is, the objective temporal relation between the two states.

Kant's discussion begins with a negative point: representation of objective temporal relations cannot be achieved simply by the fact that the representations of the two states occur successively in the mind. Although Jones perceives the snowman standing tall at t_0 and perceives the melted snowman at t_1 , this mere successiveness is insufficient for the representation of objective temporal sequence, because successiveness is ubiquitous: "[t]he apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive" (A189/B234).² Perceptual contents occur sequentially in the mind even when they represent coexistent, enduring features, as when one successively sees the different parts of a large house (A190/B235, A192f./B237f.). Since perceptions are always successive, even when the states perceived in fact coexist, successiveness of perceptions cannot have the semantic significance of denoting objective succession, as opposed to coexistence.³ Kant emphasizes that it is the "arbitrariness" of the subjective sequence that renders it insufficient to carry objective representational purport: "The subjective sequence [...] alone proves nothing about the connection of the manifold in the object, because it is entirely arbitrary." (A193/B238) This arbitrariness results from the fact that, according to Kant, temporal relations among perceptual contents are introduced by the faculty of imagination, which is capable of placing them in any order:

Connection [e.g. of "two perceptions in time"] is not the work of mere sense and intuition, but is here rather the product of a synthetic faculty of the imagination, which determines inner sense with regard to temporal relations. This [i.e. the imagination] [...] can combine the two states in question in two different ways, so that either one or the other precedes in time. (B233, cf. A201/B246)

To illustrate, let's return to Jones. At t_0 , Jones has a perception of the snowman standing tall (A) and at t_1 of the melted snowman (B). A necessary condition of Jones's representing the event of the snowman melting is that, while seeing the melted snowman, he is also conscious that previously the snowman was standing tall. This would, according

to Kant, require Jones's imagination to reproduce the perceptual content A, placing it before perception B in Jones's inner sense. Yet the imagination has the power to freely combine sensory material. At t_1 , when it is in possession of all the relevant sensory material, the imagination can thus produce either subjective ordering—A then B, or B then A—with equal ease. Unless something removes this arbitrariness of subjective order, the subjective order cannot have the semantic significance of denoting the objective order in which states succeed each other.

Kant's positive account is that when the subjective order of perceptions is a necessary order, it can have the significance of denoting an objective temporal relation. Under certain conditions, the subjective order is irreversible—not arbitrary but necessary. This enables the perceptual representation of objective sequence. Cases in which we represent events as happening are distinguished by the fact that there is only one order in which the perceptual contents can be arranged:

If in the case of an appearance that contains a happening [i.e. an event] I call the preceding state of perception A and the following one B, then B can only follow A in apprehension, but the perception A cannot follow but only precede B. (A192/B237)

Kant illustrates this with the example of “a ship driven downstream” (A192/B237). In such cases, the subjective order is “determined,” “bound down,” or rendered “necessary,” so that we are “necessitate [d] [...] to observe this order of the perceptions rather than another” (A196/B242; cf. A193/B238, A198/B243). This makes possible the representation of objective sequence. To enable objective temporal representation, something must render the subjective order of perceptions necessary.

This brings us to our central exegetical questions. What does it take for a subjective order of perceptions to be rendered necessary? What kind of mental operations are required, and how do they impose necessity on the subjective order? Furthermore, what kind of necessity is thereby imposed? My aim is to provide detailed answers to each of these questions.

Before proceeding, I will lay down a desideratum for the adequacy of any interpretation. Kant's discussion of objective temporal representation forms part of his argument for a synthetic a priori principle, namely, the Causal Principle (i.e., that, within the domain of appearances, every event has a cause). Therefore, we should strongly prefer interpretations which fit Kant's account of the necessitation of the subjective order into an internally coherent argument for the Causal Principle.

3 | CAUSAL VERSUS CONCEPTUAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE NECESSITATION OF A SUBJECTIVE ORDER

I now present the two families of interpretation that have dominated the literature, vis-à-vis the necessitation of the subjective order. Note that much of the work on the “Second Analogy” avoids taking a stand on the nature of this necessitation, focusing instead on the relationship between perceiving particular events and discovering specific causal laws (e.g., Buchdahl, 1969; Friedman, 1992) or whether Kant's conclusion has ontological or merely epistemological import (e.g., Guyer, 1987, ch. 10; Watkins, 2005, ch. 3) without detailing the theory of mental operations underlying Kant's discussion. The work that does give an account of the necessitation of a subjective order falls neatly into two camps. *Causal* readings hold that it is the causal relations between the perceived states and the subject's perceptions that fix a certain subjective order of perceptions as necessary. *Conceptual* readings hold that it is the conceptual role of the concept of causation that imposes necessity on an order of perceptions. My aim in this section is to justify pursuing a *conceptual* reading by exhibiting grounds for scepticism about *causal* readings. Readers already convinced that the necessity of the subjective order arises due to the conceptual role of the concept of cause may skip to Section 4.

The most famous among *causal* readings is Strawson's (1966, pp. 133–140). Strawson argues that the causal dependence of perception upon worldly states, along with some modest assumptions about the causal chains

involved, entails that, whenever we perceive an event, the subjective order of perceptions is causally necessary.⁴ However, he holds that the only way to get from this result to the Causal Principle is via a “non-sequitur of numbing grossness.” According to Strawson, Kant simply conflates the causal necessitation of the subject’s perception of the event with the causal necessitation of the event itself. The same charge of non sequitur is found in the *causal* readings of Lovejoy (1906), Pritchard (1909, pp. 288–91), Broad (1978, p. 168), and Walker (1978, p. 100). In accordance with the aforementioned desideratum, we should strongly prefer alternative readings if they are able to provide an interpretation with greater internal coherence.

Beck’s (1978) *causal* reading seeks to avoid saddling Kant with a non sequitur. Beck argues that we must postulate causal connections between observed events, not just between those events and our perceptions, in order to recognize their objective order. His reconstruction runs as follows:

1. Our subjective order [A then B] fails to differentiate between two objective orders—AB and BA. To recognize⁵ objective order AB, we need some way of ruling out the possibility that B precedes A.
2. Supposing that A causes B is necessary and sufficient for ruling out the possibility that B precedes A (p. 133), because “the schema of the concept [of causation] is [AB]-irreversibly” (p. 151).
3. Therefore, we can rule out the possibility that B precedes A if and only if we suppose that A causes B.
4. Therefore, we can recognize the objective order AB if and only if we hold that A causes B.

This is a definite advance on Strawson: from (4) it follows that all recognizable temporal sequences are causal sequences—a promising step towards proving the Causal Principle. However, Beck’s reconstruction is inadequate in other respects. One glaring problem is that (2) is indefensible. That events of type A cause events of type B does not entail that B cannot precede A. Consider an oscillating system (e.g., a pendulum), in which one half of the cycle (a swing to the left) gives rise to an event qualitatively identical to the one that caused it (a swing to the right).⁶ Perhaps Beck’s reading can be rescued by reading A and B as referring to event-tokens rather than -types. It seems doubtful that this could be Kant’s meaning given his frequent insistence that what is required is a causal “rule” (e.g., A193/B238). Moreover, there are further interpretative problems that this would not fix. Beck’s reconstruction centres on a model in which we determine the order of two events by identifying a causal relation between them, whereas the dominant focus of Kant’s treatment is the case in which we identify an objective change, that is, a single event, due to its being caused by some other state or event (cf. Guyer, 1987, p. 240). Therefore, we should not be satisfied with Beck’s reconstruction.

Van Cleve (1999, pp. 128–132) attempts to repair Beck’s reconstruction by adopting the model of a cause triggering a change from A to B, rather than a causal relation between A and B, and by revising the notion of “irreversibility” at issue. However, in his revised reconstruction, it is the conceptual role of causal presuppositions, rather than *de facto* causal relationships, which imposes the required structure of necessity on the subjective order. Therefore, Van Cleve in effect abandons the *causal* reading in favour of a *conceptual* approach.⁷

No attempt to explain the necessitation of a subjective order as arising from causal relations between the perceived events and the subject’s perceptions has succeeded in finding an internally coherent argument for the causal principle, despite repeated attempts.⁸ This is in sharp contrast to *conceptual* readings, which have found much to endorse in Kant’s argument. According to *conceptual* readings (e.g., Allison, 2004; Longuenesse, 2005; Melnick, 1973), when Kant speaks of the order of perceptions as being irreversible, this is not a matter of causal necessitation of the acts of perceiving. Instead, it is an upshot of the conceptual role of the concept of cause. On this view, the mental operation of applying the concept of cause imposes necessity on the temporal order of one’s perceptions.

Recent versions of the *conceptual* reading (Allison, 2004, p. 252; Longuenesse, 2005, p. 241) have converged on a coherent reconstruction of Kant’s argument for the Causal Principle:

1. To represent an event, the subjective order of perceptions must be irreversible.
2. For the subjective order of perceptions to be irreversible, they must be subsumed under the schema of causality.

3. Therefore, application of the schema of causality is a necessary condition for the experience of an event.
4. Therefore, restricting the domain to appearances (i.e., objects of possible experience), every event has a cause.

This reconstruction is well supported textually. Longuenesse (2005, pp. 253–258) identifies five expositions of this form of argument in the “Second Analogy” chapter, on the basis of close reading.

It is a considerable strength that *conceptual* readings allow for a highly coherent reconstruction, well supported by the text. However, thus far they have been less successful in spelling out the nature of the necessitation of the subjective order. Allison (2004) provides little explanation, simply stating that necessity is introduced when we “subsume [perceptions] under [...] the schema of causality” (p. 252). Longuenesse gives more explanation, but recent scholarship has deemed her account to be “less than pellucid” (Osborne, 2006, p. 420). Therefore, in what follows, I will pursue a *conceptual* reading, with the aim of explaining fully how the concept of cause generates this necessitation and what form of necessity arises.

4 | SUBJECTIVE NECESSITATION AS INFERENTIAL NECESSITATION

Our aim is to understand how deploying the concept of cause imposes necessity on the subjective order of perceptions. I begin by looking for textual clues.

4.1 | Textual evidence

The “Second Analogy” chapter contains five expositions of Kant’s argument for the Causal Principle. These share a common argumentative structure, but Kant adds various pieces of additional information with each attempt. In particular, the second and third expositions of the argument⁹ provide more detail about how the mind operates in cases where it succeeds in representing an event or objective sequence.

If, therefore, we experience that something happens, then we always presuppose [voraussetzen] that something else precedes it, which it follows in accordance with a rule. [...] [O]nly under this presupposition [Voraussetzung] alone is the experience of something that happens even possible. (A195/B240)

As soon as I perceive or presuppose [voraus annehmen] that there is in this sequence a relation to the preceding state, from which the representation follows in accordance with a rule, I represent something as an occurrence. (A198/B243)

In both passages, Kant states that cases of successful event-representation are distinguished by the subject making a certain sort of “presupposition.” This presupposition (a) concerns the existence of some “preceding state,” and (b) there is “a rule” such that, given the preceding state, the event must follow. When we compare (b) with Kant’s analysis of the concept of causation, we see that it is simply the presupposition that the preceding state causes the event. Kant describes the “schema of cause” as “the real upon which, whenever it is posited, something else always follows. It therefore consists in the succession of the manifold insofar as it is subject to a rule” (A144/B183). (Kant equates the term “succession” with “change” (B233), which the “First Analogy” has shown to be equivalent to “event.”) So what Kant is saying is that in order for a subject to represent the event AB, she must presuppose (a) that some state X obtains and presuppose the causal rule (b) that Xs cause ABs.¹⁰ For example, in order for Jones to represent the snowman melting, Jones must presuppose that some state obtains with respect to the snowman and that this kind of state causes such objects to melt. It might be that Jones already believes a causal rule, such as that sunshine causes objects made of snow to melt and judges that the sun is shining on the snowman on the basis of perception. (This explains Kant’s phrasing, “perceive or presuppose,” in the third exposition (A198/B243).) But Kant also allows the possibility that the subject does not know what state causes the event (A199/B244), in which case the content of Jones’s

presuppositions would be that some unknown state obtains with respect to this snowman and the causal rule that that type of state causes snowmen to melt.¹¹

How do subjects select specific causal presuppositions, and what is their justification in doing so? Kant's answer comes not in the "Second Analogy" but in his account of the "regulative principles" in the "Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic" and the "Introduction" to *KU*. Kant gives a normative account rather than a description of our actual hypothesis-forming process (*KU* 5:182). He provides a transcendental argument for our entitlement to select more "unified" theories, for example, by preferring theories that describe a world governed by a smaller number of more general causal laws (A650/B678; *KU* 5:182).¹² Kant insists (A651/B679) that we do not antecedently perceive events to which we try to fit our hypotheses. Instead, the very process of converting sensory material into representations of events must take place against a background of framing causal hypotheses, which always remain subject to later revision. Both in selecting and in revising our bodies of causal hypotheses and judgments about events, we tend to prefer simpler, more unified theories and are entitled to do so. A full understanding of Kant's account of hypothesis-formation would require arbitrating the debate over the move from causal rules to universal laws: do subjects begin with mere causal rules that are only later replaced by universal laws, or does the "Second Analogy" already entail a subject forming hypotheses about universal laws? I lack space to resolve this here (cf. endnote 10).

We now have a partial account of the mental activities that enable the representation of objective temporal sequence: to represent an event AB, the subject must presuppose X and Xs cause ABs. However, further clarification is still needed. How and in what sense do these causal presuppositions render a certain ordering of perceptions necessary?

4.2 | Causation and hypothetical inference

Some commentators have suggested that the inferential role of cause is what equips it to enable temporal representation. Melnick (1973) emphasizes that "a causal law is precisely a rule that allows us, on the basis of features of appearances, to conclude to a certain temporal ordering of appearances" (p. 91). Longuenesse (2005) espouses a similar view, though some critics have found her proposal hard to decipher (Osborne, 2006, p. 420). This subsection defends the view that the inferential role of cause is crucial, while Section 4.3 goes beyond existing proposals to explain how this relates to the pre-judgmental level of the ordering of perceptions.

There is considerable textual evidence that it is the logical structure that the concept of cause embodies and the form of inference it supports that is decisive. Kant draws a close connection between the concept of causation and the logical structure of the hypothetical conditional. In his derivation of the "Table of the Categories" (A80/B105) from the "Table of Judgments" (A70/B95), the pure concept of cause and effect corresponds to the logical structure of the "hypothetical" proposition (A70/B95, A73/B98). Kant's hypothetical conditional expresses a non-truth-functional "connection [*Verknüpfung*]" between its antecedent and consequent, which Kant calls "consequence [*Consequenz*]." When the antecedent holds, the consequent also holds, and the former is the "ground [*Grund*]" of the latter (*Log* 9:105–106; cf. Longuenesse, 2005, pp. 236–238). According to Kant, causal judgments are a species of hypothetical judgments. Therefore, to make the causal judgment that X causes Y is a fortiori to make the hypothetical judgment that if X, then Y (where this involves a non-truth-functional grounding connection).

In its schematized form, the concept of causation adds further spatio-temporal content to this logical structure. Specifically, the antecedent is restricted to "the real" (A144/B183), that is, states of objects "in time" (A143/B182); the consequent is restricted to temporal "successions" (A144/B183), which Kant equates with "changes" or "events" (see above); and the grounding connection between them (i.e., "consequence") is restricted to a certain direction in time, such that the event "follows" the triggering state (A144/B183).¹³ As with all categories, this process of schematization leaves the "logical meaning" of the concept of cause intact—it in no way lessens the connection between causal judgments and hypothetical judgments. Schematization merely adds extra content, which "restricts" the sphere

of possibilities falling under the concept, while enabling the application of these pure concepts to objects of experience (A146f./B185f.).

Given that causal judgments embody hypothetical conditionals, it follows that they support a kind of inference, namely, the hypothetical syllogism. In the *Jäsche Logic*, Kant describes how hypothetical conditionals support two valid forms of inference: *modus ponens* and *modus tollens* (9:106). As one would expect given the intimate relation between causation and the hypothetical conditional, Kant frequently associates causal judgments with just these kinds of inference. He writes that the “concept of cause” is the concept of “something that allows an inference to the existence of something else” (A243/B301), that it is “required” for us to be able to “infer a consequence from the existence of given determinations of things” (KpV 5:51, amended, emphasis in original), and that “what the concept of cause says” is “that one thing [is] such that, if it is posited, a second thing must thereby necessarily be posited” (Prol 4:257; cf. G 4:446). He equates the applicability of the “concept of causality” with the viability of inferences of the form “because one thing A is posited, another thing B must also necessarily be posited” (KpV 5:53).¹⁴ Commenting on the *Prolegomena* passage, Longuenesse (2005) notes that Kant’s phrasing “reproduces, almost word for word, Christian Wolff’s description of the inference in *modus ponens* in a hypothetical syllogism”, namely, “If, in a hypothetical syllogism, the antecedent is posited, the consequent must also be posited” (p. 235).

Kant’s view is that the judgment that Xs cause ABs involves the same logical content that is involved in the hypothetical conditional if X, then AB. A fortiori, this causal judgment is subject to the same inference-rules as the hypothetical conditional. In particular, it supports an inference in *modus ponens*: if a subject believes that Xs cause ABs and now posits that X obtains, then she “must necessarily posit” that AB occurs.

What are the consequences of this for our understanding of the “Second Analogy”? We can now clearly see the relation between the causal presuppositions identified above and the representation that AB occurs. The presuppositions that Xs cause ABs and that X obtains serve as the premises of a hypothetical syllogism, of which the judgment that AB occurs is the conclusion. This reading is supported by Kant’s use of the language of a hypothetical syllogism in *modus ponens* in the fourth exposition¹⁵ of the argument of the “Second Analogy”: “something [i.e. some state] ... precedes, and when this is posited, the other [i.e. the event] must necessarily follow” (A201/B246). Any subject who assents to those presuppositions must draw the conclusion that AB occurs. To capture Kant’s language of what the subject “must necessarily posit,” we can say that it is “inferentially necessary” for a subject who makes these presuppositions to draw the conclusion that AB occurs. Returning to our example, now that Jones believes (a) that the sun is shining on this snowman and (b) that sunshine causes snowmen to melt, it is inferentially necessary for him to draw the conclusion (c) that this snowman melts.

We now have a well-motivated account of how the conceptual role of cause imposes a kind of necessity on the subject’s mental activities. When she deploys the concept in certain causal presuppositions, it becomes inferentially necessary for her to judge that a certain event has occurred. We are well on our way to a fully explicit account of how the concept of cause can render the subjective order of perceptions necessary, but some questions still remain. First, how does the inferential necessitation of making a judgment relate to the ordering of perceptions (Section 4.3)? Second, what kind of modality is at stake in this notion of inferential necessity (Section 5)?

4.3 | Inferential necessitation of a subjective order of perceptions

In the previous subsection, I argued that the causal presuppositions X obtains and Xs cause ABs make the judgment that AB occurs inferentially necessary. Does this suffice for rendering the subjective order of perceptions necessary? What we have said so far has dealt only with the doxastic level of “judgments [*Urteile*]”, while Kant’s argument seems to turn on the subdoxastic level of “perceptions [*Wahrnehmungen*]”. Kant holds that inferences always operate at the level of judgments (Log 9:114), so it is not obvious how the inferential role of these causal presuppositions could relate to the level of “perceptions.” My task in this subsection is to explain how the inferential necessitation of a judgment translates into the necessitation of a subjective order of perceptions.

One possibility is to revise our interpretation of the argument, taking Kant's subject matter to be the necessitation of judgments, rather than the necessitation of an ordering of perceptions. On this reading, having explained the inferential necessity of judging that *AB* occurs, our interpretative task would be complete.¹⁶ There is some support for this approach: Kant's stated aim in the "Analogies of Experience" is to establish claims about "empirical cognition" (B218-9; *Prol* 4:310), which is usually taken to imply that he is operating at the level of judgments. Nevertheless, the text of the "Second Analogy" makes it clear that the necessitation of the pre-judgmental activity of "apprehension" is central to Kant's concerns. Kant's discussion turns on the order of "perceptions" being irreversible, not just on certain judgments being necessary (A192/B237); on the "subjective order of apprehension" and with the subjection of apprehension to a rule (A193/B238; A195/B240; A200/B245). Moreover, Kant holds that the result of the "Second Analogy" is "the formal condition of all perception" (A199/B244). To deny that Kant is concerned with the necessitation of a subjective order of perceptions, we would have to interpret him as continually misstating his point.¹⁷ Furthermore, a key conclusion of the "Transcendental Deduction" was that "all synthesis, through which even perception itself becomes possible, stands under the categories" (B161). Accordingly, it is natural to expect implications for the synthesis of apprehension within the "System of Principles."¹⁸ Unless it proves completely impossible to find one, we should seek an explanation of how the inferential necessitation of a judgment brings with it the necessitation of a subjective order of perceptions.

The key to understanding this connection is Kant's view that empirical judgments involve the synthesizing of perceptions: "[e]xperience is an empirical cognition, i.e., a cognition that determines an object through perceptions. It is therefore a synthesis of perceptions [...] [and] contains the synthetic unity of the manifold of perception in one consciousness" (B218, cf. A764/B792). Kant holds that judgments about specific worldly states, objects, and events, such as the judgment that *AB* occurs, must be "empirical cognitions," which, as this passage explains, means that they must involve the synthesizing of sensible material. This is an upshot of Kant's view that the representations of the understanding cannot have "relation to an object" unless they stand in the right kind of relation to sensibility: "we cannot cognize any object [...] except through intuitions that correspond to those concepts" (B165; cf. A50/B74). Without taking a stance on what kind of content intuitions have or what is required for an intuition to "correspond" to a judgment, we can say that for the "empirical cognition" that *AB occurs* to be possible, the subject must produce a perception which corresponds to it, by synthesizing sensory material.

What kind of "synthesis of perceptions" might be required to produce a perception corresponding to the judgment that *AB occurs*? Presumably, it would consist of a perception of *A* and a perception of *B*. These perceptions would have to be put together into a temporally structured whole, with the temporal dimension provided by the form of inner sense. In other words, to produce a perception corresponding to the judgment that *AB* occurs, the subject would have to "place" a perception of *A* before a perception of *B*. This act of arranging perceptions into a certain form would be part of the "synthesis of apprehension", carried out by the "power of imagination." In our example, Jones's "power of imagination" would "place" a perception of the snowman standing tall prior to a perception of the melted snowman, on the canvas provided by the formal intuition of time. This picture fits well both with Kant's descriptions of the imagination's synthesizing activities prior to the formation of judgments (A98-103, B151-6, B160f.); and with Kant's repeated descriptions in the "Second Analogy" of a "synthesis of apprehension" in which the "power of the imagination" "places" or "connects perceptions" (B223) in a certain "order" (B223; A193/B238).¹⁹

Given that this activity of *placing the perception of A before the perception of B* is required for the activity of *judging that event AB occurs*, it is intuitively plausible that any forms of necessity applying to the latter would also apply to the former. If a subject must *judge that AB occurs*, she must a fortiori perform the mental activities constitutive of making that judgment. Now, as argued in the previous subsection, when the subject makes presuppositions of the form *X* and *Xs cause ABs*, this makes it inferentially necessary for the subject to *judge that event AB occurs*. Therefore, it follows that making those presuppositions also makes it inferentially necessary for the subject to *place the perception of A before the perception of B*.²⁰ When this act of synthesis is a constituent part of forming a judgment and the judgment in question is one that is inferentially necessary, the synthesis is not an arbitrary act stemming from

idiosyncrasies of the subject. Rather, it is necessary in just the same sense that the judgment itself is necessary. The presuppositions that render the judgment inferentially necessary also render the subjective order of perceptions inferentially necessary: The activity of placing the perceptions in that order becomes something that the subject must do, given her assent to the premises of the causal inference.

We now have a full account of the mental activities that, according to Kant, render the representation of objective temporal order possible: The subject makes certain causal presuppositions; these presuppositions render it inferentially necessary for the subject to draw the conclusion that a certain event occurs and thereby render inferentially necessary the particular subjective order of perceptions that is required for drawing that conclusion. In the next section, we look more closely at the central term in this account, namely, inferential necessitation.

5 | INFERENTIAL NECESSITATION IS NORMATIVE NECESSITATION

In what sense, for Kant, *must* a subject assent to the conclusion of a causal inference for which she believes the premises? In what sense *must* she place her perceptions in the subjective order that is “inferentially necessary”? This section argues that the “must” is normative. The necessitation of judging that AB occurs and of performing the acts of synthesis constitutive of making that judgment is a matter of epistemic normativity.

“Normativity” is not a term used by Kant (though he does use the term “norm” in the sense of “model or guideline for assessment”²¹); so let me first pre-empt the worry that it is anachronistic to claim that normativity plays a central role in the “Second Analogy.” Normative facts or statements are those that deal in “oughts,” “shoulds,” reasons, duties, and so on. In several contexts throughout his critical philosophy, Kant draws distinctions between what, in modern parlance, we can call the normative and the non-normative. Consider the contrast between “natural philosophy” and “moral philosophy” presented in the *Groundwork*: “the first [determines certain laws] as laws in accordance with which everything happens, the second [determines certain laws] as laws in accordance with which everything ought to happen” (4:387f.). Another such contrast occurs when Kant introduces the “maxims of the power of judgment”: “they do not say what happens, i.e., in accordance with which rule our powers of cognition actually perform their role and how things are judged, but rather how they ought to be judged” (5:182). Other cases in which Kant draws this distinction include his remarks about the nature of logic (see below), the kind of necessity to which aesthetic judgments are subject (*KU* 5:239), and perhaps (though this is controversial) the famous distinction between “questions about what is lawful (*quid juris*)” and “[questions] which concern the facts (*quid facti*)” (A84/B116, amended), that is, the distinction between the way we use certain concepts and the way that we would be “justified” to use them (A84/B116). The modern term “normativity” gives us a useful way to designate one side of Kant’s contrast, picking out claims concerning what we “ought” to do or would be “justified” to do, rather than what merely is.

I now explain the proposal that causal presuppositions normatively necessitate a judgment and a fortiori an ordering of perceptions. What difference do the causal presuppositions make, vis-à-vis the judgment that AB occurs? One important factor is that a subject who believes that *X* and that *Xs* cause *ABs* has conclusive reason to believe that *AB* occurs: those presuppositions *justify* that conclusion. The proposal is that for the judgment to be inferentially necessitated is for it to be justified in this way.

Is there any basis for ascribing this kind of view to Kant? The first piece of evidence is that Kant explicitly talks in terms of “justification” within the “Second Analogy”:

[A] rule is always to be found in the perception of that which happens, and it makes the order of perceptions that follow one another (in the apprehension of this appearance) necessary. [...] This connection must therefore consist in the order of the manifold of appearance in accordance with which the apprehension of one thing (that which happens) follows that of the other (which precedes) in accordance with a rule. Only thereby can I be justified in saying of the appearance itself, and not merely of my apprehension, that a sequence is to be encountered in it, which is to say as much as that I cannot arrange the apprehension otherwise than in exactly this sequence. (A193/B238, *emphasis added*)

Here, Kant begins by repeating the claim that the representation of events is only possible when the “order of perceptions” is rendered “necessary.” Next, he asserts that this necessity can only be created by positing a causal connection between a state “which precedes” and the event itself. Finally, Kant explains that the difference made by positing this causal relation is that the subject is “thereby justified” in making the claim that an event has occurred. Explicitly, it is the epistemic or justificatory role of the causal presuppositions that is crucial in rendering the “order of perceptions” “necessary.”

This language of “justifying” is repeated in his second exposition of the argument:

If, therefore, we experience that something happens, then we always presuppose that something else precedes it, which it follows in accordance with a rule. For without this I would not say of the object that it follows, since the mere sequence in my apprehension, if it is not, by means of a rule, determined in relation to something preceding, does not justify any sequence in the object. (A195/B240, emphasis added)

Without making the causal presuppositions, Kant writes, the subject would not be justified in making a claim that there is a “sequence in the object”, that is, an objective order of states. The difference that the presuppositions make is a matter of what they “justify.” These passages strongly support the conclusion that the causal presuppositions’ “necessitation” of a particular ordering of perceptions is a matter of epistemic normativity.

The same conclusion is also supported by Kant’s apparently normative conception of the laws of logic. As argued in Section 5, the necessitation of a judgment by causal presuppositions turns on the inference-rules governing the hypothetical conditional. In the *Jäsche Logik*, we find the following characterization of the rules of logic:

Logic is [...] a science of the correct use of the understanding and of reason in general, not subjectively, however, i.e., not according to empirical (psychological) principles of how the understanding does think, but objectively, i.e., according to principles a priori for how it ought to think. (9:16, amended, emphasis added)

In logic [...] the question is not about [...] how we do think, but how we ought to think ... In logic we do not want to know how the understanding is and does think and how it has previously proceeded in thought, but rather how it ought to proceed in thought. (9:14, emphasis added)

In both passages, Kant draws the normative/non-normative distinction and firmly locates the laws of logic on the normative side. Tolley (2006) has raised doubts over whether these remarks about the nature of logic represent “Kant’s ‘considered’ or ‘mature’ (‘Critical’) position” (p. 398). (Tolley also raises substantive concerns, which are discussed below in Section 6.) However, the hypothesis that these remarks are remnants of a pre-Critical view is belied by the existence of similar remarks in lecture-transcripts from the Critical period:

We can divide the laws of our understanding in the following way[.]:

1. Rules for how we think.
2. Rules for how we ought to think.

Sometimes we think completely wrong-headedly. This use can never agree with the rules. This is the misuse of the understanding and is excluded here. Logic teaches the latter [i.e. rules for how we ought to think], namely, how to use the objective rules of our understanding. (V-Lo/Wiener 24:791, amended)²²

Logical rules are not ones according to which we think, but according to which we ought to think. (V-Lo/Dohna 24:694)

Kant holds that we often fail to think in accordance with the logical laws laid out in the course of the lectures. But the principles of logic are not descriptions of how we happen to think. Rather, they constitute standards for how we ought to think. Kant links this normative conception of logic with his notion of “critique”:

[Logic] is useful and indispensable as a critique of cognition, however, or for passing judgment on common as well as on speculative reason, not in order to teach it, but only to make it correct and in agreement with itself. (Log 9:20, Kant's emphasis; cf. Log 9:15, Log 9:16, V-Lo/Wiener 24:792, V-Lo/Dohna 24:694f.)

Far from being a remnant of Kant's pre-Critical thought, his normative conception of logic is intimately connected with his mature conception of philosophy as providing a critique of our mental faculties. The procedure appears to be this: first, we reflect on the nature of the understanding and identify principles that are universally valid, rather than being plausible only due to some bias that we happen to have.²³ Next, we use this body of principles as a "doctrine" for "critiquing" the actual patterns of thought of ourselves and others. This step may be supplemented by empirical discoveries about what errors we are most prone to make. Kant terms this empirically informed project "applied logic" (A53/B77, Log 9:18). We would therefore be unjustified in taking Kant's remarks on the normativity of logic to be a remnant of his pre-Critical views. Rather, we should try to accommodate Kant's mature characterization of logic as another facet of his critical project, in which reflecting on the nature of our faculties provides us with certain epistemic standards, which can then be used to root out error. Kant holds that the principles of logic, and a fortiori the rules of hypothetical inference, are normative in character, providing standards of "how we ought to think" (Log 9:14).

To sum up the argument of this section, we have found significant textual evidence that inferential necessitation is a form of epistemic normativity. This evidence was found both in the "Second Analogy" and in Kant's general statements about the nature of logical laws. The sense in which Jones *must* draw the conclusion of a hypothetical syllogism when he believes its premises is that he *ought* to draw that conclusion and will be open to epistemic criticism if he does not. Making causal presuppositions imposes a normative structure on the subject's mental operations. It is this normative necessity that removes the arbitrariness of these operations, thereby enabling objective purport. Once Jones presupposes that the sun is shining on the snowman and that sunshine causes snowmen to melt, his judgment that the snowman melts is not made arbitrarily but on the basis of a conclusive reason. Similarly the synthesis of perceptions required to make that judgment—placing a perception of the snowman standing tall before a perception of the melted snowman—is not an arbitrary activity stemming from the subjective constitution of Jones's mind, but an activity that is normatively necessary. This normatively necessary subjective order is the feature of Jones's perception in virtue of which it represents an objective temporal sequence.

6 | OBJECTION: NORMATIVITY AND THE POSSIBILITY OF DEVIATION

We found ample textual evidence that inferential necessity is normative. However, Tolley (2006) argues that we cannot coherently attribute to Kant the claim that logical rules are normative. This section deals with Tolley's objection.

Tolley argues that Kant is committed to the following claims:

1. For a rule to be normative for a subject, it must be possible for the subject to deviate from that rule.
2. It is not possible for thinkers to deviate from the rules of logic.

From these commitments, it follows that it would be incoherent for Kant to hold that the rules of logic are normative for thinkers. I will not question Kant's commitment to (1),²⁴ but will argue that Tolley is wrong to attribute (2) to him.

What would it mean for a thinker to deviate from the laws of logic? Focusing on the laws relevant to our topic, logic sets out which forms of inference are valid. To deviate from these laws would simply be to make an invalid inference. If Kant holds that it is possible for thinkers to make invalid inferences, then he is not committed to (2).

Is there evidence that Kant thinks that it is possible to make an invalid inference? Kant's discussion of "logical illusion" in KrV clearly shows his commitment to the idea that we sometimes make invalid inferences, which offend against certain logical rules: "Logical illusion, which consists in the mere imitation of the form of reason (the illusion of fallacious inferences) arises solely from a failure of attentiveness to the logical rule" (A296/B353). Consequently, one

of the tasks of formal logic is to “discover false illusion in the form of syllogisms” (A333/B390). Similarly, at least some of the errors Kant identifies in the “Dialectic” arise from fallacious inference—the “Paralogisms” are the result of making a “fallacious inference [Fehlschluss]” due to an ambiguous term in the premises (A341/B399); and similarly the “cosmological syllogism” that produces the “Antinomies” is a “mistake” arising from an ambiguous term. The *Hechsel Logic* also shows Kant describing formally invalid inferences not as impossible but as “erroneous or false”:

In regard to truth, the syllogismus is divided into true, and erroneous or false. An inference can be false, in such a way that the error lies either in materia or in forma. The inference suffers from an error [...] in forma if the consequentia is drawn falsely from true premises. (V-Lo/Hechsel, LV 2:455)

The propositions in an inference can be true, but the inference can nonetheless be false as to form, i.e., a fallacy. (V-Lo/Hechsel, LV 2:469)

Kant consistently endorses the possibility of deviating from the laws of valid inference, and hence denies (2) vis-à-vis these rules. Indeed, the notion that humans are naturally driven to certain violations of the rules of correct inference is central to his conception of reason. It follows that there is no reason to think that Kant denies that the rules for valid hypothetical syllogisms can be violated by thinkers.²⁵ We can reject Tolley's argument against the normativity of this logical rule and uphold the suggestion that the causal presuppositions X and Xs cause ABs make it normatively necessary for the subject to judge that AB occurs.

Tolley (2006) backs up his claim that it is impossible for thinkers to deviate from the rules of logic by contrasting the activity of thinking with the activities governed by moral laws (p. 374). In the moral case, humans have a capacity to choose freely whether or not to obey the laws, while in thought we seem to have no such “*Willkür*-correlate.” How can we reconcile this point with the thesis that rules of causal inference are normative? For our purposes it makes sense to discuss this vis-à-vis causal inference, rather than reasoning in general. Is there a “*Willkür*-correlate” in play in the domain of causal inference?

To answer this question, we need to understand what kind of “*Willkür*-correlate” is required for normative constraint. Kant elucidates the term “choice [*Willkür*]” as “[t]he faculty of desire [...] [i]nsofar as it is joined with one's consciousness of the ability to bring about its object by one's actions” (MS 6:213). This capacity is called free if it “can be determined by pure reason”, that is, if it is capable of selecting maxims on the basis of their adherence to the moral law. But in humans, “choice [*Willkür*]” is also influenced by “sensible” factors, namely “inclination, or sensible impulse”. As Tolley (2006) acknowledges, it is the fact that the faculty of desire is subject to these “possibly obstructive forces” (p. 373) that makes deviation from the moral law possible and thereby renders the moral law imperatively normative. We might be tempted to think that it is the element of “choice” that renders the moral law normative. However, Kant's position is that the combination of determination by a (self-imposed)²⁶ law and influence by “possibly obstructive forces” is the key ingredient for normativity. This is made manifest by Kant's explicit application of normative standards to other activities that are not within the purview of the “faculty of desire”, notably aesthetic judgments (KU 5:239) and the systematizing activities of reason and reflective judgment (KU 5:182; Mudd, 2016). For Kant, normative constraint does not depend on the presence of a capacity for choice, but rather on the presence of “possibly obstructive forces.”

Are “possibly obstructive forces” in play in the domain of causal inference? Yes. As discussed, making causal judgments about particular objects is not possible without a contribution from sensibility. It is for this reason that, in order to move from the premises X and Xs cause ABs to the conclusion AB occurs, a subject must carry out a certain synthesis of perceptions. Kant states in the introduction to the “Transcendental Dialectic” that once sensibility is in the frame, a force is in play that can cause the mind to deviate from the “laws of the understanding” (A350f./B294f.; cf. Log 9:53f.). Indeed, Tolley (2006) accepts that his argument has no force for domains in which the understanding works in tandem with other faculties such as sensibility (pp. 374, 399) and freely admits that logical rules may be normative when “applied” to those domains. Tolley fails to consider the possibility that the self-same formal laws that are discovered in pure logic might be normative for human subjects applying those laws in empirical judgment, but I see no reason for ruling this out. In the context of causal inference, sensibility constitutes the “possibly obstructive force” that makes deviation from logical rules possible and thereby qualifies them as normative.

7 | CONCLUSION

The necessitation of an ordering of perceptions is a form of inferential necessitation, resulting from the subject's causal presuppositions. This inferential necessitation is a form of epistemic normativity. The interpretation for which I have argued makes good sense of Kant's text, fits well with his argumentative aims and coheres closely with his broader position on the nature of causal inference. If correct, this interpretation shows that normative notions are in play right in the heart of Kant's "Transcendental Analytic" and that his conception of cognition turns at a crucial point on the idea that the mind's operations are normatively structured: It is this very normative structure, imposed by causal presuppositions and rules of logical inference, that enables the representation of objective temporal sequence. What's more, I have argued that to understand Kant's text, we have to see this normative structure as extending beyond the level of judgment and encompassing the "synthesis of apprehension" carried out by the imagination, in which sensible material is placed in a temporal order. I have therefore found support for Pollok's (2017) view that, for Kant, the "determination of sensibility" is subject to normative standards.

To further clarify this conclusion and to pre-empt misunderstandings, let me emphasize what this conclusion is not. I have not argued that the Causal Principle is itself a normative principle. On the interpretation I have given, it is alethically necessary that, for all events AB and all subjects S, AB is only perceptible to S if S judges AB to be caused. A subject who places a perception of A before a perception of B without presupposing that something causes event AB does not thereby produce a perception of AB that is defective in some respect, but fails to produce a perception with objective temporal content. Therefore, the Causal Principle is a non-normative, alethic modal principle about perceptible events. Thus, my interpretation of the "Second Analogy" should not be taken as supporting Allison's (2004, p. xvi) and Pollok's (2017, p. 2) view that "synthetic judgments a priori" such as the Causal Principle serve as "norms" for cognition. On my view, it is *adherence* to the Causal Principle, not *being assessable* with regard to it, that conditions the possibility of objective temporal contents, and hence of objectively valid judgments about events. In this I agree with Pollok's (2017) claim that adherence to such principles is constitutive of "objective validity" in theoretical cognition (p. 10, 140f.). However, I see no reason to follow Pollok (2017) in claiming that the Causal Principle serves as a norm for judgments more broadly, for example, the judgment that God spontaneously created the world (p. 10, 140f.). As I see it, neither the "Transcendental Dialectic" nor Kant's positive account of rational faith bears out the claim that judgments can be shown to be defective simply by pointing out their deviation from "principles of pure understanding" (which are in any case restricted to the domain of appearances).²⁷

Nevertheless, the interpretation for which I have argued provides some support for an extremely wide-ranging interpretation of the role played by normativity in Kant's philosophy of mind. We have explored one area in which Kant insists that necessitation of the mind's operations is required for objective representation and found that the necessitation in question is provided by normative structures. Therefore, at least in the case of objective temporal contents, we have found Kant espousing the view that the contentfulness of mental states—of perceptions as well as judgments—depends on their having a particular normative status.

This specific thesis linking objective content to normative necessitation suggests that we should explore a more general thesis, like the view attributed to Kant by McDowell (1994), according to which normative necessitation is required for all kinds of objective content. The "Second Analogy" turns on the premise that the subjective order of perceptions cannot have objective purport if it is arbitrary, but there is textual evidence that Kant is committed to the general thesis that objective purport requires a necessitation of the mind's activities. In the "Second Analogy," it is normative necessitation that removes the arbitrariness; so perhaps when Kant writes that "our thought of the relation of all cognition to its object carries something of necessity with it [...] which is opposed to our cognitions being determined at pleasure or arbitrarily [*aufs Geratewohl, oder beliebig*]" (A104), he means that all relation to objects requires normative necessitation (cf. A108, B218f., A191/B236).²⁸ On the other hand, it may be that only syntheses of "connection [*Verknüpfung, nexus*]" and not of "composition [*Zusammensetzung, compositio*]" require normative constraint in order to produce representations with objective purport—a possibility suggested by Kant's characterization of the former as "not arbitrary [*nicht willkürlich*]." If so, it would only be the representation of

necessary connections (rather than contingent existences) that requires normative constraint.²⁹ Such questions require further investigation. Starting points for expanding this investigation might include exploring whether normative notions are at work in the other "Analogies of Experience" and the rest of the "System of Principles" and providing a clearer account of how normative guidance of the "synthesis of apprehension" is possible.

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ENDNOTES

- ¹ I follow Burge (2010) in using underlining to denote mental contents.
- ² Cf. B233, A190/B235, A198/B243 and A201/B246.
- ³ I hereby adopt a semantic rather than epistemic reading of Kant's point, *pace* Beck (1978) and Guyer (1987). Watkins (2005) argues that epistemic readings of the "Second Analogy" will inevitably result in circularity, a contention borne out by Van Cleve's (1999, pp. 128–132) attempt to repair Beck's epistemic reading.
- ⁴ Strawson (1966) describes the subjective order as being a matter of "logical" rather than "causal" necessity (p. 136) but since it is contingent on facts about the causal processes which produce perception, it is more accurately classified as causal necessity. Cf. Van Cleve (1973, p. 82).
- ⁵ I use the term "recognize" in order to gloss over the fact that Beck gives the argument an epistemic rather than semantic reading. Cf. n. 3.
- ⁶ Cf. Van Cleve (1999).
- ⁷ In any case, Van Cleve argues that the argument as he reconstructs it is not cogent.
- ⁸ Further grounds for pessimism about 'causal necessitation' readings are provided by Van Cleve's (1973, pp. 84–87) criticism of Dyer.
- ⁹ Second exposition = A194f./B239f.; third exposition = A198–201/B243–6. I follow Longuenesse's (2005) numbering (pp. 253–258).
- ¹⁰ I set aside the fraught question of how Kant gets from causal rules to universal causal laws. In my view, Kant holds that the concept of causation analytically entails causation according to universal laws (B5, A91/B124, G 4:446, KU 5:195, RGV 6:35).
- ¹¹ Must the subject's causal assumptions match the physical laws which Kant (in *MAN*) argues are transcendently necessary? In my view, Kant holds that all subjects' experience necessarily conforms to these laws and that the transcendental philosopher can discover this fact and these laws by reflecting on the preconditions of experience (as Kant does in *MAN*). Nevertheless, this is compatible with many subjects failing to believe those laws, or even believing divergent laws, for example, Aristotelian physics. Therefore, Kant does not hold that subjects always make causal assumptions that are in line with the physical laws derived in *MAN* (though any assumptions contrary to them will in fact be false).
- ¹² These sections deal most explicitly with reason's attempts to unify the judgments and concepts delivered by the understanding, but Kant also writes that the "regulative use" of the "transcendental ideas" "direct[s] the understanding to a certain goal respecting which the lines of direction of all its rules converge at one point" (A644/B672) and that "without [the law of reason to seek unity] we would have [...] no coherent use of the understanding" (A651/B679). In other words, the drive towards unity is operative at the initial stage of forming causal hypotheses (examples of which are given at A646/B674 and A662f./B690f.), not just the subsequent stage of revising these in pursuit of systematicity.
- ¹³ Kant holds that most effects start as soon as their causes are present, but that since events have a temporal duration, they nevertheless "follow" their causes in an important sense (A202f./B247–9).
- ¹⁴ Kannisto (2017, pp. 510–2) argues that causal inferences are not possible until the move from causal rules to universal causal laws has been made. The passages cited, which demonstrate that for Kant the mere applicability of the concept of cause supports hypothetical inferences, suggest either that Kannisto is wrong to ascribe this view to Kant or that the concept of cause entails lawful causation (cf. n. 10).
- ¹⁵ Fourth exposition = A201f./B246f.. Cf. note 9.

- ¹⁶ For independent reasons, Allison (2004) takes this route (p. 230).
- ¹⁷ Commenting on Kant's use of the phrase "rule of apprehension" (A191/B236), Allison (2004) accuses Kant of being "misleading" (p. 234). However, he seems to underestimate the frequency of passages that jar with his reading.
- ¹⁸ Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this point.
- ¹⁹ Does this view of the imagination's activities commit me to a "conceptualist" interpretation of Kant? No. The account does not deny that the content of intuitions includes features which cannot be represented by concepts (cf. Allais, 2009; Tolley, 2013). Nor does it claim that individual intuitions would be impossible without acts of synthesis (cf. McLearn, 2014; Tolley, 2013). Nor does the account deny that temporally extended sequences of intuition could be produced without a contribution from the understanding—intuitions could be placed in a temporal sequence by merely associative processes (cf. Hanna, 2005). However, I do read Kant as insisting that those associative processes would not produce perceptions with objective temporal contents, an interpretation which seems obligatory for understanding the 'Second Analogy'. The account is therefore not entirely neutral about the relation between sensibility and understanding: I maintain that perceptions produced in the context of activities that also implicate the understanding can have a certain kind of content which perceptions produced independently of the understanding would lack. However, this thesis is quite compatible with all but the most extreme of non-conceptualist positions.
- ²⁰ If inferential necessitation behaves like an alethic necessity operator, then this is a consequence of the Distribution Axiom: $\Box (J \rightarrow P)$ ("Judging AB is inferentially necessary."), $\Box (J \rightarrow P)$ ("In order to judge AB, one must place A before B."), $\Box (J \rightarrow P) \rightarrow (\Box J \rightarrow \Box P)$ (an instance of the Distribution Axiom) $\vdash \Box P$ ("Placing A before B is inferentially necessary"). Alternatively, if inferential necessitation behaves like a deontic obligation operator (as I will argue), then the same follows by an analogue of the Hypothetical Imperative. One ought to judge AB. Placing A before B is a necessary means to judging AB. If one ought to ϕ , then one ought also to carry out the means necessary for ϕ -ing. Therefore, one ought to place A before B.
- ²¹ KU 5:239; Log 9:15. See also Pollok (2017, p. 2).
- ²² Instead of "Logic teaches the latter," Young has "Logic teaches this last" for "*die Logik lehrt das Letzte*," thereby obscuring Kant's meaning.
- ²³ It is this that explains Kant's insistence that pure logic is independent of the discoveries of empirical psychology. We will return to the question of whether it is possible for the mind to deviate from these rules in Section 6.
- ²⁴ Lu-Adler (2017, p. 207) proposes distinguishing between imperativ and evaluative normativity. While it is clear that Kant endorses (1) for imperativ normativity—facts about what subjects should do—it is doubtful whether he does so for evaluative normativity—facts about the goodness of things. Leech (2017, pp. 366f.) defends the normativity of logic in Kant by decoupling normativity and possible deviation in this way. However, since I interpret inferential necessitation as imperativ, I accept (1) for the purposes of discussion.
- ²⁵ See Lu-Adler (2017, pp. 211–213) and Leech (2017, pp. 356–363) for additional argument that Kant endorses the possibility of illogical thought.
- ²⁶ It is beyond our scope to discuss whether the laws of the understanding are self-imposed in a similar fashion to the moral law. Note that Kant writes that theoretical reason "must regard itself as the author of its principles" (G 4:448); and that "freedom in thinking signifies the subjection of reason to no laws except those which it gives itself" (WDO 8:145). Cf. Förster (2011, p. 124).
- ²⁷ Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pressing me to clarify this.
- ²⁸ Cf. Ginsborg (2008, p. 73).
- ²⁹ My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this possibility.

ORCID

James Hutton  <https://orcid.org/0000-0002-7779-6874>

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Alix Cohen

School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences, The University of Edinburgh, Dugald Stewart Building, 3 Charles Street, Edinburgh EH8 9AD, United Kingdom

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ABSTRACT

The aim of this paper is to explore Kant's account of normativity through the prism of the distinction between the natural and the human sciences. Although the pragmatic orientation of the human sciences is often defined in contrast with the theoretical orientation of the natural sciences, I show that they are in fact regulated by one and the same norm, namely reason's demand for autonomy.

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1. Introduction

The aim of this paper is to explore Kant's account of normativity through the prism of the distinction between the natural and the human sciences. Although the pragmatic orientation of the human sciences is often defined in contrast with the theoretical orientation of the natural sciences, I show that they are in fact regulated by one and the same norm, namely reason's demand for autonomy. To support this claim, I begin by spelling out the pragmatic nature of the human sciences. Insofar as they are directed towards human cultivation, civilisation and moralisation, they are committed to investigating human phenomena for a practical purpose, namely the realisation of human beings' aims. What is not sufficiently acknowledged, however, is that the human sciences also pertain to the enterprise of human cognition itself: they help human beings realise their cognitive vocation by promoting the conditions of good cognition. The second section examines these conditions and shows in what sense they constitute normative constraints upon belief. On the reading I propose, they take the form of epistemic principles that should guide our reflective attitude upon our cognitive activity. I then turn to the question of whether given their theoretical orientation, the norms that govern the natural sciences and cognition in general differ from those that govern the human sciences. For one may be tempted to think that even if cognition is normatively guided, its norms are epistemic whereas in the case of the

human sciences, by contrast, insofar as they are pragmatically oriented, their norms are practical. Yet the third section argues that this is not the case. On the interpretation of Kant I defend, our actions and our thoughts are subject to the same rational norm, for rationality expresses itself normatively through the demand for autonomy in thought as well as in action. However, crucially for my account, the prime locus of responsibility is not over beliefs and actions themselves but rather over the principles that should regulate them. Once we turn our attention to the role of these principles in regulating our activity, we can make sense of the Kantian picture according to which the only source of normativity is our capacity for autonomy.

2. The human sciences as enterprises with a pragmatic purpose

Kant begins his *Anthropology* with an explicit reference to its 'pragmatic point of view': anthropology is 'the investigation of what [the human being] as a free-acting being makes of himself, or

¹ Insofar as the following works by Kant are cited frequently, I have identified them by these abbreviations: A: *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* (Kant, 2007); CJ: *Critique of the Power of Judgement* (Kant, 2000); CPR: *Critique of Pure Reason* (Kant, 1999b); G: *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals* (Kant, 1999a); LA: *Lectures on Anthropology* (Kant, 2012); LL: *Lectures on Logic* (Kant, 1992); MM: *Metaphysics of Morals* (Kant, 1999a); WOT: *What is Orientation in Thinking?* (Kant, 2001). For the sake of clarity in the references to Kant's writings, I have chosen to use titles rather than the author/date system. I have also included a citation to the Cambridge translation in parentheses, followed by a citation to the German text of the Prussian Academy edition (volume and page reference) in brackets.

E-mail address: alix.cohen@ed.ac.uk.

can and should make of himself.² The 'makes' points to the descriptive part of Kant's project – i.e., what human beings actually make, or have made, of themselves. The 'can make' refers to the realm of possibility – i.e., the scope and limits of human beings' influence on themselves, whilst the 'should make' indicates the prescriptive part of Kant's project, which encompasses the realm of human action in general – i.e., its technical, prudential and moral dimensions. On this basis, Kant's anthropology essentially aims at accomplishing three tasks. First, it describes human beings' behaviour relative to their purposes. Second, it deduces from their predispositions the scope of what they can make of themselves. Third, it draws conclusions regarding what they should do in order to accomplish the best possible fulfilment of their purposes, whether technical, prudential or moral. For the realm of the pragmatic encompasses all the dimensions of human actions: the development of skills, the means of achieving happiness, and the helps and hindrances to morality.

The sum total of pragmatic anthropology, in respect to the vocation of the human being and the characteristic of his formation, is the following. The human being is destined by his reason to live in a society with human beings, and in it to cultivate himself, to civilize himself, and to moralize himself by means of the arts and sciences.³

To accomplish this task, Kant focuses on knowledge 'of practical relevance', that is to say knowledge that is useful to one's conduct in life.⁴ This knowledge has an extremely broad scope: it discloses 'the sources of all the [practical] sciences, the science of morality, of skill, of human intercourse, of the way to educate and govern human beings, and thus of everything that pertains to the practical'.⁵ The uniqueness of the human sciences' approach lies in their commitment to investigating human phenomena for a practical purpose.⁶

Yet the fact that the human sciences are practically oriented does not entail that they do not have a theoretical dimension. On my reading, the pragmatic intent of anthropology calls for a descriptive and explanatory dimension since human beings need to

understand their nature in order to be able to determine what they are capable of and how they can achieve their purposes.⁷ This theoretical part of the project includes the investigation of nature's purposes for the human species as well as of human beings' psychological and biological make-up.⁸ As summed up in the *Lectures on Anthropology*, 'Anthropology is thus a pragmatic knowledge of what results from our nature'.⁹ The knowledge of human beings' natural constitution is necessary for them to use nature, and in particular their nature, to realise their purposes. As a result, far from being independent of each other, or even excluding each other, as is often presupposed, in anthropology the realm of the practical necessitates that of the theoretical.¹⁰ It is on the basis of the theoretical observations about the human world that anthropology can play the crucial role of providing a map for human beings to orient themselves in it and realise their aims.¹¹

Depending on our purpose when we adopt its recommendations, anthropology can be used either towards the realisation of morality, or towards the realisation of our own happiness.¹² As a doctrine of prudence, it contributes to the latter insofar as not only does it help us choose ends that are consistent with the greatest possible happiness, it also teaches us how to realise these ends.¹³ In its moral dimension, it examines the empirical helps and hindrances to moral agency – not any empirical helps and hindrances but specifically 'the subjective conditions in human nature'.¹⁴ By identifying and recommending the means that help the realisation of our duty and counseling against the hindrances to it, it makes us more morally efficacious.¹⁵ It is in this sense that Kant's anthropological project is a pragmatic project directed towards human cultivation, civilisation and moralisation.

The practical orientation of the human sciences is often interpreted in contrast with the theoretical orientation of the natural sciences. In the Preface to his *Anthropology*, Kant himself distinguishes between the investigations of 'a mere observer', which he calls 'theoretical speculation', and the knowledge of 'how to put them to use for his purposes' – 'anthropology with a pragmatic purpose'.¹⁶ Thus there seems to be a *prima facie* contrast between theoretical and pragmatic sciences, a contrast that can further be situated within the broader contrast between the practical and the

² A 231 [7:119]. As is now well-known, Kant calls his anthropology 'pragmatic' rather than 'practical'. But in the context of the introduction to the *Anthropology*, the meanings of these terms coincide insofar as they both have to do with the realm of action: 'anthropology is concerned with subjective, practical rules' (*Lectures on Ethics* 42 [27:244]). Contrast this with the narrow meaning of 'practical' as having to do with free action (G 95 [4:448]). As is regularly noted by commentators, Kant sometimes calls the prudential dimension of human action 'pragmatic' (e.g., Louden (2000), pp. 69–70). For instance, he writes: 'The first imperative could also be called technical (belonging to art), the second pragmatic (belonging to welfare), the third moral (belonging to free conduct as such, that is, to morals)' (G 69 [4:416–17]; see also MM 565–6 [6:444–6]). However, far from entailing an inconsistency, this merely implies that the word 'pragmatic' can be understood in two distinct senses: in a narrow sense as 'prudential', having to do with welfare and happiness, and in a broad sense as 'practical', having to do with the field of action in general. My claim is that when Kant uses the term 'pragmatic' to describe his *Anthropology*, he uses the term in the latter rather than the former sense.

³ A 420 [7:324].

⁴ A 233 [7:122].

⁵ Correspondence 141 [10:145]. The notion of 'knowledge' is of course problematic in this context since Kant does not mean to suggest that the knowledge at stake in anthropology is of the same kind as the knowledge in natural science. However, it goes well beyond the remit of this paper to tackle this issue. Suffice to say that for Kant, anthropological knowledge is based on empirical generalisation, induction and interpretation. For discussions of this question, see Cohen (2009), Sturmin (2009) and Wilson (2006).

⁶ As Louden has noted, 'Kantian social science ... is not value-free but morally guided. We seek *Weltkenntnis* in order to further the goal of moralisation. Knowing the world stands under the moral imperative of making the world better' (Louden (2000), p. 230).

⁷ I have defended this claim in Cohen (2009), pp. 71–84.

⁸ Unfortunately, I cannot get into the details of the theoretical dimension of the human sciences for Kant. For a discussion of Kant's biological account of the human species and nature's purposes for it, see Cohen (2008). For a discussion of his psychological account of human beings, see Frierson (2014), pp. 1–50.

⁹ LA 48 [25:471].

¹⁰ For a version of the reverse claim that the theoretical standpoint necessitates the practical standpoint, see O'Neill (1989), ch. 3.

¹¹ For an account of anthropology as a map-making venture, Cohen (2009).

¹² '[P]rudence is the capacity to choose the best means to our happiness. Happiness consists in the satisfaction of all of our inclinations' (LA [25:413]). Reason clearly indicates our moral destination, namely the realisation of the moral law: 'reason by itself and independently of all appearances commands what ought to happen' (G 62 [4:408]). For a defense of the claim that Kant's pragmatic anthropology encompasses both prudential and moral dimensions, especially by contrast with Brandt (2003: 92), see Cohen (2009), pp. 70–71.

¹³ See Reflection [6:45n]. For a very clear account of prudence and prudential ends in Kant's anthropology, see Kaun (2003).

¹⁴ MM 372 [6:217]. Moral anthropology 'would deal with the development, spreading, and strengthening of moral principles (in education in schools and in popular instruction), and with other similar teachings and precepts based on experience. It cannot be dispensed with, but it must not precede a metaphysics of morals or be mixed with it' (MM 372 [6:217]).

¹⁵ The nature and extent of moral anthropology is the subject of numerous debates in the literature. However, it falls beyond the remit of this paper to engage with them. For helpful discussions, see Cohen (2009), 89–104, Frierson (2003), and Louden (2000) in particular.

¹⁶ A 231 [7:119].

theoretical standpoints spelt out in the *Groundwork*.¹⁷ However, although it is not sufficiently acknowledged, pragmatic anthropology cuts across these categories insofar as it encompasses recommendations that pertain to the enterprise of theoretical science and cognition in general – what Kant calls somewhat misleadingly ‘applied logic’.¹⁸

What I [Kant] call applied logic [...] is thus a representation of the understanding and the rules of its necessary use in *concreto*, namely under the contingent conditions of the subject, which can hinder or promote this use, and which can all be given only empirically.¹⁹

On my reading, the aim of applied logic and Kant’s anthropology of cognition more generally is to promote good cognition. To help us realise our cognitive vocation, they rely on the knowledge of how we use our cognitive faculties when we form beliefs in order to guide us on how to make the best use of them – Kant repeatedly talks of ‘the use of understanding and reason’, the ‘correct use of the understanding’ or the ‘purposive use of [the faculty of cognition]’.²⁰ Error can be avoided if we formulate and adhere to ‘the rules of the use of the understanding under the subjective empirical conditions that psychology teaches us’.²¹ Crucially, note the parallel between the role of the ‘various subjective obstacles and restrictions’ and the ‘contingent conditions of the subject’ as they pertain to good cognition in applied logic and the ‘subjective conditions in human

nature’ as they pertain to good willing in moral anthropology.²² Just as these subjective conditions are the key to the success or failure of the realisation of our moral aims, they are key to the success or failure of the realisation of our cognitive aims. It is thus by identifying them and spelling out how to deal with them that Kant’s anthropology of cognition can contribute to the success of our cognitive endeavours. For once we understand how error occurs, we can prevent it.²³

While it falls beyond the remit of this paper to examine Kant’s account of error, what is crucial for my present purpose is that there are rules for the correct use of our cognitive faculties, and that being epistemically responsible consists in abiding by these rules. The aim of the following section is to examine them in order to determine the kinds of normative constraints that apply to cognition.

3. Epistemic normativity

From his early *Lectures on Logic* to his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, Kant identifies three ‘principles of thinking’ that spell out the cognitive attitudes conducive to truth: first, to think for oneself; second, to think in the place of another; and third, to always think consistently with oneself.²⁴ These principles of *sensus communis*, as Kant calls them, should guide the epistemic agent in the pursuit of knowledge: ‘the issue here is not the faculty of cognition, but the way of thinking [*Denkungsart*] needed to make a purposive use of it’. As ‘[u]niversal rules and conditions for avoiding error’, they are the principles according to which we ought to think.²⁵ As second-order principles, they guide the reflective attitude we as responsible epistemic agents should take towards our cognitive activity. Thus on my reading, just as the formulas of the Categorical Imperative should guide maxim-formation, the principles of thinking should guide first-order maxims of belief-formation, which I would like to call “epistemic maxims” to parallel the more familiar “moral maxims”.²⁶ In this sense, epistemic responsibility is a matter of whether and how we formulate our epistemic maxims, and the source of false or unjustified beliefs turns out to be the wrong ‘way of thinking’ about these maxims.

To make sense of this claim, it can be helpful to explore further the epistemic case in light of the moral case. According to Kant, wrongdoing occurs when we order our principles the wrong way round. We subordinate the moral law to self-love by valuing the incentives of our inclinations over those of morality. Thereby we make the satisfaction of our own desires the ultimate value, an unconditional principle. What is at stake is thus our hierarchy of value.²⁷ How are our principles ordered? Do we place morality before self-love or self-love before morality? When our principles are ordered the right way round, our commitment to morality expresses itself through the decision to only act ‘in such a way that [we] could also will that [our] maxim should become a universal law’.²⁸ By contrast, wrongdoing occurs when our principles are ordered the wrong way round and we prioritise subjective values

¹⁷ As Kant notes, ‘The concept of a world of understanding is thus only a standpoint that reason sees itself constrained to take outside appearances in order to think of itself as practical’ (G 104 [4:458]). For discussions of the two standpoints, see for instance O’Neill (1989), pp. 51–77 and Korsgaard (1996), p. 171ff.

¹⁸ As Kant himself notes in the *Lectures on Logic*, ‘Applied logic really ought not to be called logic’ (LL 533 [9:18]). In this sense, applied logic rightly understood is the pragmatic dimension of Kant’s account of cognition. The first part of Kant’s *Anthropology*, ‘On the Cognitive Faculty’, which deals with cognition, its talents, its weaknesses and diseases, is in effect an extension of what Kant calls ‘applied logic’ in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Lectures on Logic*. I would like to thank a referee of this journal for helping me clarify my account on this point.

¹⁹ CPR 195 [A54–5/B78–9].

²⁰ Based on A 386–8 [7:288–91], LA 386 [25:1261], 106 [25:545], 520 [25:1481], LL 533 [9:18], 577 [9:74], CJ 175 [5:295]. For an overall account of Kant’s anthropology of cognition, see Cohen (2014).

²¹ CPR 194 [A53/B77]. While Kant mentions psychology in this passage, note that what he is talking about falls under the discipline of anthropology understood as the investigation of the way human beings think and act. By contrast, pure general logic is the ‘pure doctrine of reason’, which is ‘properly scientific, although brief and dry, as the scholastically correct presentation of a doctrine of the elements of the understanding requires’ (CPR 195 [A53–54/B78]). For a detailed account of the distinction between pure and applied logic, see Lu-Adler (2017). For a discussion of Kant’s psychology in relation to his anthropology, see Wilson (2006) and Friserson (2014).

²² LL 533 [9:18], CPR 195 [A54–5/B78–9], MM 372 [6:217].

²³ CPR 194 [A53/B77], 195 [A54–5/B78–9]. Kant’s central claim to this effect is that we can avoid error by withholding unwarranted judgments until we have reached objective certainty: ‘It is certainly really prudent, therefore, to know how to withhold one’s approval in most cases, until one has enough grounds for the thing’ (LL 126 [24:160]). When evidence is wanting or we lack a sufficient degree of certainty, we should suspend judgment until further evidence is available. There is of course a distinction between cases in which ‘approval does not arise immediately through the nature of the human understanding and of human reason’, and cases in which it does (LL 125 [24:158]). In the former cases, judgment is withheld and the will is called upon to orient the inquiry. But in the latter cases, not only is the will not called upon, judgment is immediate and ‘it is always very hard, if not utterly impossible, to withhold one’s approval’ (LL 124 [24:158]). In this sense, while Kant does argue that judgment can be suspended, this claim should not be mistaken for the claim that it is free to do so at will. As he notes, ‘In *suspensio iudicii* there lies some freedom’ (LL 47) [24:736]; second emphasis mine). Contrary to what the expression ‘freedom of judgment’ may suggest, judgment is not free as such; in and of itself, it has no power of choice over its operations. Rather, Kant’s claim is that it can be withheld if the epistemic environment necessary for certainty is absent. For a defense of this claim, see Cohen (2013).

²⁴ LL 563–4 [9:57]. See also LA 520 [25:1480], CJ 174–5 [5:294–5] and A 333 [7:228]. I cannot discuss the content of these maxims here due to lack of space, but for helpful discussions see McBay Merritt (2009), pp. 988–91, Wood (2002), p. 103 and O’Neill (1989); chs. 1–2.

²⁵ CJ 175 [5:295].

²⁶ For a helpful discussion of the role of the Categorical Imperative in Kant’s account of maxim formation, see O’Neill (1989); ch. 5. I will return to the parallel between moral and epistemic maxims in section 3 but in the meantime, note that the epistemic maxims I have in mind are of the sort ‘I will not ignore evidence in cases when it falsifies a belief I desire to be true’ or ‘the degree of certainty of my belief ought to be proportioned to the evidence I possess’.

²⁷ For a detailed discussion of the different ways of ordering value in a Kantian context, see Bader (2015).

²⁸ G 94 [4:402].

over objective ones, thereby acting on principles that cannot be universalised.²⁹ Kant expresses the wrong ordering of our principles in terms of moral egoism.

[T]he moral egoist limits all ends to himself, sees no use in anything except that which is useful to himself, and as a eudaemonist puts the supreme determining ground of his will simply in utility and his own happiness, not in the thought of duty.³⁰

The moral egoist makes his own happiness the ultimate value and turns it into a principle that overrides all others.

What I would like to suggest is that there is an epistemic counterpart of self-love, which Kant calls 'logical egoism': 'The logical egoist considers it unnecessary also to test his judgment by the understanding of others; as if he had no need at all for this touchstone (*criterium veritatis externum*).'³¹ Just as the moral egoist values the incentives of inclinations over those of morality, thereby subordinating the moral law to his own satisfaction, the logical egoist values his own judgment over and above everyone else's, thereby subordinating the interest of truth to his subjective point of view.³² Of course, the logical egoist doesn't think that what he believes isn't true, and in this sense he does value truth. However, the key point is that he values his subjective point of view over that of others, and he does so at the expense of truth.³³ By contrast with the logical egoist, the broad-minded thinker has what Kant calls an 'extended mode of thought': 'he sets himself apart from the subjective private conditions of the judgment ... and reflects on his own

judgment from a universal standpoint'.³⁴ To make sense of what this universal standpoint consists in, we need to turn to Kant's account of assent.

Assent for Kant is the 'holding to be true' (*fürwahrhalten*) of a proposition – a broader term encompassing what we now call 'belief'.³⁵ It has different epistemic modes, depending on whether its grounds are objective or subjective, sufficient or insufficient. While there is no space to get into the details of Kant's account here, it is sufficient to note for present purposes that only objective grounds provide reliable information about 'the constitution of the object' or the state of affairs in question.³⁶ They are grounded either on experience or on reason, and typically consist of perceptions, memories, introspections, as well as other beliefs we hold.³⁷ By contrast with objective grounds, which are 'independent of the nature and interest of the subject', subjective grounds consist of psychological processes by which a person comes to hold a belief – 'the merely private validity of the judgment'.³⁸

The former are objective criteria, which contain the ground for why something is really true or false. The others, however, [are] subjective criteria [,] which contain certain circumstances, by means of which one is in a position to make a supposition about the truth or the falsehood in a thing.³⁹

The nature of the grounds of a belief determines its epistemic mode: knowledge (*Wissen*) is both subjectively and objectively sufficient; opinion (*Meinen*) is subjectively as well as objectively insufficient; and faith (*Glauben*) is only subjectively sufficient and objectively insufficient.⁴⁰ Thus for a belief to count as knowledge, it requires sufficient subjective as well as objective grounds. Otherwise it is not knowledge but mere opinion or faith. It is permissible to hold opinions, but only explicitly *qua* opinion, 'with the consciousness that it is' mere opinion.⁴¹ As long as we acknowledge the sufficiency of their grounds or lack thereof, all these modes of believing are epistemically legitimate in their own right. If we fail to acknowledge their grounds however, we are merely persuaded, where persuasion is 'a holding-to-be-true on insufficient grounds, of which one does not know whether they are merely subjective or also objective'.⁴² If we fail to reflect on the grounds of our beliefs, error occurs.⁴³

As a result, epistemic responsibility consists in reflecting on the grounds of our judgment: are they what we think they are or are we mistaking subjective grounds for objective ones? Are they the correct grounds for the kind of judgment we are making or are we mistaking opinion for knowledge? On my account, this capacity to reflect on our grounds is precisely the locus of epistemic responsibility. Although it falls beyond the remit of this paper to defend this claim, I believe that the notion of common sense

²⁹ 'Hence the difference, whether the human being is good or evil, must not lie in the difference between the incentives that he incorporates into his maxim (not in the material of the maxim) but in their subordination (in the form of the maxim); which of the two he makes the condition of the other' (*Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason* 83 [6:36]). While I cannot get into the details of Kant's account here, note that the doctrine of radical evil is meant to explain how we might freely decide to subordinate the moral law to self-love: the radically evil person 'makes the incentives of self-love and their inclinations the condition of compliance with the moral law' (*ibid.*). For a helpful discussion of this claim, see Muchnik (2009).

³⁰ A 241 [7:130].

³¹ A 240 [7:128–29]. Logical egoism can take one of two forms: either indifference to others' judgment or arrogance about one's own judgment. 'Logical egoism is either indifference toward the judgments of others, in that I hold the judgments of others to be unnecessary for passing judgment on my own judgment, or it is conceit and arrogance, where one allots it to himself alone to make a correct judgment about a thing for all others' (LL 323 [24:874]).

³² 'Egoism can contain three kinds of presumption: the presumption of understanding, of taste, and of practical interest; that is, it can be logical, aesthetic, or practical' (A 240 [7:128]).

³³ I would like to thank Yoon Choi for pushing me on this point.

³⁴ C 175 [5:295]. Thus, a universal community of knowers is already presupposed in the agent's resting of his maxims. Knowledge is in principle not a solitary enterprise: we 'desire to test [our judgment] on the understanding of other men and to investigate. Here one makes, as it were, an experiment and checks whether what we think is universal, whether others accept it, or whether it is not in agreement with reason' (LL 141 [24:178]).

³⁵ As Stevenson has noted, 'it has recently been common for philosophers writing in English to use the word "believe" (or "assent") in this wide sense, meaning any sort of holding a proposition to be true, however confident or hesitant, rational or irrational, justified or unjustified. It would thus be tempting to translate Kant's verb *fürwahrhalten* as "believe". In that usage, knowledge implies belief; and "mere" belief, without any sufficient justification, will then be the kind of belief which does not amount to knowledge' (Stevenson (2011): 97). See also Chignell (2007b), p. 34: 'In contemporary discussions, the fundamental attitude is assumed to be belief. For Kant (as for Locke, Leibniz, and some others in the early modern tradition), the attitude is *fürwahrhalten* — "assent" or, literally, "holding-for-true". Assent for these writers is the genus of which most other positive propositional attitudes (opining, having faith in, knowing, and the like) are species. Kant doesn't have an exact equivalent of our contemporary concept of belief, but if he did that concept would also fit under the genus of assent.'

³⁶ CPR 685 [A821/B849].

³⁷ 574–5 (9:70–1).

³⁸ CPR 685 [A821/B849]. See also LL 9:66, CPR A820/B849. To formulate this distinction slightly differently, one could say that subjective grounds show why someone holds a proposition to be true whereas objective grounds show why a belief is non-accidentally true. Since there is no space to develop Kant's account of the grounds of cognition here, see Chignell (2007a) for useful discussions of this issue.

³⁹ LL 67 [24:88].

⁴⁰ CPR 686 [A822/B850].

⁴¹ CPR 686 [A822/B850].

⁴² LL 576 [9:73].

⁴³ '[E]rror is the holding-to-be-true of falsehood. ... No error is unavoidable in itself, because one simply need not judge about things of which one understands nothing. ... With error ... we are ourselves always culpable, in that we are not cautious enough in venturing a judgment, for which we do not have enough cognition' (LL 288 [24:832]).

(*Gemeinsinn*) that Kant discusses in the *Critique of Judgment* is central here.⁴⁴

By '*sensus communis*,' however, must be understood the idea of a communal sense, i.e., a faculty for judging that in its reflection takes account (*a priori*) of everyone else's way of representing in thought, in order as it were to hold its judgment up to human reason as a whole and thereby avoid the illusion which, from subjective private conditions that could easily be held to be objective, would have a detrimental influence on the judgment. (CJ 173–4 [5:293–4])

Exercising common sense consists in reflecting on the grounds of our judgments. In the aesthetic case (*common sense aestheticus*), which is most familiar to readers of Kant, common sense consists in reflecting on the grounds of our judgment of beauty to determine whether they are feelings of aesthetic pleasure.⁴⁵ In the cognitive case (*common sense logicus*), it consists in reflecting on the grounds of our cognitive judgment to determine whether they are objective or subjective. Thus in both cases, common sense consists in determining the nature of the grounds of my judgment and whether they are appropriate to the kind of judgment I make. It is in this sense that this process is normatively guided.

On this basis, we can now make sense of Kant's claim that we should think 'from a universal standpoint'.⁴⁶ The epistemic principle according to which we should reflect on our beliefs from the standpoint of others is intended to ensure that we don't hold them to be true on the mere basis of our own subjective private condition.

The touchstone of whether taking something to be true is conviction (*Überzeugung*) or mere persuasion (*Überredung*) is therefore, externally, the possibility of communicating it and finding it to be valid for the reason of every human being to assent to it; for in that case there is at least a presumption that the ground of the agreement of all judgments, regardless of the difference among subjects, rests on a common ground, namely the object with which they therefore all agree and through which the truth of the judgment is proved.⁴⁷

Recall that as I have just shown, the objective grounds of belief 'are independent of the nature and interest of the subject', whereas subjective grounds are not.⁴⁸ This suggests that the 'subjective private conditions of judgment' are not shareable and that only objective grounds can be shared.⁴⁹ As Kant notes, 'a cognition is not correct when it agrees with my private understanding but when it

agrees with the universal laws of the understanding of all men'.⁵⁰ Accordingly, first, we should only be epistemically certain on the basis of grounds that can be adopted by all, at least in principle, since they are the only grounds that are universally valid. Second, insofar as the only grounds that are shareable are objective grounds, the only belief that is valid from a universal standpoint is the assent to propositions whose grounds are objectively sufficient.⁵¹ As a result, knowing responsibly consists in ensuring the universalisability of the grounds of our assent.

Given the nature of the norms that apply to our beliefs, one may be tempted to think that insofar as they are oriented towards truth, they are strictly speaking epistemic and thus radically different from what we usually think of as practical norms, as discussed in section 1 in the case of pragmatic anthropology. If so, it would turn out that although both theoretical and practical enterprises are normatively bounded, their norms differ from each other both in ground and in content.⁵² However, the aim of the following section is to argue that the central role of the adoption of a universal standpoint in the foundation of the epistemic principles that regulate our beliefs points to the opposite claim. Namely, our theoretical and practical pursuits are ultimately regulated by the same rational norm, reason's demand for autonomy.

4. The norm of rationality: autonomy

To make sense of the claim that our theoretical and practical enterprises are regulated by the same norm, let's go back once again to the moral case. Famously for Kant, maxims of action are only morally permissible if they pass a universalisability test. Its function is to rule out any maxim that cannot become a universal law: 'I ought never to act except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law'.⁵³ Testing the universalisability of a maxim establishes whether it is permissible by determining whether it can become a universal law without generating contradictions. Thereby, the universalisability test stipulates what is morally wrong, obligatory, and permissible.⁵⁴ In the following passage, I believe that Kant suggests that epistemic maxims should also pass a universalisability test.

To make use of one's own reason means no more than to ask oneself, whenever one is supposed to assume something, whether one could find it feasible to make the ground or the rule on which one assumes it into a universal principle for the use of reason. This test is one that everyone can apply to himself.⁵⁵

If we apply this model to the epistemic realm, the formula of universal law would be formulated as follows: 'I ought never to

⁴⁴ 'One could designate taste as *sensus communis aestheticus*, common human understanding as *sensus communis logicus*.' (CJ 175 [5:294–5]).

⁴⁵ '[T]he common sense, of whose judgment I here offer my judgment of taste as an example and on account of which I ascribe exemplary validity to it, is a merely ideal norm, under the presupposition of which one could rightfully make a judgment that agrees with it and the satisfaction in an object that is expressed in it into a rule for everyone.' (CJ 123 [5:239]) For instance, when common sense reflects on the grounds of our judgment of beauty, they could turn out to be agreeable feelings instead and we may be mistaken about that. I have discussed this in Cohen (2013b).
⁴⁶ CJ 175 [5:295].

⁴⁷ CPR 685 [A820–21/B848–49].

⁴⁸ LL 574 [9:70].

⁴⁹ CJ 175 [5:295].

⁵⁰ LL 148 [9:187]. In this case, I have conviction (*Überzeugung*): 'If it is valid for everyone merely as long as he has reason, then its ground is objectively sufficient, and in that case taking something to be true is called conviction'. Persuasion (*Überredung*), on the other hand, is subjectively sufficient but not objectively sufficient: it is 'mere semblance (*Schein*), since the ground of the judgment, which lies solely in the subject, is held to be objective' (CPR 685 [A820/B848]).

⁵¹ The case of faith (*Glaube*) undoubtedly complicates this picture, although there is no space to discuss it here. As Kant notes, in this case, 'the conviction is not logical but moral certainty, and, since it depends on subjective grounds (of moral disposition) I must not even say 'It is morally certain that there is a God,' etc., but rather 'I am morally certain,' etc.' (CPR 689 [A829/B857]). On my reading, the grounds of faith are subjective and thus not shareable, which finds confirmation in the fact that Kant makes a point of noting that in the case of faith by contrast with knowledge, it is the individual subject alone that is certain (see LL 574 [9:70]). For an interesting account of the epistemic grounds of faith, see Chignell (2007b), pp. 354–7. What is clear, however, is that in the case of knowledge (*Wissen*), shareability is limited to its objective grounds.

⁵² For instance, as Louden has noted, 'moral norms and values may well be indigenous to the practice of science itself' (Louden (2014), p. 212).

⁵³ G 57 [4:402].

⁵⁴ There is controversy surrounding the interpretation of Kant's universalisability test. See, for instance, Wood (1999): 40–2, O'Neill (1989), p. 83 ff. and Sullivan (1989), pp. 47–53. However, these debates are irrelevant to my argument, at least as it is stated here.

⁵⁵ WOT 18 [8:146/n].

believe except in such a way that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal law.' I have defended this view elsewhere and unfortunately, there is no space to do so here.⁵⁶ However, what is important for my argument is that on my reading, believing responsibly consists in ensuring that the epistemic maxims that guide belief-acquisition are universalisable; that is to say, epistemic responsibility consists in ensuring that our epistemic maxims pass a universalisability test. The function of this test is to identify and rule out maxims that produce unjustified or false beliefs – maxims that Kant refers to as prejudices.

Whilst prejudice is commonly thought of as an unjustified belief, for Kant a prejudice is an illegitimate principle the subject has adopted as his epistemic maxim: 'Prejudice is a maxim of judging objectively from subjective grounds'.⁵⁷ On Kant's account, there are three different ways our epistemic maxims can be prejudiced.⁵⁸ First, a maxim can ground beliefs on inclinations. Yet since desires have no relationship to truth, they should not be used as objective grounds. Second, a maxim can ground beliefs on habits. Yet the fact that things have been a certain way until now does not justify the belief that they will remain the same in the future. Third, a maxim can ground beliefs on imitation. Yet parroting another person's beliefs fails to provide any insight into their justification.⁵⁹ These prejudiced epistemic maxims seem rather different, but on my reading they have one thing in common: they are all incapable of being universalised, and it is on this basis that they are impermissible. Whether we are talking of inclination, habit or imitation, they are entirely dependent upon the nature and interest of the subject, which limits their validity to the private sphere. Insofar as they are 'subjective conditions', as spelt out in the preceding section, they are not shareable and thus cannot be used as objective grounds of belief. Therefore all prejudiced epistemic maxims are ruled out as impermissible.

To sum up, I have argued that for Kant, belief is subject to the following normative constraints. First and negatively, epistemic agents should not form beliefs based on mere subjective grounds. Second and positively, the process of belief-formation should be guided by epistemic maxims that are universalisable. I would like to end this section by suggesting that these constraints in fact express one and the same demand, namely the demand to believe autonomously.⁶⁰ The first requirement, that we judge freely, independently of our private condition, is in effect a freedom-from, a negative freedom: the epistemic counterpart of practical freedom in the moral case.⁶¹ It is the capacity to ground our beliefs objectively, independently of our subjective condition. The second requirement, that we set our own epistemic principles, is a freedom-to, a positive freedom: the epistemic counterpart of moral

self-determination.⁶² Since the only legitimate epistemic maxims are those that can be universalised, directing our cognitive powers according to principles spelt out by reason is the only way of realising our epistemic autonomy. By contrast, if we fail to direct our cognitive practices on the basis of self-legislated maxims, our mind stops being its own guide. We let it be determined heteronomously through the adoption of prejudiced maxims that use subjective grounds as though they were objective. This is true of prejudice in the epistemic case (i.e., inclination, habit and imitation) as well as self-love in the moral case (i.e., pleasure, happiness and private satisfaction). For what the analogy between moral and logical egoism suggests is that the source of false belief is the same as the source of wrongdoing, namely the adoption of maxims that are not sharable, which Kant calls the wrong 'way of thinking' (*Denkungsart*).

The opposite of egoism can only be pluralism, that is, the way of thinking in which one is not concerned with oneself as the whole world, but rather regards and conducts oneself as a mere citizen of the world.⁶³

Acting and believing as citizens of the world consists in seeing ourselves as part of a community of agents who share a world and are equally committed to reason's demand for autonomy and thus for universalisability: the human being 'is subject *only to laws given by himself but still universal* and that he is bound only to act in conformity with his own will, which, however, in accordance with nature's end is a will giving universal law'.⁶⁴ On this basis, autonomy is the principle that grounds epistemic normativity as well as moral normativity. Contrary to what is often assumed, it is not just the remit of morality. Our capacity for self-legislation also underlies our cognitive activity: 'the power to judge autonomously – that is, freely (according to principles of thought in general) – is called reason'.⁶⁵ Just as we act autonomously if we act according to moral principles we give ourselves, we believe autonomously if we believe according to epistemic principles we give ourselves.

[F]reedom in thinking signifies the subjection of reason to no laws except those which it gives itself; ... if reason will not subject itself to the laws it gives itself, it has to bow under the yoke of laws given by another.⁶⁶

Insofar as reason's only command is that we act and think according to principles that can be shared by everyone, it

⁵⁶ See Cohen (2014b), for a defence of this view as well as an account of the relationship between maxims and beliefs. In brief, epistemic maxims are second order principles that constitute an agent's epistemic strategy: how should he think about the world? How can he make the best use of his cognitive abilities? Once the right epistemic maxims have been adopted, actual awareness of them and conscious reflection upon them is not necessary for every single case of belief acquisition: 'For common cognition it is not necessary that we be conscious of these rules and reflect on them' (LL 15 [24:27]).

⁵⁷ LL 473 [24:737]. See also LL 315–16 [24:864–5]: 'The principal sources of prejudices are subjective causes, accordingly, which are falsely held to be objective grounds. They serve, as it were, in place of principles, because prejudices must be principles.'

⁵⁸ The principal sources of prejudices are above all imitation, custom, and inclination' (LL 316 [25:865]). See also LL 579 [9:76]. For a useful discussion of prejudice, see Frerksen (2014), pp. 190–7.

⁵⁹ Note that a different kind of imitation can be legitimate in an educational context. See, for instance, A 329 [7:225].

⁶⁰ I would like to thank Eric Watkins for pressing me to address this point.

⁶¹ Kant defines practical freedom as the capacity to determine the will 'independently of alien causes' (G 94 [4:446–7]).

⁶² Although I am unable to defend this claim here, note that on my reading, although there is a sense in which for Kant we legislate the laws of nature and logical laws (i.e., what Kant calls 'pure general logic'), this legislation is not akin to epistemic self-legislation as I have defined it here. For the self-legislation I have in mind is limited to the domain of epistemic maxims. In this sense, I would argue that the laws of the understanding, for instance, are not normative in the sense that I believe our epistemic maxims are. For a defence of a similar claim with regards to the status of the laws of logic, see Tolley (2006).

⁶³ A 241–2 [7:130].

⁶⁴ G 82 [4:432]. See also 'the proposition, the will is in all its actions a law to itself, indicates only the principle, to act on no other maxim than that which can also have as object itself as a universal law' (G 94 [4:447]).

⁶⁵ *The Conflict of the Faculties* 255 [7:27].

⁶⁶ WOT 16 [8:145]. Kant's famous enlightenment motto formulates the demand for autonomy in the most striking way: 'Enlightenment is the human being's emergence from his self-incurred minority. Minority is inability to make use of one's own understanding without direction from another. This minority is self-incurred when its cause lies not in lack of understanding but in lack of resolution and courage to use it without direction from another. Sapere aude! Have courage to make use of your own understanding! Is thus the motto of enlightenment' ('What is Enlightenment?' 17 [8:35]).

commands all, in the same way, and in all cases: 'Thinking according to a commonly ruling maxim ... is only using your own reason as the supreme touchstone of truth'.⁶⁷ Although the application of reason's authority to a particular domain, whether we are deliberating about what to believe or what to do, gives rise to moral or epistemic norms, both epistemic and moral normativity are grounded on reason's demand for autonomy.⁶⁸

5. Conclusion

This paper set out to show that for Kant, the human sciences and the natural sciences are regulated by the same rational norm, namely reason's demand for autonomy. However, the argument defended here points to a much broader claim, namely that on the Kantian picture, all human enterprises, whether theoretical or practical, should be guided by the same norms, since rationality expresses itself normatively through the demand for autonomy. There is thus a fundamental analogy between our position as agents and our position as cognizers. Our actions and our beliefs function analogically in so far as they are subject to the same rational norm. Of course a lot more needs to be said to flesh out this claim. In particular, is the analogy between belief and action sufficiently sound to support the claim that we are responsible for our beliefs just as we are responsible for our actions?⁶⁹ While it falls beyond the scope of this paper to address this issue, I would like to conclude by drawing attention to the fact that on my reading of Kant, his most valuable insight is that the prime locus of responsibility is not over beliefs and actions themselves but rather over the principles that should regulate them. It is in this respect that acquiring a belief is like acting: they both ought to be guided by universalisable principles. Once we turn our attention to the role of these principles in regulating our activity, whether it is theoretical or practical, we can make sense of the Kantian picture according to which the only source of normativity is our capacity for autonomy: we ought to act and think 'only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law'.⁷⁰

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⁶⁷ LA 521 [25:1481].

⁶⁸ For enlightening discussions of Kant's claim about the unity of theoretical and practical reason, see in particular Neiman (1994), Kierkegaard (1998) and Nuzzo (2005).

⁶⁹ I have begun to tackle this question in Cohen (2014b).

⁷⁰ G 73 [4:421].

Etičkoj komisiji

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Podnosilac zahteva: dr Filip Čukljević

Zvanje: naučni saradnik

Radno mesto: Institut za filozofiju

Univerzitet u Beogradu

Filozofski fakultet

E-pošta: filipcukljevic@gmail.com

Potpis: Filip Čukljević

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Е

ТИКА И ИСТИНА
У ДОБА КРИЗЕ

Зборник радова

Ненад Цекић (уредник)

Едмција Човек и друштво у време кризе

Етика и истина у доба кризе

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Рецензенти

Проф. др Небојша Кујунџић,

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Овај зборник је настао у оквиру научноистраживачког пројекта
Човек и друштво у време кризе, који финансира
Филозофски факултет Универзитета у Београду.

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Љиљана Раденовић*

Петар Нуркић**

ЕПИСТЕМИЧКИ АУТОРИТЕТ И РЕТОРИЧКЕ СТРАТЕГИЈЕ У КРИЗНИМ ОКОЛНОСТИМА

Апстракт: У овом раду испитаћемо како се експерти одређених епистемичких мрежа понашају у околностима кризе. Користећи кризне ситуације изазване пандемијом вируса A h1n1 и SARS-CoV-2 показаћемо како експерти користе реторичке стратегије за учвршћивање сопственог епистемичког ауторитета. Кроз четири различите, али међусобно повезане реторичке стратегије епистемички субјекти који представљају експерте у одређеним научним дисциплинама и институцијама учвршћују свој епистемички ауторитет, одређују начине на које ће њихову експертизу опажати други епистемички субјекти и утичу на степен поверења који други епистемички субјекти имају у њих. Експерти користе две интерно усмерене стратегије, (1) пружајући разлоге зашто су гаранције које нуде рационалне и (2) наглашавајући сопствене нормативне одговорности. Такође, користе две екстерно усмерене реторичке стратегије, уз помоћ којих учвршћују сопствени епистемички ауторитет преко (3) оспоравања стручности других експерата и (4) изношењем сумњи о мотивима поступања других епистемичких експерата. §

Кључне речи: Епистемичке мреже, епистемички експерти, епистемички ауторитет, реторичке стратегије. §

1. Увод

У овом раду усредсредићемо се на улогу коју епистемички субјекти и експерти имају у оквиру одређених епистемичких мрежа. Контекст кризе у оквиру којег ћемо посматрати понашање

* Редовни професор, 1972, Одељење за филозофију, Филозофски факултет, Универзитет у Београду, lradenovic72@gmail.com

** Истраживач-приправник, 1991, Институт за филозофију, Филозофски факултет, Универзитет у Београду, petarnurkic91@gmail.com

епистемичких субјеката чини ово истраживање значајним, како за успостављање норми комуникације између експерата у оквиру мреже, тако и за информисање шире, неекспертске јавности о адекватним начинима тумачења изјава епистемичких експерата. Криза представља контекст изазван догађајима који ремете постојећу организацију и конвенције унутар неке епистемичке мреже (Hoffman, 1999). У кризним ситуацијама постављају се питања о постојећим институционализованим правилима, нормама и претпоставкама. Догађаји који изазивају кризе настају услед различитих друштвених фактора, регулаторних промена и инцидентата међу које можемо сврстати и природне катастрофе попут поплава, земљотреса и пандемија). Током кризних ситуација централни актери, односно епистемички експерти, покушавају да кроз разноврсне активности одбране или поврате легитимитет институционалних пракси које су се нашле у средишту спорних догађаја који су изазвали дату кризу (Jarrperson, 1991). Један од кључних аспеката кризе унутар неке епистемичке мреже представља слика коју о поменутој епистемичкој мрежи имају епистемички субјекти који јој припадају (организације, регулатори, инвеститори, корисници). Криза настаје када су исходи неког догађаја у супротности са очекивањима епистемичких субјеката и када епистемички експерти нису у стању да предузму акцију којом би избегли негативне исходе датог догађаја (Scott, 2001).

У даљем раду, под термином „епистемички експерти” подразумеваћемо централне актере кризних околности, било да су они научници чији се епистемички ауторитет темељи на специфичним експертским способностима или друштвено-политички регулатори са приступом доношењу одлука које непосредно утичу на улоге осталих субјеката. Под термином „епистемички субјекти” подразумеваћемо ширу јавност погођену кризним околностима чију улогу одређују одлуке које доносе експерти¹.

Истраживања су показала да током кризе епистемички субјекти престају да сматрају легитимним постојећа правила, норме и претпоставке (Sine и David, 2003: 186). Будући да *status quo* не представља прихватљиву опцију и да није могуће контролисати исходе догађаја који су проузроковали кризну ситуацију, епистемички експерти прибегавају реторичким оправдањима. Због тога ћемо истраживање

1 „Епистемички субјект” представља кровни појам који се односи и на епистемичког експерта. Појмовним раздвајањем експерата у односу на субјекте идентификоваћемо централне актере унутар епистемичке мреже.

усредсредити на дискурзивне околности у којима се епистемички експерти и њихова стручност налазе. Ближе речено, усредсредићемо се на улогу коју језик има у обликовању перцепције догађаја у друштву као и покушајима епистемичких експерата да сачувају или поврате поверење осталих епистемичких субјеката у датом контексту. Епистемички експерти уз помоћ реторичких стратегија утичу на институционалну структуру епистемичких мрежа као и на учвршћивање сопственог епистемичког ауторитета. Епистемички ауторитет представља поверење које епистемички субјекти унутар мреже имају у експерте, као и веровања која субјекти формирају о способностима експерта. Епистемички ауторитет утиче на степен поузданости информација које експерти пружају, односно меру у којој ће субјекти дате информације сматрати поузданим и поступати спрам препорука експерата (Kruglanski, et al., 2009).²²

Овим истраживањем покушаћемо да испитамо два централна питања. На почетку ћемо се из перспективе анализе епистемичких мрежа бавити тиме како, у кризним ситуацијама, епистемички експерти одбрану мреже реализују кроз покушаје очувања властите позиције експерата, а не кроз покушаје очувања постојећих пракси унутар мреже. На основу оваквих теоријских разматрања ћемо, у оквиру првог централног питања, испитати да ли експерти користе реторичке стратегије да би учврстили епистемички ауторитет и даље допринели очувању експертске улоге, чак и када постојеће праксе више нису прихватљиве. Добијени резултати омогућиће нам да закључимо да ли опстанак неке епистемичке мреже зависи од очувања постојећих пракси и норми или од очувања улоге коју експерти заузимају унутар дате мреже. Даље, претпоставке о условљености епистемичког ауторитета реторичким стратегијама доприносе јаснијем сагледавању фактора од којих зависи епистемички ауторитет неког експерта. Стога ћемо у оквиру другог централног питања испитивати начин на који експерти користе реторичке стратегије да би манипуласали одговорношћу. Ближе речено, испитиваћемо како епистемички експерти, путем реторичких стратегија, усмеравају одговорност и идентификују чиниоце који су одговорни за грешке.²³ На крају ћемо прокоментарисати како улога епистемичких експерата одређује исходе кризних ситуација. Ближе речено, осврнућемо се на улогу коју самоприписивање епистемичког ауторитета има у дисфункционалности епистемичких мрежа које се суочавају са кризном ситуацијом.³⁰

Најпре ћемо представити теоријску позадину истраживања (на основу које смо издвојили централна истраживачка питања).³¹ епистемичке мреже и улоге које епистемички субјекти заузимају унутар њих, однос реторичких стратегија и унутрашње организације дате епистемичке мреже и епистемички ауторитет. Након тога ћемо представити емпиријску позадину истраживања,³² метод и анализу података.³³ На крају ћемо представити и образложити резултате истраживања и пружити могуће смернице за даља истраживања.³⁴

2. Теоријска позадина ³⁵

2.1. Епистемичке мреже и епистемички експерти

Епистемичке мреже (или епистемички оквири) пружају средства за разумевање односа између епистемичких субјеката (Zollman, 2007). Епистемички субјекти чине елементе једне епистемичке мреже. Однос између епистемичких субјеката одређен је њиховим вештинама, веровањима и вредностима али и епистемичким правилима контекста у којем се налазе. Епистемичке мреже се заснивају на комуникацији између епистемичких субјеката, било да је она вербална, невербална или на другачији начин успостављена спрам одређених епистемичких правила специфичних за дати контекст (Zollman, 2010). Епистемичке мреже пружају увид у односе између епистемичких експерата и осталих епистемичких субјеката. На основу тог увида можемо образовати моделе који нам помажу у предвиђању исхода датог контекста (у нашем случају кризе изазване пандемијом) и улога које ће епистемички субјекти након тога задржати или променити (Shaffer и Graesser, 2010; Shaffer et al., 2009). Специфични индикатори епистемичких мрежа (попут често употребљаваних појмова или, у нашем случају, реторичких стратегија) указују на одређене начине комуникације између субјеката. Индикаторе можемо да групишемо у епистемичке чворове које након тога можемо да групишемо у комуникационе обрасце (Bala и Goyal, 1998). Учесалост изношења реторичких тврдњи у специфичним околностима представља један такав образац.

За потребе моделовања неке епистемичке мреже неопходно је одредити јединицу анализе (Krippendorff, 2004). Како бисмо одредили јединицу анализе потребно је узети било који део комуникације између епистемичких субјеката и разложити га на смислене

делове (инстанце). За потребе нашег истраживања као јединицу анализе издвојићемо *реторичке стратегије* које епистемички експерти користе приликом комуникације са осталим епистемичким субјектима унутар мреже. Овакав приступ нам омогућава да образујемо моделе различитих врста односа унутар мреже и у ширем смислу испитамо да ли се одређени начини разумевања информација – у оквиру одговора које експерти дају на питања осталих епистемичких субјеката и експерата – подударају са изворима информација или везама између веровања која субјекти формирају. Штавише, оно што је од значаја за наше истраживање јесте да таква анализа може пружити увид у успешност стратегија које експерти користе да би учврстили свој епистемички ауторитет – на пример, тврдње о поузданости извора информација могу бити прилично тривијалне (попут „изгледа добро”) или софистицираније (попут „користили су научни метод”). Разумевање епистемичких чворова односно стратегија које експерти користе приликом комуникације пружа увид у значајне аспекте епистемичких мрежа које бисмо пропустили када бисмо се усредсредили искључиво на поузданост извора информација. Када посматрамо комуникацију између епистемичких субјеката унутар мреже битно је да покушамо дубље да разумемо контекст који условљава поделу улога између субјеката. На овај начин добијамо увид у позадинску мотивацију комуникације између експерата и осталих епистемичких субјеката. Циљ овакве анализе је да разумемо шири контекст који одређује улоге експерата који представљају извор информација на основу којих субјекти формирају своја епистемичка опредељења. Одлуке које субјекти доносе у односу на изворе информација, и начин на који концептуализују сложеност тих информација, пресудне су за предвидивост исхода одређене кризне ситуације. Стога, иако је поузданост информација које експерти пласирају битна, прекомерно ослањање на тако тривијалну епистемичку динамику може преусмерити фокус на мање значајне аспекте епистемичких мрежа (Goldman, 1999).

За потребе нашег истраживања употребићемо скуп одговора које експерти дају на питања осталих епистемичких субјеката и експерата и на њега применити квалитативну анализу садржаја (која је дефинисана у поглављу Метод). На тај начин добићемо одговоре на истраживачка питања постављена у уводном разматрању рада и продубити разумевање епистемичког ауторитета експерата у мрежи и утицаја који улога експерта има на исходе кризних ситуација.

2.2. Реторичке стратегије и унутрашња организација епистемичких мрежа

Разлика између одређеног догађаја који узрокује промену постојећих пракси, норми и претпоставки, и кризе унутар неке епистемичке мреже се огледа у томе што криза представља далеко комплекснији изазов због размере субјеката укључених у њу³⁶ (Golsorkhi et al., 2009: 782). Претходно установљене праксе унутар епистемичких мрежа погођених кризом могу доживети неуспехе таквих размера да експертима неће бити епистемички исплативо да их и даље одржавају или бране.³⁷ Међутим, реконфигурација постојеће организације унутар мреже представља претњу по очување улоге епистемичког експерта (Hoffman, 1999: 353). У околностима кризе пред епистемичке експерте су постављени³⁸ далеко строжи стандарди него пред остале епистемичке субјекте. Услед таквог притиска експерти прибегавају одбрани својих улога и епистемичког ауторитета како би контролисали исходе кризне ситуације и након тога, захваљујући улози коју су успели да очувају, могли да обликују нове и прикладније норме, правила и структуру мреже (Graffin et al., 2013).⁴¹ Централизованост епистемичких експерата унутар мреже представља кључни структурни фактор који експертима омогућава да задрже постојеће праксе.⁴² Различита истраживања показују да очување постојећих епистемичких пракси унутар мреже директно зависи од друштвеног и институционалног положаја епистемичких експерата (Maguire и Hardy, 2009; Micelotta и Washington, 2013).⁴³ Уколико посматрамо експерте укључене у поменуто одбрамбена⁴⁴ настојања да задрже постојеће праксе, можемо приметити учестало изношење тврдњи о количини знања и способностима које поседују. Овакво самоприписивање стручности има за циљ да остали епистемички субјекти прихвате тумачење кризне ситуације које експерти нуде (Lesfrud и Meyer, 2012).⁴⁵ У овом истраживању ћемо размотрити управо оне ситуације у којима су епистемички субјекти преиспитивали оправданост одређених пракси и поступака епистемичких експерата, а експерти се налазили у позицији одбране свог ауторитета као одговора на ова преиспитивања. У таквим околностима епистемички експерти износе реторичке тврдње (које представљају нашу јединицу анализе) како би учврстили сопствени епистемички ауторитет.⁴⁶

Реторику можемо дефинисати као вештину убеђивања уз помоћ аргументације која има за циљ остваривање интереса актера који је користе (Zanotti и Janssens, 2004: 59). Реторичке стратегије представ-

љају користан инструмент за одређивање начина на који ће поједини друштвени фактори, идеје, уређења и норме бити опажани од стране епистемичких субјеката (Warnick, 2000). Кроз коришћење реторичких стратегија експерти представљају одређене поступке као морално прихватљиве, неопходне, узајамно корисне и рационалне за циљну групу односно субјекте у епистемичкој мрежи. Исто тако, поступци других могу бити приказани као штетни, неразумни и морално неприхватљиви (Vaara et al., 2006: 794). На овај начин уз помоћ реторике експерти „конструирају“ истину кроз постизање консензуса у погледу поступака које пропагирају као (не)прихватљиве (Warnick и Kline, 1992). Реторичке стратегије омогућавају флексибилност и при одређивању тога шта је „истина“ у односу на специфичне околности у којима се епистемички субјекти налазе. Ова флексибилност се темељи на повезивању искустава у погледу претходног сличног догађаја и позивању на „шире сагледавање“ кризне ситуације. Позивање на шире сагледавање ситуације укључује стратегије попут реторичке дисоцијације која има за циљ прикупљање подршке за специфично тумачење контекста које епистемички експерт нуди (Golant et al., 2015). Досадашња истраживања су показала да су реторичке стратегије користан механизам у обликовању исхода супротстављених тумачења између експерата и осталих епистемичких субјеката али такође и спрам експерата међусобно (Creed et al., 2002; Hardy et al., 2000).

2.3. Епистемички ауторитет

Како бисмо одговорили на питања постављена у претходном поглављу и боље разумели реторичке стратегије које епистемички експерти користе у околностима кризе битно је описати феномен епистемичког ауторитета. У области социјалне психологије постоји доста истраживања на тему епистемичког ауторитета (Kruglanski, 1989, 2009). Међутим, за потребе овог истраживања усредсредити се на специфичну улогу коју епистемички ауторитет заузима у околностима кризе унутар епистемичких мрежа. Епистемички ауторитет се темељи на начину опажања стручности и поверењу које епистемички субјекти имају у експерта који пружа информације и тумачи дате околности. Епистемички ауторитет је условљен бројним друштвеним факторима и одређује меру у којој ће информације које експерт пружа бити сматране поузданим и подобност експерта да у сличним будућим околностима буде извор информација (Kruglanski et al., 2005).

Постоје шири и ужи оквири унутар којих можемо анализирати епистемички ауторитет. Ауторитет родитеља или свештеника (уколико смо религиозни) обухвата разноврсне животне околности и сматрамо га поузданим извором информација када су нам потребни савети за суочавање са мањим и већим препрекама на које наилазимо у свакодневном животу. Са друге стране, епистемички ауторитет стручњака као што су пулмолози, вирусолози и епидемиолози није примењив на широк домен свакодневних животних околности већ на експертске домене пулмологије, вирусологије и епидемиологије. Штавише, епистемички ауторитет различитих експерата може варирати и произвести епистемичку атмосферу у којој неки експерти поседују већи ауторитет него други. Оваква хијерархија епистемичког ауторитета постаје значајна у околностима кризе. Експерти који поседују већи епистемички ауторитет биће у прилици да први пруже тражене информације и да на тај начин имају приоритет при обликовању начина на који ће остали епистемички субјекти опажати околности у којима се налазе. Осим тога, експерти утичу на начин на који остали субјекти формирају веровања, на степен поверења које ће субјекти имати у струку, као и на вероватноћу остварења жељеног исхода кризне ситуације спрам препорученог понашања (Bar, 1999). 71

Реторичке стратегије представљају само један од начина на који експерти остварују епистемички ауторитет (Edmundson, 1984; Nelson et al., 1987). Међутим, за потребе овог истраживања оне су адекватна јединица анализе путем које ћемо испитивати како експерти заузимају привилеговану позицију која им омогућава наметање сопственог тумачења комплексних околности кризе унутар епистемичке мреже. 73 Анализа коју ћемо понудити разоткрива бројне начине на које експерти задржавају или покушавају да поврате епистемички ауторитет, било да се ради о наметању епистемичких обавеза осталим субјектима унутар мреже, приписивању одговорности или убеђивању других у сопствени епистемички кредибилитет и валидност тумачења која износе. 74

3. Метод 75

За анализу прикупљених података користили смо квалитативни приступ анализе садржаја. Били смо нарочито усредсређени на реторичке стратегије садржане у јавним изјавама епистемич-

ких експерата, пратећи сличне анализе постојећих истраживања (Brown et al., 2012; Erkama и Vaara, 2010, Green et al., 2009). Кризне ситуације омогућавају јединствену прилику за проучавање улоге епистемичких експерата у реконфигурацији епистемичких мрежа услед новонасталих околности. Како бисмо посматрали улоге експерата у току криза изазваних пандемијама вируса A h1n1 и SARS-CoV-2 усредсредили смо се на 14 централних актера чије су одлуке непосредно утицале на обликовање јавног мишљења и исходе кризних околности у периоду од 2009. до 2010. године (криза 1) као и у периоду од 2019. године до краја 2020. године (криза 2). 79

Да бисмо се усредсредили само на анализу реторичких стратегија које експерти користе у циљу очувања властитог ауторитета чак и када постојеће праксе више нису прихватљиве, за анализу смо одабрали оне догађаје у којима су епистемички субјекти преиспитивали постојеће праксе и одлуке епистемичких експерата (тако показавши да праксе у питању престају да буду прихватљиве) и посматрали реторичке стратегије које у том случају експерти користе. Како бисмо дошли до пригодног узорка изјава које су давали епистемички експерти током кризе, усредсредили смо се на 10 кључних догађаја у оквиру две споменуте кризне ситуације. Табела 1. садржи преглед имена епистемичких експерата на које ћемо се фокусирати, институције којима су припадали током кризних околности, догађаје (ближе наведене у поглављима Друштвени контекст 1 и Друштвени контекст 2) у којима су учествовали као и тренутне улоге које заузимају. Актере (епистемичке субјекте) наведене у Табели 1. сматрамо централним актерима (епистемичким експертима) због улога које су заузимали унутар институција (епистемичких мрежа) којима су припадали током кризних околности. 80

Поменуте улоге су омогућиле експертима да непосредно утичу на исходе кризних околности као и на поступке и формирање веровања осталих епистемичких субјеката.

Табела 1.

Епидемијски експерти:	Институција којој припадају:	Догађаји у току кризе у које су били укључени:	Тренутна улога:
Предраг Кон	Радна група за борбу против епидемије/ Кризни штаб за сузбијање заразне болести ковид-19	Догађај 1, Догађај 2, Догађај 4, Догађај 6	Санитетски потпуковник Војске Србије
Бранислав Тиодоровић	Радна група за борбу против епидемије/ Кризни штаб за сузбијање заразне болести ковид-19	Догађај 1, Догађај 6;	Пензионисан
Томица Милосављевић	Министарство здравља	Догађај 1, Догађај 3	Пензионисан
Светлана Вукајловић	РЗЗО (Републички завод за здравствено осигурање)	Догађај 3	Није познато
Смиљка Милеуснић Аџић	Југохемија	Догађај 3	Власник „SINEKS MEDICAL DOO”
Владимир Гривара	Југохемија	Догађај 3	Генерални директор компаније „Celtis Pharm”
Љубомир Павићевић	Детан	Догађај 3	Специјалиста оториноларингологије у „Alfa Medica”
Ташјана Шингелић	АЛИМС	Догађај 3	Директорка Фармацеутске коморе Србије
Александар Вучић	Председништво Републике Србије	Догађај 4, Догађај 7, Догађај 8	Председник Републике Србије
Златибор Лончар	Министарство здравља	Догађај 6	Министар здравља
Ана Брнабић	Влада Републике Србије	Догађај 9	Премијерка у Влади Републике Србије
Бранимир Несћоровић	Кризни штаб за сузбијање заразне болести ковид-19	Догађај 4	Специјалиста пулмологије и алергологије у Универзитетској децјој клиници „Тиршова”
Дарија Кисић Тепавчевић	Кризни штаб за сузбијање заразне болести ковид-19	Догађај 6, Догађај 9, Догађај 10	Министарка за рад, запошљавање, борачка и социјална питања
Зоран Гојковић	Покрајински секретаријат за здравство	Догађај 5, Догађај 6	Покрајински секретар за здравство

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3.1. Кључни догађаји криза и дефинисање релевантног оквира за узорковање података

Како би се дефинисао скуп релевантних изјава за анализу садржаја, најпре су идентификовани они догађаји који представљају спорне тренутке у којима епистемички субјекти преиспитују епистемичке експерте, чиме је назначено да постојеће праксе епистемичких експерата и њихових институција више нису прихватљиве. Затим су посматране изјаве које епистемички експерти дају као одговор на оваква преиспитивања.

Као кључни догађај кризе изазване вирусом А h1n1 издвајамо спорно склапање уговора о набавци вакцина са швајцарском фармацеутском компанијом „Новартис“ што је касније проузроковало остале контроверзе и епилог саслушавања и хапшења централних актера у Специјалном тужилаштву за организовани криминал. Конференцију за штампу, одржану у Председништву Републике Србије 24. фебруара 2020. године, сматрамо кључним догађајем кризе изазване вирусом SARS-CoV-19. Овај догађај узроковао је јавну забринутост, осуду и губитак поверења од стране осталих епистемичких експерата и субјеката. Спрам ових догађаја, изабрали смо период у трајању од 22 месеца, од 11. новембра 2009. до 11. августа 2011. године, за прикупљање података у вези са кризом изазваном „свињским“ gripом и период у трајању од 10 месеци, од 24. фебруара 2020. до 24 новембра исте те године, за прикупљање података у вези са кризом изазваном корона вирусом. У наредна два поглавља описани су друштвени контексти ова два релевантна временска оквира, као и специфични догађаји у којима су централни епистемички експерти (из Табеле 1.) учествовали.

3.1.1. Друштвени контексти 1: криза изазвана вирусом А h1n1

Пандемија грипа означеног као А h1n1, познатијег као свињски или мексички грип, у Србији је 2009/2010. године била означена као централни здравствени проблем. Први смртни случај изазван свињским gripом је забележен 21. октобра, а до краја пандемије потврђено је 137 смртних случајева. Добио је назив „свињски“ јер је у циркулацију међу људе дошао након рекомбинације са свињским вирусом, док је назив „мексички“ добио по држави у којој је потврђен први случај заразе.

Догађај 1: Месец дана након што је Парламентарна скупштина Савета Европе усвојила резолуцију у којој је назначено да су Светска здравствена организација (СЗО) и друге европске здравствене

институције под утицајем фармацеутских компанија преувеличале распрострањеност вируса (Wodarg, 2009), епидемиолог Предраг Кон позвао је грађане да се вакцинишу против грипа A h1n1. Овај поступак не би био споран да и сам Кон није признао да је „ово била изузетно блага пандемија” (РТС, 7. 6. 2010.). Његовој оцени придружили су се и министар здравља Томица Милосављевић и члан Радне групе за борбу против пандемије, Бранислав Тиодоровић.

Догађај 2: После непуних месец дана вакцинације, већ 12. јануара 2010. године, Влада Републике Србије доноси одлуку да обустави увоз нових вакцина, а уговор са швајцарском фармацеутском компанијом „Новартис” раскинут је у фебруару исте године. Председник Радне групе за пандемију, др Предраг Кон, поднео је оставку на ту функцију на последњем састанку групе одржаном крајем јануара, али она није прихваћена. Епидемиолог је понудио оставку јер се до тог тренутка вакцинисало само 148.000 особа, уместо милион колико је очекивао.

Догађај 3: Током лета 2011. године у медијима су се појавиле информације да су почела саслушања због сумњи на злоупотребе приликом набавки вакцина, да би у септембру Специјално тужилаштво за организовани криминал поднело и кривичне пријаве против осам особа. На тај начин „Југохемија фармација” и „Детап”, као посредници у набавци вакцина, прибавили су имовинску корист од 855.600 евра, односно 420.000 евра и 15 милиона динара, док је буџет Србије оштећен за приближно 1.270.000 евра. У септембру те године ухапшени су тадашња директорка Републичког завода за здравствено осигурање (РЗЗО) Светлана Вукајловић, директорка „Југохемије” која се бавила увозом и дистрибуцијом вакцина, Смиљка Милеуснић Ацић, директор компаније „Југохемија фармација” Владимир Гавара, као и директор посредничке фирме „Детап” Љубомир Павићевић. Већина њих у притвору је задржана до маја 2012. године, када су уз положену кауцију пуштени да се бране са слободе. Овај случај је најпре са Специјалног прешао у Више тужилаштво у Београду, да би напослетку тужилац одустао од свих навода оптужнице.

СЗО је у августу 2011. године прогласила крај пандемије грипа A h1n1 уз констатацију да су се последице вируса показале блажим него што се страховало. Британски посланик Пол Флин (Paul Flynn), који је за Савет Европе састављао извештај о пандемији, рекао је за BBC да је СЗО „направила страшну грешку” изазивајући панику, што је довело до огромног и непотребног трошења новца за лекове и вакцине, али и великих зарада у фармацеутској индустрији. Из СЗО су одбацили оптужбе да су одлуке доносили под утицајем моћних фармацеутских компанија.

3.1.2. Друштвени контекст 2: криза изазвана вирусом SARS-CoV-2

Пандемија ковида-19 је пандемија болести коју карактеришу инфекција дисајних путева корона вирусом и упала плућа. Епидемија је проглашена почетком децембра 2019. у граду Вухан у централној Кини. Обољење изазива вирус породице вируса корона под називом SARS-CoV-2, што представља друго ширење инфективне болести из ове групе вируса, након епидемије SARS-а 2002. и 2003. године. Пренос SARS-CoV-2 вируса са човека на човека потврдила је Светска здравствена организација 23. јануара 2020. године, а пандемију је прогласила 11. марта. Пандемија је захватила 185 од 193 (95,8%) држава чланица Уједињених нација (УН) и обе државе посматраче Генералне скупштине УН (JHU, 2020).

Пандемија ковида-19 проширила се и на Србију 6. марта 2020. Први случај, у Бачкој Тополи, потврдио је министар здравља, Златибор Лончар (Reuters, 2020). Петнаестог марта 2020. проглашено је ванредно стање на територији целе државе. Затворене су школе и универзитети, забрањена масовна окупљања, а три дана касније уведен је полицијски час, први пут на територији Србије после Другог светског рата. Министар Златибор Лончар је 20. марта 2020. прогласио епидемију од већег епидемиолошког значаја. Истог дана је забележен први смртни случај (РТС, 2020). За потребе збрињавања пацијената су формиране бројне привремене болнице, укључујући и оне у објектима као што су Београдски и Новосадски сајам, Београдска арена и Спортски центар Чаир. Шестог маја Народна скупштина Републике Србије укинула је ванредно стање. У склопу проглашења епидемије од посебног епидемиолошког значаја, која није укинута, остале су ванредне мере које су донете у циљу спречавања епидемије у Републици Србији, а неке мере ће бити ублажене у зависности од епидемиолошке ситуације.

Догађај 4: 26. фебруара 2020. године одржана је конференција за штампу у Председништву Републике Србије током које су пулмолог Бранимир Несторовић, председник Србије Александар Вучић, епидемиолог Предраг Кон и директор инфективне клинике Мијомир Пелемиш, давали спорне и непроверене информације (за које се касније испоставило да су нетачне) у вези са вирусом SARS-CoV-19.

Догађај 5: 16. марта 2020. године, покрајински секретар за здравство, Зоран Гојковић, током конференције за штампу износи (како се касније испоставило) нетачне информације о броју доступних тестова за откривање инфекција вирусом SARS-CoV-19.

Догађај 6: 31. марта исте године, Кризни штаб за сузбијање заразне болести ковид-19, шаље корисницима одређених мобилних оператера поруку садржаја: „Ситуација је драматична. Приближавамо се сценарију из Италије и Шпаније. Молимо Вас да останете код куће.”

Догађај 7: 10. јуна 2020. године организована је фудбалска утакмица између Партизана и Црвене Звезде којој је присуствовало око 20.000 људи.

Догађај 8: 21. јуна исте године председник Републике Србије, Александар Вучић, доноси одлуку о расписивању парламентарних избора.

Догађај 9: 13. октобра 2020. године, новинари БИРН-а откривају да су епидемиолошкиња и чланица Кризног штаба, Дарија Кисић Тепавчевић, и премијерка Републике Србије, Ана Брнабић, износиле (како се касније испоставило) нетачне податке о броју преминулих и заражених током пандемије ковид-19. Информације које су представљене јавности нису биле идентичне са подацима у табелама информационог система ковид-19.

Догађај 10: 2. новембра исте године, чланица Кризног штаба (која је у међувремену постала министарка за рад, запошљавање, борачка и социјална питања) учествује у јавном отварању тржног центра „Галерија”. Истог месеца дозвољено је организовање манифестације „Црни петак”, у тржним центрима широм Србије, након чега је забележен велики пораст броја заражених корона вирусом.

3.2. Процедура узорковања података

Јавне изјаве у вези са кризним околностима изазваним пандемијама прикупљали смо из извора електронских медија. Узорковали смо изјаве које су давали епистемички експерти у току 22 месеца првог кризног контекста и током 10 месеци другог кризног контекста. 87 Посматрали смо изјаве свих експерата наведених у Табели 1. у вези са догађајима у које су били укључени а који су такође наведени у истој табели. Податке из извора електронских медија смо прикупљали користећи апликације Istinomer Proveri Me! и FAKE NEWS tragač, браузер news.google који припада истоименој компанији и интернет страницу FactCheck.org. Неки од домаћих медија које смо користили за потребе анализе су: „ФТС”, „Блиц”, „Политика”, „Press”, „Н1”, „Данас”, „Б92”, „Телеграф”, „Ало!”, „Курир”, „Време”, „DW (српски)”, „BBC (српски)”. Неки од иностраних медија чије смо вести у вези са кризним околностима у Србији изазваним пандемијом анализирали су „The

Guardian", „Bild", „BZ Berner Zeitung", „Der Spiegel". Свеукупно, прикупили смо 103 релевантна медијска чланка из којих смо узорковали 169 директних изјава које су износили епистемички експерти наведени у Табели 1. Изјаве смо касније редуковали на 73 релевантне, због поновљених садржаја и периферних информација. Извори које смо користили у прикупљању података били су довољни како би наша анализа имала потребну ширину и дубину. Дакле, анализа садржаја је вршена на финалном скупу од 73 изјаве епистемичких експерата.

4. Резултати истраживања

У Табели 2. издвојене су реторичке стратегије експерата као и по две репрезентативне тврдње за сваку од стратегија, једна из прве кризне ситуације (A h1n1) а друга из друге релевантне кризне ситуације (SARS-CoV-19).

Табела 2.

Реторичке стратегије:	Репрезентативни наводи из података:
<p>Интерно усмерена стратегија 1: Рационализација јужених гаранција</p>	<p>Криза 1: „Ја сам питао оне који то боље знају од вас и од мене. Питао сам стручњаке, епидемиологе и инфектологе у мојој земљи, онда сам питао стручњаке на светском нивоу, и сад ме ви... шта хоћете да кажете, да смо ми донели погрешну одлуку да се вакцинишемо?" Томица Милосављевић, Министарство здравља. („Transkript prve epizode", 2011)</p> <p>Криза 2: „Ми смо имали један начин рационалног размишљања у периоду када нисмо имали довољно тестова. Треба да се схвати, стварност је таква каква јесте. У тренутку када преузимате нешто имате одређени број, имате одређен ниво заштитне опреме. Ви сада можете да изађете и да кукате пред народом: 'Немам ни тестова, немам ни заштитне опреме'. Или ћете да изађете и да кажете: 'Имамо довољно да одрадимо један посао који ће спасити животе', то смо ми урадили. И направили смо систем који је обезбеђивао у том периоду, све време на иглама чекајући и заштитну опрему, чекајући и тестове. Тај систем тада је откривао само оне који су имали тешке форме болести, имали смо преко 38 температура, да је путовао, да има контакт, да може то епидемиолошки да се утврди и само смо те тестирали. Тада је био напад, мислим напад, притисак је био, сви су хтели да се тестирају, међутим, није било тестова. Са друге стране сте имали коме треба да се да заштитна опрема, дакле онима који су највише изложени и који ће бити директно укључени, тако да смо рационално поступали. Појава заштитне опреме и појава тестова, за нас који смо у овоме је било спасење. Једноставно је то истина." Зоран Гојковић, Покрајински секретаријат за здравство. („Testova za virus korona ima sasvim dovoljno", 2020)</p>

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Реторичке стратегије:	Репрезентативни наводи из података:
<p>Интерна усмерена стратегија 2: Наглашавање нормативних одговорности</p>	<p>Криза 1: „Тачно је, једна од тачака дневног реда била је и моја оставка. То, међутим, нису прихватили чланови Радне групе и ја остајем на функцији председника. Иако је вирус тренутно потпуно миран у Србији, ми и даље имамо спорадичне случајеве обољевања и, нажалост, смртне исходе. Тако да у таквој ситуацији човек не може да се повуче иако можда то жели, јер борба против вируса који и даље циркулише представља борбу за животе људи.” Предраг Кон, Радна група за борбу против пандемије („Vakcinacija propala, a Kon ostaje”, 2010)</p> <p>Криза 2: „Ја ћу да сносим одговорност. Ја мислим да против мене постоји једно 150 кривичних пријава. Спреман сам по свакој да сносим одговорност. Спреман сам да сносим одговорност политичку и сваку другу због овога. Једино је важно да никада не сносе одговорност лажови који измишљају број мртвих, лажови који говоре да неко држи мере и полицијски саг зато што воли да проводи диктатуру и ја немам проблем ни са тим. Моје средње име се зове одговорност. И од тога не бежим. Да доносим најтеже одлуке, али да истовремено будем крив када за нешто јесам крив.” Александар Вучић, Председништво Републике Србије („Policijski čas od petka”, 2020)</p>
<p>Екстерно усмерена стратегија 1: Опорекавање стратешких других епистемичких експерата</p>	<p>Криза 1: „То су неки, сад кад ви кажете прво да је то вакцина у којој се налази сквален који изазива аутоимуноу болест ја то не бих могла, значи ја бих могла сад ту да вас изазовем да кажем докажете ми то, јер ако се нешто прочита на интернету или ако постоје различите врсте научника који имају неку своју праксу шта мисле и своје мишљење исказују путем јавног мишљења то не значи да и она стручна пракса исто тако мисли. Значи, сквален који се налази у овој вакцини је кроз документацију потврђено да је безбедан и да може да буде примењен.” Татјана Шипетић, АЛИМС („Transkript prve epizode”, 2011)</p> <p>Криза 2: „Оно што треба да се зна је да у Републици Србији има 33.000 лекара. Колеге које су дале потпис на одређену изјаву, претпостављам да се разумеју и имају компетенције када су у питању заразне болести, мада међу њима нема ни имунолога, ни епидемиолога ни инфектолога. Претпостављам да имају компетенције када су дали за право да изнесу критике”, Дарија Кисић Тепавчевић, Кризни штаб за сузбијање заразне болести ковид-19 („Kisić Tepavčević dovela u pitanje kompetentnost 350 lekara”, 2020)</p>
<p>Екстерно усмерена стратегија 2: Изношење сумњи у мошине других епистемичких експерата</p>	<p>Криза 1: „Да ли је све ово пренадувано, да ли је неко на томе зарађивао – све је могуће, свака епидемија је ситуација у којој се измеша много тога... То је и медицина, политика, бизнис, економија, културолошки, социолошки проблем и у свакој епидемији неко зарађује, на вакцинама, лековима. Међутим, ја морам рећи, ми смо морали да будемо спремни.” Бранислав Тиодоровић, Радна група против пандемије („Pandemija i Srbija”, 2010)</p>

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Реторичке стратегије:	Репрезентативни наводи из података:
Екстерно усмерена стратегија 2: Изношење сумњи у моћиве других епистемичких експерата	Криза 2: „Иза изјаве Драгана Ђиласа вероватно стоји намера да шири панику, поручујем му да не би требало да говори о здравству, јер о томе не зна ништа. Потпредседница Странке слободе и правде Мариника Тепић долази испред нове болнице у Батајници, која је ремек-дело изградње у име једног дела тајкуна да њима прави профит, како би зарадили људи који навијају за корону.“ Златибор Лончар, Министарство здравља („Dilas ne bi trebalo da govori o zdravlju”, 2021)

4.1. Рационализација пружених гаранција 95

У овој интерно усмереној реторичкој стратегији, епистемички експерти пружају рационализације гаранција које износе како би учврстили сопствени епистемички ауторитет. Ближе речено, пружају оправдања своје улоге унутар епистемичке мреже, као и оправдања улоге коју њихова институција заузима. То чине кроз повезивање средстава и циљева својих поступака у корист наглашавања сопственог знања и способности. У овој стратегији често смо суочени са изношењем „евиденције” и „чињеница” које оправдавају претходно дефинисани однос између средстава и циљева поступања епистемичких експерата. Стратегију рационализације пружених гаранција смо посматрали како код експерата чије су институције преживеле кризу тако и код оних чије су институције сносиле негативне последице проузроковане кризом. На пример, 2009. године, током суђења због спорне набавке вакцина, Светлана Вукајловић, бивша директорка РЗЗО, кроз изјаве за медије покушала је да рационализује претходно пружене гаранције, позивајући се на закон о набавкама и правилно спроведеној тендерској процедури. На тај начин, наглашавајући поштовање претходно успостављених правила унутар епистемичке мреже, епистемички експерт учвршћује свој епистемички ауторитет. 101

Када је 2009. нашу земљу погодила епидемија грипа, организовала сам јавну набавку вакцина преко комисије која је припремала и одобравала тендерску документацију, компанија „Glakso Smit Klajn” одустала је од учешћа у тендеру и захтевала је тајне преговоре с Владом. Такав уговор никада не бих потписала јер је био штетан по државу. „Јутохемија” је била најбољи понуђач. Нисам имала никакав договор с челницима ове фирме. Када сам видела да ћемо набавити више вакцина него што је потребно, јавила сам министру здравља. („Afera vakcina”, 2015). 102

На сличан начин, пулмолог Бранимир Несторовић, након спорних изјава изнетих на конференцији за штампу, покушава да рационализује изнешене тврдње о вирусу SARS-CoV-19 (најсмешнији

вирус у историји, вирус који се не преноси на жене па стога могу да отпутују у шопинг у Италију), тако што оправдава везу између искоришћених средстава и циља који је желео да оствари. 105

Ми смо тада били у врло незгодној ситуацији. Ми тада нисмо могли да уведемо ванредно стање. Ово што се сада догађа у радњама ми не бисмо могли да издржимо тад. Ми нисмо били тад припремљени за то. Имали смо три недеље да се припремимо. Требало је спречити панику по сваку цену. Јесте била шала, али је била шала замишљена баш да релаксира људе. Ми смо успели да добијемо на времену и да не гледамо ове ситуације које смо гледали – да се бију око тоалет папира људи, и око било чега другог. („Šalom protiv sukoba oko toalet-papira”, 2020). 104

Оно што би требало да поступке пулмолога, а касније и члана Кризног штаба за борбу против заразне болести ковид-19, учини рационалним и очува његов епистемички ауторитет јесте пародија на рачун кризних околности која је послужила као средство за остваривање циља, односно сузбијања панике међу осталим епистемичким субјектима. 105

4.2. Изражавање нормативних одговорности 106

У овој интерно усмереној стратегији епистемички експерти наглашавају сопствене нормативне одговорности како би стекли поверење других епистемичких субјеката унутар мреже. Ближе речено, они изражавају бригу за друге тако што указују како њихови поступци одговарају постојећим нормама и одговорностима које се тичу најширег спектра епистемичких субјеката у мрежи. На пример, епидемиолог и члан Радне групе за борбу против пандемије, Предраг Кон, у изјавама за медије током 2010. године у вези са спорном набавком вакцина и недовољним бројем вакцинисаних, изражава сопствене нормативне одговорности према осталим епистемичким субјектима у мрежи. Штавише, када говори о одговорностима према осталим субјектима он наводи своју породицу и пријатеље чиме наглашава лични, емоционални, степен одговорности који га обавезује на исправно поступање. 107

Пред својом породицом и преосталим пријатељима стојим и даље непоколебљиво и стабилно са уверењем да је урађен један сјајан посао у коме су здравствени радници били истински хероји, а читаво друштво и Србија за свега десетак дана ће моћи да каже да је сузбила епидемију и да сачека само да истекне време од 28 дана без болести и прогласи победу. („Kon poručio 'nazoviprijateljima”, 2020). 108

Када су током априла 2020. године поједини медији критиковали одлуку Владе Србије о увођењу ванредног стања и неуставно

увођење полицијског часа, неки од чланова Кризног штаба су тврдили да такво извештавање угрожава здравље грађана. Упитан да прокоментарише поменуте наводе, члан Кризног штаба Бранислав Тиодоровић употребио је реторичку стратегију којом наглашава сопствене нормативне одговорности. 112

Ја не знам да такав закључак постоји, мало сам изненађен. Апелујем на све редакције да схвате да смо посвећени здрављу грађана, тај посао траје 24 сата и да сви лекари падају на нос да би то могли да ураде што боље. („Tiodorović o optužbama”, 2020). 113

Ближе речено, епидемиолог Тиодоровић је нагласио нормативне одговорности епистемичких експерата који припадају његовој институцији, односно епистемичкој мрежи. На тај начин је изразио и сопствену одговорност према заштити здравља грађана и забринутост за остале епистемичке субјекте и самим тим учврстио сопствени епистемички ауторитет. 114

4.3. Оспоравање стручности других епистемичких експерата 115

За разлику од претходне две наведене стратегије, које су директно усмерене на учвршћивање ауторитета путем изношења изјава о сопственим способностима и заслуженом поверењу, епистемички експерти користе и екстерно усмерене стратегије како би учврстили сопствени ауторитет кроз оспоравања епистемичког ауторитета других. У првој од две такве реторичке стратегије епистемички експерти се усредсређују на неуспехе других експерата тако што обесмишљавају њихове поступке и стручност. На тај начин оспоравају количину знања других епистемичких експерата и утичу на поверење које ће остали епистемички субјекти имати у њих. Сведочење тадашњег министра здравља, Томице Милосављевића, 115 током 2010. године у вези са спорном тендерском процедуром и склапањем уговора са швајцарском фармацеутском кућом „Новартис” представља један вид коришћења ове стратегије. 116

Нисам имао никакве везе са спровођењем тендерске процедуре у РЗЗО, од тренутка одлуке Владе 2. новембра, па до извештаја РЗЗО о спроведеном поступку. И ја као министар здравља и Влада Србије чинили смо све што је у нашој моћи да заштитимо грађане Србије, по саветима Светске здравствене организације и стручњака из Радне групе, планирањем и поступањем пре и у току пандемије у којој је умрло 140 људи, од тога десет трудних жена, а хиљаде људи лечено у интензивним негама и на респираторима. То се сада заборавља и занемарује. Многи

у овој земљи би да буду и полиција, и тужилаштво, и судије – укључујући и актуелног министра здравља. Међутим, хоћу да верујем да је заиста 2011, а не деведесет и нека. Верујем да ће правосудни органи утврдити истину. Свако нека ради свој посао. (Živanović, 2011). 119

Истичући како свако треба да ради свој посао, Милосављевић оспорава епистемички ауторитет експертима који га критикују. Оспоравање епистемичког ауторитета другог експерта, тренутног министра здравља, присутно је у Милосављевићевом тврђењу да би „сви..., па и актуелни министар здравља” желели да буду и полиција, и тужилаштво и судије. Имплицирајући да епистемички експерт који заузима улогу коју је он некада заузимао не ради свој посао него да се бави проблемима за које није довољно стручан, Милосављевић утиче на поверење које други епистемички субјекти имају у новог министра здравља.

Слично томе, министар здравља, Златибор Лончар, одговорио је на питање новинара о неразјашњеним околностима смртног исхода једног од пацијената примљеног у Ковид болницу, користећи управо ову реторичку стратегију. 122

Суштина је да је човек био на неинвазивном респиратору, имао је сатурацију 96 и то је трајало 4 дана, било би кривично дело да се интубира пацијент са таквом сатурацијом. Зашто неко не би био на респиратору ако имате 34 слободна у том тренутку? За сваки случај кад се појави сумња, постоји надзор, увек постоји нешто што контролише оно прво што се уради, дозволите да нешто мало више знамо. Ви не разумете документе, али нисте из медицинске струке, то разумем, али морали бисте да завршите медицину. („Niko nije umro zato što je čekaо na respirator”, 2020). 123

Инсистирајући да такво питање не могу да му поставе епистемички субјекти који не поседују довољну количину знања, односно они који нису завршили медицину, Лончар оспорава епистемички ауторитет других и количину поверења коју заслужују. Коришћењем ове стратегије епистемички експерти учвршћују своју улогу у таквој мери да им дати ауторитет дозвољава да не одговоре на питања постављена од стране епистемичких субјеката који не поседују сличан ниво стручности. 124

4.4. Изношење сумњи о мотивима других епистемичких експерата 125

У другој екстерно усмереној реторичкој стратегији епистемички експерти оспоравају епистемички ауторитет других експерата тако

што доводе у сумњу њихове мотиве. На тај начин епистемички експерт који оспорава мотиве других у повратном смислу учвршћује поверење које остали епистемички субјекти имају у њега. Можемо узети за пример одговор премијерке Републике Србије, Ане Брнабић, који је дала на питања новинара о наводима у појединим страним медијима о броју преминулих у ковид болницама у Србији услед недостатка респиратора. 126

Ово што се пласира данас, и путем страних агенција, јесте безочна лаж и ништа друго сем лажи. Нећемо дозволити да се о Србији плује и лаже и да се Србија унижава само из неких политичких разлога. („Ne postoji osoba u Srbiji koja je preminula jer nije bilo respiratora”, 2020). 127

На овај начин премијерка оспорава мотиве других, у овом случају страних медија, и не пружа директан одговор на питање већ уместо тога користи реторичку стратегију која има за циљ да повратно учврсти поверење које епистемички субјекти имају у њу и да очува улогу епистемичког ауторитета. На сличан начин председник Републике Србије, Александар Вучић, истовремено признаје одговорност за непоштовање препоручених епидемиолошких мера током конференције за штампу и оспорава мотиве епистемичких субјеката који изnose критике на рачун таквог поступања. 128

Потпуно сте у праву и покушаћу да прихватим, пре свега због примера, не због тога што стварно на било који начин некога угрожавам, јер никога не угрожавам, видите да постоји метар и по размака. Али, као што сте видели, овде сам дошао са маском и чим будем завршио обраћање ставићу је. Ја разумем вашу потребу да у сваком тренутку мене за нешто окривите, нисам приметио да сте се тако ревносно борили за здравље људи кад су упадали у Скупштину, тукли полицију, гађали их и када је било јасно да ће то бити права биолошко-медицинска бомба. Али добро је да и то грађани виде. Али прихватам вашу критику, иако је она формална а не суштинска. Ја сам неко ко би требало да даје пример људима у Србији, и зато ћу се постарати да што је могуће више и ту вашу добронамерну жељу у потпуности поштујем. (Gligorijević, 2020). 129

Користећи ову реторичку стратегију Вучић оспорава мотиве других, иронично их називајући „добронамерном жељом”. Оно што две горе наведене реторичке стратегије чини карактеристичним јесте недостатак негирања одговорности. Међутим, уз индиректно прихваћену одговорност, епистемички експерти често наглашавају одговорност других експерата за остварене неуспехе и критички се осврћу на мотиве осталих експерата да би учврстили сопствени епистемички ауторитет и очували поверење осталих субјеката које је потребно да би успешно утицали на исходе кризних ситуација. 130

Закључна разматрања ¹³⁵

У овом раду покушали смо да испитамо како епистемички експерти користе реторичке стратегије за учвршћивање епистемичког ауторитета током кризних околности. ¹³⁶ Наше истраживање указује на то да експерти користе језик у сврху ¹³⁷ убеђивања осталих епистемичких субјеката у стручност експерата и у поверење које на основу стручности завређују. ¹³⁸ Користећи истраживања из области социјалне психологије која испитују епистемичке димензије поверења и стручности (Kruglanski et al., 2009), као и нека новија истраживања усредсређена на сличне димензије ¹³⁹ (Damjanović, et al., 2020), успели смо да издвојимо специфичне реторичке стратегије које епистемички експерти користе за учвршћивање епистемичког ауторитета. Исте ове стратегије биле су изражене и у нашем узорку изјава епистемичких експерата.

Слика 1. представља дијаграм који, осим до сада испитаних категорија реторичких стратегија и димензија епистемичког ауторитета, приказује садржај и стил који епистемички експерти користе како би учврстили епистемички ауторитет у епистемичкој мрежи одређеног конститутивним епистемичким факторима. ¹⁴⁰

Слика 1.



На основу теоријске позадине истраживања можемо закључити да су епистемички експерти, током кризних околности, усредсређени на очување својих улога и ауторитета а не на очување постојећих пракси. Почетне хипотезе нашег истраживања биле су постављене у виду два централна питања. Користећи анализу садржаја и узорковање релевантних података из медија, дошли смо до закључка да епистемички експерти током криза изазваних пандемијама покушавају да сачувају улоге и ауторитет унутар мреже. Очување до тада установљених пракси присутно је само приликом коришћења интерно усмерених реторичких стратегија. Позивање на очување постојећих пракси, унутар епистемичке мреже, користи се као рационализација за претходно пружене гаранције и наглашавање нормативних одговорности које епистемички експерт има према осталим епистемичким субјектима. Међутим, на овај начин „очување пракси” представља конструкцију реторичке стратегије која епистемичком експерту осигурава улогу коју заузима унутар мреже. Штавише, понекад се позивање на очување претходно успостављених пракси, норми и правила не користи ни као средство за конструисање реторичке стратегије јер је епистемички неисплативо. Такав случај имамо код екстерно усмерених стратегија где је фокус стављен на друге епистемичке експерте, односно њихову стручност. 747

Наше истраживање показује да један од кључних разлога за недостатак промене унутар епистемичке мреже представља доминантно настојање експерата да очувају сопствени ауторитет и улогу. Одржавање позиције епистемичког ауторитета експертима допушта да отвореније и чешће износе мишљење о кризним околностима, када до њих дође. Кроз истраживање били смо усредсређени на кризе проузроковане пандемијама, али се наши закључци односе на сваки други контекст у којем је институционална промена отежана услед доминантних улога које експерти заузимају унутар ње. Док се структура овако успостављених епистемичких мрежа, и улога унутар ње, не реконфигурише, било каква институционална промена биће значајно отежана јер ће експерти настојати да очувају своје улоге и ауторитет и у периодима када не постоје кризне околности. 748

Будући да смо самоприписивање епистемичког ауторитета издвојили као кључни разлог дисфункционалности епистемичких мрежа у суочавању са кризним околностима, правац даљег истраживања требало би да буде усмерен ка епистемичким процедурама које епистемички субјекти могу користити током кризе. Ове епистемичке процедуре заснивале би се на анализи садржаја изјава које епистемички експерти износе пред епистемичке субјекте. Уз адекватну

идентификацију садржаја и стилова које експерти користе приликом комуникације са субјектима, могуће је препознати реторичке стратегије за самоприписивање епистемичког ауторитета, издвојити релевантне изворе информација и одмерити поступке спрам њих.

Са друге стране, даља истраживања би могла да испитају која од наведених реторичких стратегија (било да се ради о интерно и екстерно усмереним стратегијама или некој конкретној стратегији унутар њих) представља „најуспешнију”. Успешност реторичке стратегије као средства за учвршћивање епистемичког ауторитета представља значајан ресурс експертима који за циљ имају успостављање организације унутар епистемичке мреже погођене кризом. Стицање поверења епистемичких субјеката је значајно за експерте, јер им је, захваљујући поверењу, омогућено да утичу на исходе кризних околности. Да ли је контролисана организација мреже током кризних околности довољна неопходност да бисмо циљеве епистемичких експерата сматрали легитимним? Одговор на то питање можемо добити кроз будућа истраживања реализована у оквирима етике и филозофије политике.

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Ljiljana Radenović*

Petar Nurkić**

EPISTEMIC AUTHORITY AND RHETORICAL STRATEGIES IN CRISIS CIRCUMSTANCES

Abstract: In this paper we will examine how experts from certain epistemic networks behave in the circumstances of a crisis. Our main goal is to show rhetorical strategies experts use to strengthen their own epistemic authority. We will do that by analysing experts' strategies used in two pandemics: the one caused by A h1n1 virus in 2009 and the current pandemic caused by SARS-CoV-2. There are four different, but interrelated, rhetorical strategies, that epistemic experts use to consolidate their epistemic authority. Two are internally oriented and consist of 1) experts providing additional reasons for why the measures they propose in the time of crises are rational and (2) experts emphasising their own responsibilities in the crises. Experts also use two externally oriented rhetorical strategies by which they (3) challenge the expertise of other experts and (4) raise doubts about the motives of other epistemic experts.

Keywords: Epistemic networks, epistemic experts, epistemic authority, rhetorical strategies.

* Full Professor, 1972, Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, lradenovic72@gmail.com

** Junior Researcher, 1991, Institute of Philosophy, Faculty of Philosophy, University of Belgrade, petarnurkic91@gmail.com

Rhetoric of epistemic authority: Defending field positions during the financial crisis

human relations

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hum.sagepub.com



Suhaib Riaz

University of Massachusetts, USA

Sean Buchanan

University of Manitoba, Canada

Trish Ruebottom

Brock University, Canada

Abstract

In this article we explore how elite actors respond to a field-wide crisis.¹ Drawing from a study of CEOs of large US banks in the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis, we show how elite actors use rhetorical strategies to defend their dominant position in the field.² Specifically, we show how actors strengthen their epistemic authority – the perceived expertise and trustworthiness of an actor – through four distinct but interwoven rhetorical strategies. Actors used two internally-directed means of strengthening epistemic authority by providing rational guarantees and expressing normative responsibilities,³ and two externally-directed strategies that sought to strengthen their own epistemic authority by lowering the epistemic authority of others through critiquing judgments and questioning motives.⁴ We contribute to research on defensive institutional work by highlighting how elite actors rhetorically defended their position following a field-wide crisis.

Keywords

elites, field position, field-wide crisis, financial crisis, financialization, institutional work, rhetoric⁵

Corresponding author:

Suhaib Riaz, College of Management, University of Massachusetts, Boston, MA 02125, USA.

Email: suhaib.riaz@umb.edu

Introduction

In opposition to early neo-institutional research that assumed institutions were self-reproducing (Jepperson, 1991; Lawrence et al., 2002; Scott, 2001),¹³ recently scholars have argued that even the most powerful institutions require ongoing maintenance work in order to be reproduced (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006). As a result, research has begun to focus explicitly on the role of actors in the maintenance of institutions (Dacin et al., 2010; Lok and De Rond, 2013; Micelotta and Washington, 2013; Zilber, 2009). While studies have examined the ongoing work involved in the maintenance of institutions in periods of relative stability (Dacin et al., 2010; Zilber, 2009), an emerging body of research is focusing on how actors maintain existing institutions following a 'disruption' (Maguire and Hardy, 2009). Disruptions are events that disturb existing arrangements in organizational fields and call into question existing institutionalized rules, norms and assumptions (Hoffman, 1999).¹⁰ Studies have examined how actors defend institutions following disruptions arising from social movement activism (Hoffman, 1999; Maguire and Hardy, 2009; Zietsma and Lawrence, 2010), regulatory changes (Micelotta and Washington, 2013; Vermeulen et al., 2007) or accidents (Desai, 2011).⁸ This body of work suggests that in times of disruption, actors will engage in a variety of activities that aim to defend or repair the legitimacy of the contested practices.⁹

In certain cases, disruptions can lead to field-wide crises (Sine and David, 2003). Field-wide crises consist of 'perceptions by field actors (e.g. organizations, regulators, investors, customers, etc.) that fundamental outcomes are in contrast to expectations, and precipitate action intended to avoid dramatic negative outcomes' (Sine and David, 2003: 186).¹⁵ In field-wide crises, existing practices, rules, norms and assumptions are no longer viewed as legitimate and status quo is no longer an option.¹⁴ Hence, institutional maintenance work that focuses on defending the legitimacy of existing practices is not likely to be a viable option following such a crisis, and rhetorical justifications may focus instead on social categories of actors and their competence (Lefsrud and Meyer, 2012).¹² However, there is little research on how incumbent actors respond to field-wide crises¹⁷ and how a focus on actors instead of practices may differ from existing conceptions of defensive institutional work.

We address this gap in the literature by conducting a study of the rhetorical strategies of CEOs of large US banks in the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis. The financial crisis of 2007–2009 was the largest recession in 80 years, with global effects that are still being felt today. The large-scale bankruptcies and restructurings of major banks brought widespread attention to the financial leaders at the heart of the crisis and evoked responses from them in the public sphere. We draw from research on rhetoric that highlights the role of language in persuading others and shaping perceptions of social reality (Moufahim et al., 2015; Scott, 1967; Sillince and Brown, 2009; Zanoni and Janssens, 2004), and build on recent work that shows how rhetorical strategies can impact the institutional arrangements in a field (e.g. Brown et al., 2012; Creed et al., 2010; Green et al., 2009; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005).¹⁸ Our findings show that elite actors performed defensive institutional work following a field-wide crisis by rhetorically strengthening their own epistemic authority.¹⁶ Epistemic authority refers to the perceived expertise and trustworthiness of an actor. It is socially constructed and determines²¹

the extent to which information provided by the actor will be considered reliable and acted upon by others (Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski et al., 2009). We found that four rhetorical strategies were used by elite actors to strengthen their epistemic authority in the field. Specifically, actors used two internally-directed strategies, *providing rational guarantees* and *expressing normative responsibilities*, and two externally-directed strategies, *critiquing judgments* and *questioning motives*, which sought to strengthen their epistemic authority by lowering the epistemic authority of others. 141

We offer three central contributions. First, our findings show that in times of field-wide crises, defensive institutional work is primarily focused on preserving one's position in an organizational field as opposed to fighting for the legitimacy of existing practices. Specifically, we show how elite actors rhetorically strengthened their epistemic authority, which helps to preserve the central position of these actors in organizational fields even when existing institutionalized practices may no longer be viewed as legitimate. This insight opens up a new line of inquiry into research on institutional maintenance by suggesting that institutions are not necessarily maintained by the preservation of practices and norms, but by the persistence of dominant positions of actors in terms of authority, status or power. Second, our focus on the rhetorical construction of epistemic authority helps add richness to this body of research by teasing out the factors that contribute to field position and how they are constructed through rhetoric. The elite actors did not directly address blame towards themselves or the practices that resulted in the crisis. Instead they used rhetorical strategies that praised their own expertise and trustworthiness, while explicitly placing blame on others to critique others' expertise and trustworthiness. Our findings highlight the recursive relationship between the positions of power that grant actors the right to rhetorically define situations and the rhetoric that constructs the epistemic authority necessary to maintain dominant field positions. Finally, our study reveals the role of elites in structuring outcomes in contemporary societal systems (Reed, 2012; Zald and Lounsbury, 2010). Specifically, we suggest that the self-ascribing of high epistemic authority is a fundamental reason for the problematic self-seeking culture of this industry, its strained relationship with society, and its contribution to dysfunctional socio-economic systems (e.g. Admati and Hellwig, 2013; Ho, 2009; Levitin, 2014; Riaz et al., 2011). 30

The rest of our article proceeds as follows. We first provide the theoretical background from the key literatures that we draw upon: institutional maintenance and the importance of field positions in institutional work, rhetoric and organizing, and epistemic authority. Following this, we describe our empirical context and outline our research design and analysis. We then present our findings and discuss our contributions. 32 33 34

Theoretical background 35

Institutional maintenance

As neo-institutional theory has increasingly turned its attention to the role of actors in processes of institutional creation, maintenance and disruption (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006; Lawrence et al., 2009, 2013), an emerging body of research has begun to focus on how actors maintain institutions (Dacin et al., 2010; Desai, 2011; Heaphy, 2013; Hirsch and

Bermiss, 2009; Lok and De Rond, 2013; Maguire and Hardy, 2009; Zilber, 2009). In particular, studies are increasingly examining institutional maintenance following a 'disruption' (Maguire and Hardy, 2009). Whether referred to as disruptive events (Desai, 2011; Hoffman, 1999), jolts (Meyer, 1982), shocks (Fligstein, 2001) or discontinuities (Lorange et al., 1986), these disruptions create challenges to institutionalized practices and may trigger changes in field-level institutions (Hoffman, 1999; Meyer, 1982).

Studies in this area have focused on how elite or incumbent actors in a field defend existing institutions in a field following a disruption – what Maguire and Hardy (2009) refer to as 'defensive institutional work'. For example, Trank and Washington (2009) focus on the practices that a legitimating organization (Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business) used to pre-empt alternative legitimating organizations in a field (university-based business education) under threat of change. Zietsma and Lawrence (2010) found that actors in the coastal forestry industry worked to maintain existing institutions by defending practices and bolstering boundaries during the institutional life-cycle of innovation, conflict, stability and re-stabilization. A few studies have explored the role of language in maintaining practices. It has been found that incumbents responded to threats by drawing on scientific discourse (Maguire and Hardy, 2009), appealing to logos to highlight structural incompatibility and a breach with the past, or ethos to morally problematize change (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). In times of field-wide crises, incumbent actors may restore the status quo through discursive repair work (Micelotta and Washington, 2013). Desai (2011) also found that organizations similar to the 'stricken' firms are likely to engage in more defensive discourse to maintain institutionalized practices. Taken together, these studies suggest that following a disruption, incumbent actors engage in institutional maintenance primarily through defending or repairing the legitimacy of institutionalized practices.

Field positions

While disruptions may challenge existing practices, norms and assumptions, field-wide crises are more severe in both the intensity of challenge and the scope of actors affected. ³⁶
In fields undergoing such crises, practices may undergo substantive failure to the extent that it may not be prudent to defend them. In addition, such crises may involve 'reconfiguration of an organizational field and the institutions that guide behavior' (Hoffman, 1999: 353) and thereby place incumbent actors directly under threat in terms of losing their own dominant positions in the field. ³⁸
Recent research shows that elite actors are more likely to be targeted with greater scrutiny than others and judged more stringently by various audiences (Graffin et al., 2013). ³⁹
Such actors may therefore feel pressure to preserve their own positions of dominance, which could later be leveraged towards shaping future field-level rules, norms and understandings. ⁴⁰
 However, existing research has given limited attention to this aspect. This is surprising because the importance of dominant positions has been acknowledged in extant research on both institutional maintenance and change (Battilana, 2006).

Scholars have argued that fields are 'arenas of power relations' (Brint and Karabel, 1991: 355) where struggles for dominance among actors take place as they relate to each other and struggle over authority, status and power (Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008). Field

dominance is established through the possession of the forms of capital important to the field, and that therefore serve as the basis for power relations in that field (Bourdieu, 1986). In particular, symbolic capital, which is the 'power granted to those who have obtained sufficient recognition to be in a position to impose recognition', underlies other forms of capital and its acquisition is therefore particularly crucial for field dominance (Bourdieu, 1989: 23). Because these positions of dominance based on the possession of capital are 'outcomes of historical, conscious and unconscious struggles' that ensure there are 'dominant' and 'dominated' actors in a field (Golsorkhi et al., 2009: 782), the preservation of these dominant positions may be an important means of performing defensive institutional work during a crisis. For example, several studies have found that the social position of incumbents was a critical enabler in performing defensive work that aimed to maintain practices (e.g. Maguire and Hardy, 2009; Micelotta and Washington, 2013). The network centrality of elites in the field of accounting was considered crucial in Greenwood and Suddaby's (2006) study of institutional change in the big five accounting firms. In a similar vein, Rao et al. (2003) argued that institutional change was related to the socio-political legitimacy of the activists involved. Maguire et al. (2004) described how entrepreneurs sought occupations that had legitimacy and provided them with a bridge to stakeholders in order to advocate for HIV/AIDs treatment in Canada.

Despite the acknowledged importance of dominant positions as mentioned above, very few studies have explored the institutional work involved in preserving dominant positions in a field in response to threats. Currie et al. (2012) found that part of the response of incumbent elites to an external threat of policy change in healthcare (English National Health Service) involved creative acts of interpretation to enhance their own elite status. Focusing on the discourse of elite actors in more detail, Lefsrud and Meyer (2012) suggest that defensive institutional work by such actors in contested fields included making claims about their own knowledge to ensure that their version of the truth gained acceptance. We extend this literature by considering that in situations where versions of truth are highly contested (Hoffman, 1999), such as in fields undergoing crises (Desai, 2011), rhetorical claims made by elites may focus on strengthening their own dominant positions.

Rhetoric and organizing

Rhetoric is defined as the 'art of persuasion through argumentation' (Warnick, 2000; 50 Zanoni and Janssens, 2004: 59). Rhetoric, particularly in the context of its impact on institutions, can be seen as distinct from discourse due to the 'deliberate use of persuasive language' that does not leave the 'actors and their interests in the shadows' (Suddaby, 2010: 17). Rhetoric has been found to be a critical tool for constructing social reality, privileging particular ideas, perspectives and social arrangements (Moufahim et al., 2015). Through rhetoric, '[p]articular things come to be portrayed as positive, beneficial, ethical, understandable, necessary or otherwise acceptable to the specific community in question. In contrast, other things are constructed as negative, harmful, intolerable, or, for example, morally reprehensible' (Vaara et al., 2006: 793–794). In this way, rhetoric constructs 'truth' (Golant et al., 2015; Scott, 1967; Zachry, 2009) by building consensus

around what is deemed acceptable and right (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Warnick and Kline, 1992). 53

Rhetorical strategies are the linguistic means used to persuade others (Moufahim et al., 2015). There is flexibility in defining what is 'true' that allows for a 'rhetorical inventiveness' in the way ideas are connected to previous or broader understandings (Golant et al., 2015: 624). Actors may use strategies such as rhetorical dissociation to build support for new interpretations of a situation (Golant et al., 2015; Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969) or undermine competing views (Symon, 2005). Alternatively, rhetorical strategies that connect issues to specific identities can legitimize particular actors and their perspectives in a debate (Creed et al., 2002; Hardy et al., 2000; Vaara and Monin, 2010). Many of these rhetorical strategies are underpinned by a particular style of argumentation, such as logos, ethos or pathos in order to increase the persuasive capacity (Aristotle, 1984; Sillince and Brown, 2009). Existing research thus emphasizes the power of rhetoric as a mechanism for driving processes of contestation that shape the outcomes of debates. However, we still know very little about how such rhetoric is used by elite actors in response to crises and what it entails in terms of defensive institutional work. This gap in our understanding motivates our research question: *How do incumbent elite actors use rhetoric to perform defensive institutional work during a field-wide crisis?* To answer this question, we draw on the concept of epistemic authority in the social psychology literature to interpret the nature of the rhetoric used by elite actors during a field-wide crisis. 54

Epistemic authority 58

The concept of epistemic authority has a well-developed literature in social psychology and related areas, but despite its potential for understanding dominance in organizational fields, its application has not yet been extended to organizational research. Epistemic authority is based on the perceived expertise and trustworthiness of the actor providing information on a particular matter (Kruglanski et al., 2009). This authority is socially constructed and determines the extent to which the information provided by the source actor will be considered reliable and therefore whether that actor should be turned to for obtaining information (Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski et al., 2005, 2009). Such authority may be of a general nature encompassing various domains of life or of a specific nature limited to certain matters. For example, the epistemic authority of priests or parents would transcend various life events and these sources may be turned to as a means of resolving multiple types of minor or major issues that one faces (Kruglanski et al., 2009). 60 In contrast, the epistemic authority of specialist professionals such as cardiologists or statisticians would not apply to multiple general issues in life and would be bound to the professional domains of cardiology or statistics, respectively (Kruglanski et al., 2009). 66

Further, epistemic authority of different actors on a matter can vary such that some can have more authority than others. This variance is reflected in the existence of an epistemic authority hierarchy (Kruglanski et al., 2005). Actors can also self-ascribe a position for themselves in the hierarchy vis-a-vis other external sources (Kruglanski et al., 2005). Those with higher epistemic authority enjoy several crucial benefits. They are turned to earlier as a source of information, given priority in terms of how extensively 67

the information is processed, inspire overall higher confidence, and are more likely to generate action in accordance with their information. Individuals are willing to pay more for information from sources with higher epistemic authority, strongly prefer seeking information from and choose products recommended by those with higher epistemic authority, and also feel greater confidence in choices based on recommendations from those with higher epistemic authority (Bar, 1999; Kruglanski et al., 2009). By implication, those actors with higher epistemic authority would have higher status and greater influence in organizational fields.

Rhetoric is one means through which actors make such authority claims (Edmondson, 1984; Gusfield, 1976; McCloskey, 1985; Nelson et al., 1987). In the face of legitimacy challenges, leaders are ideally positioned to construct and impose their interpretations of complex events (Brown, 2004), constructing shared cognition and commitment to particular interpretations and outcomes (Brown, 2004; Carton et al., 2014; Golant et al., 2015; Jarzabkowski and Sillince, 2007). Accounts of events can be used to assign blame (Brown and Jones, 2000), persuade others of personal credibility and validity (Watson, 1995), or construct certain actors as experts (Lefsrud and Meyer, 2012). These ideas are relevant to the preservation of dominant positions in a field-wide crisis and we accordingly interpret and explain the nature of the rhetorical claims made by elite actors with respect to epistemic authority in our empirical context. We return to this in our findings and discussion section.

Method

Empirical context

The global financial crisis that marked the first decade of the 21st century raised questions about the institutional structures underlying most modern capitalist economies and is widely recognized as a field-wide crisis (Crotty, 2009; Davis, 2009; Kotz, 2009; Lounsbury and Hirsch, 2010; Riaz, 2009). It brought attention to certain actors that were seen as closely intertwined with the existing system. In particular, the crisis has been attributed to causes deeply connected to the banking industry, such as sub-prime loans, credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations and other banking practices. The start of large-scale mortgage defaults in 2007 in the USA provided the trigger for dramatic events in the banking industry and in the wider financial system. These events included the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers; the buyouts of Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch by JPMorgan Chase & Co. and Bank of America, respectively; the bankruptcy of Washington Mutual and its buyout by Bank of America; the change in structure of investment banks Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley to deposit holding banks in order to allow their bailout by government funds; and the bailout of Citigroup by government funds.

Banks were seen as closely intertwined with the financial system and elite bankers became the center of scrutiny in the public realm (Hargie et al., 2010; Tourish and Hargie, 2012; Whittle and Mueller, 2012). In the USA, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) was set up by the Congress to examine the causes of the financial crisis and CEOs of major US banks implicated in the crisis were publicly cross-examined. While

the media accounts involving bankers in the US context were rich in journalistic detail (Sorkin, 2009; Taibbi, 2009), there has been somewhat limited attention by institutional theorists towards systematically analyzing these developments (Munir, 2011). The financial crisis thus provides a context where the interests of actors in dominant positions are likely to be challenged and there is an opportunity to observe how these actors respond to the field-wide crisis.

Data

Crises offer unique opportunities to study the roles of elites in the alteration and reconfiguration of regimes (Kerr and Robinson, 2012). To observe the role of elite actors impacted by the financial crisis, we focused on 11 CEOs of US banks whose tenure included the key decisions made by their bank during the financial crisis in the years 2007–2009. To arrive at our sample of these CEOs, we followed detailed media accounts of key events involving US banks during the crisis and focused on the 10 major US banks directly involved in these events: the ‘big five’ pre-crisis standalone investment banks (Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns) and five universal/commercial banks (the ‘big four’ Citigroup, Bank of America, JPMorgan Chase & Co., Wells Fargo, and the largest savings bank Washington Mutual, which was the largest bank failure in US history). These 10 banks had 11 CEOs due to a change in CEO at Bear Stearns. Table 1 lists the CEOs of these banks along with a brief description of the crisis-related events of their banks. We considered these bank CEOs as ‘elite bankers’ due to their dominant status and power within large, influential banking organizations (Kerr and Robinson, 2012) and because they comprise the ‘small number of exemplary individuals who combine all the properties and all the titles that confer membership rights’ (Bourdieu, 1998: 316).

We considered the start of public hearings by the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) as the key event in terms of collection of public statements made by CEOs. The FCIC defines itself as ‘a bipartisan commission that has been given a critical non-partisan mission – to examine the causes of the financial crisis that has gripped the country and to report our findings to the Congress, the President, and the American people’ (FCIC, 2011). The FCIC started its public hearings on 13 January 2010 as this was the crucial time when the issues surrounding the crisis escalated into a major public concern. Accordingly, we chose an 18-month period, 13 January 2009–13 July 2010, for our data collection. This allowed us to collect the public statements building up to the FCIC hearings along with those that immediately followed the hearings in the next six months.

We collected public statements from two sources: (1) the transcripts of testimonies given by CEOs during the FCIC hearings and (2) quotes in the media from CEOs over the 18-month period. The detailed testimonies to the FCIC ranged from three to 16 pages and were obtained as transcribed text documents from the FCIC website. Six of the 11 CEOs in our Table 1 provided these testimonies and we included these in our data. For the media data, we conducted searches using the Factiva database on the 11 CEOs in Table 1 using their first and last name as keywords, looking for media articles that included quotes by the CEOs. This media data included major publications such as *The*

Table 1. Elite bankers during the financial crisis.

Bank CEOs and tenures	Bank	Key crisis event(s)	Current position
Richard Fuld (1994–15 May 2009)	Lehman Brothers	Bankruptcy (15 Sept. 2008)	No known public role
James Dimon (31 Dec. 2005–Present)	JPMorgan Chase & Co.	Acquired Bear Stearns (17 Mar. 2008)	CEO of JP Morgan Chase & Co.
James Cayne (1993–7 Jan. 2008)	Bear Stearns	Acquired by JPMorgan Chase & Co. (17 Mar. 2008)	No known public role
Alan Schwartz (8 Jan. 2008–Mar. 2008)			Executive Chairman of Guggenheim partners
Kenneth Lewis (2001–31 Dec. 2009)	Bank of America	Acquired Merrill Lynch (15 Sept. 2008)	Retired
John Thain (14 Nov. 2007–22 Jan. 2009)	Merrill Lynch	Acquired by Bank of America (15 Sept. 2008)	CEO of CIT Group
Lloyd Blankfein (31 May 2006–Present)	Goldman Sachs	Converted to deposit holding bank to accept government bailout (21 Sept. 2008)	CEO of Goldman Sachs
John Mack (30 June 2005–1 Jan. 2010)	Morgan Stanley	Converted to deposit holding bank to accept government bailout (21 Sept. 2008)	Senior Advisory at Morgan Stanley
Vikram Pandit (11 Dec. 2007–16 Oct. 2012)	Citigroup	Bailed out by government funds (24 Nov. 2008)	CEO of TGG group
Kerry Killinger (1990–8 Sept. 2008)	Washington Mutual	Declared Bankruptcy and acquired by JPMorgan Chase & Co. (25–26 Sept. 2008)	Principal of Crescent Capital Associates
John Stumpf (27 June 2007–Present)	Wells Fargo	Acquired Wachovia (11–12 Oct. 2008)	CEO of Wells Fargo

Sources: Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission and media reports.

Wall Street Journal, *Financial Times*, *The Economist* and *Fortune*. Overall, we found 116 relevant media articles. We read through the articles and identified 239 direct quotes by the CEOs, which were later reduced to 196 through omitting repetitions or irrelevant quotes. Our two sources of data taken together thus provided us with the necessary breadth and depth for our analysis.

Analytic process

We analyzed our data through a qualitative multi-step iterative process. We specifically focused on the rhetoric contained in the public statements, following the work by earlier scholars (e.g. Brown et al., 2012; Erkama and Vaara, 2010; Green et al., 2009; Suddaby

and Greenwood, 2005).⁷⁷ Examining rhetoric is of particular use in institutional analysis because rhetoric highlights the 'explicitly political or interest laden discourse' utilized by actors (Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005: 40). In addition, rhetoric highlights the 'social positions' of actors as they channel their appeals through texts (Lawrence and Suddaby, 2006: 240) and is useful for examining institutional work (Desai, 2011; Maguire and Hardy, 2009).

In our first step, we identified the rhetorical content and style of the statements by focusing on the most frequent themes in the data (Krippendorff, 2004), similar to rhetorical analyses in related work (e.g. Brown et al., 2012; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). For the rhetorical content, we followed a bottom-up process to categorize the data using an open coding approach (Gioia et al., 2013; Strauss and Corbin, 1998) rather than imposing top-down categories. We first read through each FCIC testimony and media quote, referring to the additional information in the media article to understand the information in the quote where needed. We marked the statements using keywords that identified patterns in the rhetoric. We then collated these statements into more abstract and logically connected categories by identifying thematic distinctions (Krippendorff, 2004: 107). As these thematic categories emerged, we validated them by comparing the categories to each other and considering their categorical fidelity employing the approach of axial coding (Gioia et al., 2013; Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Through this process, we ended up with four themes for rhetorical content that we interpreted as: assurance, care, failings and lack of care. 'Assurance' included statements in which the bank CEOs highlighted the positives of an actor either by referring to past/present attributes or future potential of that actor. 'Care' included quotes where bank CEOs claimed to be concerned about the interests of some actor and claimed to be serving them. 'Failings' consisted of statements in which the bank CEOs assigned blame towards some actor for what went wrong. And 'Lack of care' included quotes that questioned the motives of other actors during the crisis.¹⁴¹

To determine the rhetorical style, we followed prior studies in looking for rhetorical appeals of persuasion (pisteis) along the lines of the three classical appeals: logos (appeals to logic), ethos (appeals to character and broader societal norms) and pathos (appeals to emotion) (Brown et al., 2012; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). Through this analysis, we ended up with two dominant styles used in conjunction with each of the four categories of content that we interpreted as 'analytical' and 'normative' styles. Further, we coded each statement based on the *referent* of the rhetoric – that is, the actor that bankers refer to in the statement. We used a bottom-up approach that started with a long list of referents that we then aggregated to: the bankers themselves, bank, clients (of the bank), society, the market and the state. By bringing together the thematic categories in the rhetorical content and rhetorical style of persuasion with the referents, we were able to observe the rhetorical strategies employed by the elite bankers.¹⁴¹

Our second step took on a much more interpretive approach, in line with prior work in linguistic analysis (Moufahim et al., 2015; Phillips and Hardy, 2002). This involved extensive discussions among the authors as we iterated multiple times with theory, often going to several literatures in search of meaning and insights for our findings. At this stage, we paid attention to the context of the global financial crisis to search for deeper implications of the rhetorical strategies and this pushed us towards understanding the strategies in terms of their critical implications related to power, dominance and

authority in the context of the crisis. We were then able to interpret the rhetorical strategies to address the question ‘what’s going on here?’ theoretically (Gioia et al., 2013: 20) and transition from the inductive to abductive theoretical realm (Alvesson and Kärreman, 2007). Specifically, we observed that the rhetorical strategies were employed to either claim expertise or trustworthiness for elite bankers or to question expertise or trustworthiness of other referents. We accordingly interpreted these strategies in terms of their implications for strengthening the epistemic authority of elite bankers as presented in the next section. 141

Findings 93

We find that elite bankers employ four rhetorical strategies in response to the unfolding crisis. Due to the public nature of the statements, the strategies are targeted at audiences in the public domain; however, they differ in other respects. Two of the strategies we describe – *providing rational guarantees* and *expressing normative responsibilities* – are internally-directed strategies aimed at strengthening their own epistemic authority, while the other two rhetorical strategies – *critiquing judgments* and *questioning motives* – are externally-directed strategies that attempt to achieve the same by questioning the epistemic authority of other referents. Both the internal and external strategies make claims about expertise and trustworthiness, but use different referents and express opposing content. The strategies are distinct but interwoven and are often used in conjunction with each other to amplify the difference. In Figure 1, we outline the rhetorical strategies in terms of their content, style and referents, and show how these strategies work to strengthen epistemic authority. In Table 2, we provide definitions and examples from the data for each of the strategies. We now discuss each strategy in detail. 141

Providing rational guarantees 95

In this internally-directed rhetorical strategy, bankers provide rational guarantees to claim expertise for themselves. Specifically, they provided assurances about themselves and their bank using analytical appeals that connect means and ends in order to highlight their own knowledge and skillfulness. These appeals showed evidence and drew on ‘facts’ to argue for a means–ends relationship between the actions of the bankers and the solid position of the bank. This strategy was consistently observed from CEOs representing banks that had survived the crisis as well as those representing banks that had faced bankruptcy. For example, Richard Fuld – who headed Lehman Brothers for over 15 years before its infamous bankruptcy – admitted making mistakes, only to provide assurance about the bank’s position due to the actions taken by the team, thus claiming expertise: 107

In retrospect, there is no question we made some poorly timed business decisions and investments, but we addressed those mistakes and got ourselves back to a strong equity position with a Tier I capital ratio of 11%. We also had financeable collateral and solidly performing businesses. There is nothing about this profile that would indicate a bankrupt company. (FCIC testimony) 102




Figure 1. Framework of rhetorical strategies for strengthening epistemic authority. ¹⁹⁰

Fuld emphasized that the mistakes were addressed, resulting in a 'strong equity position', 'financeable collateral and solidly performing businesses'. In a similar fashion, Alan Schwartz, who ran Bear Stearns for only three months before it was acquired by JP Morgan Chase & Co., highlighted his and colleagues' expertise: ¹⁹¹

My colleagues at Bear Stearns were among the finest groups of people I have ever been associated with and I will always be proud to have been part of that organization. Throughout the period when I held these positions, Bear Stearns' management in my view attempted to manage the firm prudently to meet the difficult financial conditions as it foresaw them. (FCIC testimony) ¹⁹⁴

Schwartz assured the audience that the management team 'foresaw' the difficult conditions and 'prudently' managed the firm. During crisis years (2009), James Dimon of JPMorgan Chase & Co. described his bank, of which he had been CEO for about three years going into the crisis, rather evocatively in military terms to provide assurances that those in charge did a good job, and thus had the required expertise:

A key reason behind JPMorgan's reputation for solidity can be attributed to Dimon's obsession with capital and a 'fortress balance sheet,' a phrase he's been using for almost a decade. 'If you have the 82nd Airborne, you're able to go to war and handle battle,' he says, referring to the U.S. Army's most combat-ready military unit. (Media data)

He directly attributed their skilled actions to the positive outcomes for the bank:

Throughout the financial crisis, JPMorgan Chase never posted a quarterly loss . . . As a result of our steadfast focus on risk management and prudent lending, and our disciplined approach to capital and liquidity management, we were able to avoid the worst outcomes experienced by others in the industry. (FCIC testimony)

Table 2. Representative data for the rhetorical strategies to strengthen epistemic authority of bankers.

Dimensions and themes	Description	Representative quotes from the data
Internally-directed strategies		
Providing rational guarantees <i>Expertise</i>	Content: Provide assurance to highlight expertise Style: Analytical Referent: Bank and bankers	'Our capital ratios and liquidity pool remained high by historical standards . . . Subsequent events show that Bear Stearns' collapse was not the result of any actions or decisions unique to Bear Stearns . . . The efforts we made to strengthen the firm were reasonable and prudent.' Cayne, Bear Stearns [FCIC data] 'I feel really good about the progress we've made, about our financial strength, and about all the people at Citi who have worked extremely hard.' Pandit, Citigroup [Media data]
Expressing normative responsibilities <i>Trustworthiness</i>	Content: Project care for others Style: Normative Referent: Bank, clients and society	'our entire team – including the firm's credit officers, risk officers, and legal, finance, audit and compliance teams – worked diligently to address these issues and minimize the cost to our company and our customers . . . [JPMorgan Chase & Co.] served as a safe haven for depositors, worked closely with the federal government, and remained an active lender to consumers, small and large businesses, government entities and not-for-profit organizations.' Dimon, JPMorgan Chase [FCIC data] He [Blankfein] wants Goldman to 'be the leader in things like ethics, in putting clients first.' Mr. Blankfein added 'we don't want people to be OK with Goldman Sachs. We want people to be bragging that they have their accounts with Goldman Sachs.' Blankfein, Goldman Sachs [Media data]
Externally-directed strategies		
Critiquing judgments <i>Expertise</i>	Content: Place blame by highlighting failings Style: Analytical Referent: Market, state	'Lehman's demise was caused by uncontrollable market forces and the incorrect perception and accompanying rumors . . . All of this resulted in a loss of confidence, which then undermined the firm's strength and soundness. Those same forces threatened the stability of other banks – not just Lehman . . . unfounded rumors about Lehman continued to besiege the firm and erode confidence . . . This loss of confidence, although unjustified and irrational, became a self-fulfilling prophecy and culminated in a classic run on the bank.' Fuld, Lehman Brothers [FCIC data]

(Continued)

94

Table 2. (Continued)

Dimensions and themes	Description	Representative quotes from the data
Questioning motives Trustworthiness	Content: Highlight lack of care Style: Normative Referent: Market, state	<p>'as a result of these rumors, during the week of March 10, 2008, brokerage customers withdrew assets and counterparties refused to roll over repo facilities. These events resulted in a dramatic loss of liquidity. The market's loss of confidence, even though it was unjustified and irrational, became a self-fulfilling prophecy.' Cayne, Bear Stearns [Media data; longer excerpt in FCIC data]</p> <p>'The company was excluded from hundreds of meetings and telephone calls between Wall Street executives and policy leaders that ultimately determined the winners and losers in this financial crisis . . . I believe that Washington Mutual's seizure was unnecessary and the company should have been given a chance to work its way through the crisis.' Killinger, Washington Mutual [Media data]</p> <p>"In my heart I believe there was some stuff going on," he said. "Can I prove it? It's very hard to distinguish when a bunch of people are running out of a crowded theater, which one yelled, 'Fire'". Schwartz, Bear Stearns [Media data]</p>

Dimon argues that it was '[a]s a result of' their 'steadfast focus' and 'disciplined approach' that the bank could 'avoid the worst outcomes'. In each of these examples, the CEOs offered means-end logic, connecting actions of the management to the resulting positive position of the bank, ensuring that they possessed the necessary expertise to hold their elite positions in the field. 105

Expressing normative responsibilities 106

In this internally-directed rhetorical strategy, elite bankers express normative responsibilities to claim trustworthiness for themselves. Specifically, they express care for others by showing that their actions conformed to wider norms of responsibility to a broad set of stakeholders. These included the shareholders of their own bank, their clients including average household customers going through the lived experiences of using the bank's products and services, other firms with whom the bank had transactional relationships, and people across society who were being impacted by the financial crisis. Through this strategy, the bankers sought to establish their own credibility and reliability in serving these referents, thus claiming to be trustworthy. For example, James Dimon's assurance about the bank discussed above is complemented by describing how he and his team of

bankers served clients, to suggest that they could be relied upon to do the right things and were therefore trustworthy: 109

Throughout the financial crisis, we continued to support our clients' financing and liquidity needs. For example, we helped provide state and local governments financing to cover cash flow shortfalls . . . we helped our clients to optimize their working capital, manage their collateral and help mitigate their risk. JPMorgan Chase is also at the forefront in doing everything we can to help families meet their mortgage obligations . . . we enrolled 600,000 borrowers in payment plans – flexible plans that help borrowers who are experiencing economic challenges. (FCIC testimony) 111

Dimon emphasized that those at the bank worked 'to support our clients' and those 'experiencing economic challenges', also acknowledging that the stakeholders are not just clients, but 'families'. Similarly, John Mack explained how Morgan Stanley has helped its clients: 110

Morgan Stanley has helped its clients raise over \$940 billion in debt and equity to invest in their businesses since the beginning of the fourth quarter of 2008. In addition, Morgan Stanley – through its residential loan servicing subsidiary Saxon Mortgage Services, Inc. – has been an active participant in the Administration's Home Affordable Mortgage Program ('HAMP'). . . . Saxon leads all participating servicers in active trial modifications for eligible borrowers who are over 60 days delinquent . . . Saxon has partnered with HOPE NOW – a nationally known borrower counseling group – in an effort to communicate with borrowers and help address their individual needs. (FCIC testimony) 111

He pointed to the bank's 'active participation' in an affordable mortgage program, a partnership with a charitable counseling organization, and support for clients not able to meet their financial obligations, in order to show care for clients. Vikram Pandit expanded on this to explain Citigroup's responsibility to the financial wellbeing of society more broadly in order to underscore his claims for trustworthiness: 112/114

Mr Pandit still acknowledges 'a significant responsibility' on Citi's part to help be 'an integral part of the American recovery.' He cited Citi's efforts to help American homeowners and credit-card holders who are having trouble making their payments. (Media data) 113

This rhetorical strategy that projects care was often used in conjunction with providing rational guarantees, as is seen in John Thain's assurance about Merrill Lynch, which he headed for less than two years before negotiating an acquisition by Bank of America to survive the financial crisis:

'I have received thousands of e-mails saying, "Thank you for saving our company".' And yet [Thain] admitted that the decision to sell Merrill Lynch – a 94-year-old institution that was always 'bullish on America' – had been painful. 'This was a great job. This was a great franchise. Emotionally, it was a huge responsibility.' (Media data)

Thain's statement implied that he did well in his job of running and later 'saving' the 'great franchise', thereby constituting a claim of *expertise*; simultaneously he projected

care towards the bank's stakeholders, describing his role as a 'huge responsibility' and acknowledging the number of people who were grateful, thereby emphasizing his trustworthiness.

The pattern of projecting care towards clients and society is strongly highlighted in statements by Lloyd Blankfein of Goldman Sachs, which he led for two years going into the crisis. Though the bank survived the crisis through an overnight conversion to a deposit holding bank that could receive a government bailout, it faced a lot of public scrutiny. In a specific example of projecting care, Blankfein explained Goldman Sachs' 'social purpose':

We're very important. We help companies to grow by helping them to raise capital. Companies that grow create wealth. This, in turn, allows people to have jobs that create more growth and more wealth. It's a virtuous cycle . . . We have a social purpose. (Media data)

Blankfein argued that 'we help companies', which creates 'wealth' that in turn leads to 'jobs', in order to suggest that bankers could be relied upon to fulfill their social purpose and are therefore *trustworthy*. Overall, the claims of expertise and trustworthiness in these two internally-directed rhetorical strategies attempt to strengthen the perception that elite bankers have the knowledge and skills on the unfolding issues related to the financial crisis and that they can be trusted and relied upon by others on these issues. 116

Critiquing judgments¹¹⁵

In contrast to the first two strategies described above, which aim to directly strengthen epistemic authority by making personal claims pertaining to expertise and trustworthiness, elite bankers also employed externally-directed strategies to strengthen their own epistemic authority by critiquing the expertise and trustworthiness of others. In this first external strategy, elite bankers place blame on the failings of others using analytical appeals that connect means and ends to question the knowledge and skill of key market players and forces, along with regulators. Through the statements made as part of this rhetorical strategy, the bankers sought to place the market or state in a position where the referent's expertise became suspect. The questioning of these referents by the bankers suggests it is elite bankers alone who have the required knowledge and skills on the key issues related to the financial crisis, thus implicitly strengthening their own claims to expertise. 116

This strategy is often placed in juxtaposition to the internal strategies, in long statements where the claims for elite bankers are interspersed with their critiquing of others. 134 There were many references that place blame on the 'market' by questioning its ability to manage the situation, in contrast to the elite bankers' efforts at serving the bank along with caring for their clients and society. The testimony by John Mack of Morgan Stanley showed this interspersion of strategies. Mack headed the bank for over four years and made it the second bank to convert to a deposit holding company overnight in order to access government bailout funds during the crisis. In this statement, he claimed expertise through Morgan Stanley's superior position, while critiquing the expertise of the market. 120

Morgan Stanley was in a better position than many of our peers to weather the financial storm . . . the global financial markets plunged into an acute and severe crisis of confidence . . . Morgan Stanley and similar institutions experienced a classic 'run on the bank,' as investors lost confidence in financial institutions and the entire investment banking business model came under siege . . . This period was marked by rampant – often untrue – rumors and speculation. (FCIC testimony) 119

Similarly, he projected care towards the clients in order to claim trustworthiness, while simultaneously critiquing the judgment of the market: 120

[T]he entire Morgan Stanley leadership team worked nonstop over the course of the following week to provide information to clients, the markets, and our employees in order to dispel the false rumors that were spreading through the financial markets and to provide investors with an informed basis to make investment decisions. (FCIC testimony) 119

Overall, Mack critiqued the market's irrational and uncontrollable bases for decision making, characterizing it as a 'financial storm' that involves 'rumors and speculation' and operates on 'false rumors'. The metaphor of 'storm' that draws comparisons to natural disasters, and more generally the critique of market forces as the 'collective other', attempts to highlight the imposed constraints within which bankers tried to do their best. A similar interspersed of strategies is evident in James Cayne's statements regarding Bear Stearns, which only survived the financial crisis through an acquisition by JPMorgan Chase & Co. Cayne, who headed Bear Stearns for over 15 years before its bankruptcy, 121 provided assurances about the bank to claim expertise; simultaneously and serving as a point of contrast, the market is blamed for its incorrect judgments thereby questioning its expertise: 124

[T]hese developments gave rise to market uncertainty about the firm. We believed that this concern was unjustified and that the firm had ample capital and liquidity. Nevertheless, we worked aggressively to address the market's concerns . . . These concerns were unfounded . . . Only a few months after Bear Stearns collapsed, the same market forces caused the collapse and near collapse of much larger institutions . . . The efforts we made to strengthen the firm were reasonable and prudent. (FCIC testimony) 123

The bankers handled the situation, 'worked aggressively to address concerns' with efforts that 'were reasonable and prudent'. Yet the market's 'concerns were unjustified' and 'unfounded' 125 Cayne's successor, Alan Schwartz, who headed Bear Stearns for just three months leading up to its bankruptcy and takeover, did not depart from this line of rhetoric: 122

[U]nfounded rumors and attendant speculation began circulating that Bear Stearns was in the midst of a liquidity crisis. Due to the stressed condition of the credit market as a whole and the unprecedented speed at which rumors and speculation travel and echo through the modern financial media environment, the rumors and speculation continued throughout the week. The rumors thus became a self-fulfilling prophecy: there was, simply put, a run on the bank. (FCIC testimony) 123

Again, he described market decisions as 'speculation', based on 'rumors' from the 'modern financial media environment', which are presented as the cause of a 'self-fulfilling prophecy'. 124

Beyond denouncing the failings of the market, elite bankers denounced the failings of the state, questioning its expertise and assuming the role of an expert who knows better and needs to tell the state what has to be done. 124 For example, John Mack of Morgan Stanley projected blame on the state to question its expertise:

From a policy perspective, it [financial crisis] made clear that regulators simply didn't have the tools or the authority to protect the stability of the financial system as a whole . . . we need a systemic risk regulator with the ability and responsibility to ensure that excessive risk-taking never again jeopardizes the entire financial system. We cannot and should not take risk out of the system – that's what drives the engine of our capitalist economy. But no firm should be considered 'too big to fail.' If a firm mismanages its risks, regulators need the authority to unwind it in a way that minimizes instability to the system. It is also clear that the complexity of financial markets – and financial products – has exploded in recent years, but regulation and oversight have not kept pace. (FCIC testimony) 123

The regulators lack of 'tools', 'authority' and 'oversight' were mentioned as the cause of the financial crisis. At no point does Mack attempt to directly defend the practices used by the banks that led to the crisis; however, neither does he acknowledge their failings. Instead, he diffuses blame by questioning the expertise of those in the role of oversight. Similarly, James Dimon of JPMorgan Chase & Co., whose bank acquired the bankrupt Bear Stearns, blamed the state while implicitly taking on the role of someone who knows exactly what was wrong. He acknowledged the 'failure of large, global financial companies' without defending the practices that led to their collapse, and instead firmly criticizes the failings of the regulatory system: 124

The current regulatory system is poorly organized with overlapping responsibilities, and many regulators did not have the statutory resolution authority needed to address the failure of large, global financial companies . . . Extraordinary growth and high leverage of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were allowed where the fundamental premise of their credit was implicit support by the U.S. government. The abundance of pro-cyclical policies has proven harmful in times of economic distress. (FCIC testimony) 123

By arguing that the regulatory system is 'poorly organized', with 'pro-cyclical policies' that have 'proven harmful', without the necessary 'authority needed to address the failure', Dimon critiques the expertise of the state. Together, the CEOs juxtapose their own expertise and care with the failings of other key actors in the crisis. 124

Questioning motives 125

In the second externally-directed strategy, elite bankers denounce the motives of others using appeals to normative responsibilities to question the trustworthiness of market players, regulators and policy makers. The questioning of these referents by the bankers implicitly strengthens their own claims to trustworthiness. 126 It thus forms another externally-directed strategy that questions the motives of others to suggest that it is elite

bankers alone who can be trusted and relied upon. For example, Richard Fuld, CEO of Lehman Brothers, refers to the report of the state bankruptcy court in this manner: 128

The examiner's report distorted the relevant facts, and the press, in turn, distorted the examiner's report. The result is that Lehman and its people have been unfairly vilified. (Media data) 129

He clearly accuses the state examiner because it 'distorted' facts that led to his bank being 'unfairly vilified'; in another place he also suggests that proper feedback was withheld from him by regulators who performed stress tests preceding the bank's collapse: 'not once did I hear any feedback that led me to believe that we were deficient' (media data). While defending his own bank, these remarks also emphasize that state actors displayed a lack of care and fell short of their normative responsibilities, thus raising questions about their trustworthiness. 130

Similarly, Kerry Killinger, CEO of Washington Mutual, clearly denounced the motives of what he called the 'inner circle' in saving itself, implying a lack of trustworthiness: 131

For those that were part of the inner circle and were 'too clubby to fail', the benefits were obvious. For those outside of the club, the penalty was severe. (Media data) 132

And:

I also believe it was unfair that Washington Mutual was not given the benefits extended to and actions taken on behalf of other financial services companies within days of Washington Mutual's seizure. (Media data) 132

Killinger declared that the favoritism was 'unfair', ending in the seizure of Washington Mutual, thus questioning the motives of decision makers. Alan Schwartz of Bear Stearns specifically blamed the downfall of the firm on the profit motive underlying the actions of others: 'I think there was activity that was motivated by [a] profit motive to start rumors' (media data). His predecessor, Jimmy Cayne, also blamed market rumors, short sellers and hedge funds that 'ganged up' for precipitating the bank's demise in 2008, saying that his company was like a 'big fat goose' waiting to be 'eaten up alive' by its enemies' (media data). Dimon, of JPMorgan Chase & Co. similarly denounced the motives of investors, while also implicating the failings of the system: 133

Investors caused enormous flows out of the banking and credit system as they collectively acted in their own self-interest. In many instances, stronger regulation may have been able to prevent some of the problems . . . it is important to examine how the system could have functioned better. (FCIC testimony) 132

In summary, while these prominent banks went through somewhat different events during the crisis – either facing bankruptcy and surviving through acquisition, acquiring another bank as part of restructuring often aided by state support, or changing to deposit holding banks to accept government bailouts – their CEOs displayed remarkable consistency in using the four rhetorical strategies. As shown in Figure 1, the two

internally-directed strategies, providing rational guarantees and expressing normative responsibilities, directly claim expertise and trustworthiness for the bankers themselves; and the two externally-directed strategies, critiquing judgments and questioning motives, problematize these same qualities in other referents (the market and state) who may have posed a threat to them during the wider instability and public scrutiny accompanying the crisis, thus indirectly strengthening their claims to expertise and trustworthiness. 134

Discussion 135

In this article we sought to understand how elite actors use rhetoric to perform defensive institutional work following a field-wide crisis. Our findings suggest that elite actors use persuasive language to rhetorically strengthen their own authority in an organizational field by making claims about expertise and trustworthiness. Interpreting these attempts in light of the theoretical literature, we argue that these strategies amount to an overall strategy of strengthening the 'epistemic authority' of elite bankers, which has been described in the social psychology literature as closely related to expertise and trustworthiness (Kruglanski et al., 2009). Our study reveals the specific rhetorical strategies used to build this epistemic authority as a form of defensive work following a field-wide crisis. 135

In our study, elite actors rhetorically constructed opposing depictions of self and others in order to maintain their dominant positions using a specific type of the rhetorical strategy, 'paired oppositions' (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Sillince and Brown, 2009). Research has similarly drawn attention to the rhetorical strategies used in the opposing creation of heroes and villains to explain crises and failures (Hartz and Steger, 2010; Ruebottom, 2013; Whittle et al., 2009; Zilber, 2007). Here, elite bankers rhetorically constructed themselves as important actors in the field due to their expertise in managing their organizations in a complex system and their trustworthiness in terms of caring for multiple stakeholders, while rendering the now illegitimate practices they engaged in to the background of the conversation. These actors critiqued the failings and questioned the motives of the state and market, constructing these others as 'villains'. This juxtaposition of rhetoric about self and others emphasized the opposing attributions of praise and blame. The actors didn't try to directly absolve themselves of blame (i.e. this wasn't our fault). Instead, they indirectly aimed to create such an impression, claiming the fault was that of others. The opposition of expertise/trustworthiness and lack of expertise/untrustworthiness increased the difference between actor categories in the contest for power and authority that took place following the field-wide crisis; thus the elite actors aimed to rhetorically reproduce the existing configuration of power and authority in the field (Brown et al., 2012; Foucault, 1979; Zanon and Janssens, 2004), even while key practices were deemed illegitimate and indefensible. 134

The importance of this defensive work can be understood through reflection on the nature of the crisis. In the contestation over versions of truth in such a crisis, the judgments of major social actors become contested as there is a struggle over authority (Lefsrud and Meyer, 2012; Watson, 1995). In particular, such a crisis involves increased public scrutiny (Desai, 2011) and raises questions on what role the state or the market should have vis-a-vis the industry (e.g. Admati and Hellwig, 2013; Crotty, 2009; Davis, 2009; Kotz, 2009; Marti and Scherer, 2015). However, due to the high complexity of

issues related to the financial crisis, most stakeholders must rely on those who are seen as having the expertise and trustworthiness to elucidate the issues (Rosenhek, 2013). Thus, making claims to having such expertise and trustworthiness to strengthen their high level of epistemic authority would confer several advantages to elite actors. They would command priority in terms of being a more trusted source of information, having their information processed more extensively, and being more likely to generate action by others based on their information (Kruglanski, 1989; Kruglanski et al., 2005, 2009). Specifically, preserving their dominant position of higher epistemic authority would enable elite bankers to defend the status quo and their own interests from both market forces and state control. The bankers' higher epistemic authority would allow them to negate the market when it turns against their interests and subvert its potential to punish excessive risks and inefficient decisions. Similarly, it would allow them to reduce the power of the state to regulate their industry by questioning the state from their position as expert bankers and also taking on expert positions in state regulatory bodies by drawing on their established authority – a problem currently known as the 'revolving door' between financial industry and state regulatory bodies (e.g. Levitin, 2014). In sum, the claims made by elite bankers through the rhetorical strategies would help them preserve their dominant positions in the field and defend the existing institutional framework from threats emanating from the crisis. ¹⁴³

Our study contributes to research on institutional maintenance by addressing how elite actors perform defensive institutional work following a field-wide crisis. In contrast to existing research that emphasizes the importance of defending or repairing the legitimacy of existing practices following a disruption (Maguire and Hardy, 2009; Micelotta and Washington, 2013; Zietsma and Lawrence, 2010), the field-wide crisis led incumbent actors to protect and reinforce their own position in an organizational field. This insight redirects research on defensive institutional work from the preservation of institutionalized practices to the preservation of field positions. ¹⁴⁵ Specifically, our study suggests that preserving dominant positions in a field may be a useful way for incumbents to preserve the underlying power relations in an organizational field and shape its ultimate future direction (Maguire et al., 2004). Indeed, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, elite bankers were effectively able to preserve their position in the field and have continued to play a role in shaping the post-crisis institutional environment (Levitin, 2014).

A number of studies have suggested that the position of an actor in a field influences their ability to shape institutions in the field (Maguire et al., 2004) and deviate from the status quo (Battilana, 2006). Yet, existing conceptions of field position tend to be simplistic – only creating a broad distinction between 'central' and 'peripheral' actors (Greenwood and Suddaby, 2006; Leblebici et al., 1991; Maguire and Hardy, 2009). Outside of studies that argue that legitimacy is a central contributor to field position (Maguire et al., 2004), other factors that may contribute to field position are largely unknown. Our study contributes to this line of inquiry by showing the importance of epistemic authority for the field position of actors. In the field that we studied, epistemic authority serves as the capital that underlies an actor's position in the field. Epistemic authority is related to knowledge, judgment and credibility of decisions; it is thus more tacit than other forms of authority and

contestations over it are likely more 'sacred' as it can underlie the distribution of other overt forms of authority. The efforts to strengthen epistemic authority therefore echo Bourdieu's arguments on the importance of symbolic capital in a field (Bourdieu, 1989; Emirbayer and Johnson, 2008) and point to epistemic authority as the ultimate 'token of status' in this field (Schinkel and Noordegraaf, 2011: 78). As stated by Bourdieu, 'the power to impose upon other minds a vision, old or new, of social divisions depends on the social authority acquired in previous struggles' (Bourdieu, 1989: 23). In a Bourdieusian sense, the struggle for epistemic authority is therefore a fundamental struggle for determining long-term outcomes at the macro socio-economic level. For elite actors, it is therefore essential to safeguard their epistemic authority during the current struggles in order to make future use of this authority. Our study thus highlights that, following a field-wide crisis where the legitimacy of practices may be beyond repair, the defensive institutional work by elite actors may be directed towards preserving dominant positions (of authority, status or power) in the field, as opposed to preserving the legitimacy of practices. 144

By articulating how the rhetorical strategies were used to build epistemic authority, we highlight the important role of rhetoric in processes of field domination, addressing calls for research that takes into account 'the complex interplay of change, continuity, social context, politics and history as well as the broader ethical implications' (Moufahim et al., 2015: 105). As such, a second contribution of our study is the identification of the rhetorical strategies used to build the epistemic authority that protects field positions. It has been argued that the rhetoric of elite actors seeks to 'manipulate public opinion' (Sillince and Brown, 2009: 1846) and hegemonically impose a particular version of the truth (Zanoni and Janssens, 2004) in order to bolster themselves and the institutional arrangements that provide their status and power. For elite bankers in the aftermath of the financial crisis, there is a recursive process of field domination at play. It was the elite status and authority underpinning the symbolic capital possessed by these bankers that ensured they were granted voice (Bourdieu, 1989; Hardy et al., 2000) to create and share their rhetorical reconstruction of the events in the crisis. And it was through their rhetorical reconstructions that they escaped censure and avoided structural changes to the industry that could reduce their power, thereby ensuring that the elite bankers maintained their symbolic capital within the field.

The rhetoric employed also shows an interesting interplay between what we call internally-directed and externally-directed strategies. Though the rhetoric of both of these strategies was directed at persuading others, the ultimate outcome of strengthening the self-group's epistemic authority was sought through a juxtaposition of symmetrical, yet opposing arguments of expertise and trustworthiness for self and others: specifically, highlighting the extent of expertise/trustworthiness of the bankers (internally-directed) and the simultaneous lack of expertise/trustworthiness of others (externally-directed). While most institutional research has focused on the rhetorical legitimization of practices as opposed to actors, a small body of research has also acknowledged the importance of rhetorically portraying institutional actors as credible and expert (Brown et al., 2012; Lefsrud and Meyer, 2012). We extend this research by uncovering the rival conceptions of self and others within the rhetoric of an elite group,

similar to the paired opposition of effectiveness-ineffectiveness found in the rhetoric of police websites (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969; Sillince and Brown, 2009). In the contestation following the financial crisis, the elite bankers did not just portray their own expertise, but also their trustworthiness, and this was constructed in contrast to the non-expertise and non-trustworthiness of others. Defending positions therefore involved the use of rhetoric that simultaneously constructed field-relevant qualities in self while negating these same qualities in others, thereby constructing the epistemic authority of the focal actors. 434

Further, our findings suggest that certain styles of argumentation may be less viable in some situations. In our study, rhetoric relied heavily on the 'analytical' (logos) and 'normative' (ethos) rhetorical styles. However, we rarely observed pathos-style emotional appeals. While recent work has found that pathos is an important part of rhetoric (Brown et al., 2012; Erkama and Vaara, 2010; Sillince and Brown, 2009), there is a conspicuous lack of pathos in the rhetoric of elite bankers. This is likely because the very actors who caused the suffering of a large number of people could not directly address the emotional impact of the crisis without facing an unforgiving negative reaction from the audience, which would be too great a 'social risk' (Harmon et al., 2015: 78). Instead, creating a perception of logic and responsibility was a more viable and less risky option for these elite actors, setting the boundaries on their strategies for building epistemic authority. Our research therefore indicates that certain rhetorical strategies may not be available for all actors in a field to use at all times.

Finally, our study has important implications for the role of elites in contemporary socio-economic systems. Our exploration of elite efforts towards preserving their dominant positions reveals both how contemporary 'command posts' are constructed and to what end they are employed (Reed, 2012; Zald and Lounsbury, 2010). Prior studies have argued that occupational and professional elites attempt to construct macro-level 'rule systems' that ultimately benefit them by 'consolidating their power and legitimacy as the exclusive interpreters of the new rules' (Suddaby and Viale, 2011: 432). Our study provides an example of how elites strengthened their position in these command posts as a way to continue having influence over the institutional system, providing the more critical reading of institutional processes that has been called for by several institutional theorists (Cooper et al., 2008; Khan et al., 2007; Willmott, 2011). The construction of these command posts through strengthening the self's epistemic authority is likely related to deeper problems in the financial industry and its strained relationship with society. The self-ascribing of epistemic authority by elites as a form of defensive institutional work would reduce their motivation for seeking information from other stakeholders and lead to a closure of their own knowledge-formation process (Kruglanski et al., 2005, 2009). Under such closure, elite perspectives turn blind to the actual needs of societal stakeholders and result in a self-seeking and entitlement culture that is inherently hard to change (e.g. Admati and Hellwig, 2013; Ho, 2009; Levitin, 2014; Riaz, 2015). The societal dominance of such self-seeking elites through unchallenged authority leads to the accumulation of excessive rents by redistributing rewards from the economy in their own favor, furthering the persistence of dysfunctional socio-economic systems (Piketty, 2014; Stiglitz, 2012).

Conclusion

Our study shows that one of the major reasons for the lack of change in the financial industry could be the continuing dominance of elite bankers in the field through their strengthened epistemic authority. Maintaining their position enables them to have more say than others on issues related to the financial industry and its role in the economy and society. Though our study focused on the financial industry, the general argument goes beyond this to other contexts where institutional change may be difficult due to dominant positions established by elite actors. Until the nature of these positions and the efforts by elites towards preserving them are recognized, achieving major institutional change will continue to be difficult, as borne out during the years after the financial crisis. Our study uncovered details of how elites rhetorically strengthened their dominant positions of higher epistemic authority in the field as a form of defensive institutional work during the financial crisis. We thereby unravel a conceptual puzzle regarding the continued dominance of elites and highlight a direction for overcoming such dominance that may be crucial for changing contemporary dysfunctional socio-economic systems.

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Suhaib Riaz is Assistant Professor of Strategic Management at the University of Massachusetts, Boston, USA. His research interests are in exploring organizational and institutional issues related to financialization, debt practices and socio-economic inequality. He also has an interest in innovation around alternative organizing forms under institutional constraints. His work has been published in *Human Relations*, *Organization*, *Critical Perspectives on International Business*, *Journal of World Business* and *The Leadership Quarterly*. [Email: suhaib.riaz@umb.edu]

Sean Buchanan is Assistant Professor of Business Administration at the Asper School of Business, University of Manitoba, Canada. His research examines the relationships among actors, institutions and social and environmental issues. He is currently studying the dynamics of change and stability in organizational fields defined by contested issues. His research has been published in *Organization*, *Non-Profit Quarterly* and *Academy of Management Best Paper Proceedings*. [Email: sean.buchanan2@umanitoba.ca]

Trish Ruebottom is Assistant Professor of Strategic Management at the Goodman School of Management, Brock University, Canada. Her research interests lie at the intersection of social innovation and language, specifically exploring the rhetorical strategies and stories told in order to create social change. Her work has been published in *Journal of Business Venturing*, *Journal of Business Ethics*, *MIT/Sloan Management Review* and *Social Enterprise Journal*. [Email: truebottom@brocku.ca]